area handbook series 

Turkey 

a country study 



Turkey 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
January 1995 



On the cover: Yeni Mosque, Istanbul, one of Turkey's 
famous mosques 



Fifth Edition, First Printing, 1996. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Turkey : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 5th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam ; 550-80) 

"Supersedes the 1988 edition of Turkey : a country 
study, edited by Paul M. Pitman, III." — T.p. verso. 

"Research completed January 1995." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 399-423) and 
index. 

ISBN 0-8444-0864-6 (alk. paper) 

Z663.275 .T87 1996 

1. Turkey. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library 
of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. 
Series: DA Pam ; 550-80 
DR417.T874 1996 95-49612 
956.1— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-80 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisci- 
plinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a 
basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a 
dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is 
devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, 
dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the 
issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their 
involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes 
toward each other and toward their social system and political 
order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-4840 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the 
writers of the 1988 edition of Turkey: A Country Study, edited by 
Paul M. Pitman III. Their work provided general background 
for the present volume. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various govern- 
ment agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, 
research materials, and expertise in the production of this 
book. These individuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who over- 
sees the Country Studies/Area Handbook program for the 
Department of the Army. The authors also wish to thank mem- 
bers of the Federal Research Division staff who contributed 
directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These people 
include Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all drafts, served as 
liaison with the sponsoring agency, and managed book produc- 
tion; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing; Andrea T. Mer- 
rill, who edited tables and figures; Lauren Morris, who assisted 
with bibliographic research; Barbara Edgerton and Izella Wat- 
son, who did word processing; David P. Cabitto, Stephen C. 
Cranton, Janie L. Gilchrist, and Izella Watson, who prepared 
the camera-ready copy; and Rita M. Byrnes, who assisted with 
proofreading. 

Also involved in preparing the text were Vincent Ercolano, 
who edited chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed 
the prepublication editorial review; and Joan C. Cook, who 
compiled the index. 

Graphics were prepared by David P. Cabitto. David P. Cabitto 
and the firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared the final 
maps. Special thanks are owed to Hermine Dreyfuss, whose 
photographs form the basis for the illustrations prepared by 
Wayne Home that appear on the title page of each chapter and 
the cover art. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the Turk- 
ish Information Office in Washington and the other govern- 
ment and private bodies and individuals who allowed their 
photographs to be used in this study. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xv 

Introduction xxv 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Steven A. Glazer 

ANCIENT ANATOLIA 6 

Hittites 6 

Phrygians and Lydians 7 

Armenians and Kurds 9 

Greeks 9 

ROME AND THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE 10 

TURKISH ORIGINS 11 

Great Seljuks 13 

Sultanate of Rum 14 

The Crusades 15 

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 17 

Ottoman Institutions 19 

Selim I and Siileyman the Magnificent 20 

Kopriilu Era 22 

External Threats and Internal Transformations .... 23 

The Young Turks 27 

World War I 28 

ATATURK AND THE TURKISH NATION 31 

Plans for Partitioning Turkey 32 

Nationalist Movement 33 

War of Independence 34 

Ataturk's Reforms 36 

Foreign Policy 39 

TURKEY AFTER ATATURK 39 

vii 



World War II 40 

Multiparty Politics, 1946-60 40 

The Armed Forces Coup and Interim 

Rule, 1960-61 42 

Politics and Foreign Relations in the 1960s 44 

CRISIS IN TURKISH DEMOCRACY 48 

Politics and Elections in the 1970s 49 

Conflict and Diplomacy: Cyprus and Beyond 53 

The Economy: An Unresolved Issue 56 

Challenges to Public Order 59 

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE RETURN 

TO CIVILIAN RULE 60 

Military Interlude 60 

Politics and the Return to Civilian Rule 62 

Economic Stabilization and Prospects for 

the 1990s 68 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 71 

Eric Hooglund 

GEOGRAPHY 75 

External Boundaries 76 

Geology 77 

Landform Regions 78 

Climate 84 

POPULATION 86 

Population Density, Distribution, and 

Settlement 87 

Migration 88 

Government Population Policies 90 

LANGUAGE REFORM: FROM OTTOMAN TO 

TURKISH 92 

LINGUISTIC AND ETHNIC GROUPS 95 

Turks 96 

Kurds 98 

Arabs 101 

Peoples from the Caucasus 102 

Donme 102 

Greeks 103 

Armenians 103 

Jews 104 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 105 



viii 



Islam 106 

Secularist Policies 116 

Retreat from Secularism 117 

Non-Muslim Minorities 120 

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 123 

The Changing National Elite 124 

Urban Life 125 

Towns 128 

Village Life 128 

THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY, AND GENDER 

RELATIONS 132 

Marriage 133 

The Extended Family 135 

Gender Relations 137 

The Status of Women 138 

EDUCATION 139 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 143 

Chapter 3. The Economy 147 

Fareed Mohamedi 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 152 

Economic Development 152 

Reforms under Ozal 154 

Economic Performance in the Early 1990s 156 

Structure of the Economy 159 

HUMAN RESOURCES AND TRADE UNIONS 159 

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMY 167 

Liberal Interlude 167 

Etatism 168 

State Economic Enterprises and Privatization 169 

Development Planning 172 

Budget 173 

AGRICULTURE 175 

Agricultural Policy 178 

Irrigation 180 

Land Use 182 

Land Tenure 184 

Cropping Patterns and Production 187 

Livestock 191 

Forestry and Fisheries 193 

INDUSTRY 194 

ix 



Industrial Policy 196 

Energy 197 

Mineral Resources 204 

Manufacturing 205 

Construction 209 

SERVICES ..... 210 

Banking and Finance 210 

Transportation and Telecommunications 214 

Tourism 219 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 220 

Foreign Trade 220 

Balance of Payments 223 

Regional Economic Integration 226 

OUTLOOK 229 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 231 

Eric Hooglund 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 236 

Provisions of the 1982 Constitution 237 

Electoral System 240 

GOVERNMENT . .. 241 

National Assembly 241 

President, Council of Ministers, and Prime 

Minister 244 

Judiciary 248 

Provincial and Local Government . 250 

Civil Service 252 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 254 

Political Developments since the 1980 Coup 254 

Political Parties 262 

Political Interest Groups 270 

MASS MEDIA 283 

Newspapers and Periodicals 284 

Radio and Television 284 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 285 

Dissolution of the Soviet Union 286 

The Middle East , 290 

European Union 295 

The United States 298 



x 



Chapter 5. National Security 303 

Jean K Tartter 

HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES 307 

THE ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 309 

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY 310 

EXTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS 312 

Middle Eastern Conflicts 314 

Syria 316 

Iran 316 

The Balkans 317 

Greece and Cyprus 318 

TURKEYS PARTICIPATION IN NATO 319 

ARMED FORCES 321 

Defense Spending 325 

Sources and Quality of Personnel 327 

Education and Training 330 

Conditions of Service 333 

Army 335 

Air Force 339 

Navy 341 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 345 

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED 

STATES 348 

DOMESTIC ARMS INDUSTRY 351 

INTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS 354 

Kurdish Separatists 355 

Terrorism of the Left 357 

Armenian Terrorism 358 

Islamists 359 

POLICE SYSTEM 360 

National Police 361 

Gendarmerie 362 

Intelligence Services 365 

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 366 

Procedures in Criminal Law 367 

Incidence of Crime 369 

Narcotics Trafficking 370 

Individual Rights 371 

Penal System 373 

Appendix A. Tables 377 

xi 



Appendix B. Selected Political Parties and 

Labor Organizations 395 

Bibliography 399 

Glossary 425 

Index 431 

Contributors 455 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Turkey, 1995 xxii 

2 Anatolia in Antiquity, First Century B.C 8 

3 Distribution of the Turkish Peoples: Migrations 

and Conquests, Seventh Through Eleventh 

Centuries 12 

4 Anatolia in the Thirteenth Century 16 

5 Expansion of the Ottoman Empire, 1324-1683 18 

6 Decline of the Ottoman Empire from the 

Treaty of Karlowitz, 1699, to the Treaty 

of Lausanne, 1923 24 

7 Topography and Drainage 80 

8 Structure of the Gross Domestic Product 

(GDP), 1985 and 1993 160 

9 Major Crop Areas and Land Use, 1995 188 

10 Selected Industries and Minerals, 1995 200 

1 1 Transportation System and Crude Oil 

Pipeline, 1995 216 

12 Government Structure, 1995 246 

13 Provincial Elections, 1989 and 1994 260 

14 Organization of the National Security 

Establishment, 1995 324 

15 Disposition of Major Units of the Turkish 

Armed Forces and Major Military Instal- 
lations Used by the United States, 1995 338 

16 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1995 346 

17 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1995 347 



xii 



Preface 



This edition of Turkey: A Country Study replaces the previous 
edition published in 1988. Like its predecessor, the present 
book attempts to treat in a compact and objective manner the 
dominant historical, social, economic, political, and national 
security aspects of contemporary Turkey. Sources of informa- 
tion included scholarly books, journals, and monographs; offi- 
cial reports and documents of governments and international 
organizations; and foreign and domestic newspapers and peri- 
odicals. Relatively up-to-date economic data were available 
from several sources, but the sources were not always in agree- 
ment. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief 
comments on some of the more valuable sources for further 
reading appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measure- 
ments are given in the metric system; a conversion table is pro- 
vided to assist those who are unfamiliar with the metric system 
(see table 1, Appendix A) . Appendix B is a list of selected polit- 
ical parties and labor organizations, with their acronyms. The 
Glossary provides brief definitions of terms that may be unfa- 
miliar to the general reader. 

The authors have attempted to follow standard Turkish 
spelling of Turkish words, phrases, and place-names. The prin- 
cipal guide used was The Concise Oxford Turkish Dictionary (1971 
edition). The place-names used are those established by the 
United States Board on Geographic Names as of September 
1984. A few exceptions were made for well-known geographical 
features. For example, the study uses Bosporus and Dar- 
danelles instead of Istanbul Bogazi and Qanakkale Bogazi. In 
addition, although Mustafa Kemal did not become Kemal 
Atatiirk until the Law of Surnames was enacted in 1934, he is 
referred to throughout as Atatiirk. However, the Turkish 
names appearing in the text of this volume are missing most of 
the diacritics used by the language. In this case, it is a matter of 
lagging technology: the typesetting software being used simply 
cannot produce all of the necessary diacritics in the text 
(although they appear on the maps). For this the authors apol- 
ogize and hope that by the time this country study is updated, 
missing diacritics will no longer be the norm. 



xiii 



The body of the text reflects information available as of Jan- 
uary 1995. Certain other portions of the text, however, have 
been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events 
that have occurred since the completion of research, and the 
Country Profile and Appendix B include updated information 
as available. 



xiv 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Turkey. 
Short Form: Turkey. 
Term for Citizens: Turk(s). 
Capital: Ankara. 

Geography 

Size: About 779,452 square kilometers, somewhat smaller than 
Texas and Louisiana combined. 



xv 



Topography: Seven natural regions — Black Sea, Aegean, 
Mediterranean, Pontus and Taurus mountain ranges, 
Anatolian Plateau, eastern highlands, and Arabian Platform. 
Country includes one of the most earthquake-prone areas of 
the world. 

Climate: Periphery of Turkey has Mediterranean climate with 
cool, rainy winters and hot, moderately dry summers. Interior, 
shielded from Mediterranean influences by mountains, has 
continental climate with cold winters and dry, hot summers. 
Eastern mountainous area has inhospitable climate, with hot, 
extremely dry summers and bitter winters. Rainfall varies, 
ranging from annual average of more than 2,500 millimeters 
on eastern Black Sea coast to less than 250 millimeters in 
central plateau area. 

Society 

Population: (1994) Turkish government figure 61.2 million, 
growing at 2.1 percent a year. 

Languages and Ethnic Groups: Turkish, official language, 
spoken by most citizens; mother tongue of about 82 percent. 
Kurdish spoken by roughly 17 percent of population. Arabic 
and Caucasian languages spoken by small minority groups. 
Turks constitute at least 80 percent of population; Kurds form 
at least 10 percent. Other minorities include Arabs, people 
from Caucasus countries, Donme, Greeks, and Jews. 

Religion: About 99 percent nominally Muslim, of whom about 
66 percent Sunni Muslims, and about 33 percent Alevi (Shia) 
Muslims. Constitution proclaims Turkey secular nation. 

Education: Steadily increasing enrollments in tuition-free 
schools, universities, and numerous technical institutes. 
Attendance compulsory at five-year primary schools and three- 
year middle schools. Middle and high schools offer academic, 
technical, and vocational education. Twenty-seven public 
universities form core of higher education system. In 1990 
literacy above 81 percent for people over fifteen years of age. 

Health: Inadequate sewer systems in some urban areas and 
poor water supplies in many villages pose continuing health 
threats, but major infectious diseases under control. Life 
expectancy (1992): males, sixty-eight years; females, seventy- 



XVI 



two years; infant mortality fifty-five per 1,000 births. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$312.4 billion in 1993 
(US$5,000 per capita). Economy gradually being liberalized 
and industrialized; real growth averaged 7.3 percent in 1993. 

Agriculture: Less than 15 percent of GDP in 1993 but remains 
crucial sector of the economy, providing more than 50 percent 
of employment, most raw materials for industry, and 15 
percent of exports. Wheat and barley main crops; cotton, sugar 
beets, hazelnuts, and tobacco major cash crops. Livestock 
production extensive and growing. Valuable forest areas poorly 
managed; fisheries underdeveloped. 

Industry: Major growth sector contributing more than 30 
percent of GDP in 1993, employing 33 percent of labor force. 
Food processing and textiles major industries; basic metals, 
chemicals, and petrochemicals well established. 

Imports: US$29.4 billion in 1993. Main imports included 
machinery and equipment, 60 percent; petroleum, 8.5 
percent; and foodstuffs, 4 percent. 

Exports: US$15.3 billion in 1993, consisting of manufactured 
goods (mainly textiles and processed leather products), 70 
percent; foodstuffs, 20 percent; mineral products, 4 percent. 

Major Trading Partners: Industrialized countries, especially 
members of European Union, United States, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia. 

Balance of Payments: In 1993-94 Turkey experienced its 
fourth major balance of payments crisis in last forty years. 
Domestic fiscal policy and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
helped reduce imports in 1994. Trade deficit was US$4.8 
billion in 1994. Soaring imports during first seven months of 
1995 pushed trade deficit up to US$6 billion. 

General Economic Conditions: In 1995 economy grew during 
first nine months; inflation became more severe. December 
1995 elections important for fiscal stability. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: 1 Turkish lira (TL) = 100 kurus; 
(August 31, 1995) US$1.00 = TL47,963.00. 



xvii 



Transportation and Telecommunications 



Railroads: 8,430 kilometers (standard gauge — 1.435 meters), 
of which 796 kilometers electrified in 1995. 

Roads: (1995) Nearly 59,770 kilometers of all-weather highways 
of which 27,000 kilometers paved. Highways main means of 
transport. Government planned large highway expansion by 
year 2000. 

Ports: Five major ports: Istanbul, Mersin, Ismir, Iskenderun, 
and Kocaeli; ten secondary ports, eighteen minor ports. 

Airports: 105 usable airports, sixty-nine with paved runways in 
1994. 

Telecommunications: Telephone system overloaded in 1995; 
modernization program promised to make telephones 
available and eliminate waiting circuits. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Democratic, secular, and parliamentary, 
according to provisions of 1982 constitution. Divided into 
legislative, executive, and judicial establishments, with 
legislative power vested in unicameral National Assembly 
consisting of 450 deputies elected every five years. Executive 
authority greater than under 1961 constitution. 

Judicial System: Independent of other state organs; autonomy 
protected by High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. 
Higher courts include Constitutional Court, Council of State, 
Court of Jurisdictional Dispute, Court of Cassation, and 
Military Court of Cassation. For purpose of civil and criminal 
justice, Court of Cassation serves as supreme court. 

Administrative System: In 1995 centralized administrative 
system of seventy-six provinces, divided into districts, and 
subdistricts. Provinces headed by governors appointed by 
executive branch and responsible to central administration. 

Politics: True Path (Dogru Yol Partisi — DYP) ruling coalition 
with Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci 
Parti — SHP) collapsed in September 1995 after SHP deputies 
voted to join new Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi — CHP). New government of DYP-CHP formed in 
October 1995 to serve in a caretaker capacity prior to 



xviii 



parliamentary elections on December 24. Other parties are 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi — ANAP), Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi — RP), and Democratic Left (Demokratik Sol 
Partisi— DSP). 

International Affairs: Allied with West through North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). Tensions with NATO allies 
followed 1980 military takeover but reduced after 1983. 
Continued conflict with Greece over Cyprus and control of 
Aegean waters. 

National Security 

Armed Forces (1994-95): Total personnel on active duty 
503,800, including 410,200 draftees serving for fifteen months. 
Reserves total 952,300. Component services: army of 393,000 
(345,000 conscripts), air force of 56,800 (28,700 conscripts), 
and navy of 54,000 (36,500 conscripts plus 3,000 marines). 

Major Tactical Military Units (1994-95): Army: one 
mechanized division, one mechanized division headquarters, 
one infantry division, fourteen armored brigades, seventeen 
mechanized brigades, nine infantry brigades, four commando 
brigades, one infantry regiment, one Presidential Guard 
regiment, five border defense regiments, and twenty-six border 
defense battalions. Air Force: fourteen fighter-ground attack 
squadrons, six fighter squadrons, three training squadrons, 
and eight surface-to-air missile squadrons. Navy: seventeen 
submarines, eleven destroyers, sixteen frigates, sixteen fast- 
attack craft, miscellaneous patrol, coastal, and mine-warfare 
combatants, and twenty-eight helicopters. 

Military Equipment (1995): Heavy dependence on United 
States and other Western allies for armored fighting vehicles, 
artillery, aircraft, missiles, and fighting ships. Modernization 
programs underway stressing improved antitank and air 
defense capability. New effort to meet needs through domestic 
manufacture, including F-16 fighter airplanes on 
coproduction basis, artillery, tank upgrades, communication 
and navigation equipment, frigates, and submarines. 

Military Budget: About TL93,453 billion (US$4.6 billion) plus 
US$3 billion for the gendarmerie in 1994. Defense 
expenditures estimated to be 9.4 percent of GNP in 1994. 
Turkey's defense expenditures per capita lowest among NATO 



xix 



countries. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Member of NATO since 1952. 

Internal Security Forces: Principal security agencies: National 
Police, believed to number about 50,000, oriented to urban 
areas, and gendarmerie, a force of about 70,000 active-duty 
personnel with 50,000 reserves, oriented primarily to rural and 
border areas. Gendarmerie under army command in wartime 
and in areas where martial law prevails; deploys three mobile 
brigades equipped as light mechanized infantry. Special police 
units fight drug traffic and terrorism and support gendarmerie 
and army operations against Kurdish insurgents. National 
Intelligence Organization primary body concerned with 
intelligence on subversive activity. 



xx 




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xxiii 



Introduction 



THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti) was 
established on October 29, 1923, under the firm control and 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal, better known as Kemal Ataturk. 
The new state was at once the successor to and victor over the 
Ottoman Empire, long a major power in the European states 
system. The creation of the modern Turkish polity reflected 
not only a successful struggle against external enemies but also 
a triumph over deeply rooted domestic traditions. The repub- 
lic deliberately rejected important elements of Turkey's Otto- 
man past, especially the Ottoman dynasty's claim to spiritual 
leadership of Muslims worldwide. However, the official dis- 
establishment of Islam as the state religion in 1924 did not 
result in the creation of a fully secular society as Ataturk and his 
colleagues had hoped. 

Although a commitment to secularism has continued to be 
almost a prerequisite for membership in the country's political 
elite, Turkey has experienced several popular movements of 
Islamic political activism. The most recent movement, which 
began in the mid-1980s and is continuing, has threatened secu- 
larism in ways the republic's founders could not have imagined 
in the 1920s and 1930s. 

Although the republic emerged through the work and effort 
of many people, it bore the indelible imprint of Ataturk. Dur- 
ing World War I, the Ottoman Empire had been an ally of Ger- 
many, and in the chaos that accompanied the empire's defeat 
by the Allied powers, Ataturk, as the victor over Australian and 
British forces at Gallipoli, emerged as one of the few national 
heroes. His military reputation was enhanced further during 
the four-year War of Independence, when he led the forces 
that expelled the Greek invading army from the country. Of 
even greater long-term importance, Ataturk was a pragmatic 
political leader with a penchant for social reform. In keeping 
with long-standing Ottoman concepts of government, however, 
he was also an elitist; his reforms did not change significantly 
the relationship of the privileged governing stratum with the 
masses, although they did alter to some extent the nature of 
the elite. By the mid-1990s, the continuing impact of Ataturk 
and his precepts in shaping the form and nature of Turkish 



xxv 



society were being challenged by Turkey's diverse ethnic, reli- 
gious, and social groups. 

Ataturk's avowed goal was to create from the Anatolian rem- 
nant of the Ottoman Empire a new society patterned directly 
on the societies of Western Europe. In pursuit of this goal, he 
tolerated only token opposition. Turkey's president from 1923 
until his death in 1938, he apparently was persuaded that the 
masses needed a period of tutelage. Although the presidency 
technically possessed relatively few constitutional powers, 
Ataturk ruled for fifteen years as charismatic governor and 
teacher — training, cajoling, and forcing the government, his 
political party, the bureaucracy, the military, and the masses to 
behave in the manner he thought appropriate. Ataturk's "Six 
Arrows" — secularism, republicanism, etatism (see Glossary), 
populism, nationalism, and reformism — were incorporated 
into the constitutions of 1924, 1961, and 1982. In a general 
sense, Atatiirkism (also known as Kemalism) has been accepted 
by the Turkish political elite but has been contested by various 
organized groups. 

There is general agreement among scholars that secularism 
was and remains the most significant, and by far the most con- 
troversial, aspect of Atattirkism. The Turks, whose origins go 
back to Central Asia, had converted to Islam by the time they 
began establishing their political sovereignty in parts of Anato- 
lia during the tenth century. Throughout the next nine centu- 
ries, Islam was the primary guiding as well as delimiting force 
in societal development. From administrative institutions to 
social customs, from ideals of governance to the concepts of 
being a subject or a citizen, from birth to death, most aspects of 
life were influenced and regulated by Islamic tenets, precepts, 
and laws. Various forms of popular or folk Islam gained an 
important hold on the Turkish imagination, and Sufi brother- 
hoods became vital socioreligious institutions. 

Ataturk and his associates rejected the historical legacy of 
Islam and were determined to create a secular republic. Follow- 
ing the disestablishment of Islam and continuing into the mid- 
19405, the government suppressed public manifestations and 
observances of religion that the secularist minority deemed 
inimical to the development of a modern, European-style state. 
The regime closed the religious schools, shut down the Sufi 
brotherhoods, and banned their rituals and meetings. The 
reformers replaced Islamic law, the seriat, with codes borrowed 
from European countries; dropped the Islamic calendar in 



xxvi 



favor of the Gregorian; and abolished the pervasive legal and 
religious functions of the religious scholars and lawyers. 
Atatvirk imposed outward signs of secularization by discourag- 
ing or outlawing articles of clothing closely identified with 
Islamic traditions such as the veil for women and the fez for 
men. Finally, the use of Arabic script for writing in Turkish was 
declared illegal, despite its sacerdotal association as the lan- 
guage of the Kuran (Quran) and hence the language of God. 

Although Ataturk believed that the secularist campaign 
made a period of authoritarian government necessary, his suc- 
cessors wanted to establish a democratic government. Thus, 
Ismet Inonu, who had become president after Atatiirk's death 
in 1938, permitted the creation of a multiparty political system 
following World War II. In the first contested election in 1946, 
the ruling Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Par- 
tisi — CHP) retained its majority in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, although opposition candidates accused the CHP of 
electoral irregularities. When the Democrat Party (Demokrat 
Parti — DP) subsequently won a majority in the 1950 election, 
Inonu voluntarily relinquished power, despite offers from ele- 
ments of the armed forces to stage a coup. Thus began Tur- 
key's experiment in democracy: the military-bureaucratic elite 
that had established the republican order gradually turned 
over its power to an elected parliament, which reflected the 
interests and desires of broader sectors of society. 

Although the Kemalists have made compromises with tradi- 
tional forces in Turkish society, they never have abandoned the 
main tenets of the secularist program. By the end of the 1950s, 
the armed forces had assumed a role as guardians, not only of 
national security, but also of Atatiirk's legacy. On three occa- 
sions, in 1960, 1971, and 1980, the senior military intervened 
to safeguard Turkey's political development from forces that 
the military believed threatened the integrity of the state. In 
each case, civilian leaders had proved unable or unwilling to 
deliver policies acceptable to the military. In both 1960 and 
1980, a military junta took over the government, and rule by 
martial law included widespread suppression of civil rights and 
purges of the political class. On both occasions, after a period 
of direct military rule the military restored civilian govern- 
ment, but only after implementing constitutional changes, 
social reforms, and economic policies designed to put Turkey 
back on the path of achieving Atatiirk's goal: a modern, secular 
republic. 



xxvii 



Before the 1980 military coup, Turkish society had experi- 
enced what was perhaps its most serious crisis since the War of 
Independence. The framework instituted by the relatively lib- 
eral constitution of 1961, along with the fragmented party sys- 
tem, had contributed to political disorder: unstable coalitions 
rapidly succeeded one another while failing to address the 
country's pressing social, economic, and political problems. 
Underlying the political crisis were rapid and profound social 
changes. Massive population shifts from villages to towns and 
cities, expanded access to primary and secondary education, 
the availability of mass media, and the experiences of many 
Turkish workers in Western Europe exposed a nation of prima- 
rily peasants to new and generally disruptive influences. The 
extension of the Westernization process from the educated 
elite to the Anatolian masses both challenged and reinforced 
the latter's adherence to Islamic and Turkish traditions. During 
the second half of the 1970s, the economy, which had under- 
gone rapid growth in the postwar decades, entered a severe 
depression. Turkey's economic difficulties resulted from the 
inherent limitations of import-substitution industrialization 
and were exacerbated by the deterioration of world economic 
conditions that followed the 1973 oil crisis. By the late 1970s, at 
least one-quarter of the work force was unemployed, the 
annual inflation rate exceeded 100 percent, and shortages of 
foreign exchange reduced imports of essential commodities, 
causing widespread reductions in industrial production. 

One result of these interrelated crises was the mobilization 
of opposing social and cultural forces, which found political 
expression in radical parties and organizations. These included 
leftists active in the Turkish Communist Party (TCP) and the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey 
(Turkiye Devrimci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu — DISK), 
Islamicly motivated political elements behind Necmettin Erba- 
kan's National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi — MSP), 
and extreme nationalist groups linked to Alparslan Tiirkes's 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi — MHP) . As 
political life became increasingly tense, offshoots of these polit- 
ical groups fought each other and carried out terrorist attacks 
against representatives of the established order; an estimated 
5,000 persons were killed in politically related civil strife 
between 1971 and 1980. The coalition governments of the 
1970s lacked sufficient political support to effect the kinds of 
social reforms that would alleviate the main causes of popular 



xxviii 



discontent, and the country consequently descended into con- 
ditions resembling civil war. 

Following the September 1980 coup, the military made the 
restoration of political stability its main priority. The command- 
ers of the armed forces formed the National Security Council 
(NSC — see Glossary) , which ruled the country until November 
1983. The NSC ordered the arrest and imprisonment of thou- 
sands of militants, political leaders, and trade unionists; it also 
imposed widespread censorship and purged the armed forces, 
the bureaucracy, and the universities. These and other mea- 
sures effectively suppressed both violence and normal political 
life. The NSC's objective was to eliminate leftist, nationalist, 
Islamic, and ethnic organizations that contested Ataturk's polit- 
ical legacy. The NSC retained Turgut Ozal, an economist who 
had served in Suleyman Demirel's civilian cabinet ousted by 
the coup and who enjoyed the confidence of the international 
financial community, and gave him responsibility for economic 
policy. Although Ozal's austerity package brought immediate 
hardship for many Turks, it ended the balance of payments cri- 
sis and contributed to an economic recovery. 

After restoring public order and overcoming the most press- 
ing economic problems, the NSC supervised the drafting of a 
new constitution and electoral laws designed to rectify the per- 
ceived defects of the 1961 constitution by limiting the role of 
smaller parties and strengthening the powers of the president, 
the prime minister, and the party that won a majority in parlia- 
mentary elections. However, the new constitution also cur- 
tailed political rights, thus arousing sharp criticism both in 
Turkey and abroad. Particularly controversial was a ten-year 
ban on the political activities of about 200 leading politicians, 
including former prime ministers Biilent Ecevit and Demirel. 
The NSC sought to maintain its role by means of a clause 
under which the NSC chairman, General Kenan Evren, was 
named president for a six-year term. 

Having established a new political framework, the NSC grad- 
ually relaxed restrictions on political life and arranged a return 
to civilian government after a parliamentary election held in 
November 1983. The NSC strictly supervised this election; it 
allowed only three parties to present candidates, and President 
Evren blatantly intervened on behalf of the NSC's favorite, the 
Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi — 
MDP). Nevertheless, Ozal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Par- 
tisi — ANAP), the only independently established party that had 



xxix 



been tolerated by the NSC, achieved a strong majority, an out- 
come that was widely interpreted as a sign of the electorate's 
disapproval of military rule. 

Ozal, whose primary goal was economic liberalization, 
claimed that his triumph represented a mandate for sweeping 
changes in the economy. In power from November 1983 to 
November 1989, he sought to limit state intervention in the 
economy. Rejecting protectionism and import substitution, he 
opened the economy to international markets, arguing that 
economic growth and technical modernization would do more 
than traditional social policies to ease the country's problems. 
His package of economic reforms aimed to make Turkey eco- 
nomically similar to the countries of the European Union 
(EU — see Glossary), a body that Ozal hoped Turkey could join. 
The package of reforms included reduction of government 
price-setting, positive real interest rates, devaluation and float- 
ing of the Turkish lira (TL; for value of the lira — see Glossary), 
liberalization of import regulations, and export subsidies. 

Turkey's economic performance after 1983 was impressive. 
Real gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) averaged an 
annual 5.5 percent growth rate. GDP actually reached 8 per- 
cent in 1986, higher than that of any other member of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD — see Glossary). Inflation, estimated at more than 30 
percent during the 1983-85 period, fell in the 1986-89 period. 
Unemployment, however, remained a serious problem, rising 
every year during the 1980s except for 1986, a year when 
growth was sufficient to allow employment to increase faster 
than the increase in the working population. 

The restoration of civilian rule and the general improve- 
ment in the overall economy failed to resolve outstanding 
social issues, which have continued to bedevil Turkey's leader- 
ship. Although the government tends to play down the diver- 
sity of the population, the country's inhabitants in fact form a 
mosaic of diverse religious and ethnic groups. Most of the 
country's citizens continue to accept as true Turks only Sunni 
(see Glossary) Muslims whose native language is Turkish — 
effectively excluding other religious and ethnic groups such as 
the Alevi Muslims and Kurds, who together comprise at least 20 
percent of the population. Conflicts between the country's 
Turkish-speaking, Sunni majority and its various ethnic and 
religious minorities have intensified since the mid-1980s, 
threatening to disrupt public order and projecting an illiberal 



xxx 



spirit at odds with the dominant political culture of the EU that 
Turkey aspires to join. In effect, the question of Turkey's 
national identity remains a focal point for political controversy 
and social conflict. 

The government's troubled relations with its Kurdish minor- 
ity reveal the limits of social integration. Beginning in 1984, the 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan — PKK) 
launched guerrilla attacks on government personnel and 
installations in the predominantly Kurdish-populated prov- 
inces of southeastern Turkey. The PKK's announced objective 
was the establishment of a separate state of Kurdistan. PKK 
guerrillas have evoked some sympathy among Kurds in the 
southeast, a region characterized by endemic poverty, lack of 
jobs, inadequate schools and health care facilities, and severe 
underdevelopment of basic infrastructure such as electricity, 
piped water, and sewerage systems. The Ozal government 
sought to counter the appeal of the PKK by making govern- 
ment aid to the long-neglected southeast a priority, and it 
invested large sums to extend electricity, telephones, and roads 
to the region. Ozal envisioned the major southeastern Anatolia 
irrigation and power project as a program to provide the basis 
for real economic development that eventually would assuage 
local resentments of the central government. In the short run, 
however, the government has continued to depend on police 
actions to suppress the activities of Kurdish insurgents. Never- 
theless, the armed forces have been unable to maintain order 
in the region, despite the deployment of large military and 
paramilitary forces, and the southeastern provinces remain 
under de facto martial law. 

Turkey also has experienced a revival of religiously moti- 
vated political activity since the early 1980s. Veteran Islamist 
activist Necmettin Erbakan organized the new Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi — RP; also seen as Prosperity Party) in 1983, but 
the military prohibited it from participating in the parliamen- 
tary elections held in the fall of that year. Subsequently, the 
new civilian government under Ozal relaxed restrictions on 
avowedly religious parties, thus enabling the Welfare Party to 
organize freely and compete in local and national elections. 
With the notable exception of Erbakan, the Welfare Party's 
leaders represent a new generation that has grown up and 
been educated in a secular Turkey but professes a commitment 
to Islamic values. The Welfare Party rejects the use of political 
violence and seeks to propagate its political message through 



xxxi 



example. Working at the grassroots level in Turkey's cities and 
towns, the party's strongest appeal has been in lower-middle- 
class neighborhoods. However, the Welfare Party also has 
attracted support among some upper-middle-class profession- 
als and ethnic Kurds. Although the Welfare Party calls for the 
application of Islamic principles in relations between govern- 
ment agencies and the people, its primary appeal seems to 
derive from its advocacy of economic reform policies designed 
to control inflation and limit the amount of interest banks may 
charge on loans. 

The Welfare Party's popularity has grown gradually but 
steadily. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, it obtained more 
than 10 percent of the vote, thus surpassing the minimum 
threshold for winning seats in the National Assembly. Its elec- 
toral performance in the 1994 municipal elections was even 
better: the party won 19 percent of the total vote and control of 
the government of several large cities, including both Ankara 
and Istanbul. In the December 1995 National Assembly elec- 
tions, the Welfare Party won 21 percent of the vote and the 
largest number of seats of any party — 158. 

The return to civilian rule in 1983 also affected Turkey's for- 
eign policy. The three years of military government had 
harmed the country's reputation among its allies in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the OECD, all of 
which had democratic governments. Turkey's leaders had been 
committed to becoming an equal partner of the countries of 
Western Europe since the late 1940s. For example, Turkey 
became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949, dis- 
patched its troops to participate in the United States-led 
United Nations military force in Korea in 1950, and became a 
full member of the NATO military alliance in 1952. Thus, West 
European criticisms of Turkey's undemocratic government and 
human rights abuses were very painful. In addition, Turkey's 
image suffered from the continuing tension with neighboring 
Greece — also a member of NATO — over Cyprus and the con- 
trol of the Aegean Sea. Ozal therefore wanted to repair Tur- 
key's international reputation as quickly as possible. He 
envisioned EU membership as an important means to demon- 
strate that Turkey is an essential part of Western Europe. In 
addition, he believed that EU membership would provide Tur- 
key with vital economic benefits. 

Although a substantial portion of the political and economic 
elite supported Ozal's objective of EU membership, it was not a 



xxxii 



goal shared by all Turks. For example, the Welfare Party 
opposed any further integration with Europe, arguing instead 
that Turkey should search for new export markets in its natural 
and historical hinterland, the Middle East. The Ozal govern- 
ment did not dismiss the idea of expanding political and eco- 
nomic ties with other Islamic countries, and actually did 
cultivate relations with Iran and Iraq. These two neighbors 
were at war with each other from 1980 to 1988, and Turkey was 
able to reap economic dividends by remaining strictly neutral 
with respect to that conflict. Nevertheless, the government con- 
tinued to believe that Turkey's national interests would be 
served best by strengthening ties to Western Europe. Thus, 
Ozal undertook a series of economic and political reform mea- 
sures that he believed would provide credibility for Turkey's 
formal application to join the EU. The application finally was 
submitted in April 1987. To demonstrate that Turkey was com- 
mitted to democracy, and thus worthy of membership in the 
EU, all martial law decrees were repealed in March, although a 
state of emergency remained in force in the southeastern prov- 
inces. New parliamentary elections also were announced for 
the fall, a full year before they were required. 

The November 1987 parliamentary elections were a turning 
point in the democratization process in Turkey inasmuch as 
these were the first genuinely free elections since the 1980 
coup. All political parties were permitted to take part. In addi- 
tion, the ban on political activities of 200 senior political lead- 
ers had been lifted as a result of a popular referendum held 
earlier in September 1987. Consequently, former prime minis- 
ters Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit campaigned actively, 
the former as head of the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi — 
DYP) and the latter as head of the Democratic Left Party 
(Demokratik Sol Partisi — DSP). Although Ozal's Motherland 
Party retained its parliamentary majority (292 of 450 seats), the 
True Path Party obtained fifty-nine seats, thus gaining for 
Demirel an important national political platform. During the 
next four years, Demirel used his organizing and persuasive 
skills to rebuild the True Path Party with the objective of 
atuacting enough Motherland voters to propel his party to the 
leading position. Within eighteen months, Demirel's persistent 
criticisms of Ozal administration policies brought initial politi- 
cal dividends for the True Path Party. As a result of the March 
1989 municipal council elections, the Motherland Party suf- 
fered a major setback; it received only 26 percent of the total 



xxxiii 



vote nationwide and ranked third behind the Social Demo- 
cratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti — SHP) and 
the True Path Party. 

Neither Demirel nor other True Path leaders considered the 
opportunity to share responsibility for local government to be 
equivalent to the control of the national government, which 
remained in the hands of Ozal's Motherland Party. However, 
they appreciated the significance of their increased share of 
the popular vote and the fact that they had party cadres in posi- 
tions to dispense some city and town patronage. Capitalizing 
on the momentum of the victories, the True Path Party intensi- 
fied its organizing efforts in anticipation of the next parliamen- 
tary elections. These elections, which were held in October 
1991, proved to be both sweet and sour for Demirel. The True 
Path Party defeated its rival, the Motherland Party, by edging it 
out in the popular vote, 27 to 24 percent. Although Demirel 
could draw satisfaction from the True Path's emergence from 
the elections as the largest party in parliament with 178 seats, 
he simultaneously was disappointed that it had not won the 
absolute majority — 226 seats — required to form a government. 
After weeks of negotiations, Demirel and SHP leader Erdal 
Inonii — the son of Ismet Inonii — reached agreement on the 
formation of a True Path-SHP coalition government. Thus, 
Demirel, whom the military had overthrown in 1980, once 
again became prime minister of Turkey. 

Demirel's victory was not at the expense of Ozal. Two years 
earlier, Ozal had been elected president to replace General 
Evren, whose constitutionally mandated seven-year term had 
concluded at the end of 1989. The 1982 constitution provides 
for the president to be elected by the parliament. Because the 
Motherland Party still held a majority of parliamentary seats in 
1989, Ozal's election seemed assured once he announced his 
candidacy. Nevertheless, Demirel and other politicians refused 
to support Ozal's bid for the presidency, and their tactics pre- 
vented his confirmation until the third ballot. Demirel's own 
opposition to Ozal seemed to be more personal than ideologi- 
cal. Prior to the 1980 coup, Ozal had been a member of 
Demirel's Justice Party (Adalet Partisi — AP) and had held a 
junior ministerial post in the Demirel cabinet. Demirel appar- 
ently never forgave Ozal for joining the military government 
following the coup. Thus, when Demirel became prime minis- 
ter, Turkish politicians had reservations as to whether he and 
President Ozal would be able to cooperate. Indeed, as leader of 



xxxiv 



an opposition party in parliament during 1990 and 1991, 
Demirel had expressed frequent criticism of Ozal's role in for- 
eign policy, especially the latter's decisions to align Turkey on 
the side of the United States-led coalition against Iraq during 
the Kuwait crisis and Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. Neverthe- 
less, once Demirel became prime minister, he and Ozal did 
cooperate. 

Demirel had served as prime minister for less than eighteen 
months when the unexpected death of Ozal in April 1993 pro- 
vided the opportunity for him to succeed to the presidency. 
During his tenure as head of government, Demirel had been 
preoccupied with both domestic and international challenges. 
Within Turkey, the PKK had intensified its attacks on Turkish 
security and civilian personnel in southeastern Anatolia. The 
PKK's insurgency had received an unexpected boost from the 
1991 collapse of central government authority in northern 
Iraq's Kurdish region, which borders southeastern Turkey. 
Since the mid-1980s, the PKK had established in this territory 
clandestine bases from which it carried out some of its opera- 
tions. By the end of 1991, the absence of any security on the 
Iraqi side of the border had enabled the PKK both to expand 
its network of bases and to use them as sanctuaries. One of 
Demirel's most important policy decisions was to approve in 
October 1992 a plan by the Turkish military to attack PKK 
bases in northern Iraq. This plan was particularly controversial 
because three of Turkey's NATO allies — Britain, France, and 
the United States — were enforcing a ban on any Iraqi military 
presence in northern Iraq in order to protect Iraqi Kurds from 
being attacked by their own government. 

Demirel's government also had to deal with the unantici- 
pated collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Soviet 
Union had been a powerful and generally feared neighbor 
ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Its sud- 
den disappearance necessitated the formulation of new diplo- 
matic, economic, and political strategies to deal with the 
multifaceted consequences. Demirel and his colleagues had a 
special interest in Central Asia, and they hoped that Turkey 
could serve as a role model for the new Turkic-speaking states 
of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. However, from a geographic perspective, these 
new countries were closer to Iran than to Turkey, and officials 
frequently expressed concern about suspected Iranian inten- 
tions in Central Asia. Throughout 1992 the Demirel adminis- 



XXXV 



tration perceived Turkey to be engaged in a competitive race 
with Iran for regional influence. However, by the time Demirel 
became president in May 1993, most officials had come to real- 
ize that neither their country nor Iran had sufficient resources 
for such a competition. 

Demirel had to give up his leadership of the True Path Party 
when the National Assembly elected him president. The DYP 
deputies in the assembly subsequently chose Tansu (filler as 
their leader — the first woman to head a political party — and in 
June 1993 she became Turkey's first woman prime minister. 
Under (filler's administration, the status of Turkey's Kurdish 
minority continued to be the country's most serious domestic 
problem, one that had multiple international repercussions. 
Although the PKK had renounced its goal of a separate Kurd- 
ish state in 1993, reaching a political compromise proved diffi- 
cult because the Turkish military insisted on a military 
solution. Because both (filler and Demirel were sensitive about 
past military interventions in domestic politics, neither was 
prepared to risk a civilian-military confrontation by challeng- 
ing the military's assumption of almost a free hand in dealing 
with the security situation in southeastern Turkey. By 1995 
more than 220,000 soldiers, in addition to 50,000 gendarmerie 
and other security forces, were stationed in the southeast. Nev- 
ertheless, the progressive intensification of the military offen- 
sive against the PKK failed to repress the PKK's ability to mount 
deadly assaults. 

The military campaign provoked criticism from Kurdish and 
Turkish politicians, and in response the military resurrected 
the Prevention of Terrorism Law, which criminalized any activ- 
ity — including speech — that threatened the integrity of the 
state. This law was used in 1994 and 1995 to arrest journalists 
and elected members of the National Assembly, who were tried 
in special state security courts that are under the jurisdiction of 
the military. 

The Kurdish problem has had significant reverberations on 
Turkey's foreign policy. The arrest of seven members of the 
National Assembly, all of whom were Kurdish deputies charged 
with endangering state security through their discussions of the 
Kurdish issue with fellow parliamentarians in Europe and 
North America, was especially troublesome for EU countries. 
Member governments of the EU condemned the arrests, the 
stripping of the Kurdish deputies' parliamentary immunity, 
and the subsequent December 1994 sentencing of the deputies 



xxx vi 



to long prison terms. Much to the embarrassment of the Turk- 
ish government, imprisoned Deputy Leyla Zane, who was one 
of the first women elected to the National Assembly, was among 
the several human rights activists whom the Norwegian parlia- 
ment nominated for the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize. Several EU 
countries cited the trial of the elected Kurdish deputies and 
similar prosecutions of journalists as well as of Turkey's most 
famous novelist, Yashar Kamal, as evidence that authoritarian- 
ism was stronger than democratic practices in Turkey and that, 
therefore, the country's outstanding application for EU mem- 
bership should not be considered. 

Because joining the EU was as important an economic goal 
for the (filler administration as it had been for her predeces- 
sors, (filler sought to dampen European criticisms in January 
1995 by proposing to repeal those clauses of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Law that criminalized speech and publications. Her 
objective was to obtain enough support to win EU approval of 
an agreement that accepted Turkey into a customs union with 
the EU. The EU voted in March 1995 to accept Turkey into a 
customs union on condition that the Council of Europe (the 
European parliament) certify that the country had made 
progress in the institutionalization of democratic practices. 

Immediately following the EU vote, a new crisis in Turkish- 
EU relations erupted when more than 35,000 Turkish troops 
invaded northern Iraq in yet another attempt to destroy sus- 
pected PKK bases. The military offensive in northern Iraq 
lasted for more than three months and reignited European 
criticisms of Turkish policies. Attention inevitably focused on 
the government of Turkey's relations with its Kurdish minority. 
Criticism of Turkey's human rights practices at an April 1995 
meeting of the Council of Europe was so intense that the Turk- 
ish delegates walked out, partly in protest and partly to avoid 
the humiliation of being present for a vote against Turkey. To 
dilute European criticisms, (filler proposed that the National 
Assembly adopt amendments to the 1982 constitution that 
would strengthen democratic procedures. For example, the 
amendments would end the ban on political activities by associ- 
ations such as labor unions and professional groups, permit 
civil servants and university students to organize, and make it 
difficult for courts to strip parliamentary deputies of their 
immunity from prosecution. The National Assembly's adoption 
of the amendments in July 1995, coupled with the withdrawal 
of the last Turkish military units from Iraq, helped to ease 



xxxvii 



some of the tension between Turkey and its erstwhile Euro- 
pean friends. 

The democratization process is not without controversy 
within Turkey. An influential minority of the political elite 
believe that the country's laws and institutions provide ade- 
quate protection of civil liberties and that EU pressures consti- 
tute unacceptable interference in Turkey's internal affairs. 
This view is particularly strong among some military officers, 
and their opposition to (filler's proposal to repeal Article 8 of 
the Prevention of Terrorism Law was sufficient to persuade a 
majority of deputies in the National Assembly to vote against 
the bill. 

The failure to win approval for repealing the controversial 
Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Law had serious impli- 
cations for the (filler government. During the summer of 1995, 
the DYP coalition partner, the SHP, effectively dissolved itself 
by incorporating with the more liberal Republican People's 
Party (GHP), which, since its revival in 1992, had adopted a 
strong position in favor of abolishing Article 8. The merger 
necessitated party elections for a new leader, elections that 
resulted in Deniz Baykal's selection as head of the expanded 
CHP in September 1995. Baykal not only was opposed to Arti- 
cle 8, but also advocated civil rights legislation that would 
include punishment for security officials who abuse the rights 
of political detainees. Given his views, Baykal was not expected 
to keep the CHP in the coalition government, and, only ten 
days after his victory, he withdrew, causing the government's 
collapse, (filler tried to form a minority government in Octo- 
ber, but within ten days was forced to resign for the second 
time in less than one month when her DYP government failed 
to win a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. Baykal 
then agreed to join a new coalition government on two condi- 
tions: that the Article 8 amendments be resubmitted to the 
National Assembly and that new parliamentary elections be 
scheduled, (filler imposed strict party discipline for the second 
vote, thus ensuring a majority favoring passage of the amend- 
ments to Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Law, and she 
reluctantly called for new elections, to be held in December 
1995. 

The December 1995 elections represented a major setback 
for filler and her party, which came in third with 19 percent of 
the vote. The Welfare Party emerged in first place with 21 per- 
cent of the vote, followed by the Motherland Party with 19.6 



xxxviii 



percent. The failure of any party to win a majority of seats in 
the National Assembly mandated the formation of a coalition 
government. However, this task proved to be politically difficult 
because none of the secular parties was willing to participate in 
a Welfare-dominated government, and neither the DYP nor the 
Motherland Party was keen on cooperation. Finally, after more 
than ten weeks of sometimes tense political wrangling, Caller 
and Motherland Party leader Mesut Yilmaz agreed to put aside 
their bitter rivalry and form a minority government with Yilmaz 
as prime minister for the first year and (filler replacing him in 
1997. This Mother lan d-DYP coalition won a vote of confidence 
in March 1996 because Ecevit's DSP, which had seventy-five 
National Assembly seats, agreed to abstain on confidence votes. 

The performance of Turkey's economy was mixed during 
1995. The monetary policies of the (filler government included 
strict controls over public-sector expenditures, which contrib- 
uted to an easing of the financial crisis that had developed in 
early 1994. Although exports rose steadily during the first two 
quarters of the year, imports increased at a faster rate, and this 
surge in imports added to the country's severe balance of pay- 
ments deficit. In addition, inflation continued to be a major 
economic problem, totalling 78.9 percent for all of 1995. Sev- 
eral years of high inflation rates and low wage increases had 
aggravated employer-employee relations. The strain was 
reflected in the large number of strikes during 1995, including 
a crippling two-month-long strike by more than 350,000 public- 
sector workers in the autumn. Moreover, the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises — the principal feature of the (filler 
administration's structural adjustment program — made little 
progress in 1995. Within the National Assembly, a majority of 
deputies opposed the sale of major public factories for ideolog- 
ical (the relevant industries were strategic) or political (fear 
that sales would lead to increased unemployment) reasons. 

March 18, 1996 Paul M. Pitman, III, and 

Eric Hooglund 



xxxix 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Isak Pasa Palace, in Dogubayazit, east central Turkey, built in 1685 



TURKEY IS A NEW COUNTRY in an old land. The modern 
Turkish state — beginning with the creation of the Republic of 
Turkey in the years immediately after World War I — drew on a 
national consciousness that had developed only in the late 
nineteenth century. But the history of nomadic Turkish tribes 
can be traced with certainty to the sixth century A.D., when 
they wandered the steppes of central Asia. Asia Minor, which 
the Turks invaded in the eleventh century, has a recorded his- 
tory that dates back to the Hittites, who flourished there in the 
second millennium B.C. Archaeological evidence of far older 
cultures has been found in the region, however. 

The term Turkey, although sometimes used to signify the 
Ottoman Empire, was not assigned to a specific political entity 
or geographic area until the republic was founded in 1923. The 
conquering Turks called Asia Minor, the large peninsular terri- 
tory they had wrested from the Byzantine Empire, by its Greek 
name, Ajiatole (sunrise; figuratively, the East), or Anatolia. The 
term Anatolia is also used when events described affected both 
that region and Turkish Thrace ("Turkey-in-Europe") because 
of the two areas' closely linked political, social, and cultural 
development. 

Anatolia is a bridge connecting the Middle East and Europe, 
and it shares in the history of both those parts of the world. 
Despite the diversity of its peoples and their cultures, and the 
constantly shifting borders of its ethnic map, Anatolia has a his- 
tory characterized by remarkable continuity. Wave after wave of 
conquerors and settlers have imposed their language and other 
unique features of their culture on it, but they also have invari- 
ably assimilated the customs of the peoples who preceded 
them. 

The history of Turkey encompasses, first, the history of Ana- 
tolia before the coming of the Turks and of the civilizations — 
Hittite, Thracian, Hellenistic, and Byzantine — of which the 
Turkish nation is the heir by assimilation or example. Second, 
it includes the history of the Turkish peoples, including the 
Seljuks, who brought Islam and the Turkish language to Anato- 
lia. Third, it is the history of the Ottoman Empire, a vast, cos- 
mopolitan, pan-Islamic state that developed from a small 
Turkish amirate in Anatolia and that for centuries was a world 
power. 



3 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Finally, Turkey's history is that of the republic established in 
1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), 
called Ataturk — the "Father Turk." The creation of the new 
republic in the heartland of the old Islamic empire was 
achieved in the face of internal traditionalist opposition and 
foreign intervention. Atatiirk's goal was to build on the ruins of 
Ottoman Turkey a new country and society patterned directly 
on Western Europe. He equated Westernization with the intro- 
duction of technology, the modernization of administration, 
and the evolution of democratic institutions. 

The Turkish horsemen who stormed into Anatolia in the 
eleventh century were called gazis (warriors of the faith), but 
they followed their tribal leaders to win booty and to take land 
as well as to spread Islam. The Ottoman Empire, built on the 
conquests of the gazis, was Islamic but not specifically Turkish. 
Engendered in reaction to this Ottoman universalism, early 
Turkish nationalism was often pan-Turanian, envisioning a 
common destiny for all Turkic-speaking peoples. By contrast, 
Ataturk narrowed the focus of his nationalism to the Turks of 
Turkey. Under his influence, twentieth-century Turkish histori- 
ography bypassed the Islamic Ottoman period to link the Turk- 
ish nation with ancient Anatolia in such a way that the Hittites, 
for instance, were recognized as proto-Turks from whom mod- 
ern Turks can trace descent. Although contemporary Turkey is 
relatively homogeneous linguistically, it is estimated that per- 
haps 75 percent of the country's genetic pool is non-Turkish in 
origin. 

Atatiirk's ideological legacy — known as Kemalism — consists 
of the "Six Arrows": republicanism, nationalism, populism, 
reformism, etatism (see Glossary), and secularism. These prin- 
ciples have been embodied in successive constitutions, and 
appeals for both reforms and retrenchment have been made in 
their name. 

In the late 1940s, Atatiirk's long-time lieutenant and succes- 
sor, Ismet Inonu (earlier known as Ismet Pasha), introduced 
democratic elections and opened the political system to multi- 
party activity. In 1950 the Republican People's Party (Cumhu- 
riyet Halk Partisi — CHP) — Atatiirk's party — was badly defeated 
at the polls by the new Democrat Party, headed by Adnan Men- 
deres. The Menderes government attempted to redirect the 
economy, allowing for greater private initiative, and was more 
tolerant of traditional religious and social attitudes in the coun- 
tryside. In their role as guardians of Kemalism, military leaders 



4 



Historical Setting 



became convinced in 1960 that the Menderes government had 
departed dangerously from the principles of the republic's 
founder, and overthrew it in a military coup. After a brief inter- 
val of military rule, a new, liberal constitution was adopted for 
the so-called Second Republic, and the government returned 
to civilian hands. 

The 1960s witnessed coalition governments led, until 1965, 
by the CHP under Inonu. A new grouping — the right-wing Jus- 
tice Party organized under Suleyman Demirel and recognized 
as the successor to the outlawed Democrat Party — came to 
power in that year. In opposition, the new leader of the CHP, 
Biilent Ecevit, introduced a platform that shifted Atatiirk's 
party leftward. Political factionalism became so extreme as to 
prejudice public order and the smooth functioning of the gov- 
ernment and economy. 

In 1971 the leaders of the armed forces demanded appoint- 
ment of a government "above parties" charged with restoring 
law and order. A succession of nonparty governments came to 
power, but, unable to gain adequate parliamentary support, 
each quickly fell during a period of political instability that 
lasted until 1974. Demirel and Ecevit alternated in office as 
head of government during the remainder of the 1970s, a 
period marked by the rise of political extremism and religious 
revivalism, terrorist activities, and rapid economic changes 
accompanied by high inflation and severe unemployment. The 
apparent inability of parliamentary government to deal with 
the situation prompted another military coup in 1980, led by 
Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren. The new regime's 
National Security Council acted to restore order and stabilize 
the economy. It also moved deliberately toward reinstating 
civilian rule. A constitution for the Third Republic, promul- 
gated in 1982, increased the executive authority of the presi- 
dent and provided for Evren's appointment to a seven-year 
term in that office. General elections to the new National 
Assembly held the following year enabled Turgut Ozal to form 
a one-party majority government that promised to bring stabil- 
ity to the political process. 

In two subsequent parliamentary elections, in 1987 and 
1991, Turkey demonstrated a commitment to pluralist politics 
and a peaceful transfer of power. The 1991 election ended the 
eight-year rule of Ozal's Motherland Party and brought to 
power the True Path Party, headed by Suleyman Demirel. 
Upon the death of Ozal in 1993, Demirel ascended to the pres- 



5 



Turkey: A Country Study 

idency, and Tansu (filler became Turkey's first woman prime 
minister. 

Ancient Anatolia 

There is abundant archaeological evidence of a thriving 
neolithic culture in Anatolia at least as early as the seventh mil- 
lennium B.C. What may have been the world's first urban set- 
tlement (dated ca. 6500 B.C.) has been uncovered at 
Qatalhuyuk in the Konya Ovasi (Konya Basin). Introduced 
early in the third millennium B.C., metallurgy made possible a 
flourishing "copper age" (ca. 2500-2000 B.C.) during which 
cultural patterns throughout the region were remarkably uni- 
form. The use of bronze weapons and implements was wide- 
spread by 2000 B.C. Colonies of Assyrian merchants, who 
settled in Anatolia during the copper age, provided metal for 
the military empires of Mesopotamia, and their accounts and 
business correspondence are the earliest written records found 
in Anatolia. From about 1500 B.C., southern Anatolia, which 
had plentiful sources of ore and numerous furnace sites, devel- 
oped as a center of iron production. Two of the area's most cel- 
ebrated archaeological excavations are the sites at Troy and 
Hattusas (Bogazkoy) (see fig. 2). 

The cape projecting into the Aegean between the Dar- 
danelles and the Gulf of Edremit was known in antiquity as 
Troas. There, a thirty-meter-high mound called Hisarlik was 
identified as the site of ancient Troy in diggings begun by Ger- 
man archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann in the 1870s. The first 
five levels of the nine discovered at Hisarlik contained remains 
of cities from the third millennium B.C. that controlled access 
to the shortest crossing of the Dardanelles and that probably 
derived their prosperity from tolls. Artifacts give evidence of 
1,000 years of cultural continuity in the cities built on these lev- 
els. A sharp break with the past occurred on the sixth level, set- 
tled about 1900 B.C. by newcomers believed to have been 
related to the early Greeks. Built after an earthquake devas- 
tated the previous city about 1300 B.C., the seventh level was 
clearly the victim of sacking and burning about 1150 B.C., and 
it is recognized as having been the Troy of Homer's Iliad. Hisar- 
lik subsequently was the site of a Greek city, Ilion, and a Roman 
one, Ilium. 

Hittites 

Late in the third millennium B.C., waves of invaders speak- 



6 



Historical Setting 



ing Indo-European languages crossed the Caucasus Mountains 
into Anatolia. Among them were the bronze-working, chariot- 
borne warriors who conquered and settled the central plain. 
Building on older cultures, these invaders borrowed even their 
name, the Hittites, from the indigenous Hatti whom they had 
subjugated. They adopted the native Hattic deities and adapted 
to their written language the cuneiform alphabet and literary 
conventions of the Semitic cultures of Mesopotamia. The Hit- 
tites imposed their political and social organization on their 
dominions in the Anatolian interior and northern Syria, where 
the indigenous peasantry supported the Hittite warrior caste 
with rents, services, and taxes. In time the Hittites won reputa- 
tions as merchants and statesmen who schooled the ancient 
Middle East in both commerce and diplomacy. The Hittite 
Empire achieved the zenith of its political power and cultural 
accomplishment in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries 
B.C., but the state collapsed after 1200 B.C. when the Phry- 
gians, clients of the Hittites, rebelled and burned Hattusas. 

Phrygians and Lydians 

The twelfth to ninth centuries B.C. were a time of turmoil 
throughout Anatolia and the Aegean world. The destruction of 
Troy, Hattusas, and numerous other cities in the region was a 
collective disaster that coincided with the rise of the aggressive 
Assyrian Empire in Mesopotamia, the Dorian invasion of 
Greece, and the appearance of the "sea peoples" who ravaged 
the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. 

The first light to penetrate the dark age in Anatolia was lit by 
the very Phrygians who had destroyed Hattusas. Architects, 
builders, and skilled workers of iron, they had assimilated the 
Hittites' syncretic culture and adopted many of their political 
institutions. Phrygian kings apparently ruled most of western 
and central Anatolia in the ninth century B.C. from their capi- 
tal at Gordium (a site sixty kilometers southwest of modern 
Ankara). Phrygian strength soon waned, however, and the 
kingdom was overthrown in the seventh century B.C. by the 
Cimmerians, a nomadic people who had been pursued over 
the Caucasus into Anatolia by the Scythians. 

Order was restored in Anatolia by the Lydians, a Thracian 
warrior caste who dominated the indigenous peasantry and 
derived their great wealth from alluvial gold found in the tribu- 
taries of the Hermus River (Gediz Nehri). From their court at 



7 



Turkey: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



Sardis, such Lydian kings as Croesus controlled western Anato- 
lia until their kingdom fell to the Persians in 546 B.C. 

Armenians and Kurds 

The Armenians took refuge in the Lake Van region in the 
seventh century B.C., apparently in reaction to Cimmerian 
raids. Their country was described by Xenophon around 400 
B.C. as a tributary of Persia. By the first century B.C., a united 
Armenian kingdom that stretched from the Black Sea to the 
Caspian Sea had been established as a client of the Roman 
Empire to buffer the frontier with Persia. 

Xenophon also recorded the presence of the Kurds. Con- 
temporary linguistic evidence has challenged the previously 
held view that the Kurds are descendants of the Medes, 
although many Kurds still accept this explanation of their ori- 
gin. Kurdish people migrated from the Eurasian steppes in the 
second millennium B.C. and joined indigenous inhabitants liv- 
ing in the region. 

Greeks 

The Aegean coast of Anatolia was an integral part of a 
Minoan-Mycenean civilization (ca. 2600-1200 B.C.) that drew 
its cultural impulses from Crete. During the Aegean region's 
so-called Dark Age (ca. 1050-800 B.C.), Ionian Greek refugees 
fled across the sea to Anatolia, then under Lydian rule, to 
escape the onslaught of the Dorians. Many more cities were 
founded along the Anatolian coast during the great period of 
Greek expansion after the eighth century B.C. One among 
them was Byzantium, a distant colony established on the 
Bosporus by the city-state of Megara. Despite endemic political 
unrest, the cities founded by the Ionians and subsequent Greek 
settlers prospered from commerce with Phrygia and Lydia, 
grew in size and number, and generated a renaissance that put 
Ionia in the cultural vanguard of the Hellenic world. 

At first the Greeks welcomed the Persians, grateful to be 
freed from Lydian control. But when the Persians began to 
impose unpopular tyrants on the city-states, the Greeks 
rebelled and called on their kinsmen in Greece for aid. In 334 
B.C., Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont, defeated the 
Persians at the Granicus River (Biga Qayi), and during four 
years of campaigning liberated the Ionian city-states, incorpo- 
rating them into an empire that at his death in 323 B.C. 
stretched from the Nile to the Indus. 



9 



Turkey: A Country Study 

After Alexander died, control of Anatolia was contested by 
several of the Macedonian generals among whom his empire 
was divided. By 280 B.C. one of them, Seleucus Nicator, had 
made good his claim to an extensive kingdom that included 
southern and western Anatolia and Thrace as well as Syria, 
Mesopotamia, and, for a time, Persia. Under the Seleucid 
Dynasty, which survived until 64 B.C., colonists were brought 
from Greece, and the process of hellenization was extended 
among the non-Greek elites. 

The Seleucids were plagued by rebellions, and their domains 
in Anatolia were steadily eaten away by secession and attacks by 
rival Hellenistic regimes. Pergamum became independent in 
262 B.C., during the Attalid Dynasty, and won fame as the para- 
gon of Hellenistic states. Noted for the cleanliness of its streets 
and the splendor of its art, Pergamum, in west-central Anatolia, 
derived its extraordinary wealth from trade in pitch, parch- 
ment, and perfume, while slave labor produced a food surplus 
on scientifically managed state farms. It was also a center of 
learning that boasted a medical school and a library second in 
renown only to that of Alexandria. But Pergamum was both 
despised and envied by the other Greek states because of its 
alliance with Rome. 

Rome and the Byzantine Empire 

The last of the Attalid kings bequeathed Pergamum to his 
Roman allies upon his death in 138 B.C. Rome organized this 
extensive territory under a proconsul as the province of Asia. 
All of Anatolia except Armenia, which was a Roman client- 
state, was integrated into the imperial system by A.D. 43. After 
the accession of the Roman emperor Augustus (r. 27 B.C.-A.D. 
14), and for generations thereafter, the Anatolian provinces 
enjoyed prosperity and security. The cities were administered 
by local councils and sent delegates to provincial assemblies 
that advised the Roman governors. Their inhabitants were citi- 
zens of a cosmopolitan world state, subject to a common legal 
system and sharing a common Roman identity. Roman in alle- 
giance and Greek in culture, the region nonetheless retained 
its ethnic complexity. 

In A.D. 285, the emperor Diocletian undertook the reorga- 
nization of the Roman Empire, dividing jurisdiction between 
its Latin-speaking and Greek-speaking halves. In 330 Dio- 
cletian's successor, Constantine, established his capital at the 
Greek city of Byzantium, a "New Rome" strategically situated 



10 



Historical Setting 



on the European side of the Bosporus at its entrance to the Sea 
of Marmara. For nearly twelve centuries the city, embellished 
and renamed Constantinople, remained the capital of the 
Roman Empire — better known in its continuous development 
in the East as the Byzantine Empire. 

Christianity was introduced to Anatolia through the mission- 
ary activity of Saint Paul, a Greek-speaking Jew from Tarsus in 
Cilicia, and his companions. Christians possibly even consti- 
tuted a majority of the population in most of Anatolia by the 
time Christianity was granted official toleration under the Edict 
of Milan in A.D. 313. Before the end of the fourth century, a 
patriarchate was established in Constantinople with ecclesiasti- 
cal jurisdiction over much of the Greek East. The basilica of 
Hagia Sophia (Holy Wisdom), whose construction in Constan- 
tinople was ordered by Emperor Justinian in 532, became the 
spiritual focus of Greek Christendom. 

Although Greek in language and culture, the Byzantine 
Empire was thoroughly Roman in its laws and administration. 
The emperor's Greek-speaking subjects, conscious of their 
imperial vocation, called themselves romaioi — Romans. Almost 
until the end of its long history, the Byzantine Empire was seen 
as ecumenical — intended to encompass all Christian peoples — 
rather than as a specifically Greek state. 

In the early seventh century, the emperor in Constantinople 
presided over a realm that included not only Greece and Ana- 
tolia but Syria, Egypt, Sicily, most of Italy, and the Balkans, with 
outposts across North Africa as far as Morocco. Anatolia was 
the most productive part of this extensive empire and was also 
the principal reservoir of manpower for its defense. With the 
loss of Syria to Muslim conquest in the seventh century, Anato- 
lia became the frontier as well as the heartland of the empire. 
The military demands imposed on the Byzantine state to police 
its provinces and defend its frontiers were enormous, but 
despite the gradual contraction of the empire and frequent 
political unrest, Byzantine forces generally remained strong 
until the eleventh century. 

Turkish Origins 

The first historical references to the Turks appear in Chi- 
nese records dating around 200 B.C. These records refer to 
tribes called the Hsiung-nu (an early form of the Western term 
Hun) , who lived in an area bounded by the Altai Mountains, 
Lake Baykal, and the northern edge of the Gobi Desert, and 



1! 



Turkey: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



who are believed to have been the ancestors of the Turks (see 
fig. 3). Specific references in Chinese sources in the sixth cen- 
tury A.D. identify the tribal kingdom called Tu-Kue located on 
the Orkhon River south of Lake Baykal. The khans (chiefs) of 
this tribe accepted the nominal suzerainty of the Tang Dynasty. 
The earliest known example of writing in a Turkic language 
was found in that area and has been dated around A.D. 730. 

Other Turkish nomads from the Altai region founded the 
Gortiirk Empire, a confederation of tribes under a dynasty of 
khans whose influence extended during the sixth through 
eighth centuries from the Aral Sea to the Hindu Kush in the 
land bridge known as Transoxania (i.e., across the Oxus River). 
The Gorturks are known to have been enlisted by a Byzantine 
emperor in the seventh century as allies against the Sassanians. 
In the eighth century, separate Turkish tribes, among them the 
Oguz, moved south of the Oxus River, while others migrated 
west to the northern shore of the Black Sea. 

Great Seljuks 

The Turkish migrations after the sixth century were part of a 
general movement of peoples out of central Asia during the 
first millennium A.D. that was influenced by a number of inter- 
related factors — climatic changes, the strain of growing popula- 
tions on a fragile pastoral economy, and pressure from 
stronger neighbors also on the move. Among those who 
migrated were the Oguz Turks, who had embraced Islam in the 
tenth century. They established themselves around Bukhara in 
Transoxania under their khan, Seljuk. Split by dissension 
among the tribes, one branch of the Oguz, led by descendants 
of Seljuk, moved west and entered service with the Abbasid 
caliphs of Baghdad. 

The Turkish horsemen, known as gazis, were organized into 
tribal bands to defend the frontiers of the caliphate, often 
against their own kinsmen. However, in 1055 a Seljuk khan, 
Tugrul Bey, occupied Baghdad at the head of an army com- 
posed of gazis and mamluks (slave-soldiers, a number of whom 
became military leaders and rulers). Tugrul forced the caliph 
(the spiritual leader of Islam) to recognize him as sultan, or 
temporal leader, in Persia and Mesopotamia. While they 
engaged in state building, the Seljuks also emerged as the 
champions of Sunni (see Glossary) Islam against the religion's 
Shia (see Glossary) sect. Tugrul's successor, Mehmet ibn Daud 
(r. 1063-72) — better known as Alp Arslan, the "Lion Hero" — 



13 



Turkey: A Country Study 

prepared for a campaign against the Shia Fatimid caliphate in 
Egypt but was forced to divert his attention to Anatolia by the 
gazis, on whose endurance and mobility the Seljuks depended. 
The Seljuk elite could not persuade these gazis to live within 
the framework of a bureaucratic Persian state, content with col- 
lecting taxes and patrolling ttade routes. Each year the gazis cut 
deeper into Byzantine territory, raiding and taking booty 
according to their tradition. Some served as mercenaries in the 
private wars of Byzantine nobles and occasionally settled on 
land they had taken. The Seljuks followed the gazis into Anato- 
lia in order to retain control over them. In 1071 Alp Arslan 
routed the Byzantine army at Manzikert near Lake Van, open- 
ing all of Anatolia to conquest by the Turks. 

Armenia had been annexed by the Byzantine Empire in 
1045, but religious animosity between the Armenians and the 
Greeks prevented these two Christian peoples from cooperat- 
ing against the Turks on the frontier. Although Christianity 
had been adopted as the official religion of the state by King 
Titidates III around A.D. 300, nearly 100 years before similar 
action was taken in the Roman Empire, Armenians were con- 
verted to a form of Christianity at variance with the Orthodox 
tradition of the Greek church, and they had their own patri- 
archate independent of Constantinople. After their conquest 
by the Sassanians around 400, their religion bound them 
together as a nation and provided the inspiration for a flower- 
ing of Armenian culture in the fifth century. When their home- 
land fell to the Seljuks in the late eleventh century, large 
numbers of Armenians were dispersed throughout the Byzan- 
tine Empire, many of them settling in Constantinople, where 
in its centuries of decline they became generals and statesmen 
as well as craftsmen, builders, and traders. 

Sultanate of Rum 

Within ten years of the Battle of Manzikert, the Seljuks had 
won control of most of Anatolia. Although successful in the 
west, the Seljuk sultanate in Baghdad reeled under attacks 
from the Mongols in the east and was unable — indeed unwill- 
ing — to exert its authority directly in Anatolia. The gazis carved 
out a number of states there, under the nominal suzerainty of 
Baghdad, states that were continually reinforced by further 
Turkish immigration. The strongest of these states to emerge 
was the Seljuk sultanate of Rum ("Rome," i.e., Byzantine 
Empire), which had its capital at Konya (Iconium). During the 



14 



Historical Setting 



twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Rum became dominant over 
the other Turkish states (see fig. 4). 

The society and economy of the Anatolian countryside were 
unchanged by the Seljuks, who had simply replaced Byzantine 
officials with a new elite that was Turkish and Muslim. Conver- 
sion to Islam and the imposition of the language, mores, and 
customs of the Turks progressed steadily in the countryside, 
facilitated by intermarriage. The cleavage widened, however, 
between the unruly gazi warriors and the state-building bureau- 
cracy in Konya. 

The Crusades 

The success of the Seljuk Turks stimulated a response from 
Latin Europe in the form of the First Crusade. A counteroffen- 
sive launched in 1097 by the Byzantine emperor with the aid of 
the crusaders dealt the Seljuks a decisive defeat. Konya fell to 
the crusaders, and after a few years of campaigning Byzantine 
rule was restored in the western third of Anatolia. 

Although a Turkish revival in the 1140s nullified many of the 
Christian gains, greater damage was done to Byzantine security 
by dynastic strife in Constantinople in which the largely French 
contingents of the Fourth Crusade and their Venetian allies 
intervened. In 1204 these crusaders installed Count Baldwin of 
Flanders in the Byzantine capital as emperor of the so-called 
Latin Empire of Constantinople, dismembering the old realm 
into tributary states where West European feudal institutions 
were transplanted intact. Independent Greek kingdoms were 
established at Nicaea and Trebizond (present-day Trabzon) 
and in Epirus from remnant Byzantine provinces. Turks allied 
with Greeks in Anatolia against the Latins, and Greeks with 
Turks against the Mongols. In 1261 Michael Palaeologus of 
Nicaea drove the Latins from Constantinople and restored the 
Byzantine Empire, but as an essentially Balkan state reduced in 
size to Thrace and northwestern Anatolia. 

Seljuk Rum survived in the late thirteenth century as a vassal 
state of the Mongols, who had already subjugated the Great Sel- 
juk sultanate at Baghdad. Mongol influence in the region had 
disappeared by the 1330s, leaving behind gazi amirates compet- 
ing for supremacy. From the chaotic conditions that prevailed 
throughout the Middle East, however, a new power emerged in 
Anatolia — the Ottoman Turks. 



15 



Turkey: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



The Ottoman Empire 

Documentation of the early history of the Ottomans is 
scarce. According to semilegendary accounts, Ertugrul, khan 
of the Kayi tribe of the Oguz Turks, took service with the sultan 
of Rum at the head of a gazi force numbering "400 tents." He 
was granted territory — if he could seize and hold it — in 
Bithynia, facing the Byzantine strongholds at Bursa, Nicomedia 
(Izmit), and Nicaea. Leadership subsequently passed to 
Ertugrul's son, Osman I (r. ca. 1284-1324), founder of the 
Osmanli Dynasty — better known in the West as the Ottomans. 
This dynasty was to endure for six centuries through the reigns 
of thirty-six sultans (see table 2, Appendix A). 

Osman Fs small amir ate attracted gazis from other amirates, 
who required plunder from new conquests to maintain their 
way of life. Such growth gave the Ottoman state a military stat- 
ure that was out of proportion to its size. Acquiring the title of 
sultan, Osman I organized a politically centralized administra- 
tion that subordinated the activities of the gazis to its needs and 
facilitated rapid territorial expansion. Bursa fell in the final 
year of his reign. His successor, Orhan (r. 1324-60), crossed the 
Dardanelles in force and established a permanent European 
base at Gallipoli in 1354. Murad I (r. 1360-89) annexed most of 
Thrace (called Rumelia, or "Roman land," by the Turks), encir- 
cling Constantinople, and moved the seat of Ottoman govern- 
ment to Adrianople (Edirne) in Europe. In 1389 the Ottoman 
gazis defeated the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo, although at the 
cost of Murad's life. The steady stream of Ottoman victories in 
the Balkans continued under Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402). Bul- 
garia was subdued in 1393, and in 1396 a French-led force of 
crusaders that had crossed the Danube from Hungary was 
annihilated at Nicopolis (see fig. 5). 

In Anatolia, where Ottoman policy had been directed 
toward consolidating the sultan's hold over the gazi amirates by 
means of conquest, usurpation, and purchase, the Ottomans 
were confronted by the forces of the Mongol leader Timur 
(Tamerlane), to whom many of the Turkish gazis had defected. 
Timur crushed Ottoman forces near Ankara in 1402 and cap- 
tured Bayezid I. The unfortunate sultan died in captivity the 
next year, leaving four heirs, who for a decade competed for 
control of what remained of Ottoman Anatolia. By the 1420s, 
however, Ottoman power had revived to the extent that fresh 
campaigns were undertaken in Greece. 



17 



Turkey: A Country Study 




18 



Historical Setting 



Aside from scattered outposts in Greece, all that remained of 
the Byzantine Empire was its capital, Constantinople. Cut off by 
land since 1365, the city, despite long periods of truce with the 
Turks, was supplied and reinforced by Venetian traders who 
controlled its commerce by sea. On becoming sultan in 1444, 
Mehmet II (r. 1444-46, 1451-81) immediately set out to con- 
quer the city. The military campaigning season of 1453 com- 
menced with the fifty-day siege of Constantinople, during 
which Mehmet II brought warships overland on greased run- 
ners into the Bosporus inlet known as the Golden Horn to 
bypass the chain barrage and fortresses that had blocked the 
entrance to Constantinople's harbor. On May 29, the Turks 
fought their way through the gates of the city and brought the 
siege to a successful conclusion. 

As an isolated military action, the taking of Constantinople 
did not have a critical effect on European security, but to the 
Ottoman Dynasty the capture of the imperial capital was of 
supreme symbolic importance. Mehmet II regarded himself as 
the direct successor to the Byzantine emperors. He made Con- 
stantinople the imperial capital, as it had been under the Byz- 
antine emperors, and set about rebuilding the city. The 
cathedral of Hagia Sophia was converted to a mosque, and 
Constantinople — which the Turks called Istanbul (from the 
Greek phrase eis tin polin, "to the city") — replaced Baghdad as 
the center of Sunni Islam. The city also remained the ecclesias- 
tical center of the Greek Orthodox Church, of which Mehmet 
II proclaimed himself the protector and for which he 
appointed a new patriarch after the custom of the Byzantine 
emperors. 

Ottoman Institutions 

At the apex of the hierarchical Ottoman system was the sul- 
tan, who acted in political, military, judicial, social, and reli- 
gious capacities, under a variety of titles. He was theoretically 
responsible only to God and God's law — the Islamic serial (in 
Arabic, sharia) , of which he was the chief executor. All offices 
were filled by his authority, and every law was issued by him in 
the form of a firman (decree). He was supreme military com- 
mander and had official title to all land. During the early six- 
teenth-century Ottoman expansion in Arabia, Selim I also 
adopted the title of caliph, thus indicating that he was the uni- 
versal Muslim ruler. Although theocratic and absolute in the- 
ory and in principle, the sultan's powers were in practice 



19 



Turkey: A Country Study 

limited. The attitudes of important members of the dynasty, 
the bureaucratic and military establishments, and religious 
leaders had to be considered. 

Three characteristics were necessary for acceptance into the 
ruling class: Islamic faith, loyalty to the sultan, and compliance 
with the standards of behavior of the Ottoman court. The last 
qualification effectively excluded the majority of common 
Turks, whose language and manners were very different from 
those of the Ottomans. The language of the court and govern- 
ment was Ottoman Turkish, a highly formalized hybrid lan- 
guage that included Persian and Arabic loanwords. In time 
Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were also employed in state ser- 
vice, usually in diplomatic, technical, or commercial capacities. 

The day-to-day conduct of government and the formulation 
of policy were in the hands of the divan, a relatively small coun- 
cil of ministers directed by the chief minister, the grand vizier. 
The entranceway to the public buildings in which the divan 
met — and which in the seventeenth century became the resi- 
dence of the grand vizier — was called the Bab-i Ali (High Gate, 
or Sublime Porte). In diplomatic correspondence, the term 
Porte was synonymous with the Ottoman government, a usage 
that acknowledged the power wielded by the grand vizier. 

The Ottoman Empire had Turkish origins and Islamic foun- 
dations, but from the start it was a heterogeneous mixture of 
ethnic groups and religious creeds. Ethnicity was determined 
solely by religious affiliation. Non-Muslim peoples, including 
Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, were recognized as millets (see 
Glossary) and were granted communal autonomy. Such groups 
were allowed to operate schools, religious establishments, and 
courts based on their own customary law. 

Selim I and Suleyman the Magnificent 

Selim I (r. 1512-20) extended Ottoman sovereignty south- 
ward, conquering Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. He also gained 
recognition as guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina. 

Selim I's son, Suleyman I (r. 1520-66), was called the "law- 
giver" (kanuni) by his Muslim subjects because of a new codifi- 
cation of seriat undertaken during his reign. In Europe, 
however, he was known as Suleyman the Magnificent, a recog- 
nition of his prowess by those who had most to fear from it. Bel- 
grade fell to Suleyman in 1521, and in 1522 he compelled the 
Knights of Saint John to abandon Rhodes. In 1526 the Otto- 



20 



Historical Setting 



man victory at the Battle of Mohacs led to the taking of Buda 
on the Danube. Vienna was besieged unsuccessfully during the 
campaign season of 1529. North Africa up to the Moroccan 
frontier was brought under Ottoman suzerainty in the 1520s 
and 1530s, and governors named by the sultan were installed in 
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. In 1534 Kurdistan and Mesopo- 
tamia were taken from Persia. The latter conquest gave the 
Ottomans an outlet to the Persian Gulf, where they were soon 
engaged in a naval war with the Portuguese. 

When Suleyman died in 1566, the Ottoman Empire was a 
world power. Most of the great cities of Islam — Mecca, Medina, 
Jerusalem, Damascus, Cairo, Tunis, and Baghdad — were under 
the sultan's crescent flag. The Porte exercised direct control 
over Anatolia, the sub-Danubian Balkan provinces, Syria, Pales- 
tine, and Mesopotamia. Egypt, Mecca, and the North African 
provinces were governed under special regulations, as were sat- 
ellite domains in Arabia and the Caucasus, and among the 
Crimean Tartars. In addition, the native rulers of Wallachia, 
Moldavia, Transylvania, and Ragusa (Dubrovnik) were vassals 
of the sultan. 

The Ottomans had always dealt with the European states 
from a position of strength. Treaties with them took the form 
of truces approved by the sultan as a favor to lesser princes, 
provided that payment of tribute accompanied the settlement. 
The Ottomans were slow to recognize the shift in the military 
balance to Europe and the reasons for it. They also increasingly 
permitted European commerce to penetrate the barriers built 
to protect imperial autarky. Some native craft industries were 
destroyed by the influx of European goods, and, in general, the 
balance of trade shifted to the disadvantage of the empire, 
making it in time an indebted client of European producers. 

European political intervention followed economic penetra- 
tion. In 1536 the Ottoman Empire, then at the height of its 
power, had voluntarily granted concessions to France, but the 
system of capitulations introduced at that time was later used to 
impose important limitations on Ottoman sovereignty. Com- 
mercial privileges were greatly extended, and residents who 
came under the protection of a treaty country were thereby 
made subject to the jurisdiction of that country's law rather 
than Ottoman law, an arrangement that led to flagrant abuses 
of justice. The last thirty years of the sixteenth century saw the 
rapid onset of a decline in Ottoman power symbolized by the 
defeat of the Turkish fleet by the Spanish and Portuguese at 



21 



Turkey: A Country Study 

the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 and by the unbridled bloody suc- 
cession struggles within the imperial palace, the Seraglio of 
Constantinople. 

Koprulu Era 

Ottoman imperial decadence was finally halted by a notable 
family of imperial bureaucrats, the Koprulu family, which for 
more than forty years (1656-1703) provided the empire with 
grand viziers, combining ambition and ruthlessness with genu- 
ine talent. Mehmet, followed by his son Ahmet, overhauled the 
bureaucracy and instituted military reforms. Crete and Lem- 
nos were taken from Venice, and large provinces in Ukraine 
were wrested temporarily from Poland and Russia. The 
Koprulu family also resumed the offensive against Austria, 
pushing the Ottoman frontier to within 120 kilometers of 
Vienna. An attempt in 1664 to capture the Habsburg capital 
was beaten back, but Ahmet Koprulu extorted a huge tribute as 
the price of a nineteen-year truce. When it expired in 1683, the 
Ottoman army again invaded Austria, laying siege to Vienna 
for two months, only to be routed ultimately by a relief force 
led by the king of Poland, Jan Sobieski. 

The siege of Vienna was the high-water mark of Ottoman 
expansion in Europe, and its failure opened Hungary to recon- 
quest by the European powers. In a ruinous sixteen-year war, 
Russia and the Holy League — composed of Austria, Poland, 
and Venice, and organized under the aegis of the pope — finally 
drove the Ottomans south of the Danube and east of the Car- 
pathians. Under the terms of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, 
the first in which the Ottomans acknowledged defeat, Hun- 
gary, Transylvania, and Croatia were formally relinquished to 
Austria. Poland recovered Podolia, and Dalmatia and the 
Morea were ceded to Venice. In a separate peace the next year, 
Russia received the Azov region (see fig. 6). 

The last of the Koprulu rulers fell from power when Mustafa 
II (r. 1695-1703) was forced by rebellious janissaries to abdi- 
cate. Under Ahmet III (r. 1703-30), effective control of the 
government passed to the military leaders. Ahmet Ill's reign is 
referred to as the "tulip period" because of the popularity of 
tulip cultivation in Istanbul during those years. At this time, 
Peter the Great of Russia moved to eliminate the Ottoman 
presence on the north shore of the Black Sea. Russia's main 
objective in the region subsequently was to win access to warm- 
water ports on the Black Sea and then to obtain an opening to 



22 



Historical Setting 



the Mediterranean through the Ottoman-controlled Bosporus 
and Dardanelles straits. Despite territorial gains at Ottoman 
expense, however, Russia was unable to achieve these goals, 
and the Black Sea remained for the time an "Ottoman lake" on 
which Russian warships were prohibited. 

External Threats and Internal Transformations 

During the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was 
almost continuously at war with one or more of its enemies — 
Persia, Poland, Austria, and Russia. Under the humiliating 
terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynarja that ended the Russo- 
Ottoman War of 1768-74, the Porte abandoned the Tartar kha- 
nate in the Crimea, granted autonomy to the Trans-Danubian 
provinces, allowed Russian ships free access to Ottoman waters, 
and agreed to pay a large war indemnity. 

The implications of the decline of Ottoman power, the vul- 
nerability and attractiveness of the empire's vast holdings, the 
stirrings of nationalism among its subject peoples, and the peri- 
odic crises resulting from these and other factors became col- 
lectively known to European diplomats in the nineteenth 
century as "the Eastern Question." In 1853 Tsar Nicholas I of 
Russia described the Ottoman Empire as "the sick man of 
Europe." The problem from the viewpoint of European diplo- 
macy was how to dispose of the empire in such a manner that 
no one power would gain an advantage at the expense of the 
others and upset the political balance of Europe. 

The first nineteenth-century crisis to bring about European 
intervention was the Greek War of Independence (1821-32). 
In 1827 an Anglo-French fleet destroyed the Ottoman and 
Egyptian fleets at the Battle of Navarino, while the Russian 
army advanced as far as Edirne before a cease-fire was called in 
1829. The European powers forced the Porte to recognize 
Greek independence under the London Convention of 1832. 

Muhammad Ali, an Ottoman officer who had been desig- 
nated pasha of Egypt by the sultan in 1805, had given substan- 
tial aid to the Ottoman cause in the Greek war. When he was 
not rewarded as promised for his assistance, he invaded Syria in 
1831 and pursued the retreating Ottoman army deep into Ana- 
tolia. In desperation, the Porte appealed to Russia for support. 
Britain then intervened, constraining Muhammad Ali to with- 
draw from Anatolia to Syria. The price the sultan paid Russia 
for its assistance was the Treaty of Hiinkar Iskelesi of 1833. 



23 



Turkey: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



Under this treaty, the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits were to 
be closed on Russian demand to naval vessels of other powers. 

War with Muhammad Ali resumed in 1839, and Ottoman 
forces were again defeated. Russia waived its rights under the 
1833 treaty and aligned itself with British efforts to support the 
Ottoman Empire militarily and diplomatically. Under the Lon- 
don Convention of 1840, Muhammad Ali was forced to aban- 
don his claim to Syria, but he was recognized as hereditary 
ruler of Egypt under nominal Ottoman suzerainty. Under an 
additional protocol, in 1841 the Porte undertook to close the 
straits to warships of all powers. 

The Ottoman Empire fought two more wars with Russia in 
the nineteenth century. The Crimean War (1854-56) pitted 
France, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire against Russia. 
Under the Treaty of Paris, which ended the war, Russia aban- 
doned its claim to protect Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman 
Empire and renounced the right to intervene in the Balkans. 
War resumed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 
1877. Russia opened hostilities in response to Ottoman sup- 
pression of uprisings in Bulgaria and to the threat posed to Ser- 
bia by Ottoman forces. The Russian army had driven through 
Bulgaria and reached as far as Edirne when the Porte acceded 
to the terms imposed by a new agreement, the Treaty of San 
Stefano. The treaty reduced Ottoman holdings in Europe to 
eastern Thrace and created a large, independent Bulgarian 
state under Russian protection. 

Refusing to accept the dominant position of Russia in the 
Balkans, the other European powers called the Congress of 
Berlin in 1878. At this conclave, the Europeans agreed to a 
much smaller autonomous Bulgarian state under nominal 
Ottoman suzerainty. Serbia and Romania were recognized as 
fully independent states, and the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina were placed under Austrian administration. 
Cyprus, although remaining technically part of the Ottoman 
Empire, became a British protectorate. For all its wartime exer- 
tions, Russia received only minor territorial concessions in 
Bessarabia and the Caucasus. In the course of the nineteenth 
century, France seized Algeria and Tunisia, while Britain began 
its occupation of Egypt in 1882. In all these cases, the occupied 
territories formerly had belonged to the Ottoman Empire. 

The Ottoman Empire had a dual economy in the nineteenth 
century consisting of a large subsistence sector and a small 
colonial-style commercial sector linked to European markets 



25 



Turkey: A Country Study 

and controlled by foreign interests. The empire's first railroads, 
for example, were built by foreign investors to bring the cash 
crops of Anatolia's coastal valleys — tobacco, grapes, and other 
fruit — to Smyrna (Izmir) for processing and export. The cost 
of maintaining a modern army without a thorough reform of 
economic institutions caused expenditures to be made in 
excess of tax revenues. Heavy borrowing from foreign banks in 
the 1870s to reinforce the treasury and the undertaking of new 
loans to pay the interest on older ones created a financial crisis 
that in 1881 obliged the Porte to surrender administration of 
the Ottoman debt to a commission representing foreign inves- 
tors. The debt commission collected public revenues and trans- 
ferred the receipts directly to creditors in Europe. 

The 1860s and early 1870s saw the emergence of the Young 
Ottoman movement among Western-oriented intellectuals who 
wanted to see the empire accepted as an equal by the Euro- 
pean powers. They sought to adopt Western political institu- 
tions, including an efficient centralized government, an 
elected parliament, and a written constitution. The "Ottoman- 
ism" they advocated also called for an integrated dynastic state 
that would subordinate Islam to secular interests and allow 
non-Muslim subjects to participate in representative parliamen- 
tary institutions. 

In 1876 the hapless sultan was deposed by a fetva (legal opin- 
ion) obtained by Midhat Pasha, a reformist minister sympa- 
thetic to the aims of the Young Ottomans. His successor, Abdul 
Hamid II (r. 1876-1909), came to the throne with the approval 
of Midhat and other reformers. In December of that year, on 
the eve of the war with Russia, the new sultan promulgated a 
constitution, based on European models, that had been 
drafted by senior political, military, and religious officials 
under Midhat's direction. Embodying the substance of the 
Young Ottoman program, this document created a representa- 
tive parliament, guaranteed religious liberty, and provided for 
enlarged freedom of expression. Abdul Hamid IPs acceptance 
of constitutionalism was a temporary tactical expedient to gain 
the throne, however. Midhat was dismissed in February 1877 
and was later murdered. The sultan called the empire's first 
parliament but dissolved it within a year. 

Unrest in Eastern Rumelia led the European powers to insist 
on the union of that province with Bulgaria in 1885. Mean- 
while, Greek and Bulgarian partisans were carrying on a run- 
ning battle with Ottoman forces in Macedonia. In addition, the 



26 



Historical Setting 



repression of revolutionary activities in Armenia during 1894- 
96 cost about 300,000 lives and aroused European public opin- 
ion against the Ottoman regime. Outside support for a rebel- 
lion on Crete also caused the Porte to declare war on Greece in 
1897. Although the Ottoman army defeated the Greeks deci- 
sively in Thrace, the European powers forced a compromise 
peace that kept Crete under Ottoman suzerainty while install- 
ing the son of the Greek king as its governor. 

More isolated from Europe than it had been for half a cen- 
tury, the Ottoman regime could count on support only from 
Germany, whose friendship offered Abdul Hamid II a conge- 
nial alternative to British and French intervention. In 1902 
Germany was granted a ninety-nine-year concession to build 
and operate a Beiiin-to-Baghdad rail connection. Germany 
continued to invest in the Ottoman economy, and German offi- 
cers held training and command posts in the Ottoman army. 

Opposition to the sultan's regime continued to assert itself 
among Westernized intellectuals and liberal members of the 
ruling class. Some continued to advocate "Ottomanism," 
whereas others argued for pan-Turanism, the union of Turkic- 
speaking peoples inside and outside the Ottoman Empire. The 
Turkish nationalist ideologist of the period was the writer Ziya 
Gokalp, who defined Turkish nationalism within the context of 
the Ottoman Empire. Gokalp went much farther than his con- 
temporaries, however, by calling for the adoption of the vernac- 
ular in place of Ottoman Turkish. Gokalp's advocacy of a 
national Turkish state in which folk culture and Western values 
would play equally important revitalizing roles foreshadowed 
events a quarter-century in the future. 

The Young Turks 

The repressive policies of Abdul Hamid II fostered disaffec- 
tion, especially among those educated in Europe or in Western- 
ized schools. Young officers and students who conspired 
against the sultan's regime coalesced into small groups, largely 
outside Istanbul. One young officer, Mustafa Kemal (later 
known as Ataturk), organized a secret society among fellow 
officers in Damascus and, later, in Thessaloniki (Salonika) in 
present-day Greece. Atatiirk's group merged with other nation- 
alist reform organizations in 1907 to form the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP). Also known as the Young Turks, 
this group sought to restore the 1876 constitution and unify 
the diverse elements of the empire into a homogeneous nation 



27 



Turkey: A Country Study 

through greater government centralization under a parliamen- 
tary regime. 

In July 1908, army units in Macedonia revolted and 
demanded a return to constitutional government. Appearing 
to yield, Abdul Hamid II approved parliamentary elections in 
November in which the CUP won all but one of the Turkish 
seats under a system that allowed proportional representation 
of all millets. The Young Turk government was weakened by 
splits between nationalist and liberal reformers, however, and 
was threatened by traditionalist Muslims and by demands from 
non-Turkish communities for greater autonomy. Abdul Hamid 
II was forced to abdicate and was succeeded by his brother, 
Mehmet V, in 1909. Foreign powers took advantage of the 
political instability in Istanbul to seize portions of the empire. 
Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after 
the 1908 revolution, and Bulgaria proclaimed its complete 
independence. Italy declared war in 1911 and seized Libya. 
Having earlier formed a secret alliance, Greece, Serbia, Mon- 
tenegro, and Bulgaria invaded Ottoman-held Macedonia and 
Thrace in October 1912. Ottoman forces were defeated, and 
the empire lost all of its European holdings except part of east- 
ern Thrace. 

The disasters befalling the empire led to internal political 
change. The liberal government in power since July 1912 was 
overthrown in January 1913 in a coup engineered by Enver 
Pasha, and the most authoritarian elements of the Young Turk 
movement gained full control. A second Balkan war broke out 
in June 1913, when the Balkan allies began fighting among 
themselves over the division of the spoils from the first war. 
Taking advantage of the situation, Ottoman forces turned on 
Bulgaria, regaining Edirne and establishing the western 
boundary of the empire at the Maritsa River. 

After a brief period of constitutional rule, the leadership of 
the CUP emerged as a military dictatorship with power concen- 
trated in the hands of a triumvirate consisting of Mehmet Talat 
Pasha, Ahmet Cemal Pasha, and Enver, who, as minister of war, 
was its acknowledged leader in the war. 

World War I 

As the two European alliance systems drew closer to war in 
1914, Enver's pronounced pro-German sympathies, shared by 
many in the military and bureaucracy, prevailed over the prag- 
matic neutrality proposed by Talat and Cemal. Germany had 



28 



Ruins of ancient Troy 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



been pro-Ottoman during the Balkan wars, but the Porte had 
no outstanding differences with either Britain or France in the 
summer of 1914. In guiding his government toward alignment 
with Germany, Enver was able to play on fear of the traditional 
Ottoman enemy, Russia, the ally of Britain and France in the 
war. 

On August 2, 1914, Enver concluded a secret treaty of alli- 
ance with Germany. General mobilization was ordered the next 
day, and in the following weeks concessions granted to foreign 
powers under the capitulations were canceled. It remained for 
Germany, however, to provide the casus belli. Two German mil- 
itary vessels — the battleship Goben and the heavy cruiser Bres- 
lau — that had been caught in a neutral Ottoman port when war 
broke out in Europe were turned over to the Ottoman navy. In 
October they put to sea with German officers and crews and 
shelled Odessa and other Russian ports while flying the Otto- 



29 



Turkey: A Country Study 

man flag. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 
November 5, followed the next day by Britain and France. 
Within six months, the Ottoman army of about 800,000 men 
was engaged in a four-front war that became part of the greater 
conflict of World War I. 

Enver launched an ill-prepared offensive in the winter of 
1914-15 against the Russians in the Caucasus, vainly hoping 
that an impressive demonstration of Ottoman strength there 
would incite an insurrection among the tsar's Turkish-speaking 
subjects. Instead, a Russian counteroffensive inflicted stagger- 
ing losses on Ottoman forces, driving them back to Lake Van. 
During the campaign in eastern Anatolia, assistance was given 
to the Russians by some Armenians, who saw them as liberators 
rather than invaders. Armenian units were also part of the Rus- 
sian army. Enver claimed that an Armenian conspiracy existed 
and that a generalized revolt by the Armenians was imminent. 
During the winter months of 1915, as the shattered Ottoman 
army retreated toward Lake Van, a massive deportation of as 
many as 2 million Armenians was undertaken in the war zone. 
It shortly degenerated into a massacre, as ethnic Turks and 
Kurds descended on Armenian villages or slaughtered refugees 
along the road. The most conservative estimates put the num- 
ber of dead at 600,000, but other sources cite figures of more 
than 1 million. The situation of those Armenians who survived 
the march out of Anatolia was scarcely improved under the mil- 
itary government in Syria. Others managed to escape behind 
Russian lines. The episode occasioned a revulsion in Western 
Europe that had its effect in the harsh terms meted out by the 
Allies in the postwar settlement. 

In the spring of 1915, the Allies undertook naval and land 
operations in the Dardanelles that were intended to knock the 
Ottoman Empire out of the war with one blow and to open the 
straits for the passage of supplies to Russia. Amphibious land- 
ings were carried out at Gallipoli, but British forces, vigorously 
opposed by forces commanded by Atatiirk, were unable to 
expand their beachheads. The last units of the expeditionary 
force were evacuated by February 1916. 

In Mesopotamia the Ottoman army defeated a British expe- 
ditionary force that had marched on Baghdad from a base 
established at Basra in 1915. The British mounted a new offen- 
sive in 1917, taking Baghdad and driving Ottoman forces out of 
Mesopotamia. In eastern Anatolia, Russian armies won a series 
of battles that carried their control west to Erzincan by July 



30 



Historical Setting 



1916, although Atatiirk, who was then given command of the 
eastern front, led a counteroffensive that checked the Russian 
advance. Russia left the war after the Bolshevik Revolution in 

1917. The new Russian government concluded the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers in March 1918, under 
which the Ottoman Empire regained its eastern provinces. 

Sharif Husayn ibn Ali, the sultan's regent in Mecca and the 
Hijaz region of western Arabia, launched the Arab Revolt in 

1916. The British provided advisers, of whom T.E. Lawrence 
was to become the best known, as well as supplies. In October 

1917, British forces in Egypt opened an offensive into Pales- 
tine; they took Jerusalem by December. After hard fighting, 
British and Arab forces entered Damascus in October 1918. 
Late in the campaign, Atatiirk succeeded to command of Turk- 
ish forces in Syria and withdrew many units intact into Anato- 
lia. 

Ottoman resistance was exhausted. Early in October, the war 
government resigned, and the Young Turk triumvirate — Enver, 
Talat, and Cemal— fled to exile in Germany. Mehmet VI (r. 
1918-22), who had succeeded to the rule upon his brother's 
death in July, sued for peace through a government headed by 
liberal ministers that signed an armistice at Mudros on Octo- 
ber 30, 1918, that had been dictated by the Allies. Allied war- 
ships steamed through the Dardanelles and anchored off 
Istanbul on November 12, the day after the end of the war in 
Europe. In four years of war, the Ottoman Empire had mobi- 
lized about 2.8 million men, of whom about 325,000 were 
killed in battle. In addition, more than 2 million civilians, 
including both Turks and Armenians, are believed to have died 
of war-related causes. Talat and Cemal, who were held responsi- 
ble for the deportation of Armenians and the mistreatment of 
refugees, were assassinated by Armenian nationalists in 1921. 
The following year, Enver was killed while fighting the Bolshe- 
viks in Central Asia. 

Atatiirk and the Turkish Nation 

Atatiirk returned to Istanbul at the end of the war, his mili- 
tary reputation untarnished by the defeat of the empire that he 
had served. Revered by his troops as well as the Turkish masses, 
Atatiirk soon emerged as the standard-bearer of the Turkish 
nationalist movement. 

Born in Thessaloniki in 1881, Atatiirk was the son of a minor 
government official in a city where Turks outnumbered 



31 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Greeks. His ardent Turkish nationalism dated from his early 
days as a cadet in the military school at Monastir (in the 
present-day Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) during a 
time of constant conflict between Ottoman troops and Mace- 
donian guerrillas, who attacked the Turkish population in the 
region. Following graduation from the military academy in 
Istanbul, Atatiirk held various staff positions and served in gar- 
risons at Damascus and Thessaloniki, where he became 
involved in nationalist activities. He took part in the coup that 
forced Abdul Hamid IFs abdication in 1909. Atatiirk organized 
irregular forces in Libya during the war with Italy in 1911 and 
subsequently held field commands in the two Balkan wars 
(1912-13). Assigned to a post in the Ministry of War after the 
armistice, Atatiirk quickly recognized the extent of Allied 
intentions toward the Ottoman Empire. 

Plans for Partitioning Turkey 

Allied troops — British, French, and Italian, as well as a con- 
tingent of Greeks — occupied Istanbul and were permitted 
under the conditions of the armistice to intervene in areas 
where they considered their interests to be imperiled. During 
the war, the Allies had negotiated a series of agreements that 
outlined not only the definitive dismantling of the Ottoman 
Empire but also the partitioning among them of what Turkish 
nationalists had come to regard as the Turkish homeland. 
According to these agreements, Russia was at last to be 
rewarded with possession of Istanbul and the straits, as well as 
eastern Anatolia as far south as Bitlis below Lake Van. France 
and Italy were conceded portions of Anatolia, and Britain had 
promised Izmir to Greece — although it had also been prom- 
ised to Italy — to encourage Greek entry into the war in 1917. 

The Bolshevik government had renounced tsarist claims 
when it made its separate peace at Brest-Litovsk, but Britain, 
France, Italy, and Greece all pressed their respective claims at 
the Paris peace talks in 1919. All agreed with the provisions of 
President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points calling for an 
independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan. How the 
Allies would implement the clause providing that the Turkish- 
speaking nation "should be assured of a secure sovereignty" was 
not clear. 

The terms of a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire were 
presented by the Allies in April 1920 at San Remo, Italy, and 
were embodied in the Treaty of Sevres, which was concluded 



32 



Historical Setting 



the following August. The treaty was shaped by the wartime 
agreements made by the Allies. In addition, France received a 
mandate over Lebanon and Syria (including what is now Hatay 
Province in Turkey), and Britain's mandate covered Iraq, Jor- 
dan, and Palestine. Eastern Thrace up to a line from the Black 
Sea to the Sea of Marmara as well as Izmir and its hinterland 
were to be occupied by Greece, with the final disposition of the 
territory to be decided in a plebiscite. The Treaty of Sevres was 
never enforced as such, as events in Turkey soon rendered it 
irrelevant. 

Nationalist Movement 

The sultan was kept in the custody of the Allies to ensure the 
cooperation of an Ottoman administration, which had effec- 
tive jurisdiction only in Istanbul and part of northern Anatolia, 
while they disposed of the rest of his empire. At the same time, 
a Turkish nationalist movement was organized under Ataturk' s 
leadership to resist the dismemberment of Turkish-speaking 
areas. Ataturk had been sent to eastern Anatolia as inspector 
general, ostensibly to supervise the demobilization of Ottoman 
forces and the disposition of supplies, but more particularly to 
remove him from the capital after he had expressed opposition 
to the Allied occupation there. Upon his arrival at Samsun in 
May 1919, Ataturk proceeded to rally support for the national- 
ist cause and to recruit a nationalist army. Guerrilla warfare 
against the government gradually grew to full-fledged cam- 
paigns against the Greek army that threatened to involve the 
other Allied occupation forces. 

In July 1919, a nationalist congress met at Erzurum with 
Ataturk presiding to endorse a protocol calling for an indepen- 
dent Turkish state. In September the congress reconvened at 
Sivas. Although the delegates voiced their loyalty to the sultan- 
caliph, they also pledged to maintain the integrity of the Turk- 
ish nation. The congress adopted the National Pact, which 
defined objectives of the nationalist movement that were not 
open to compromise. Among its provisions were the renuncia- 
tion of claims to the Arab provinces, the principle of the abso- 
lute integrity of all remaining Ottoman territory inhabited by a 
Turkish Muslim majority, a guarantee of minority rights, the 
retention of Istanbul and the straits, and rejection of any 
restriction on the political, judicial, and financial rights of the 
nation. 



33 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Negotiations continued between the nationalist congress 
and the Ottoman government, but to no avail. Ataturk 
resigned from the army when relieved of his duties. The nam- 
ing of a chief minister in Istanbul considered sympathetic to 
the nationalist cause brought a brief improvement in relations, 
however, and the Ottoman parliament, which met in January 
1920, approved the National Pact. In reaction to these develop- 
ments, Allied occupation forces seized public buildings and 
reinforced their positions in the capital, arrested and deported 
numerous nationalist leaders, and had parliament dismissed. 

Allied actions brought a quick response from the national- 
ists. In April they convened the Grand National Assembly in 
Ankara, in defiance of the Ottoman regime, and elected 
Ataturk its president. The Law of Fundamental Organization 
(also known as the Organic Law) was adopted in January 1921. 
With this legislation, the nationalists proclaimed that sover- 
eignty belonged to the nation and was exercised on its behalf 
by the Grand National Assembly. 

War of Independence 

During the summer and fall of 1919, with authorization 
from the Supreme Allied War Council, the Greeks occupied 
Edirne, Bursa, and Izmir. A landing was effected at the latter 
port under the protection of an Allied flotilla that included 
United States warships. The Greeks soon moved as far as Usak, 
175 kilometers inland from Izmir. Military action between 
Turks and Greeks in Anatolia in 1920 was inconclusive, but the 
nationalist cause was strengthened the next year by a series of 
important victories. In January and again in April, Ismet Pasha 
defeated the Greek army at Inonu, blocking its advance into 
the interior of Anatolia. In July, in the face of a third offensive, 
the Turkish forces fell back in good order to the Sakarya River, 
eighty kilometers from Ankara, where Ataturk took personal 
command and decisively defeated the Greeks in a twenty-day 
battle. 

An improvement in Turkey's diplomatic situation accompa- 
nied its military success. Impressed by the viability of the 
nationalist forces, both France and Italy withdrew from Anato- 
lia by October 1921. Treaties were signed that year with Soviet 
Russia, the first European power to recognize the nationalists, 
establishing the boundary between the two countries. As early 
as 1919, the Turkish nationalists had cooperated with the Bol- 
shevik government in attacking the newly proclaimed Arme- 



34 



Historical Setting 



nian republic. Armenian resistance was broken by the summer 
of 1921, and the Kars region was occupied by the Turks. In 
1922 the nationalists recognized the Soviet absorption of what 
remained of the Armenian state. 

The final drive against the Greeks began in August 1922. In 
September the Turks moved into Izmir, where thousands were 
killed during the ensuing fighting and in the disorder that fol- 
lowed the city's capture. Greek soldiers and refugees, who had 
crowded into Izmir, were rescued by Allied ships. 

The nationalist army then concentrated on driving remain- 
ing Greek forces out of eastern Thrace, but the new campaign 
threatened to put the Turks in direct confrontation with Allied 
contingents defending access to the straits and holding Istan- 
bul, where they were protecting the Ottoman government. A 
crisis was averted when Atatvirk accepted a British-proposed 
truce that brought an end to the fighting and also signaled that 
the Allies were unwilling to intervene on behalf of the Greeks. 
In compliance with the Armistice of Mundanya, concluded in 
October, Greek troops withdrew beyond the Maritsa River, 
allowing the Turkish nationalists to occupy territory up to that 
boundary. The agreement entailed acceptance of a continued 
x\llied presence in the straits and in Istanbul until a compre- 
hensive settlement could be reached. 

At the end of October 1922, the Allies invited the nationalist 
and Ottoman governments to a conference at Lausanne, Swit- 
zerland, but Atattirk was determined that the nationalist gov- 
ernment should be Turkey's sole representative. In November 
1922, the Grand National Assembly separated the offices of sul- 
tan and caliph and abolished the former. The assembly further 
stated that the Ottoman regime had ceased to be the govern- 
ment of Turkey when the Allies seized the capital in 1920, in 
effect abolishing the Ottoman Empire. Mehmet VI went into 
exile on Malta, and his cousin, Abdulmecid, was named caliph. 

Turkey was the only power defeated in World War I to nego- 
tiate with the Allies as an equal and to influence the provisions 
of the resultant treaty. Ismet Pasha was the chief Turkish nego- 
tiator at the Lausanne Conference, which opened in Novem- 
ber 1922. The National Pact of 1919 was the basis of the 
Turkish negotiating position, and its provisions were incorpo- 
rated in the Treaty of Lausanne, concluded in July 1923. With 
this treaty, the Allies recognized the present-day territory of 
Turkey and denied Turkey's claim to the Mosul area in the east 
(in present-day Iraq) and Hatay, which included the Mediterra- 



35 



Turkey: A Country Study 



nean port of Alexandretta (Iskenderun). The boundary with 
the newly created state of Iraq was settled by a League of 
Nations initiative in 1926, and Iskenderun was ceded in 1939 
by France during its rule as mandatory power for Syria. 

Detailed provisions of the treaty regulated use of the straits. 
General supervisory powers were given to a straits commission 
under the League of Nations, and the straits area was to be 
demilitarized after completion of the Allied withdrawal. Turkey 
was to hold the presidency of the commission, which included 
the Soviet Union among its members. The capitulations and 
foreign administration of the Ottoman public debt, which 
infringed on the sovereignty of Turkey, were abolished. Turkey, 
however, assumed 40 percent of the Ottoman debt, the remain- 
der being apportioned among other former Ottoman territo- 
ries. Turkey was also required to maintain low tariffs on 
imports from signatory powers until 1929. The Treaty of Lau- 
sanne reaffirmed the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim Turk- 
ish nationals. Turkey and Greece arranged a mandatory 
exchange of their respective ethnic Greek and Turkish minori- 
ties, with the exception of some Greeks in Istanbul and Turks 
in western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands. 

On October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly pro- 
claimed the Republic of Turkey. Ataturk was named its presi- 
dent and Ankara its capital, and the modern state of Turkey 
was born. 

Ataturk's Reforms 

On assuming office, Ataturk initiated a series of radical 
reforms of the country's political, social, and economic life that 
were aimed at rapidly transforming Turkey into a modern state 
(see table A). A secular legal code, modeled along European 
lines, was introduced that completely altered laws affecting 
women, marriage, and family relations. 

Ataturk also urged his fellow citizens to look and act like 
Europeans. Turks were encouraged to wear European-style 
clothing. Surnames were adopted: Mustafa Kemal, for exam- 
ple, became Kemal Ataturk, and Ismet Pasha took Inonii as his 
surname to commemorate his victories there. Likewise, Ataturk 
insisted on cutting links with the past that he considered 
anachronistic. Titles of honor were abolished. The wearing of 
the fez, which had been introduced a century earlier as a mod- 
ernizing reform to replace the turban, was outlawed because it 



36 



Historical Setting 



Table A. Chronobgy of Major Kemalist Reforms 



Year 


Reform 


1922 


Sultanate abolished (November 1). 




Treaty of Lausanne secured (July 24) . 




Republic of Turkey with capital at Ankara proclaimed (October 29). 


1924 


Caliphate abolished (March 3). 




Traditional religious schools closed, seriat abolished. Constitution 




adorned fAnril 90) 


1925 


Dervish brotherhoods abolished. 




Fez outlawed by the Hat Law (November 25). Veiling of women discour- 




aged; Western clothing for men and women encouraged. 




Western (Gregorian) calendar adopted. 


1926 


New civil, commercial, and penal codes based on European models 




adopted. New civil code ended Islamic polygamy and divorce by 




renunciation and introduced civil marriage. 




Millet system ended. 


1927 


First systematic census. 


1928 






secular (April 10); constitutional provision establishing Islam as offi- 




cial religion deleted. 


1933 


Islamic call to worship and public readings of the Kuran (Quran) 




required to be in Turkish rather than Arabic. 


1934 


Women given the vote and the right to hold office. 




Law of Surnames adopted — Mustafa Kemal given the name Kemal 




Ataturk (Father Turk) by the Grand National Assembly, Ismet Pasha 




took surname of Inonu. 


1935 


Sunday adopted as legal weekly holiday. 




State role in managing economy written into the constitution. 



had become for the nationalists a symbol of the reactionary 
Ottoman regime. 

The ideological foundation of Ataturk's reform program 
became known as Kemalism. Its main points were enumerated 
in the "Six Arrows" of Kemalism: republicanism, nationalism, 
populism, reformism, etatism (statism), and secularism. These 
were regarded as "fundamental and unchanging principles" 
guiding the republic, and were written into its constitution. 
The principle of republicanism was contained in the constitu- 
tional declaration that "sovereignty is vested in the nation" and 
not in a single ruler. Displaying considerable ingenuity, Ataturk 
set about reinventing the Turkish language and recasting Turk- 
ish history in a nationalist mold. The president himself went 
out into the park in Ankara on Sunday, the newly established 
day of rest, to teach the Latin alphabet adapted to Turkish as 
part of the language reform. Populism encompassed not only 
the notion that all Turkish citizens were equal but that all of 



37 



Turkey: A Country Study 

them were Turks. What remained of the millet system that had 
provided communal autonomy to other ethnic groups was 
abolished. Reformism legitimized the radical means by which 
changes in Turkish political and social life were implemented. 
Etatism emphasized the central role reserved to the state in 
directing the nation's economic activities. This concept was 
cited particularly to justify state planning of Turkey's mixed 
economy and large-scale investment in state-owned enterprises. 
An important aim of Ataturk's economic policies was to pre- 
vent foreign interests from exercising undue influence on the 
Turkish economy. 

Of all the Kemalist reforms, the exclusion of Islam from an 
official role in the life of the nation shocked Ataturk's contem- 
poraries most profoundly. The abolition of the caliphate ended 
any connection between the state and religion. The Islamic 
religious orders were suppressed, religious schools were closed, 
public education was secularized, and the seriatwas revoked. 
These changes required readjustment of the entire social 
framework of the Turkish people. Despite subsequent protests, 
Atatiirk conceded nothing to the traditionalists. 

In 1924 the Grand National Assembly adopted a new consti- 
tution to replace the 1876 document that had continued to 
serve as the legal framework of the republican government. 
The 1924 constitution vested sovereign power in the Grand 
National Assembly as representative of the people, to whom it 
also guaranteed basic civil rights. Under the new document, 
the assembly would be a unicameral body elected to a four-year 
term by universal suffrage. Its legislative authority would 
include responsibility for approving the budget, ratifying trea- 
ties, and declaring war. The president of the republic would be 
elected to a four-year term by the assembly, and he in turn 
would appoint the prime minister, who was expected to enjoy 
the confidence of the assembly (see table 3, Appendix A). 

Throughout his presidency, repeatedly extended by the 
assembly, Atatiirk governed Turkey essentially by personal rule 
in a one-party state. He founded the Republican People's Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi — CHP) in 1923 to represent the 
nationalist movement in elections and to serve as a vanguard 
party in support of the Kemalist reform program. Ataturk's Six 
Arrows were an integral part of the CHP's political platform. By 
controlling the CHP, Atatiirk also controlled the assembly and 
assured support there for the government he had appointed. 
Atatiirk regarded a stage of personal authoritarian rule as nec- 



38 



Historical Setting 



essary to secure his reforms before he entrusted the govern- 
ment of the country to the democratic process. 

Foreign Policy 

Ataturk's foreign policy, which had as its main object the 
preservation of the independence and integrity of the new 
republic, was careful, conservative, and successful. The presi- 
dent enunciated the principle of "peace at home and peace 
abroad." This guideline, whose observance was necessary to the 
task of internal nation building, became the cornerstone of 
Turkey's foreign relations. 

By the end of 1925, friendship treaties had been negotiated 
with fifteen states. These included a twenty-year treaty of 
friendship and neutrality signed that year with the Soviet 
Union that remained in effect until unilaterally abrogated by 
the Soviet Union in 1945. Turkey subsequently joined Greece, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia in the Balkan Pact to counter the 
increasingly aggressive foreign policy of fascist Italy and the 
effect of a potential Bulgarian alignment with Nazi Germany. 
Turkey also entered into a nonaggression treaty with Afghani- 
stan, Iraq, and Iran in 1937. 

Ataturk attained his greatest diplomatic success in 1936, 
when Turkey persuaded the signatory powers of the Treaty of 
Lausanne to allow Turkish control and remilitarization of the 
straits as part of the Montreux Convention. Under its terms, 
merchant vessels were to continue to have freedom of naviga- 
tion of the straits, but Turkey took over the functions of the 
international commission for registry, sanitary inspection, and 
the levying of tolls. Turkey was permitted to refortify the straits 
area and, if at war or under imminent threat of war, to close 
them to warships. 

Turkey after Ataturk 

Ataturk's death in Istanbul on November 10, 1938, caused an 
outpouring of grief throughout the Turkish nation. With much 
ceremony, the president's body was transported to Ankara and 
placed in a temporary tomb from which it was transferred in 
1953 to a newly completed mausoleum on a hill overlooking 
Ankara. The building has since become a national shrine. 

The stability of the new republic was made evident by the 
smoothness of the presidential succession. The day after 
Ataturk's death, the Grand National Assembly elected his chief 



39 



Turkey: A Country Study 

lieutenant, Inonii, president. Celal Bayar, who had succeeded 
Inonti as prime minister in 1937, continued in that office. 

World War II 

As tensions in Europe heightened, Inonti determined to 
keep Turkey neutral in the event of war, unless the country's 
vital interests were clearly at stake. The Nazi-Soviet nonaggres- 
sion pact of August 1939 prompted Turkey to sign a treaty of 
mutual assistance with Britain and France in October. Hedging 
its bets, the government concluded a nonaggression treaty with 
Nazi Germany on June 18, 1941, just four days before the Axis 
invasion of the Soviet Union. The early military successes of the 
Axis forces contributed to increased pro-German sentiment, 
even in some official circles. However, Inonti seems never to 
have wavered from his position that the Axis powers could not 
win the war. Despite German pressure, Turkey at no time per- 
mitted the passage of Axis troops, ships, or aircraft through or 
over Turkey and its waters, and the Montreux Convention was 
scrupulously enforced in the straits. Turkey broke diplomatic 
relations with Adolf Hitler's government in August 1944, and, 
in February 1945, declared war on Germany, a necessary pre- 
condition for participation in the Conference on International 
Organization, held in San Francisco in April 1945, from which 
the United Nations (UN) emerged. Turkey thereby became 
one of the fifty-one original members of the world organiza- 
tion. 

Multiparty Politics, 1946-60 

The UN charter was approved by the Grand National Assem- 
bly in August 1945, but the debate on the measure during the 
summer brought about Turkey's first major postwar domestic 
political conflict. A proposal was entered by former Prime Min- 
ister Bayar, Adnan Menderes, and two additional CHP deputies 
calling for changes in Turkish law to assure the domestic appli- 
cation of the liberties and rights to which the government had 
ostensibly subscribed by accepting the principles of the UN 
Charter. When the proposal was disallowed, its four propo- 
nents left the CHP and resigned their seats in the assembly. 

Despite the rejection of Menderes's proposal, the govern- 
ment relaxed many wartime controls and agreed to the further 
democratization of the political process. In January 1946, the 
Democrat Party (DP), headed by Bayar and Menderes, was reg- 
istered; it subsequently became the main focus of opposition to 



40 



Ancient Roman aqueduct 
in Istanbul 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



the CHR The general elections in July 1946 gave the DP sixty- 
two seats out of 465 in the assembly, demonstrating the appeal 
of the new party. Although the DP represented the interests of 
private business and industry, it also received strong support in 
rural areas. 

In the May 1950 general election, about 88 percent of an 
electorate totaling about 8.5 million went to the polls, return- 
ing a huge DP majority. In the assembly, 408 seats went to the 
DP and only sixty-nine to the CHP, whose unbroken domi- 
nance since the founding of the republic was thus ended. Bayar 
was elected president by the new assembly, replacing Inonii, 
and named Menderes prime minister. As expected, the Men- 
deres government's economic policy reduced reliance on state 
direction while encouraging private enterprise and foreign 
investment in industrial development. 

In the May 1954 election, the DP increased its parliamentary 
majority. Taking its election victory as a mandate to make 
sweeping changes, including reform of the civil service and 
state-run enterprises, the Menderes government obtained the 
passage of a legislative package by means that the opposition 
characterized as "undemocratic and authoritarian." The CHP 
concentrated its attacks on a government-sponsored law that 
limited freedom of the press. Tension increased when the press 
law was tightened further and restrictions were imposed on 



41 



Turkey: A Country Study 

public assembly several months before the scheduled October 
1957 election. The government argued that the legislation was 
necessary to prevent "irresponsible journalists" from inciting 
disorder. The inability of the two main political parties to coop- 
erate in the assembly brought the parliamentary process to a 
standstill as months passed. When a tour of central Anatolia by 
CHP leader Inonu in early 1960 became the occasion for out- 
breaks of violence along his route, the Menderes government 
reacted by suspending all political activity and imposing mar- 
tial law. On April 28, 1960, students in Istanbul who were dem- 
onstrating against government policies in defiance of martial 
law were fired on by police; several were killed. The following 
week, cadets from the military academy staged a protest march 
in solidarity with the student movement, thereby bringing an 
element of the armed forces into confrontation with civilian 
authorities. 

The Armed Forces Coup and Interim Rule, 1960-61 

Atatiirk had always insisted that the military forces, as a 
national institution above partisanship and factionalism, 
should stay out of politics. The military leadership traditionally 
had subscribed to this viewpoint, with the proviso that a major 
role of the armed forces was to act as guardian of the constitu- 
tion and Kemalism. By 1960, with the military already deeply 
involved in political affairs because of the government's use of 
martial law to enforce its policies, the senior command con- 
cluded that the government had departed from Kemalist prin- 
ciples and that the republic was in imminent danger of 
disintegration. On May 27, 1960, Turkish army units, under the 
direction of the chief of General Staff, Cemal Gursel, seized 
the principal government buildings and communications cen- 
ters and arrested President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, 
and most of the DP representatives in the Grand National 
Assembly, as well as a large number of other public officials. 
Those arrested were charged with abrogating the constitution 
and instituting a dictatorship. 

The coup was accomplished with little violence and was 
accepted quickly throughout the country. The government was 
replaced by the Committee of National Unity (CNU), com- 
posed of the thirty-eight officers who had organized the coup. 
The committee acted as supreme authority, appointing a cabi- 
net, initially consisting of five officers and thirteen civilians, to 
carry out executive functions. The number of civilians in the 



42 



Historical Setting 



cabinet, however, was later reduced to three. General Gursel, 
who had fought at Gallipoli under Atatiirk, temporarily 
assumed the positions of president, prime minister, and 
defense minister. At the outset, Gursel announced that the 
committee's rule would be of an interim nature and that gov- 
ernment would be returned to civilian hands at an early date. 

The most pressing problems the CNU faced in the first 
months after the coup were economic. The ousted regime had 
been responsible for inflation and heavy debt, and emergency 
austerity measures had to be taken to stabilize the economy. An 
economic planning agency, the State Planning Organization, 
was established to study social and economic conditions and to 
draw up the country's five-year development plans. 

In January 1961, a constituent assembly was formed in which 
the CNU participated. This interim legislature produced a new 
constitution, which, after much debate, it ratified in May and 
submitted to a popular referendum in July. This constitution, 
which created Turkey's so-called Second Republic, contained a 
number of substantial departures from the 1924 constitution 
but continued to embody the principles of Kemalism. The new 
constitution was approved by 60 percent of the electorate. The 
large opposition vote was a disappointment to the CNU and 
showed that sympathy for the DP persisted, particularly in 
socially conservative small towns and rural constituencies. 

Meanwhile, the trial of some 600 former government offi- 
cials and DP functionaries had begun in October 1960 on the 
island of Yassiada in the Bosporus. All but about 100 of those 
tried were found guilty, and fifteen death sentences were pro- 
nounced. Partly in response to public appeals for leniency, the 
death sentences of former President Bayar and eleven others 
were commuted to life imprisonment, but Menderes and two 
former cabinet ministers were hanged. 

Fourteen political parties offered candidates in the October 
1961 election, but only four won seats in the bicameral Grand 
National Assembly created under the new constitution. The 
results gave the CHP 173 seats in the lower house — the 450- 
member National Assembly — and only thirty-six in the 150- 
member Senate. The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi — AP), gener- 
ally recognized as the heir of the DP, obtained 158 seats in the 
lower house and seventy in the upper. The remaining seats 
were divided between the New Turkey Party and the Republi- 
can Peasants' Nation Party, subsequently renamed the Nation- 
alist Action Party (Milliyetci Haraket Partisi — MHP). The New 



43 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Turkey Party was led by onetime DP dissidents who had broken 
with Menderes in the mid-1950s; the MHP attracted militant 
rightists. Because neither of the two larger parties commanded 
a majority, formation of a broad coalition either between the 
two larger parties or between one of them and the two smaller 
parties would be necessary. 

Politics and Foreign Relations in the 1960s 

The new bicameral legislature elected General Gursel presi- 
dent of the republic. On taking office, he asked seventy-eight- 
year-old former President Inonu to form a government. Inonu, 
who had first been named prime minister by Atatiirk in 1923, 
attempted to reach an agreement with the AP for a coalition in 
which that party would share an equal number of cabinet posts 
with the CHP, but party leaders failed to resolve their differ- 
ences concerning amnesty for those convicted in the Yassiada 
trials. President Gursel and General Cevdet Sunay, chief of the 
General Staff, warned that the irresponsibility of some legisla- 
tors could provoke renewed military intervention in politics. In 
February 1962, a group of army officers staged a revolt in 
Ankara in protest of the role of the AP in government-pro- 
posed amnesty plans. The uprising was quickly suppressed, and 
suspected sympathizers in the officer corps were purged. Inonu 
subsequently introduced legislation granting amnesty to the 
officers involved in the revolt. In October 283 of those who had 
been convicted at Yassiada were given executive clemency on 
the recommendation of the assembly and freed. Another two 
years elapsed before former President Bayar and the remaining 
prisoners were released. 

The AP made such significant gains in the 1964 local elec- 
tions that Inonu stepped down as prime minister. After unsuc- 
cessful attempts by the AP and the CHP to form a government, 
an interim administration was appointed to serve until the 
October 1965 general election. Voters in that election gave the 
AP a clear majority in the Grand National Assembly. The vote 
allowed the new prime minister, forty-four-year-old Suleyman 
Demirel, to form a single-party government and claim a popu- 
lar mandate for his legislative program. An engineer and 
former head of the National Water Authority, Demirel was a 
onetime protege of Menderes. Although Demirel cultivated a 
pragmatic and technocratic image for the young party, the AP 
inherited the DP's identification with right-wing populism and 
catered to the same broadly based constituency. The party 



44 



Historical Setting 



attracted support from the business community and from arti- 
sans and shopkeepers, but its real strength lay in the peasantry 
and in the large number of workers who had recently arrived 
in the cities from the countryside. Although it never disavowed 
the principle of secularism enshrined in Kemalism, the AP pro- 
moted tolerance of the open expression of the traditional 
Islam that appealed to many in these latter groups. While 
accepting a large role for state enterprises in a mixed economy, 
the AP also encouraged the development of a stronger private 
sector than had been allowed previously and was receptive to 
foreign investment in Turkey. 

Although Demirel increased defense spending and took a 
hard line on law-and-order issues, military leaders remained 
suspicious of his party because of its roots in the DP. Demirel 
seemed to improve his standing among them by supporting the 
successful presidential candidacy of General Sunay when Giir- 
sel died in office in 1966, but objections by the military subse- 
quently forced the prime minister to withdraw legislation that 
would have restored full political rights to surviving former DP 
leaders. Enactment of other legislation was also hampered by 
growing factional splits in the AP. Representing the party's busi- 
ness-oriented liberal wing, Demirel urged greater reliance on a 
market economy. He was opposed on some issues and prodded 
on others by a traditionalist wing that was socially conservative, 
more agrarian in its orientation, and had ties to the Islamic 
movement. 

Following the CHP's defeat in the 1965 general election, that 
party engaged in an internal debate to determine its position 
in the left-right continuum. When forty-year-old Bulent Ecevit 
succeeded Inonii as party leader the following year, he sought 
to identify the CHP with the social democratic parties of West- 
ern Europe. The party platform favored state-directed invest- 
ment over private investment and recommended limits on 
foreign participation in the Turkish economy It also called for 
rapid expansion of public services financed by taxation that 
would restrict the growth of private incomes. Ecevit empha- 
sized the CHP's dedication to maintaining political secularism 
in contrast to the AP's leniency in the face of a revival of reli- 
gious influence. While promising to adhere to Turkey's defense 
commitments, he insisted on a more self-reliant foreign policy 
that included efforts to improve bilateral relations with the 
Soviet Union. 



45 



Turkey: A Country Study 

As party leader, Ecevit attempted to transform the CHP from 
an elitist party seeking to guide the nation from above into a 
mass movement involving a broadly based constituency in the 
political process. Ecevit's socialist rhetoric was compatible with 
the Kemalist principles of state direction of the economy, but 
the shift to the left he inaugurated caused dissension in the 
party. In 1967 forty-five CHP deputies broke away to form a 
centrist party that won nearly 7 percent of the vote in the Octo- 
ber 1969 general election. Both major parties lost votes, but 
right-of-center parties, led by the AP, outpolled the CHP and 
the small left-wing parties by nearly two to one, and the AP was 
able to increase its Grand National Assembly majority by six- 
teen seats. To some observers, the election results indicated a 
polarization of Turkish politics that would pull the AP and 
CHP in opposite directions and aggravate political extremism. 

The extreme left was represented in the Grand National 
Assembly during the 1960s by the Turkish Workers' Party 
(TWP). Its platform called for the redistribution of land, 
nationalization of industry and financial institutions, and the 
exclusion of foreign capital, and urged closer cooperation with 
the Soviet Union. The party attracted the support of only a 
small number of trade unionists and leftist intellectuals. 
Although it had won fifteen seats in the 1961 election, its share 
of the vote in 1965 and 1969 averaged less than 3 percent. Of 
greater consequence in the 1960s — and for the future — was the 
party of the extreme right led by Alparslan Tiirkes, one of the 
architects of the 1960 coup. Tiirkes had been among those offi- 
cers ousted from the CNU for opposing the restoration of dem- 
ocratic institutions. He subsequently resigned from the army 
and in 1965 took control of the Republican Peasants' Nation 
Party, later the MHP. Tiirkes came to personify the ultranation- 
alistic and authoritarian nature of his party. Labeled by some as 
fascist, the MHP demanded strong state action to maintain 
order and manage the economy. Although sympathetic to pri- 
vate ownership, the party was hostile toward capitalism and for- 
eign investment. Essentially secularist, the MHP nonetheless 
regarded Islam as one of the pillars of the Turkish state, and 
Tiirkes incorporated references to religion into his nationalist 
platform. 

Tiirkes's party had won 14 percent of the vote and fifty-four 
seats in the 1961 election, but electoral support plummeted to 
under 3 percent in 1965, when many marginal rightist voters 
switched to the AP. In 1969 the MHP was reduced to a single 



46 




St. Sophia in Istanbul, an Orthodox cathedral that became 
a mosque after the Ottoman conquest 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfus s 



seat in the Grand National Assembly; however, Turkes's inflam- 
matory rhetoric and confrontational tactics gave the party a 
higher profile than its strength at the polls alone would have 
justified. He organized the party on military lines and indoctri- 
nated party activists, imposing strict discipline on them. The 
party's youth movement included a paramilitary arm, the "Gray 
Wolves," whose members disrupted left-wing student activities, 
initiated physical attacks on political opponents, and retaliated 
for assaults on MHP members. MHP-incited violence escalated 
in the late 1960s and set the tone for the volatile political atmo- 
sphere of the 1970s. 

Turkey's links to the United States grew rapidly in the after- 
math of World War II. Turkey took a resolutely pro-Western 
stance as the Cold War developed in the late 1940s and, in 
1950, sent an infantry brigade to the Korean Peninsula to serve 
under UN command there. The pattern of close bilateral ties 
with the United States that characterized postwar Turkish for- 
eign relations began to take shape with an agreement signed in 
Ankara in September 1947 implementing a policy formulated 
by President Harry S Truman the previous March. Known as 



47 



Turkey: A Country Study 

the Truman Doctrine, the president's policy declaration 
spelled out United States intentions to guarantee the security 
of Turkey and Greece. Truman won approval from the United 
States Congress for an initial appropriation of US$400 million 
to aid both countries. Congress also authorized United States 
civilian and military personnel to assist in economic recon- 
struction and development and to provide military training. 
Turkey subsequently participated in the United States-spon- 
sored European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan). Turkey 
also was admitted to membership in the Council of Europe and 
in 1959 applied for association with the European Community 
(EC), later called the European Union (EU — see Glossary). Set 
aside after the 1960 coup, Turkey's application finally was 
approved in 1964. 

Turkey was admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion (NATO — see Glossary) in 1952, and in 1955 joined with 
Britain, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan in the Baghdad Pact, a multi- 
lateral defense agreement that became the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO) after the overthrow of the Iraqi mon- 
archy in 1958. Turkey played a vital diplomatic and strategic 
role as the bridge between the NATO and CENTO alliance sys- 
tems. The headquarters of NATO's Allied Land Forces South- 
eastern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST) was established at Izmir. 
In addition, operational bases near Adana were developed for 
NATO purposes. A 1954 military facilities agreement with the 
United States permitted the opening of other NATO installa- 
tions and the stationing of United States forces in Turkey. 
Headquarters for CENTO were moved to Ankara when Iraq 
withdrew from the alliance. 

Turkish participation in NATO was complicated by a 
regional dispute between Turkey and Greece involving the sta- 
tus of the island of Cyprus, until 1960 a British crown colony. 
The Greek-speaking Cypriots sought an end to British rule and 
many favored enosis (union) with Greece. Fearing discrimina- 
tion and the loss of identity, the Turkish-speaking minority 
countered with proposals for partition of the island between 
the two ethnic communities. Conflict between the two commu- 
nities led to major crises in 1964 and again in 1967, during 
which Turkey and Greece — both members of NATO — reached 
the verge of war. 

Crisis in Turkish Democracy 

The Demirel government's majority in the Grand National 



48 



Historical Setting 



Assembly gradually dissipated after the 1969 general election as 
factions within the circle of its initial supporters regrouped in 
new political constellations. In 1970 three small rightist parties 
that had usually cooperated with the government merged as 
the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi — MSP), an 
explicitly Islamic-oriented party that imposed politically com- 
promising demands on Demirel as the price of their continued 
support. Some former AP members deserted the AP in 1971 to 
form the more right-wing Democratic Party. Other, more lib- 
eral AP members, dissatisfied with Demirel's concessions to the 
right, defected from the party and sat as independents. As a 
result of these shifts, the Demirel government lost its parlia- 
mentary majority and, in the eyes of critics, forfeited its right to 
govern the country. Acts of politically motivated violence and 
terrorism escalated in frequency and intensity. Unrest was 
fueled in part by economic distress, perceptions of social ineq- 
uities, and the slowness of reform, but protest was increasingly 
directed at Turkey's military and economic ties to the West. 

Politics and Elections in the 1970s 

On March 12, 1971, the armed forces chiefs, headed by army 
commander General Faruk Gurler, presented a memorandum 
to President Sunay demanding the installation of a "strong and 
credible government." The military leaders warned civilian 
officials that the armed forces would be compelled to take over 
the administration of the state once again unless a government 
were found that could curb the violence and implement the 
economic and social reforms, including land reform, stipu- 
lated in the 1961 constitution. Demirel resigned the same day. 
The incident was referred to as the "coup by memorandum." 

After consultation with Gurler and the other armed forces 
chiefs, Sunay asked Nihat Erim, a university professor and CHP 
centrist, to form a "national unity, above-party government" 
that would enlist the support of the major parties. Erim led the 
first of a series of weak caretaker cabinets that governed Turkey 
until the October 1973 elections. 

A joint session of the Grand National Assembly was con- 
vened in March 1973 to elect a successor to President Sunay. 
Many observers had assumed that General Gurler, whose candi- 
dacy had the open backing of the armed forces, would be 
elected without serious opposition, but Demirel was deter- 
mined to resist what he considered dictation by the military. 
The AP nominated Tekin Ariburun, chairman of the Senate, to 



49 



Turkey: A Country Study 



oppose Gurler. After seven ballots, Gurler and Ariburun with- 
drew. When Sunay's term expired on March 28, Ariburun, in 
his capacity as Senate chairman, became acting president 
under the constitution. On April 6, deputies and senators in 
the Grand National Assembly elected Fahri Koruturk president 
on the fifteenth ballot. Significantly, the new president, a sev- 
enty-year-old retired admiral who had served as an indepen- 
dent member of the Senate since 1968, had a direct tie to 
Ataturk, who reportedly had conferred on him the name 
Koruturk, meaning "Protect the Turks." 

In the 1973 election, Ecevit's CHP increased its support by 
more than 1 million votes by calling for redistribution of wealth 
through taxation and social services, rural development, land 
reform, continued state direction of economic activity, and a 
general amnesty for political prisoners detained under martial 
law. However, holding only 185 seats, the party failed to gain an 
overall majority in the Grand National Assembly. The AP, 
which saw its share of the vote decline to 30 percent, retained 
only 149 seats. A large segment of its right-wing support was 
siphoned off by the MSP and the Democratic Party, which won 
forty-eight seats and forty-five seats, respectively. The Republi- 
can Reliance Party (RRP), formed by the merger of centrist 
groups that had seceded earlier from the CHP, won thirteen 
seats. The MHP took three seats. 

The most significant consequence of the 1973 election was 
that the Democratic Party and the MSP held the balance of 
power in parliament, and it was unlikely that any coalition gov- 
ernment could be formed without the participation of one or 
both of them. The politicians in the Democratic Party strongly 
resented the warnings periodically handed down to elected 
officials by military leaders, but also disapproved of Demirel on 
personal as well as political grounds. The MSP was led by Nec- 
mettin Erbakan, who had been leader of the proscribed New 
Order Party. The MSP was regarded as a revival of that party 
under a new name. The principal plank in the MSP's platform 
was the restoration of Islamic law and practice in Turkey. The 
party sought improved relations with other Muslim countries 
and less reliance on the West, yet was also ardently anticommu- 
nist. Advocating direct election of the president and the 
strengthening of executive authority, the MSP, while upholding 
the right to private property, opposed the liberal economic pol- 
icies favored by the AP. 



50 



Historical Setting 



In January 1974, Ecevit, leader of the party founded by 
Ataturk, reached a short-lived agreement with Erbakan, the 
head of an Islamic revivalist party, to join in a coalition govern- 
ment in which Erbakan would be Ecevit's deputy prime minis- 
ter. In September the MSP pulled out of the coalition. Ecevit 
remained prime minister at the head of another caretaker gov- 
ernment while Korutiirk vainly tried to interest Demirel in join- 
ing with the CHP in a government of national unity. In 
November, Korutiirk persuaded Sadi Irmak, an elderly senator 
and an independent, to preside over a nonparty government 
and prepare the country for an early general election. Irmak's 
failure to obtain a parliamentary vote of confidence created a 
parliamentary crisis that left Turkey without a stable, majority- 
based government for more than a year, during which time 
economic conditions continued to deteriorate, fanning unrest 
around the country. Late in 1974, four of the five right-of-cen- 
ter parties in the Grand National Assembly — the AP, MSP, 
MHP, and RRP — formed an opposition bloc, called the 
National Front. In March 1975, the National Front parties 
joined in a minority coalition government under Demirel's pre- 
miership. Despite its ineffectiveness, the National Front coali- 
tion managed to struggle along for two years, maintaining a 
slim parliamentary majority dependent on support from inde- 
pendents. 

Trading on Ecevit's enormous popularity, in the 1977 elec- 
tion the CHP increased its share of the vote to more than 40 
percent and remained the largest party in the Grand National 
Assembly. However, the 213 seats that it won were still insuffi- 
cient to form a single-party government. The AP had also 
improved its standing by taking back some of the votes lost to 
other right-wing parties in 1973; it returned 189 deputies. MSP 
representation was cut in half, to twenty-four seats, and the 
Democratic Party was reduced to one seat. The MHP, however, 
nearly doubled its vote and elected sixteen deputies. Despite its 
electoral success, the CHP failed to form a governing coalition. 

At length Demirel put together another right-of-center gov- 
ernment, linking the AP with the MSP and the MHP in a coali- 
tion that depended on a four-seat majority. But the 
inducements that he offered to assure cooperation caused con- 
cern within the liberal wing of his own party. Under the 
arrangement, responsibility for key areas of concern — public 
order, the economy, and social reform — was divided among the 
three party leaders. Demirel was assigned internal security, 



51 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Erbakan the economy, and Turkes social affairs, including edu- 
cation. Each leader expected to exercise exclusive authority in 
his particular area, but the arrangement soon proved unwork- 
able. Meanwhile, groups identified with one of the coalition 
partners, the MHP, were among the principal instigators of the 
mounting political violence. 

Anger and frustration at the government's ineffectiveness in 
dealing with the economy and restoring public order led to an 
erosion of support from liberal AP deputies. On the last day of 
1977, the Demirel government was defeated on a vote of confi- 
dence in which a dozen AP deputies sided with the CHP oppo- 
sition. The party leaders having ruled out a "grand coalition," 
President Koruturk turned to Ecevit to lead a new government, 
which was backed by a four-seat parliamentary majority. 

The Ecevit administration was crisis-ridden from the start. 
The prime minister's attempt to combine regard for civil liber- 
ties with tougher law-and-order measures satisfied no one, least 
of all the military and the police. In December 1978, the gov- 
ernment was forced to proclaim martial law in thirteen prov- 
inces in reaction to a serious outbreak of sectarian violence. 
The calm imposed by martial law was only temporary, and in 
April 1979, the government extended legal restrictions. 

Ecevit resigned in October 1979, after the CHP lost ground 
to the AP in by-elections, and advised President Koruturk to 
summon Demirel to replace him. Demirel rejected Ecevit's sub- 
sequent proposal for a "grand coalition" and chose instead to 
put together a technocratic government whose members were 
selected for their competence rather than their political affilia- 
tion. Subsidies to state enterprises were reduced as part of a 
plan for restructuring, but attempts to rationalize the work- 
force and control labor costs were challenged by the trade 
unions in a series of strikes. Demirel countered by extending 
martial law still further, imposing severe curbs on union activ- 
ity, and restricting public assembly. Meanwhile, military leaders 
made no secret of their uneasiness at the growing influence 
that religious sectarianism was having on politics in obvious 
defiance of the constitution. 

President Korutiirk's seven-year term in office expired in 
April 1980. After 100 ballots, the joint session of the Grand 
National Assembly failed to agree on a successor. Koruturk 
retired on schedule, and the chairman of the Senate, Ihsan 
Sabri Qaglayangil, was installed as acting president of the 



52 



Historical Setting 



republic. £aglayangil could do little more than provide the sig- 
nature necessary for the enactment of legislation. 

Conflict and Diplomacy: Cyprus and Beyond 

The historical distrust between Turkey and Greece was com- 
pounded during the 1970s by the unfolding Cyprus dispute 
and conflicting claims in the Aegean Sea. Problems arising 
from the relationship between Turkish- and Greek-speaking 
Cypriots on the island had produced a pattern of confronta- 
tion between the two countries during the previous decade. 

In July 1974, the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios 
III, demanded withdrawal of Greek army officers assigned to 
the National Guard on the well-founded charge that they were 
using their position to subvert his government. In reaction, 
Athens engineered an anti-Makarios coup, which was carried 
out successfully by conspirators planning union with Greece. In 
Ankara, Prime Minister Ecevit condemned the coup as consti- 
tuting a direct threat to Cyprus's Turkish minority. At the UN, 
the Turkish representative stated that his government had 
determined that Greece's direct involvement in the coup was 
aimed at the annexation of Cyprus in violation of the 1960 
independence agreement guaranteed by Turkey, Greece, and 
Britain. He stressed that Turkey had a clear responsibility 
under the agreement to protect the rights of the Turkish Cyp- 
riot community. 

Between July 20 and 22, 1974, some 30,000 Turkish troops, 
supported by air and naval units, were dropped or landed on 
Cyprus in the Kyrenia area and advanced toward Nicosia, the 
Cypriot capital. By the time a UN-sponsored cease-fire went 
into effect on July 22, Turkish troops controlled the twenty- 
kilometer-long Nicosia-Kyrenia road and occupied territory on 
both sides of it, in some places thirty kilometers deep, in an 
area that had a large Turkish Cypriot population. 

The discredited Greek government fell within days as a 
result of the Cyprus imbroglio. Meeting in Geneva on July 30, 
the foreign ministers of the three guaranteeing powers — Turan 
Gunes of Turkey, James Callaghan of Britain, and Georgios 
Mavros representing the new provisional Greek government — 
accepted the establishment of a buffer zone between the two 
sides on Cyprus, patrolled by UN forces. They agreed to meet 
again at Geneva in a week's time to work out terms for a consti- 
tutional government that would be representative of both com- 
munities on the island. 



53 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Despite the cease-fire and a UN Security Council resolution 
calling for the phased reduction of hostile forces on Cyprus, 
the Turks continued to land reinforcements. In the week 
between the cease-fire and the first Geneva foreign ministers' 
conference, they pushed Greek Cypriot forces to the western 
extremity of the Kyrenia Range and consolidated their posi- 
tions around Nicosia. Glafcos Clerides, acting president of 
Cyprus, and Rauf Denktas, leader of the Turkish-Cypriot com- 
munity, attended the second session of the Geneva talks, held 
August 8-14. Denktas rejected the notion of communal auton- 
omy within a federal system favored by Greece and the Greek 
Cypriot authorities, proposing instead the creation of a single 
autonomous Turkish region in the northern third of the 
island, a suggestion Clerides refused to consider. Although Tur- 
key backed the Turkish Cypriot demand for regional auton- 
omy, Gunes, speaking for his government, offered an 
alternative plan that would have allowed the Turkish Cypriots 
the same amount of land by halving their holdings in the north 
and creating several autonomous Turkish enclaves elsewhere 
on the island. The Gunes plan would have sharply reduced the 
number of refugees from both communities. Talks broke 
down, however, when Gunes abruptly rejected a request from 
Mavros and Clerides for a three-day adjournment to enable 
them to communicate the Turkish proposal to their respective 
governments. 

Two hours after the collapse of the Geneva talks, Turkish 
forces on Cyprus moved out of the Kyrenia bridgehead to cut 
off the northeastern third of the island. After three days of 
fighting, Clerides accepted a Turkish cease-fire offer that left 
the Turks in control of all territory north of a line that ran 
from Lefka in the west to Famagusta in the east. Ecevit held 
that this division should form the basis for two autonomous 
regions within a federal state. In February 1975, the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus was established in the northern 
region with Denktas as president. In 1983 this entity was consti- 
tuted as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) . To 
date, only Turkey has granted official recognition to the 
TRNC. 

The partition of Cyprus created about 200,000 refugees out 
of a population of about 600,000. About 10,000 Turkish Cyp- 
riot refugees from enclaves in the south were flown to north- 
ern Cyprus from British bases by way of Turkey. Greek Cypriot 
authorities protested this action and charged that at the same 



54 



Historical Setting 



time the Turks were sending in settlers from Anatolia to colo- 
nize areas where Greek Cypriots had been dispossessed. 

Relations between Turkey and Greece had already been 
tense before the Cyprus crisis as a consequence of the continu- 
ing dispute over competing rights in the Aegean region. Ten- 
sions heightened after March 1974, when Greek drillers struck 
oil off the island of Thasos. Given the dependence of both 
countries on oil imports, this development brought into focus 
a range of outstanding regional disputes: the demarcation of 
the continental shelf for the purpose of establishing seabed 
mineral rights, extension of territorial waters and airspace, and 
the militarization of Greek islands off the Turkish coast. A few 
months earlier, in late 1973, Turkey had granted oil conces- 
sions in several Aegean seabed areas, some of which were on 
part of the continental shelf claimed by Greece. 

In January 1975, Greece submitted a claim to the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice in The Hague for sole rights to the conti- 
nental shelf. Greece claimed seabed rights off each of the 
several hundred Greek islands in the Aegean, some of them no 
more than a few nautical miles from the Turkish coast. Greece 
also unilaterally attempted to extend its territorial waters from 
six nautical miles to the twelve nautical miles accepted else- 
where in the world and prohibited Turkish overflights in those 
areas. Prime Minister Irmak responded that it was "unthink- 
able" that Turkey would accept the Aegean as a "Greek lake" 
and charged that Greek claims and alleged Greek militariza- 
tion of the Aegean were in contravention of the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne. However, Greece maintained that it had primary 
responsibility for the defense of the Aegean as part of its NATO 
commitments. 

During the summer of 1976, Turkish naval escorts con- 
fronted Greek warships when the latter challenged a Turkish 
vessel engaged in seismic research on the seabed in disputed 
waters between the Turkish islands of Gokceada (Imroz) and 
Bozca Ada (Tenedos). For a brief period, war between the two 
NATO allies seemed imminent. Although Turkey and Greece 
subsequently agreed to settle outstanding disputes through 
negotiation, troop alerts and naval demonstrations were 
repeated the following year. Ecevit and Greek prime minister 
Konstantinos Karamanlis met in Switzerland in March 1978 to 
find a mutually acceptable framework for resolving their differ- 
ences. Two months later, they met again in Washington to dis- 
cuss issues of bilateral interest. At these meetings, the two 



55 



Turkey: A Country Study 

leaders affirmed their mutual wish to find peaceful solutions to 
their unresolved disputes, but relations between the two coun- 
tries remained strained. 

In February 1975, the United States Congress imposed an 
arms embargo on Turkey on the grounds that United States- 
supplied military equipment had been used illegally during the 
Cyprus operation. In June Turkey confirmed that twenty 
United States installations in Turkey would be subject to a "new 
situation" unless negotiations were opened on their future sta- 
tus. President Gerald Ford urged Congress to reconsider the 
arms embargo, citing the damage it would do to vital United 
States interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Angered by the 
defeat in Congress the following month of a measure to lift the 
embargo, the Turkish government announced the abrogation 
of the 1969 defense cooperation treaty with the United States 
and placed United States installations, mainly communications 
and monitoring stations, under Turkish control. This action, 
however, did not affect the only United States combat unit in 
Turkey, an aircraft squadron based in Incirlik under NATO 
command. 

President Ford signed legislation in October that partially 
lifted the embargo, allowing the release of arms already pur- 
chased by Turkey. In 1978 the administration of President 
Jimmy Carter succeeded in persuading Congress to end the 
embargo, although an amendment to the Security Aid Act 
required periodic review of conditions as a prerequisite to con- 
tinued military assistance. Shortly thereafter, Turkey allowed 
United States installations to reopen under Turkish supervi- 
sion while a completely new defense cooperation pact was 
negotiated. 

In 1980 United States military assistance to Turkey 
amounted to US$250 million, and economic aid to about 
US$200 million. The United States also joined other countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment (OECD) in pledging emergency credits in a bid to halt 
Turkey's slide into bankruptcy during the financial crisis of the 
late 1970s. 

The Economy: An Unresolved Issue 

The Turkish economy was severely hurt by the increase in oil 
prices after 1973. Conditions deteriorated over the next several 
years, reaching the crisis level by 1977. Inflation reached a rate 
exceeding 50 percent that year, while unemployment was unof- 



56 




57 



Turkey: A Country Study 

ficially estimated at as high as 30 percent of the available work- 
force. Domestic industries also lost ground in export markets 
because of increases in the cost of raw materials and energy. 
Turkey's trade deficit reached US$4 billion in 1977, contribut- 
ing to a balance of payments deficit nearly five times the 1974 
level. Becoming skeptical of Turkey's ability to repay existing 
debts, a number of foreign creditors refused to extend further 
loans. As a result, the country virtually ran out of foreign 
exchange to meet its immediate commitments and was faced 
with national bankruptcy, which was averted only when the 
Central Bank intervened by suspending payments for many 
imports and, in effect, forced credit from foreign exporters. 

Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary), the Demirel government belatedly 
announced such measures as a 10 percent devaluation of the 
currency and substantial increases of some government-subsi- 
dized prices. By the end of 1977, Turkey had accumulated a 
total external debt of more than US$11 billion. The Ecevit gov- 
ernment came to power in January 1978 with a stabilization 
program that essentially had had to be approved by the IMF 
and the OECD. The plan included incentives for foreign invest- 
ment and further price adjustments to restrain domestic 
demand. An international consortium of six banks collabo- 
rated in restructuring the Turkish debt and arranged for a 
US$500 million loan to the Central Bank for economic devel- 
opment. Subsidies to state-directed enterprises were cut, but 
Ecevit insisted on increased public spending for employment 
and regional development, which he argued were required to 
maintain "domestic peace." 

Despite the stabilization program, another major devalua- 
tion of the Turkish lira (for value of the Turkish lira — see Glos- 
sary), and rescheduling of the foreign debt, there were no 
clear signs in 1978 that economic recovery was under way. In 
fact, austerities imposed under the program had the opposite 
effect to what was intended. Because of energy conservation 
efforts and restrictions imposed on imports of raw materials, 
industrial production fell. Consequently, exports lagged and 
unemployment continued to increase. State enterprises regis- 
tered losses of about US$2 billion for the year. Because of a 
lack of confidence in the government, the stabilization pro- 
gram failed to attract new investment from abroad. 

On returning to office in November 1979, Demirel pro- 
posed a new economic stabilization program that for the first 



58 



Historical Setting 



time emphasized private-sector initiatives. The program, drawn 
up in consultation with a consortium of international banks, 
was approved by parliament, and Turgut Ozal, an economist, 
was placed in charge of implementing it. Some progress was 
recorded, but the government's attention was diverted by 
intensified political violence, which by mid-1980 was claiming 
twenty or more lives a day. 

Challenges to Public Order 

Turkey faced recurrent political violence throughout the 
1970s. Political parties, particularly those of the extreme right, 
organized strong-arm auxiliaries for street fighting. Kurdish 
nationalism and sectarian divisions were also factors. From 
time to time, specifically from 1971 to 1973 and again in 
December 1978, the frequency of such violence and the 
involvement of increasing numbers of persons led to the impo- 
sition of martial law in parts of the country. 

Most of the violence-prone groups of the right were appar- 
ently attached, directly or indirectly, to Tiirkes and the MHP. 
The best organized of these, the Gray Wolves, were armed and 
regularly resorted to terrorist tactics. Other groups — particu- 
larly those on the left — used violence in the hope that the reac- 
tion of the state would lead to revolution. Their members 
assaulted politicians and public officials, the police, journalists, 
and members of rival groups. United States military personnel 
stationed in Turkey were also targets of attack. Some groups 
involved in the violence were identified with the Kurdish 
nationalist movement. 

The Ecevit government initially tried to play down the signif- 
icance of Kurdish separatism and to avoid actions that might 
alienate the many Kurds who supported the CHP and lead 
them to join extremist groups that they might otherwise 
ignore. Opposition members in the Grand National Assembly, 
who tended to identify any sign of restiveness in the Kurdish 
regions with Kurdish separatism, insisted on stronger measures 
from the government. In April 1979, the martial law that had 
been proclaimed in some parts of the country the previous 
December was extended to provinces with Kurdish-speaking 
majorities. 

Estimates vary, but some sources claim that as many as 2,000 
persons died in political violence in the two-year period 1978- 
79. The single most serious incident erupted in the town of 
Kahramanmaras in December 1978, when more than 100 per- 



59 



Turkey: A Country Study 

sons were killed in sectarian conflict between Sunni and Alevi 
(see Glossary) Muslims. The incident led to the imposition of 
martial law in the Kahramanmaras Province that same month. 

The military became increasingly uneasy over continued 
criticism of the armed forces in the Grand National Assembly. 
The apparent inability of successive governments to deal with 
problems of the economy and public order led many in the 
military to conclude that the 1961 constitution was defective. 
Their frustration with the political process was confirmed in 
September 1980, when the assembly was unable to fulfill its 
constitutional responsibility to elect a new president. 

Military Intervention and the Return to Civilian Rule 

Military Interlude 

The summer of 1980 was a chaotic time in Turkey. Political 
violence and sectarian unrest mounted in the cities and spread 
through the countryside. The work of parliament had come 
almost to a standstill, and the country was left without an 
elected president. On September 5, Ecevit aligned the CHP 
with Erbakan and his NSP to force the resignation of Demirel's 
foreign minister, Hayrettin Erkman, whose strongly pro-West- 
ern views had won him the approval of General Staff officers. 
The next day, the NSP sponsored a massive rally at Konya, 
where Islamists (also seen as fundamentalists) demonstrated to 
demand the reinstatement of Islamic law in Turkey, reportedly 
showing disrespect for the flag and the national anthem. These 
acts were regarded as an open renunciation of Kemalism and a 
direct challenge to the military. On September 7, General 
Evren met secretly with armed forces and police commanders 
to set in motion plans for another coup. 

In the early morning hours of September 12, 1980, the 
armed forces seized control of the country. There was no orga- 
nized resistance to the coup; indeed, many Turks welcomed it 
as the only alternative to anarchy. Whereas the 1960 and 1971 
military coups had institutional reform as their objective, the 
1980 action was undertaken to shore up the order created by 
the earlier interventions. A five-member executive body, the 
National Security Council (NSC — see Glossary), was 
appointed. Composed of the service chiefs and the gendarme- 
rie commander, it was headed by General Evren, who was rec- 
ognized as head of state. On September 21, the NSC installed a 
predominantly civilian cabinet and named Biilent Ulusu, a 



60 



Historical Setting 



recently retired admiral, prime minister. A 160-member Con- 
sultative Assembly subsequently was appointed to draft a consti- 
tution for what would become Turkey's Third Republic. 

The first order of business for the military regime was to 
reestablish law and order in the strife-torn country. Martial law 
was extended to all the provinces. Suspected militants of all 
political persuasions as well as trade union and student activists 
were arrested, and party leaders were taken into custody along 
with a large number of deputies. Demirel and Ecevit were soon 
released but told to keep a low profile. When Ecevit began to 
publish political articles, he was rearrested and jailed for sev- 
eral months. The Grand National Assembly was dissolved and 
its members barred from politics for periods of up to ten years. 
Political parties were abolished and their assets liquidated by 
the state. The trade unions were purged and strikes banned. 
Workers who were striking at the time of the coup were given 
substantial pay raises and ordered back to their jobs. 

Altogether, some 30,000 people were reported arrested in 
the first few weeks after the coup. Figures are uncertain, but a 
year later about 25,000 were still being held, and, after two 
years, an estimated 10,000 remained in custody, some without 
having been formally charged. Tiirkes and nearly 600 of his fol- 
lowers from the MHP were tried on charges of committing or 
abetting terrorist acts. A number of those found guilty of ter- 
rorism were hanged. Erbakan and Tiirkes were subsequently 
convicted of election tampering and given two-year prison 
terms. Turkey's international reputation suffered as a result of 
charges of political repression, arbitrary arrest, imprisonment 
without trial, torture, and other human rights violations. West 
European governments appealed to the military regime to 
restore parliamentary rule, and a portion of the OECD's relief 
package for Turkey was withheld. The European Community 
also suspended financial assistance, and Turkish delegates were 
denied their seats in the assembly of the Council of Europe. 

The performance of the Turkish economy improved signifi- 
cantly in the first two years after the military intervention. The 
new regime saw to it that the economic stabilization program 
introduced by Demirel was implemented under the direction 
of Ozal, one of the few members of the former government 
retained after the coup. Austerity measures were strictly 
enforced, bringing the inflation rate down to 30 percent in 
1982. Disagreement developed within the government, how- 
ever, over the strict monetarist policies promoted by Ozal, 



61 



Turkey: A Country Study 

which were seen in some quarters as running counter to 
Kemalist principles. Ozal was forced to resign as minister of 
state in July 1982, when the country's largest money broker, the 
Kastelli Bank, collapsed. 

Politics and the Return to Civilian Rule 

The draft of a new constitution was presented by the Consul- 
tative Assembly to the nation on July 17, 1982. In providing for 
a strong presidency, it took partial inspiration from the 1958 
constitution that established France's Fifth Republic. The con- 
stitution was put to a national referendum on November 7, 
1982, and received approval from 91.4 percent of the elector- 
ate. The only parts of the country to register significant "no" 
votes were those with large Kurdish populations. Included in 
the vote was approval of Evren as president for a seven-year 
term. He took office on November 9, 1982. 

A new law on political parties was issued in March 1983, 
which included a ten-year ban on all politicians active in the 
pre-September 1980 period. Parties were invited to form so as 
to contest parliamentary elections later in the year but were 
required to receive approval from the military rulers. Of fifteen 
parties requesting certification, only three received approval: 
the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi — ANAP), the Populist 
Party (Halkci Partisi — HP), and the Nationalist Democracy 
Party (Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi — MDP), the latter being the 
clear favorite of the military. 

The Motherland Party was led by Turgut Ozal, who had 
helped formulate the economic stabilization plan under the 
1979 Demirel government and then implemented the program 
under the military government. Ozal was able to draw on sup- 
port from a broad coalition of forces from the political land- 
scape of the 1970s. The Motherland Party drew to its ranks 
adherents of the old Justice Party, the Islamist National Salva- 
tion Party, and the extreme right-wing Nationalist Action Party. 
The Populist Party, which came closest to expressing the tradi- 
tional Kemalist values of the CHP, was led by Necdet Calp. The 
Nationalist Democracy Party was seen by the electorate as the 
party of the generals, who openly supported it. Its leader, Tur- 
gut Sunalp, was a retired general. The Motherland Party came 
to be viewed by the electorate as the most distant from the mili- 
tary, and its success in the first postcoup election may be largely 
attributed to this perception. 



62 



Historical Setting 



In parliamentary elections held on November 6, 1983, the 
Motherland Party won 45.2 percent of the vote and an absolute 
majority of seats in the new unicameral National Assembly The 
Populist Party won 30.5 percent of the vote, and the Nationalist 
Democracy Party obtained only 23.3 percent of the vote. The 
results were widely viewed as a rebuke to the military. 

Municipal elections followed the parliamentary elections 
early the following year. Prior to the March 25, 1984, election 
date, the assembly voted to allow some of the banned parties to 
participate. Among the new parties were the Social Democratic 
Party (Sosyal Demokrat Parti — Sodep), led by university profes- 
sor Erdal Inonii, son of Turkey's second president, and the 
True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi — DYP), led unofficially by 
Suleyman Demirel. The Motherland Party continued as Tur- 
key's leading party, claiming 41.5 percent of the vote nation- 
wide; the Social Democratic Party drew 23.5 percent, and the 
True Path Party 13.5 percent. Another new party with a reli- 
gious orientation, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi — RP; also 
seen as Prosperity Party), garnered 4.5 percent. 

The two parties that had competed with the Motherland 
Party in the previous general elections now appeared even 
weaker, receiving some 7 percent of the vote each. The 1984 
municipal elections would be the last in which each would 
compete. In November 1985, the Populist Party merged with 
the Social Democratic Party, and in May 1986 the leadership of 
the Nationalist Democracy Party voted to dissolve the organiza- 
tion. Most of the party faithful found a new home in the broad 
spectrum that made up the Motherland Party; others joined 
the True Path Party. At this time, Ecevit also emerged with a 
rival left-of-center party, the Democratic Left Party (Demokra- 
tik Sol Partisi — DSP), officially led by his wife, Rahsan. 

In national elections for local government officials held on 
September 28, 1986, Ozal's party saw its popularity decline, 
although it still garnered a plurality of votes. The Motherland 
Party received 32 percent of votes cast, compared with 23.7 per- 
cent for the True Path Party, which emerged as the second larg- 
est party at a time when Demirel, its de facto leader, was still 
officially banned from politics. The product of a merger, the 
new Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci 
Parti— SHP) took 22.7 percent of the vote; the DSP drew 8.5 
percent. Following this election, Ozal found himself under 
increasing pressure to restore the political rights of the banned 
politicians. The assembly repealed the provisional article of the 



63 



Turkey: A Country Study 

constitution that would have banned them from political activ- 
ity until 1991. 

Following the constitutional amendments, which also 
enlarged the National Assembly to 450 seats, the prime minis- 
ter announced that assembly elections would be held early, on 
November 29. Ozal also amended the election laws to increase 
the advantage to large parties, which under existing laws 
already stood to gain from minimum-threshold provisions and 
the manner in which extra seats were allocated. The Mother- 
land Party saw its electoral percentage drop to 36.3 percent, 
nearly 10 percentage points below its 1983 total, but given the 
late amendments to the electoral law, the party retained an 
absolute majority in the assembly with 292 seats, or 65 percent 
of the total. The SHP won 24.8 percent of the vote and 
received 22 percent of the seats; Demirel's party won 19.2 per- 
cent of the vote but only 13 percent of the seats. The leader of 
the True Path Party denounced the late changes to the election 
law and dubbed the new government the "election-law govern- 
ment." None of the other parties competing reached the 
required 10 percent threshold; Ecevit's DSP received 8.5 per- 
cent of the vote, while Erbakan's Welfare Party received less 
than 7 percent. 

In 1989, as Evren's term as president drew to an end, Ozal 
announced that he would seek to succeed him. This decision 
was made despite the steadily declining popularity of Ozal and 
the Motherland Party. In municipal elections on March 26, the 
Motherland Party polled only 21.9 percent of the vote, third 
behind the SHP's 28.2 percent and the True Path Party's 25.6 
percent. On October 30, 1989, parliament elected Ozal Tur- 
key's eighth president. He was sworn in on November 9, after 
Bayar the second civilian in modern Turkish history to hold 
the position. 

Ozal's popularity declined steadily, largely because of prob- 
lems in the economy. Of particular concern was the recurrence 
of high inflation, which had returned to precoup levels and 
was rapidly eroding the purchasing power of most Turks. Cou- 
pled with economic difficulties were widespread perceptions of 
government corruption and nepotism, which forced the resig- 
nation of several members of Ozal's government. 

In the summer of 1990, the crisis in the Persian Gulf result- 
ing from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait gave Ozal the opportunity to 
regain the political initiative. The Turkish government moved 
quickly to support UN sanctions against Iraq, on August 7 stop- 



64 



Old-style house of Ottoman 
times in Istanbul 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfus s 




ping the flow of oil through the pipeline from Iraq to Turkey's 
Mediterranean coast. In September the assembly voted to allow 
foreign troops onto Turkish soil and to authorize Turkish 
troops to serve in the Persian Gulf. Opposition parties found 
little to offer in the way of other options. Ozal no doubt hoped 
that Turkey's willing participation in the United States-led coa- 
lition would strengthen the country's image abroad as a crucial 
ally, a particular concern in the post-Cold War world. Some 
have speculated that he hoped Turkish involvement would lead 
to EC admission, much as Turkey's participation in the Korean 
War had provided the opportunity to join NATO. The govern- 
ment authorized the use of the air base at Incirlik by Allied air- 
craft in the bombing campaign against Iraq. In addition, 
Turkish troops were deployed along the Turkish-Iraqi border, 
although Ankara insisted that it did not intend to open a sec- 
ond front against Iraq and that it remained committed to Iraq's 
territorial integrity. 

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Kurds 
attempted to throw off the rule of Saddam Husayn in northern 
Iraq, following encouragement by United States officials. The 
uprising, which failed to receive support from the allied coali- 
tion, was quickly crushed, leading a massive number of Iraqi 
Kurdish civilians to seek safety in Iran and Turkey. The Turkish 
government was unable or unwilling to permit several hundred 



65 



Turkey: A Country Study 

thousand refugees to enter the country. The coalition allies, 
together with Turkey, proposed the creation of a "security 
zone" in northern Iraq. By mid-May 1991, some 200,000 Kurd- 
ish refugees had been persuaded to return to Iraq. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc 
had significant implications for Turkey's foreign policy. In the 
trans-Caucasian region of the former Soviet Union, the armed 
conflict between the newly independent republics of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region found the 
Turkish government trying to remain above the fray, despite 
popular sympathy for the Azerbaijani claims. Turkey sought 
close ties with the new republics of Central Asia, arguing that 
Turkey's experience as a secular republic could serve as a use- 
ful model for these states. 

Relations with Bulgaria, which were strained by the faltering 
communist regime's persecution of ethnic Turkish Bulgarians 
in the late 1980s, improved following that regime's collapse. 
The new government abandoned the campaign of ethnic 
harassment. Elsewhere in the Balkans, Turkey maintained close 
relations with Albania and established contact with the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 

Relations with Greece continued to be complicated by long- 
standing differences over Cyprus and naval and air rights in the 
Aegean Sea. In 1986 Ozal paid an official visit to the self-pro- 
claimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which to date 
remains without diplomatic recognition from any state other 
than Turkey. In March 1987, Greece and Turkey nearly came to 
blows over oil-drilling rights in the Aegean Sea. Nevertheless, 
both countries' governments displayed a willingness to empha- 
size diplomacy over force. In June 1989, Ozal became the first 
Turkish prime minister to visit Athens in thirty-six years. Talks 
on the future of Cyprus, held under UN auspices, have 
remained inconclusive, and the island remains under a de 
facto partition after more than twenty years. 

Turkey's 1991 parliamentary elections may have been the 
most significant since the restoration of civilian rule. Political 
power passed peacefully from the Motherland Party to its 
major rival, the True Path Party. In the vote held on October 
21, Demirel's party won about 27 percent and captured the 
largest block of seats, 178. The Motherland Party, widely pre- 
dicted as destined for oblivion, surprised its critics by polling 
some 24 percent of the vote and winning 115 seats. The SHP, 
which had expected to do better, won 20.8 percent of the vote, 



66 



Historical Setting 



or eighty-eight seats. Left-of-center votes were split between the 
SHP and the DSP; the latter gained about 10.8 percent of the 
vote and seven seats. The Welfare Party appeared to do very 
well, with 16.9 percent and sixty-two seats, but this result 
reflected a strategic decision to join forces with another reli- 
giously oriented party in order to surpass the 10 percent 
threshold. Following the elections, the alliance was dissolved in 
the assembly. Although the Motherland and True Path parties 
were not too far apart ideologically, the personal discord 
between Ozal and Demirel precluded any coalition arrange- 
ment. Instead, Demirel made common cause with Erdal 
Inonu's SHP, an alliance with the left that he had resisted 
throughout the 1970s. The coalition controlled 266 seats in 
parliament and reflected the support of almost 48 percent of 
the electorate. 

Defining the place of the Kurdish ethnic minority in Turkey 
remained a difficult challenge throughout this period; indeed, 
it may have ranked as the primary challenge to domestic politi- 
cal stability. Given the founding principles of the Turkish 
republic, conceiving the country as the homeland of the Turks, 
any proposed recognition of Kurdish linguistic or cultural 
rights has been questioned on the grounds that such recogni- 
tion would threaten the unity of the Turkish nation. 

President Ozal went farther than any Turkish official in 
extending recognition of Kurdish identity when, in January 
1991, he proposed rescinding a law prohibiting the playing of 
Kurdish music or the use of Kurdish speech. Law 2932, passed 
in 1983 (declaring the mother tongue of Turkish citizens to be 
Turkish), was repealed in April 1991, thereby legalizing Kurd- 
ish speech, song, and music. Proposals were also floated for a 
relaxation of the ban on Kurdish in the print and broadcast 
media and in education, but such liberalization did not occur. 

Since the restoration of civilian rule, Turkish governments 
have been faced with the armed insurrection of the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan — PKK) . The PKK, 
one of several armed Kurdish guerrilla organizations, was 
founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978. Ocalan fled to Syria after 
the 1980 coup. The PKK, which was officially banned by the 
Turkish government, began a sustained guerrilla campaign in 
March 1984, timed to coincide with the beginning of the Kurd- 
ish new year. The conflict, which between 1984 and 1994 
claimed about 12,000 lives, showed no signs of abating by the 
early 1990s. The Turkish army was unable to defeat the PKK 



67 



Turkey: A Country Study 



with military force alone, while the PKK was no closer to its 
goal of an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey 
(see Political Parties, ch. 4; Kurdish Separatists, ch. 5). 

Economic Stabilization and Prospects for the 1990s 

In 1980 the rate of inflation was more than 100 percent at 
one point and stayed at 70 percent for most of the year. The 
economic stabilization program, begun before the coup, now 
proceeded unhindered by political resistance. The program 
aimed to improve Turkey's balance of payments, bring infla- 
tion under control, and create an export-oriented free-market 
economy. To achieve these goals, the plan sought devaluation 
of the lira on a continuing basis, increases in interest rates to 
reduce inflation and overconsumption, a freeze on wages, and 
a reduction in state subsidies. Exports were to be encouraged 
through subsidies for exporters, reductions in bureaucratic 
regulations, and the abolition of customs duties on imports 
needed for export-oriented industries. Foreign investment was 
actively encouraged by laws providing for easy repatriation of 
capital and export of profits,and the establishment of four free- 
trade zones. 

The results of the ambitious programs of the 1980s were 
mixed. On the negative side, purchasing power declined 40 to 
60 percent in the decade from 1979 to 1989. Inflation, which 
had been brought down to annual rates of 30 to 40 percent in 
the early 1980s, was back up to nearly 70 percent by 1988. The 
steady decline in Ozal's popularity with the electorate can be 
attributed in large part to these disappointing results. The gov- 
ernment continued to run a high deficit, partly because of its 
unwillingness or inability to end support of large state-owned 
industries. On the positive side, exports grew by an average of 
22 percent each year between 1980 and 1987. Exports in 1979 
amounted to US$2.3 billion; in 1988 the value of exports had 
increased to US$11.7 billion. Moreover, industrial exports rose 
in this period from less than 45 percent of all exports to more 
than 72 percent. 

The government also undertook to modernize the country's 
infrastructure, emphasizing improvements in roads and tele- 
communications. In July 1988, a second bridge across the 
Bosporus was opened, paralleling the first bridge opened in 
1973. Together with a bypass road around Istanbul, the bridges 
were intended to facilitate commercial traffic moving to and 
from Europe and the Middle East. Of perhaps the most long- 



68 



Historical Setting 



term significance was the ongoing commitment to the South- 
east Anatolia Project (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi — GAP), a 
series of dams along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that when 
completed would include hydroelectric plants as well as exten- 
sive irrigation works. The latter were projected to allow for the 
irrigation of 1.6 million hectares of land, or twice the area pre- 
viously under cultivation. In addition, the plentiful hydroelec- 
tricity would supply energy for Turkish industry. Because of 
Turkey's inability to come to agreement with its downstream 
neighbors, Iraq and Syria, no international funds were made 
available for GAP. The project, consequently, was self-financed. 
In 1992 a milestone was reached with the opening of the 
Atatiirk Dam on the Euphrates, northwest of Urfa. 

On April 17, 1993, President Ozal died suddenly of a heart 
attack. On its third ballot, on May 16, the assembly elected 
Suleyman Demirel as Turkey's ninth president. Demirel was 
succeeded by former economics minister Tansu (filler, who 
became Turkey's first woman prime minister. She received 
nearly 90 percent of the votes cast in a special election for the 
leadership of the True Path Party. The smooth succession of 
power may be seen as evidence that civilian rule was firmly in 
place. Moreover, the accession of filler to the prime minister's 
office, the second highest position in the nation, showed the 
extent to which Ataturk's legacy, and in particular the political 
rights of women, was becoming ingrained in the Turkish body 
politic. 

* * * 

A useful introduction to Turkish history from antiquity to 
the 1980s is Turkey: A Short History, by Roderic H. Davison, 
updated to 1988. The most thorough scholarly survey of Turk- 
ish history to 1975 available in English is the two-volume History 
of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, by Stanford J. Shaw and 
Ezel Kural Shaw. For the modern period, Bernard Lewis's The 
Emergence of Modern Turkey remains useful. It may be supple- 
mented by two recent works, Feroz Ahmad's The Making of Mod- 
ern Turkey and Erik J. Zurcher's Turkey: A Modern History. Also 
useful for the period up to 1975 is Modern Turkey, by Geoffrey 
Lewis. Patrick Balfour Kinross has written the standard English 
biography of Atatiirk, offering a sympathetic evaluation of Tur- 
key's founding father. For contemporary Turkish history, see 
George S. Harris's Turkey: Coping with Crisis, Feroz Ahmad's The 



69 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, and Frank Tachau's 
Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



70 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Christianity and Islam have long coexisted, as reflected in this scene in Kars in 
eastern Turkey. 



THE OFFICIAL IMAGE OF TURKISH society promoted by the 
ruling elite since the 1920s is one of relative homogeneity This 
image has been enshrined in successive constitutions of the 
republic, including the 1982 document, in which it is stated 
that "the Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indi- 
visible entity. Its language is Turkish." In reality, however, Turk- 
ish society is a mosaic of diverse and at times contending ethnic 
and linguistic groups. The question, "Who is a Turk?," contin- 
ued to provoke controversy in the mid-1990s. 

Sociologists and other scholars, both Turkish and foreign, 
have noted that a majority of the population — estimated at the 
end of 1994 at 61.2 million — accepts as true Turks only those 
individuals whose native tongue is Turkish and who adhere to 
Sunni (see Glossary) Islam. This definition excludes a sizable 
minority of Turkish citizens from consideration as true Turks. 
The largest group within this minority is the Kurds, the over- 
whelming majority of whom speak Kurdish, an Indo-European 
language related to Persian, as their native tongue. In 1994 esti- 
mates of the size of the Kurdish minority in Turkey ranged 
from 10 to 20 percent of the country's total population. Since 
1990 demands by Kurdish political leaders that the Kurdish 
minority be permitted to read, write, and speak Kurdish have 
created a major political issue in Turkey (see Political Interest 
Groups, ch. 4). 

Although most adult Kurds are Sunni Muslims, perhaps as 
much as one-third of the total Kurdish population in Turkey 
belongs to a Shia Muslim sect known as Alevi (see Glossary). In 
addition to the Kurdish Alevi, many of the nation's estimated 
700,000 to 1 million Arabs are Alevi. The Alevi Arabs — most of 
whom live in or near Hatay Province — also are known as 
Nusayri and maintain discreet ties with the Alawi (also seen as 
Alawites) of neighboring Syria. A significant number of Alevi 
are ethnic Turks. 

The continued presence of linguistic and religious minori- 
ties conflicts with the elite's conception of a modern society 
that is Turkish-speaking and secular. This notion was an inte- 
gral part of the social revolution begun after World War I by 
Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatiirk). Linguistic reform was 
essential to Atauirk's vision of the new Turkey, and the reconsti- 
tuted Turkish language has been both a central symbol and a 



73 



Turkey: A Country Study 

powerful mechanism for the establishment of a new national 
identity. Ataturk institutionalized the secularization of the 
country through measures that included abolishing the caliph- 
ate, disestablishing Islam as the state religion, suppressing the 
unorthodox but highly influential dervish — or mystical — 
orders, closing the religious courts, and ending locally based 
religious education (see Ataturk's Reforms, ch. 1; Secularist 
Reforms, this ch.). Under Ataturk's leadership, the ideologi- 
cally secularist and modernist urban elite ended state support 
and patronage of Islamic institutions and attempted to make 
religion a matter solely of private conscience. 

The result of Ataturk's reforms was the creation of two cul- 
tures: a secularized and Westernized elite culture and a mass 
culture based on traditional religious values. Prior to 1950, the 
elite's attitude toward traditional culture tended to be con- 
temptuous in general and specifically hostile toward religious 
expression. Since 1950, however, the elite generally has 
become more tolerant of religion, or at least of orthodox 
Sunni Islam, and various political parties have attempted to 
conciliate religious interests, albeit within the framework of 
Ataturk's institutional secularism. Nevertheless, in the mid- 
1990s the single most significant distinction in Turkish society 
remained the gap separating the secular elite from traditional 
culture. 

Since the early nineteenth century, Western-oriented secular 
education has been a major factor distinguishing the elite and 
traditional cultures. By 1908 a substantial portion of the gov- 
erning stratum, particularly the military officers and higher- 
ranking members of the bureaucracy, had received a secular 
education in their youth. Their values, knowledge, and view- 
points separated them sharply from the illiterate, religiously 
observant, and socially traditional masses. The cultural differ- 
ence between the educated and the uneducated, the urban 
and the rural, the modernist and the traditionalist, has contin- 
ued to affect Turkish society in multiple, intertwined ways. The 
views of Ataturk, who articulated the values of the secular elite 
in the 1920s and 1930s, remain central in Turkey more than 
fifty years after his death. Ataturk identified "civilization" with 
the culture of Europe, contrasting it with what he said was the 
backwardness, ignorance, and obscurantism of the common 
people of Turkey. He actively promoted a "modern" Turkey 
that embraced the civilization of Europe as its inspiration and 
model. Since Ataturk's time, mediation between Turkey's two 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



cultures has been and remains politically problematic. The 
emergence in the late 1980s and early 1990s of a relatively pop- 
ular political party appealing to what it defined as Islamic val- 
ues has tended to increase the polarization of the elite and 
nonelite cultures. In the mid-1990s, the Turkish government 
was attempting to reconcile this heretofore divisive trend. 

In the early republican period of the 1920s and 1930s, civil 
and military officials occupied the unchallenged pinnacle of 
the social structure. Since that time, however, competing ele- 
ments, especially businesspeople, industrialists, professionals, 
and employees of private organizations, have challenged the 
supremacy of the officials. As a result, the social complexion of 
the political elite has been in transition since the early 1980s, 
not just in Ankara and Istanbul but in other cities as well. In 
rural areas, however, and for the vast majority of the popula- 
tion, traditional forms and values, such as the centrality of fam- 
ily life and adherence to an ethical blueprint of behavior 
perceived in religious terms, have survived, although in altered 
form. Consequently, the balance between traditional and 
"modern" values remains uneasy. 

Geography 

Turkey is a large, roughly rectangular peninsula situated 
bridge-like between southeastern Europe and Asia. Indeed, the 
country has functioned as a bridge for human movement 
throughout history. Turkey extends more than 1,600 kilome- 
ters from west to east but generally less than 800 kilometers 
from north to south. Total land area is about 779,452 square 
kilometers, of which 755,688 square kilometers are in Asia and 
23,764 square kilometers in Europe. 

The European portion of Turkey, known as Thrace (Trakya), 
encompasses 3 percent of the total area but is home to more 
than 10 percent of the total population. Thrace is separated 
from the Asian portion of Turkey by the Bosporus Strait (Istan- 
bul Bogazi or Karadeniz Bogazi), the Sea of Marmara (Mar- 
mara Denizi), and the Dardanelles Strait (Qanakkale Bogazi). 
The Asian part of the country is known by a variety of names — 
Asia Minor, Asiatic Turkey, the Anatolian Plateau, and Anatolia 
(Anadolu). The term Anatolia is most frequently used in spe- 
cific reference to the large, semiarid central plateau, which is 
rimmed by hills and mountains that in many places limit access 
to the fertile, densely settled coastal regions. Astride the straits 
separating the two continents, Istanbul is the country's primary 



75 



Turkey: A Country Study 



industrial, commercial, and intellectual center. However, the 
Anatolian city of Ankara, which Ataturk and his associates 
picked as the capital of the new republic, is the political center 
of the country and has emerged as an important industrial and 
cultural center in its own right (see fig. 1). 

External Boundaries 

Turkey is bounded by eight countries and six bodies of 
water. Surrounded by water on three sides and protected by 
high mountains along its eastern border, the country generally 
has well-defined natural borders. Its demarcated land frontiers 
were settled by treaty early in the twentieth century and have 
since remained stable. The boundary with Greece — 206 kilo- 
meters — was confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, 
which resolved persistent boundary and territorial claims 
involving areas in Thrace and provided for a population 
exchange (see War of Independence, ch. 1). Under the agree- 
ment, most members of the sizable Greek-speaking community 
of western Turkey were forced to resettle in Greece, and the 
majority of the Turkish-speaking residents of Greek Thrace 
were removed to Turkey The 1923 treaty also confirmed Tur- 
key's 240-kilometer boundary with Bulgaria. 

Since 1991 the more than 500-kilometer boundary with the 
former Soviet Union, which was defined in the 1921 treaties of 
Moscow and Kars, has formed Turkey's borders with the inde- 
pendent countries of Armenia (268 kilometers), Azerbaijan 
(nine kilometers), and Georgia (252 kilometers). The 499-kilo- 
meter boundary with Iran was confirmed by treaty in 1937. 
Turkey's two southern neighbors, Iraq and Syria, had been part 
of the Ottoman Empire up to 1918. According to the terms of 
the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey ceded all its claims to these two 
countries, which had been organized as League of Nations 
mandates under the governing responsibility of Britain and 
France, respectively. Turkey and Britain agreed on the 331-kilo- 
meter boundary between Turkish and Iraqi territory in the 
1926 Treaty of Angora (Ankara). Turkey's boundary with 
Syria — 822 kilometers long — has not been accepted by Syria. 
As a result of the Treaty of Lausanne, the former Ottoman San- 
jak (province) of Alexandretta (present-day Hatay Province) 
was ceded to Syria. However, France agreed in June 1939 to 
transfer Hatay Province to Turkish sovereignty, despite the 
strong objections of Syria's political leaders. Since achieving 
independence in 1946, Syria has harbored a lingering resent- 



7(3 



The Society and Its Environment 



ment over the loss of the province and its principal towns of 
Antakya and Iskenderun (formerly Antioch and Alexandretta). 
This issue has continued to be an irritant in Syrian-Turkish 
relations. 

Geology 

Turkey's varied landscapes are the product of complex earth 
movements that have shaped Anatolia over thousands of years 
and still manifest themselves in fairly frequent earthquakes and 
occasional volcanic eruptions. Except for a relatively small por- 
tion of its territory along the Syrian border that is a continua- 
tion of the Arabian Platform, Turkey geologically is part of the 
great Alpine belt that extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Himalaya Mountains. This belt was formed during the Tertiary 
Period (about 65 million to 1.6 million B.C.), as the Arabian, 
African, and Indian continental plates began to collide with 
the Eurasian plate, and the sedimentary layers laid down by the 
prehistoric Tethyan Sea buckled, folded, and contorted. The 
intensive folding and uplifting of this mountain belt was 
accompanied by strong volcanic activity and intrusions of igne- 
ous rock material, followed by extensive faulting during the 
Quaternary Period, which began about 1.6. million B.C. This 
folding and faulting process is still at work, as the Turkish and 
Aegean plates, moving south and southwest, respectively, con- 
tinue to collide. As a result, Turkey is one of the world's more 
active earthquake and volcano regions, 

Earthquakes range from barely perceptible tremors to major 
movements measuring five or higher on the open-ended Rich- 
ter scale. Earthquakes measuring more than six can cause mas- 
sive damage to buildings and, especially if they occur on winter 
nights, numerous deaths and injuries. Turkey's most severe 
earthquake in the twentieth century occurred in Erzincan on 
the night of December 28-29, 1939; it devastated most of the 
city and caused an estimated 160,000 deaths. Earthquakes of 
moderate intensity often continue with sporadic aftershocks 
over periods of several days or even weeks. The most 
earthquake-prone part of Turkey is an arc-shaped region 
stretching from the general vicinity of Kocaeli to the area north 
of Lake Van on the border with Armenia and Georgia (see fig. 
7). 

Turkey's terrain is structurally complex. A central massif 
composed of uplifted blocks and downfolded troughs, covered 
by recent deposits and giving the appearance of a plateau with 



77 



Turkey: A Country Study 

rough terrain, is wedged between two folded mountain ranges 
that converge in the east. True lowland is confined to the 
Ergene Plain in Thrace, extending along rivers that discharge 
into the Aegean Sea or the Sea of Marmara, and to a few nar- 
row coastal strips along the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea 
coasts. Nearly 85 percent of the land is at an elevation of at 
least 450 meters; the median altitude of the country is 1,128 
meters. In Asiatic Turkey, flat or gently sloping land is rare and 
largely confined to the deltas of the Kizihrmak River, the 
coastal plains of Antalya and Adana, and the valley floors of the 
Gediz River and the Buyukmenderes River, and some interior 
high plains in Anatolia, mainly around Tuz Golii (Salt Lake) 
and Konya Ovasi (Konya Basin). Moderately sloping terrain is 
limited almost entirely outside Thrace to the hills of the Ara- 
bian Platform along the border with Syria. 

More than 80 percent of the land surface is rough, broken, 
and mountainous, and therefore is of limited agricultural value 
(see Agriculture, ch. 3). The terrain's ruggedness is accentu- 
ated in the eastern part of the country, where the two moun- 
tain ranges converge into a lofty region with a median 
elevation of more than 1,500 meters, which reaches its highest 
point along the borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. 
Turkey's highest peak, Mount Ararat (Agri Dagi) — about 5,166 
meters high — is situated near the point where the boundaries 
of the four countries meet. 

Landform Regions 

Distinct contrasts between the interior and periphery of Tur- 
key are manifested in its landform regions, climate, soils, and 
vegetation. The periphery is divided into the Black Sea region, 
the Aegean region, and the Mediterranean region. The inte- 
rior is also divided into three regions: the Pontus and Taurus 
mountain ranges, the Anatolian Plateau, and the eastern high- 
lands. The seventh region of the country is the Arabian Plat- 
form in the southeast, adjacent to the Syrian border. 

Black Sea Region 

The Black Sea region has a steep, rocky coast with rivers that 
cascade through the gorges of the coastal ranges. A few larger 
rivers, those cutting back through the Pontus Mountains 
(Dogukaradeniz Daglan), have tributaries that flow in broad, 
elevated basins. Access inland from the coast is limited to a few 
narrow valleys because mountain ridges, with elevations of 



78 




International boundary 



(J) National capital 

• Populated place 

A Spot elevation in meters 

50 100 KILOMETERS 

1 11 'i 1 ■ 1 

50 100 MILES 



1 



The Society and Its Environment 



1,525 to 1,800 meters in the west and 3,000 to 4,000 meters in 
the east, form an almost unbroken wall separating the coast 
from the interior. The higher slopes facing northwest tend to 
be densely forested. Because of these natural conditions, the 
Black Sea coast historically has been isolated from Anatolia. 

Running from Zonguldak in the west to Rize in the east, the 
narrow coastal strip widens at several places into fertile, 
intensely cultivated deltas. The Samsun area, close to the mid- 
point, is a major tobacco-growing region; east of it are numer- 
ous citrus groves. East of Samsun, the area around Trabzon is 
world-renowned for the production of hazelnuts, and farther 
east the Rize region has numerous tea plantations. All cultiva- 
ble areas, including mountain slopes wherever they are not too 
steep, are sown or used as pasture. The mild, damp climate of 
the Black Sea coast makes commercial farming profitable. The 
western part of the Black Sea region, especially the Zonguldak 
area, is a center of coal mining and heavy industry. 

Aegean Region 

The European portion of the Aegean region consists mainly 
of rolling plateau country well suited to agriculture. It receives 
about 520 millimeters of rainfall annually. Densely populated, 
this area includes the cities of Istanbul and Edirne. The 
Bosporus, which links the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, is 
about twenty-five kilometers long and averages 1.5 kilometers 
in width but narrows in places to less than 500 meters. Both its 
Asian and European banks rise steeply from the water and 
form a succession of cliffs, coves, and nearly landlocked bays. 
Most of the shores are densely wooded and are marked by 
numerous small towns and villages. The Dardanelles Strait, 
which links the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean Sea, is approx- 
imately forty kilometers long and increases in width toward the 
south. Unlike the Bosporus, the Dardanelles has few settle- 
ments along its shores. 

On its Asian side, the Aegean region has fertile soils and a 
typically Mediterranean climate with mild, wet winters and hot, 
dry summers. The broad, cultivated valley lowlands contain 
about half of the country's richest farmland. Major crops are 
olives, citrus, nuts (especially almonds), and tobacco. The most 
important valleys are the Kocaeli Valley, the Bursa Ovasi (Bursa 
Basin), and the Plains of Troy. The valley lowlands are densely 
populated, particularly around Bursa and Izmir, the country's 
third largest city and a major manufacturing center. 



81 




80 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Mediterranean Region 

The narrow coastal plains of the Mediterranean region, sep- 
arated from Anatolia by the Taurus Mountains, which reach 
elevations of 2,000 to 2,750 meters, are cultivated intensively. 
Fertile soils and a warm climate make the Mediterranean coast 
ideal for growing citrus fruits, grapes, figs, bananas, various 
vegetables, barley, wheat, and, in irrigated areas, rice and cot- 
ton. The Cukur Ova in the east is a plain that is the most devel- 
oped agricultural area of the Mediterranean region. It is a 
significant cotton-growing center and also supports a major 
cotton-based textile industry. In general, summers are hot and 
dry in the Mediterranean region. The weather in combination 
with the region's numerous sandy beaches has encouraged the 
development of a tourist industry. 

Toward the east, the extensive plains around Adana, Tur- 
key's fourth largest city, consist largely of reclaimed flood lands. 
In general, rivers have not cut valleys to the sea in the western 
part of the region. Historically, movement inland from the 
western Mediterranean coast was difficult. East of Adana, much 
of the coastal plain has limestone features such as collapsed 
caverns and sinkholes. Between Adana and Antalya, the Taurus 
Mountains rise sharply from the coast to high elevations. Other 
than Adana, Antalya, and Mersin, the Mediterranean coast has 
few major cities, although it has numerous farming villages. 

Ponhis and Taurus Mountains 

The Pontus Mountains (also called the North Anatolian 
Mountains) in the north are an interrupted chain of folded 
highlands that generally parallel the Black Sea coast. In the 
west, the mountains tend to be low, with elevations rarely 
exceeding 1,500 meters, but they rise in an easterly direction to 
heights greater than 3,000 meters south of Rize. Lengthy, 
troughlike valleys and basins characterize the mountains. Riv- 
ers flow from the mountains toward the Black Sea. The south- 
ern slopes — facing the Anatolian Plateau — are mostly 
unwooded, but the northern slopes contain dense growths of 
both deciduous and evergreen trees. 

Paralleling the Mediterranean coast, the Taurus (Toros Dag- 
lan) is Turkey's second chain of folded mountains. The range 
rises just inland from the coast and uends generally in an east- 
erly direction until it reaches the Arabian Platform, where it 
arcs around the northern side of the platform. The Taurus 
Mountains are more rugged and less dissected by rivers than 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Pontus Mountains and historically have served as a barrier 
to human movement inland from the Mediterranean coast 
except where there are mountain passes such as the Cilician 
Gates (Giilek Bogazi), northwest of Adana. 

Frequently interspersed throughout the folded mountains, 
and also situated on the Anatolian Plateau, are well-defined 
basins, which the Turks call ova. Some are no more than a wid- 
ening of a stream valley; others, such as the Konya Ovasi, are 
large basins of inland drainage or are the result of limestone 
erosion. Most of the basins take their names from cities or 
towns located at their rims. Where a lake has formed within the 
basin, the water body is usually saline as a result of the internal 
drainage — the water has no outlet to the sea. 

Anatolian Plateau 

Stretching inland from the Aegean coastal plain, the Anato- 
lian Plateau occupies the area between the two zones of the 
folded mountains, extending east to the point where the two 
ranges converge. The plateau-like, semiarid highlands of Ana- 
tolia are considered the heartland of the country. The region 
varies in elevation from 600 to 1,200 meters from west to east. 
The two largest basins on the plateau are the Konya Ovasi and 
the basin occupied by the large salt lake, Tuz Golu. Both basins 
are characterized by inland drainage. Wooded areas are con- 
fined to the northwest and northeast of the plateau. Rain-fed 
cultivation is widespread, with wheat being the principal crop. 
Irrigated agriculture is restricted to the areas surrounding riv- 
ers and wherever sufficient underground water is available. 
Important irrigated crops include barley, corn, cotton, various 
fruits, grapes, opium poppies, sugar beets, roses, and tobacco. 
There also is extensive grazing throughout the plateau. 

The Anatolian Plateau receives little annual rainfall. For 
instance, the semiarid center of the plateau receives an average 
yearly precipitation of only 300 millimeters. However, actual 
rainfall from year to year is irregular and occasionally may be 
less than 200 millimeters, leading to severe reductions in crop 
yields for both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture. In years of 
low rainfall, stock losses also can be high. Overgrazing has con- 
tributed to soil erosion on the plateau. During the summers, 
frequent dust storms blow a fine yellow powder across the pla- 
teau. Locusts occasionally ravage the eastern area in April and 
May. In general, the plateau experiences extreme heat, with 



83 



Turkey: A Country Study 

almost no rainfall in summer and cold weather with heavy snow 
in winter. 

Eastern Highlands 

Eastern Anatolia, where the Pontus and Taurus mountain 
ranges converge, is rugged country with higher elevations, a 
more severe climate, and greater precipitation than are found 
on the Anatolian Plateau. The region is known as the Anti-Tau- 
rus, and the average elevation of its peaks exceeds 3,000 
meters. Mount Ararat, at 5,166 meters the highest point in Tur- 
key, is located in the Anti-Taurus. Many of the Anti-Taurus 
peaks apparently are recently extinct volcanoes, to judge from 
extensive lava flows. Turkey's largest lake, Lake Van, is situated 
in the mountains at an elevation of 1,546 meters. The headwa- 
ters of three major rivers arise in the Anti-Taurus: the east-flow- 
ing Aras, which empties into the Caspian Sea; the south-flowing 
Euphrates; and the south-flowing Tigris, which eventually joins 
the Euphrates in Iraq before emptying into the Persian Gulf. 
Several small streams that empty into the Black Sea or land- 
locked Lake Van also originate in these mountains. 

Most of eastern Anatolia comprises the area known histori- 
cally as Kurdistan. In addition to its rugged mountains, the 
area is known for severe winters with heavy snowfalls. The few 
valleys and plains in these mountains tend to be fertile and to 
support diverse agriculture. The main basin is the Mus Valley, 
west of Lake Van. Narrow valleys also lie at the foot of the lofty 
peaks along river corridors. 

Arabian Platform 

The Arabian Platform is in southeast Anatolia south of the 
Anti-Taurus Mountains. It is a region of rolling hills and a 
broad plateau surface that extends into Syria. Elevations 
decrease gradually, from about 800 meters in the north to 
about 500 meters in the south. Traditionally, wheat and barley 
were the main crops of the region, but the inauguration of 
major new irrigation projects in the 1980s has led to greater 
agricultural diversity and development. 

Climate 

Turkey's diverse regions have different climates, with the 
weather system on the coasts contrasting with that prevailing in 
the interior. The Aegean and Mediterranean coasts have cool, 
rainy winters and hot, moderately dry summers. Annual precip- 



84 



Land formations once used for dwellings in central Anatolia 

Farmer in eastern Turkey 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



85 



Turkey: A Country Study 

itation in those areas varies from 580 to 1,300 millimeters, 
depending on location. Generally, rainfall is less to the east. 
The Black Sea coast receives the greatest amount of rainfall. 
The eastern part of that coast averages 1,400 millimeters annu- 
ally and is the only region of Turkey that receives rainfall 
throughout the year. 

Mountains close to the coast prevent Mediterranean influ- 
ences from extending inland, giving the interior of Turkey a 
continental climate with distinct seasons. The Anatolian Pla- 
teau is much more subject to extremes than are the coastal 
areas. Winters on the plateau are especially severe. Tempera- 
tures of -30°C to -40°C can occur in the mountainous areas in 
the east, and snow may lie on the ground 120 days of the year. 
In the west, winter temperatures average below 1°C. Summers 
are hot and dry, with temperatures above 30°C. Annual precip- 
itation averages about 400 millimeters, with actual amounts 
determined by elevation. The driest regions are the Konya 
Ovasi and the Malatya Ovasi, where annual rainfall frequently 
is less than 300 millimeters. May is generally the wettest month 
and July and August the driest. 

The climate of the Anti-Taurus Mountain region of eastern 
Turkey can be inhospitable. Summers tend to be hot and 
extremely dry. Winters are bitterly cold with frequent, heavy 
snowfall. Villages can be isolated for several days during winter 
storms. Spring and autumn are generally mild, but during both 
seasons sudden hot and cold spells frequently occur. 

Population 

Turkey's population at the end of 1994 was estimated at 61.2 
million. This number represented an 8.4 percent increase over 
the 56.5 million enumerated in the twelfth quinquennial cen- 
sus, conducted in October 1990. The State Institute of Statistics 
(SIS) has estimated that since 1990 the country's population 
has been growing at an average annual rate of 2.1 percent, a 
decrease from the 2.5 percent average annual rate recorded 
during the 1980s. Turkey's population in 1985 was about 50.7 
million, and in 1980 about 44.7 million. In the fourteen years 
from 1980 to 1994, the population increased nearly 37 percent. 

Turkey's first census of the republican era was taken in 1927 
and counted a total population of about 13.6 million. Less than 
seventy years later, the country's population had more than 
quadrupled. Between 1927 and 1945, growth was slow; in cer- 
tain years during the 1930s, the population actually declined. 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



Significant growth occurred between 1945 and 1980, when the 
population increased almost 2.5 times. Although the rate of 
growth has been slowing gradually since 1980, Turkey's average 
annual population increase is relatively high in comparison to 
that of European countries. In fact, member states of the Euro- 
pean Union (EU — see Glossary) have cited this high popula- 
tion growth rate as justification for delaying a decision on 
Turkey's long-pending application to join the EU. 

The 1990 census is the most recent one for which detailed 
statistical data are available. That census revealed the relative 
youth of the population, with 20 percent being ten years of age 
or under (see table 4, Appendix A). About 50.5 percent of the 
population was male, and 49.5 percent female. The average life 
expectancy for females of seventy-two years was greater than 
the corresponding figure for men of sixty-eight years. The 
birth rate was twenty-eight per 1,000 population; the death rate 
was six per 1,000. 

Population Density, Distribution, and Settlement 

Population density has increased along with the relatively 
rapid growth rate. For example, although Turkey had an aver- 
age of only twenty-seven inhabitants per square kilometer in 
1950, this figure had nearly tripled, to 72.5 persons people per 
square kilometer, by 1990. Population density was estimated at 
78.5 people per square kilometer at the end of 1994. According 
to the 1990 census, the most densely populated provinces 
included Istanbul, with 1,330 persons per square kilometer; 
Kocaeli, with 260; and Izmir, with 220. The most lightly popu- 
lated provinces included Tunceli and Karaman, with seventeen 
and twenty-four persons, respectively, per square kilometer. 
Turkey's overall population density was less than one-half the 
densities in major EU countries such as Britain, Germany, and 
Italy. 

Although overall population density is low, some regions of 
Turkey, especially Thrace and the Aegean and Black Sea coasts, 
are densely populated. The uneven population distribution is 
most obvious in the coastal area stretching from Zonguldak 
westward to Istanbul, then around the Sea of Marmara and 
south along the Aegean coast to Izmir. Although this area 
includes less than 25 percent of Turkey's total land, more than 
45 percent of the total population lived there in 1990. In con- 
trast, the Anatolian Plateau and mountainous east account for 
62 percent of the total land, but only 40 percent of the popula- 



87 



Turkey: A Country Study 

tion resided there in 1990. The remaining 15 percent of the 
population lived along the southern Mediterranean coast, 
which makes up 13 percent of Turkey's territory. 

In 1990 about 50 percent of the population was classified as 
rural. This figure represented a decline of more than 30 per- 
cent since 1950, when the rural population accounted for 82 
percent of the country's total. The rural population lived in 
more than 36,000 villages in 1990, most of which had fewer 
than 1,000 inhabitants (see Village Life, this ch.). For adminis- 
trative purposes, a village can be a small settlement or a num- 
ber of scattered rural households, jointly administered by a 
village headman ( muhtar) . 

By 1995 more than 65 percent of Turkey's population lived 
in cities, defined as built-up areas with 10,000 or more inhabit- 
ants. The urban population has been growing at a rapid rate 
since 1950, when it accounted for only 18 percent of Turkey's 
total. The main factor in the growth of the cities has been the 
steady migration of villagers to urban areas, a process that was 
continuing in the 1990s. The trend toward urbanization was 
revealed in the 1990 census, which enumerated more than 17.6 
million people — more than 30 percent of the total popula- 
tion — as living in nineteen cities with populations then of more 
than 200,000. The largest was Istanbul, with a population then 
of about 6.6 million, approximately 12 percent of Turkey's 
overall population. Two other cities also had populations in 
excess of 1 million: Ankara, the capital (about 2.6 million), and 
Izmir, a major port and industrial center on the Aegean Sea 
(about 1.8 million). Turkey's fourth and fifth largest cities, 
Adana (about 916,000 in 1990) and Bursa (about 835,000), 
have been growing at rates in excess of 3 percent per year, and 
each is expected to have more than 1 million inhabitants 
before 2000. Gaziantep in the southeast and Konya on the Ana- 
tolian Plateau were the only other cities with populations in 
excess of 500,000 in 1990. The ten largest cities also included 
Mersin (about 422,000), Kayseri (about 421,000), and Eskisehir 
(about 413,000). 

Migration 

During the decade 1915 to 1925, the country experienced 
large population transfers — a substantial movement outward of 
minority groups and an influx of refugees and immigrants. The 
first major population shift began in 1915, when the Ottoman 
government, for a variety of complex and in some instances 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



contradictory reasons, decided to deport an estimated 2 mil- 
lion Armenians from their historical homeland in eastern Ana- 
tolia (see Armenians, this ch.; World War I, ch. 1). The 
movement of Greeks out of Turkey, which began during the 
1912-13 Balkan Wars, climaxed in the 1920s with an interna- 
tionally sanctioned exchange of population between Turkey 
and the Balkan states, primarily. In accordance with the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey accepted approximately 500,000 
Muslims, who were forced to leave their homes in the Balkans, 
in exchange for nearly 2 million Greeks, who were forced to 
leave Anatolia. By special arrangement, Greeks living in Istan- 
bul and Turks living in the Greek part of Thrace were 
exempted from the compulsory exchanges. 

After 1925 Turkey continued to accept Muslims speaking 
Turkic languages as immigrants and did not discourage the 
emigration of members of non-Turkic minorities. More than 
90 percent of all immigrants arrived from the Balkan countries. 
Between 1935 and 1940, for example, approximately 124,000 
Bulgarians and Romanians of Turkish origin immigrated to 
Turkey, and between 1954 and 1956 about 35,000 Muslim Slavs 
immigrated from Yugoslavia. In the fifty-five-year period end- 
ing in 1980, Turkey admitted approximately 1.3 million immi- 
grants; 36 percent came from Bulgaria, 30 percent from 
Greece, 22.1 percent from Yugoslavia, and 8.9 percent from 
Romania. These Balkan immigrants, as well as smaller numbers 
of Turkic immigrants from Cyprus and the Soviet Union, were 
granted full citizenship upon their arrival in Turkey. The immi- 
grants were settled primarily in the Marmara and Aegean 
regions (78 percent) and in central Anatolia (11.7 percent). 

The most recent immigration influx was that of Bulgarian 
Turks and Bosnian Muslims. In 1989 an estimated 320,000 Bul- 
garian Turks fled to Turkey to escape a campaign of forced 
assimilation. Following the collapse of Bulgaria's communist 
government that same year, the number of Bulgarian Turks 
seeking refuge in Turkey declined to under 1,000 per month. 
In fact, the number of Bulgarian Turks who voluntarily repatri- 
ated — 125,000 — exceeded new arrivals. By March 1994, a total 
of 245,000 Bulgarian Turks had been granted Turkish citizen- 
ship. However, Turkey no longer regards Bulgarian Turks as 
refugees. Beginning in 1994, new entrants to Turkey have been 
detained and deported. As of December 31, 1994, an estimated 
20,000 Bosnians were living in Turkey, mostly in the Istanbul 



89 



Turkey: A Country Study 

area. About 2,600 were living in camps; the rest were dispersed 
in private residences. 

In 1994 the government claimed that as many as 2 million 
Iranians were living in Turkey, a figure that most international 
organizations consider to be grossly exaggerated. Turkey is one 
of the few countries that Iranians may enter without first 
obtaining a visa; authorities believe that the relative ease of 
travel from Iran to Turkey encourages many Iranians to visit 
Turkey as tourists, or to use Turkey as a way station to obtain 
visas for the countries of Europe and North America. Conse- 
quently, as many as 2 million Iranians actually may transit Tur- 
key — including multiple reentries for many individuals — in a 
given year. Specialized agencies of the European Union and 
the United Nations that deal with issues of migrants and refu- 
gees believe a more realistic figure of the number of Iranians 
who live in Turkey, and do not have a residence in Iran or else- 
where, is closer to 50,000. 

In the 1960s, working-age Turks, primarily men, began 
migrating to Western Europe to find employment as guest 
workers. Many of these Turkish workers eventually brought 
their families to Europe. An estimated 2 million Turkish work- 
ers and their dependents resided in Western Europe in the 
early 1980s, before the onset of an economic recession that led 
to severe job losses. The Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) initiated the program of accepting Turkish guest 
workers. In the 1990s, however, Germany adopted a policy of 
economic incentives to encourage the voluntary repatriation of 
Turkish workers. At the end of 1994, an estimated 1.1 million 
Turks continued to reside in Western Europe as semiperma- 
nent aliens. About two-thirds of these Turkish migrants lived in 
Germany, and another 10 percent in France. Other European 
countries with sizable Turkish communities included Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. In addi- 
tion, at least 150,000 Turks were working in Saudi Arabia and 
other Arab oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf. 

Government Population Policies 

For almost forty years after the establishment of the republic 
in 1923, the government of Turkey encouraged population 
growth. Use of contraceptives and distribution of information 
about them were prohibited by law, and the state provided 
financial incentives to encourage large families. During the 
1950s, however, members of the political elite gradually 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



became concerned that the country's relatively high popula- 
tion growth rate of nearly 3 percent was hurting economic 
development. Following the military coup of May 1960, popu- 
lation planning became a major government objective. A 1965 
family planning law provided for the establishment of the Fam- 
ily Planning Division within the Ministry of Health and Social 
Assistance to extend birth control information and services to 
as many couples as possible. A 1967 law decriminalized abor- 
tion and authorized use of this procedure for a broad range of 
medical causes. Access to abortion was liberalized further by 
legislation in 1983 stipulating that a pregnancy could be termi- 
nated lawfully upon request in a public hospital up to ten 
weeks after conception. A married woman seeking an abortion 
was required to obtain her husband's permission or submit a 
formal statement of assumption of all responsibility prior to the 
procedure. 

Family planning services have expanded considerably since 
the mid-1960s. A primary focus has been on educating couples 
about the material and health benefits of both limiting and 
spacing births. The Ministry of Health adopted the 1978 Inter- 
national Congress on Primary Health Care recommendations 
that family planning be combined with maternal and child 
health services and undertaken in cooperation with state hospi- 
tals, maternity hospitals, health centers, and clinics in both 
urban and rural areas. In addition to its support of public edu- 
cation about family planning, the ministry has solicited the 
cooperation of volunteer associations and international organi- 
zations to promote its programs. But despite concerted govern- 
ment efforts to encourage smaller families, Turkey's birth rate 
between 1965 and 1994 declined at a relatively slow pace, fall- 
ing only from thirty-three to twenty-eight births per 1,000 pop- 
ulation. 

Concern about the continuing high birth rate prompted the 
Ministry of Health in 1986 to launch a new population conuol 
campaign that concentrated on rural areas, where the fertility 
rate was highest. The campaign included the construction of 
new health clinics, the expansion of centers training medical 
professionals in family planning counseling, and the enlist- 
ment of private-sector cooperation in the distribution of birth 
control information and materials in factories. Private busi- 
nesses established the Turkish Family Health and Planning 
Foundation, which has supplemented the state's population 
control efforts since 1986 through its financial support for spe- 



91 



Turkey: A Country Study 

cial training programs and nationwide television advertise- 
ments. 

Religion has not been an impediment to birth control. Tur- 
key's Sunni Muslim religious leaders, who have addressed the 
subject of birth control in religious publications, have stated 
that Islam does not prohibit married couples from trying to 
space births or limit the size of their families. The use of spe- 
cific birth control devices generally has not been addressed in 
religious literature. However, during the early 1990s there 
appeared to be a consensus among religious leaders that the 
resort to sterilization or abortion as a means of birth control 
was not permissible under Islam. 

Language Reform: From Ottoman to Turkish 

Within the Ottoman Empire, the Turks had constituted 
merely one of many linguistic and ethnic groups. In fact, for 
the ruling elite, the word Turk connoted crudeness and boor- 
ishness. Members of the civil, military, and religious elites con- 
versed and conducted their business in Ottoman Turkish, 
which was a mixture of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. Arabic 
remained the primary language of religion and religious law 
(see Religious Life, this ch.). Persian was the language of art, 
refined literature, and diplomacy. At an official level, Ottoman 
Turkish usually was used only for matters pertaining to the 
administration of the empire. Ottoman Turkish not only bor- 
rowed vocabulary from Arabic and Persian but also lifted entire 
expressions and syntactic structures out of these languages and 
incorporated them into the Ottoman idiom. 

The multiple linguistic influences on Ottoman Turkish 
caused difficulties in spelling and writing. The constituent 
parts — Turkish, Persian, and Arabic — belong to three different 
language families — Ural-Altaic, Indo-European, and Semitic, 
respectively — and the writing system fits only Semitic. Phono- 
logical, grammatical, and etymological principles are quite dif- 
ferent among the three families. For these reasons, modernist 
intellectuals during the nineteenth century began to call for a 
reform of the language. They advocated a language that would 
be easier to read and write and contain more purely Turkish 
words. The principle of Turkish language reform thus was tied 
intimately to the reforms of the 1839-78 period (see External 
Threats and Internal Transformations, ch. 1). Later in the 
nineteenth century, language reform became a political issue. 
Turkish nationalists sought a language that would unite rather 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



than divide the people. In the writings of Ziya Gokalp (d. 
1924), Turkish nationalism was presented as the force uniting 
all those who were Turks by language and ethnic background. 

With the establishment of the republic, Atatiirk made lan- 
guage reform an important part of the nationalist program. 
The goal was to produce a language that was more Turkish and 
less Arabic, Persian, and Islamic; one that was more modern, 
practical, and precise, and less difficult to learn. The republi- 
can language reform called for a drastic alteration of both the 
spoken and the written language. This process was to be 
accomplished through two basic strategies — adoption of a new 
alphabet and purification of the vocabulary. 

The language revolution (dil devrimi) officially began in May 
1928, when numbers written in Arabic were replaced with their 
Western equivalents. In November the Grand National Assem- 
bly approved a new Latin alphabet that had been devised by a 
committee of scholars. Many members of the assembly favored 
gradually introducing the new letters over a period lasting up 
to five years. Atatiirk, however, insisted that the transition last 
only a few months, and his opinion prevailed. With chalk and a 
portable blackboard, he traveled throughout the country giv- 
ing writing lessons in the new Latin alphabet in schools, village 
squares, and other public places to a people whose illiteracy 
rate was suddenly 100 percent. On January 1, 1929, it became 
unlawful to use the Arabic alphabet to write Turkish. 

The new Latin alphabet represented the Turkish vowels and 
consonants more clearly than had the Arabic alphabet. One 
symbol was used for each sound of standard Turkish, which was 
identified as the educated speech of Istanbul. By replacing the 
Arabic with the Latin alphabet, Turkey turned consciously 
toward the West and effectively severed a major link with a part 
of its Islamic heritage. By providing the new generation no 
need or opportunity to learn Arabic letters, the alphabet 
reform cut it off from Turkey's Ottoman past, culture, and 
value system, as well as from religion (see Ataturk's Reforms, 
ch. 1). 

Atatiirk and his language reformers viewed non-Turkish 
words as symbols of the past. They encouraged a national cam- 
paign, supported by government policies, to purify the lan- 
guage. Lexicographers began to drop Arabic and Persian 
words from dictionaries, substituting for them resurrected 
archaic terms or words from Turkish dialects or new words 
coined from old stems and roots. The Turkish Language Soci- 



93 



Turkey: A Country Study 



ety (Turk Dil Kurumu), founded in 1932, supervised the col- 
lection and dissemination of Turkish folk vocabulary and folk 
phrases to be used in place of foreign words. The citizenry at 
large was invited to suggest alternatives to words and expres- 
sions of non-Turkish origin, and many responded. In 1934 lists 
of new Turkish words began to be published, and in 1935 they 
began to appear in newspapers. 

Enthusiasm for language reform reached its height in the 
mid-1930s. Some of the suggested reforms were so extreme as 
to endanger the comprehension of the language. Although 
purists and zealots favored the complete banishment of all 
words of non-Turkish origin, many officials realized that some 
of the suggested reforms verged on the ridiculous. Ataturk 
resolved the problem with an ingenious political invention 
that, although embarrassing to language experts, appealed to 
the nationalists. He suggested the historically inaccurate but 
politically efficacious Sun-Language Theory, which asserted 
that Turkish was the "mother of all languages," and that there- 
fore all foreign words originally were Turkish. Thus, if a suit- 
able Turkish equivalent for a foreign word could not be found, 
the loanword could be retained without violating the "purity" 
of the Turkish language. 

By the late 1940s, considerable opposition to the purifica- 
tion movement had emerged. Teachers, writers, poets, journa- 
lists, editors, and others began to complain publicly about the 
instability and arbitrariness of the officially sanctioned vocabu- 
lary. In 1950 the Turkish Language Society lost its semi-official 
status. Eventually, some Arabic and Persian loanwords began to 
reappear in government publications. 

The language reform's long-term effects have been mixed. 
The phonetically designed alphabet based on the Latin script 
facilitated the quick acquisition of literacy. In addition, the 
developers of modern Turkish consciously incorporated scien- 
tific and technological terms. By making possible a uniform 
mass language that soon acquired its own literature, the reform 
also helped to lessen the linguistic gap between the classes, a 
legacy of Ottoman society. Although the newly created works 
lacked some of the rich connotations of the older lexicon, 
modern Turkish developed as a fertile literary language as 
prose writers and poets created powerful works in this new 
idiom, especially after 1950. The cost of language reform, how- 
ever, has been a drastic and permanent estrangement from the 
literary and linguistic heritage of the Ottomans. Although 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



some prerepublican writings have been transliterated into the 
new alphabet, the vocabulary and syntax are barely under- 
standable to a speaker of modern Turkish. 

Language and language reform continue to be political 
issues in Turkey. Each decade since Ataturk's death has been 
characterized by its own particular stance vis-a-vis language 
reform: whether to support a more traditional lexicon or a 
modern, Turkified one abounding in Western loanwords and 
indigenous coinages. Language reform and modern usage 
have pushed forward during periods of liberal governments 
and been deemphasized under conservative governments such 
as those of the 1980s. Meanwhile, religious publications have 
not been as affected by language reforms as secular literature. 
Religious publications have continued to use an idiom that is 
heavily Arabic or Persian in vocabulary and Persian in syntax. 
The emergence of a popular religious-oriented political move- 
ment in the 1990s has resulted in the reintroduction of many 
Islamic terms into spoken Turkish. 

Linguistic and Ethnic Groups 

Since the founding of the Republic of Turkey, the govern- 
ment has sought to diminish the significance of ethnic, linguis- 
tic, and religious distinctions. For instance, the 1965 census was 
the last one to list linguistic minorities. The country's largest 
minority, the Kurds, has posed the most serious and most per- 
sistent challenge to the official image of a homogeneous soci- 
ety. During the 1930s and 1940s, the government had disguised 
the presence of the Kurds statistically by categorizing them as 
"Mountain Turks." With official encouragement, some scholars 
even suggested that Kurdish, an Indo-European language 
closely related to Persian, was a dialect of Turkish. By the 1980s, 
the Mountain Turks' label had been dropped in favor of a new 
euphemism for Kurds: "Eastern Turks" (dogulu). Officials of 
the SIS were prosecuted after preparing guidelines for the 
1985 census that instructed enumerators to list Kurdish, when 
appropriate, as a language spoken in addition to Turkish. The 
same official and popular confusion exists in the application of 
the term Laz, which sometimes is used erroneously to refer to 
the inhabitants of the eastern end of Turkey's Black Sea coastal 
region. In actuality, the Laz constitute a small ethnic group 
(26,007 according to the 1965 census), speaking Lazi, a Cauca- 
sian language that is neither Indo-European nor Altaic. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

The 1982 constitution includes a seemingly contradictory 
policy on the use of non-Turkish languages. Whereas one arti- 
cle prohibits discrimination on the basis of language, other 
articles ban the public use of languages "prohibited by law." 
Although legislation forbidding the use of specific languages 
has never been enacted, many Kurdish citizens were arrested 
prior to 1991 on charges relating to the public use of Kurdish. 
Although speaking or reading Kurdish no longer is cause for 
arrest, at an official level there remains an entrenched bias 
against the use of Kurdish. At the end of 1994, for example, 
imprisoned Kurds still were required to communicate with 
their lawyers and visiting family members in Turkish, even if 
they did not speak or understand that language. 

In a holdover from the Ottoman system of millets (see Glos- 
sary), Turks traditionally have tended to consider all Sunni 
Muslims as Turks and to regard non-Sunni speakers of Turkish 
as non-Turks. The revival of popular interest in religion since 
the early 1980s has reinvigorated popular prejudices against 
religious minorities, especially the adherents of the Shia Mus- 
lim sect, the Alevi, most of whom are ethnic Kurds or Arabs. 
Also, since 1984 the extensive migration of Kurds from the pre- 
dominantly Kurdish and rural provinces of the southeast to the 
cities of western Turkey has resulted at the popular level in the 
emergence of a relatively strong, urban-based Kurdish ethnic 
consciousness and popular resentment of the Kurds' presence 
among ethnic Turks. 

Turks 

People identified as ethnic Turks comprise 80 to 88 percent 
of Turkey's population. The Turks include a number of 
regional groups who differ from one another in dialect, dress, 
customs, and outlook. In most cases, these differences reflect 
variations in historical and environmental circumstances. In 
general, regional differences are beginning to decrease while 
differences arising from urbanization and social class stratifica- 
tion are assuming greater importance. The three most impor- 
tant Turkish groups are the Anatolian Turks, the Rumelian 
Turks (primarily immigrants from former Ottoman territories 
in the Balkans and their descendants), and the Central Asian 
Turks (Turkic-speaking immigrants from the Caucasus region, 
southern Russia, and Central Asia and their descendants). 

The Anatolian Turks historically lived on the central Anato- 
lian Plateau in isolated villages and small towns. Following the 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



implementation of the Ottoman Land Code in the late 1860s, 
rural Anatolian Turks were likely to own their own land, culti- 
vating wheat and other cereal grains in addition to herding 
sheep and goats. During the early republican period, the Ana- 
tolian Turks' reputation for physical toughness and obstinate 
patience was applied to all Turks, and the Anatolians' culture, 
albeit as interpreted by the urban elite, became part of the 
foundation of Turkish nationalism. The Turks who lived in the 
coastal stretches along the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean 
seas also were considered Anatolian Turks, although the more 
diverse and agreeable climate of the coastal areas encouraged 
the evolution of cultural patterns different from those predom- 
inating on the interior plateau. However, extensive industrial- 
ization, urbanization, and village-to-city migration since 1960 
have tended to minimize regional differences, creating instead 
new class and occupational distinctions. Despite the social and 
economic changes, transhumance has remained an efficient 
means of raising livestock on the Anatolian Plateau, and as 
many as 1 million Turks were seminomadic herders of sheep 
and goats in the early 1990s. Included in this population were 
an estimated 600,000 Yiiruks, Turks of Asiatic origin, whom the 
government has not officially recognized as a separate group. 

The Rumelian Turks are descended from Turks who settled 
in the Balkans when, from the fifteenth to the nineteenth cen- 
turies, that region of southern Europe was part of the Ottoman 
Empire. They were stranded when imperial territories began 
acquiring national independence in the nineteenth century 
(see Migration, this ch.). Most of the Rumelian Turks resettled 
in Turkey between 1878 and 1924. In rural areas, Rumelian 
Turks tended to become farmers or artisans in the coastal vil- 
lages evacuated by Greeks during the 1920s population 
exchanges. Rumelian Turks also settled in urban centers, espe- 
cially Edirne, Tekirdag, Kirklareli, Nigde, Bilecik, and Bursa. 

The Central Asian Turks include Crimean Tartars and 
Turkomans. They live in scattered communities in various parts 
of the country; for example, there are several Crimean Tartar 
villages in the vicinity of Eskisehir. In 1945 an estimated 10,000 
people spoke Tartar as their first language; since then several 
thousand additional Crimean Tartars have resettled in Turkey. 
The Turkomans, who speak a Turkic dialect distinct from Ana- 
tolian Turkish, have lived in eastern Turkey for several centu- 
ries. Historically, Turkomans were organized by tribe; tribal 
affiliations still retained importance for some Turkomans in 



97 



Turkey: A Country Study 

1995. Since the establishment of the republic, no reliable esti- 
mate of the number of Turkomans has been published. Tradi- 
tionally, Turkomans have been Shia Muslims; scholars believe 
that most still adhere to Shia Islam. 

Kurds 

Turkey's largest non-Turkish ethnic group, the Kurds, are 
concentrated in eleven provinces of the southeast, the same 
area that their ancestors inhabited when Xenophon men- 
tioned the Kurds in the fifth century B.C. There also are iso- 
lated Kurdish villages in other parts of Turkey. Kurds have been 
migrating to Istanbul for centuries, and since 1960 they have 
migrated to almost all other urban centers as well. There are 
Kurdish neighborhoods, for example, in many of the gecekondus 
(see Glossary) or shantytowns, which have grown up around 
large cities in western Turkey. About half of all Kurds world- 
wide live in Turkey. Most of the rest live in adjacent regions of 
Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey's censuses do not list Kurds as a 
separate ethnic group. Consequently, there are no reliable data 
on their total numbers. In 1995 estimates of the number of 
Kurds in Turkey ranged from 6 million to 12 million. 

Because of the size of the Kurdish population, the Kurds are 
perceived as the only minority that could pose a threat to Turk- 
ish national unity. Indeed, there has been an active Kurdish 
separatist movement in southeastern Turkey since 1984 (see 
Political Parties, ch. 4). The government's main strategy for 
assimilating the Kurds has been language suppression. Yet, 
despite official attempts over several decades to spread Turkish 
among them, most Kurds have retained their native language. 
In Turkey two major Kurdish dialects are spoken: Kermanji, 
which is used by the majority of Kurds, as well as by some of the 
Kurds in Iran and Iraq; and Zaza, spoken mainly in a triangular 
region in southeastern Turkey between Diyarbakir, Ezurum, 
and Sivas, as well as in parts of Iran. Literate Kurds in Turkey 
have used Kermanji as the written form of Kurdish since the 
seventeenth century. However, almost all literary development 
of the language since 1924 has occurred outside Turkey. In 
1932 Kurds in exile developed a Latin script for Kermanji, and 
this alphabet continued to be used in the mid-1990s. 

Prior to the 1980 military coup, government authorities con- 
sidered Kurdish one of the unnamed languages banned by law. 
Use of Kurdish was strictly prohibited in all government institu- 
tions, including the courts and schools. Nevertheless, during 



98 



Kurdish village on Mount Ararat (Agn Dagi) 
Kurdish village in the mountains near Lake Van, eastern Turkey 

Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



99 



Turkey: A Country Study 

the 1960s and again in the mid-1970s, Kurdish intellectuals 
attempted to start Kurdish-language journals and newspapers. 
None of these publications survived for more than a few issues 
because state prosecutors inevitably found legal pretexts for 
closing them down. Between 1980 and 1983, the military gov- 
ernment passed several laws expressly banning the use of Kurd- 
ish and the possession of written or audio materials in Kurdish. 

The initiation of armed insurrection by the Kurdistan Work- 
ers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan — PKK) in 1984, along 
with the increasing international media interest in the Kurds of 
Iraq beginning in the mid-1980s, compelled some members of 
Turkey's political elite to question government policy toward 
the country's Kurdish population. Turgut Ozal, who became 
prime minister in 1983 and president in 1989, broke the offi- 
cial taboo on using the term Kurd by referring publicly to the 
people of eastern Anatolia as Kurds. Subsequently, indepen- 
dent Turkish newspapers began using the term and discussing 
the political and economic problems in the eleven predomi- 
nantly Kurdish provinces. In 1991 Ozal supported a bill that 
revoked the ban on the use of Kurdish and possession of mate- 
rials in Kurdish. However, as of 1995, the use of Kurdish in gov- 
ernment institutions such as the courts and schools still was 
prohibited. 

Although the Kurds comprise a distinct ethnic group, they 
are divided by class, regional, and sectarian differences similar 
to those affecting ethnic Turks. Religious divisions often have 
been a source of conflict among the Kurds. Although the gov- 
ernment of Turkey does not compile official data on religious 
affiliation, scholars estimate that at least two-thirds of the Kurds 
in Turkey nominally are Sunni Muslims, and that as many as 
one-third are Shia Muslims of the Alevi sect. Unlike the Sunni 
Turks, who follow the Hanafi school of Islamic law, the Sunni 
Kurds follow the Shafii school. Like their Turkish counterparts, 
adult male Kurds with religious inclinations tend to join Sufi 
brotherhoods. The Naksibendi and Kadiri orders, both of 
which predate the republic, have large Kurdish followings in 
Turkey although their greatest strength is among the Kurds of 
Iran. The Nurcular, a brotherhood that came to prominence 
during the early republican years, also has many Kurdish 
adherents in Turkey. 

Whereas the number of Kurds belonging to the Alevi sect of 
Shia Islam is uncertain, the majority of Alevi are either Arabs or 
Turks. Historically, the Alevi lived in isolated mountain com- 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



munities in southeastern Turkey and western Syria. The Kurd- 
ish Alevi have been migrating from their villages to the cities of 
central Anatolia since the 1950s. Whereas Kurdish and Turkish 
Alevi generally have good relations, the competition between 
Alevi and Sunni Turks for urban jobs led to a revival of tradi- 
tional sectarian tensions by the mid-1970s. These intertwined 
economic and religious tensions culminated in a series of vio- 
lent sectarian clashes in Kahramanmaras, Corum, and other 
cities in 1978-79 in which hundreds of Alevi died. 

A small but unknown number of Kurds also adhere to the 
secretive Yazidi sect, which historically has been persecuted by 
both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Small communities of Yazidi live 
in Mardin, Siirt, and Sanli Urfa provinces. Yazidi are also found 
among Kurds in Armenia, Iran, and Iraq. In Turkey the Yazidi 
believe that the government does not protect them from reli- 
gious persecution. Consequently, as many as 50 percent of all 
Yazidi have immigrated to Germany, where they feel free to 
practice their heterodox form of Islam. 

Class differences also divide the Kurds. Wealthy landowners 
in rural areas and entrepreneurs in urban areas tend to coop- 
erate with the government and espouse assimilation. Many of 
these Kurds are bilingual or even speak Turkish more comfort- 
ably than Kurdish, which they disparage as the language of the 
uneducated. The economic changes that began in the 1960s 
have exacerbated the differences between the minority of 
assimilated Kurds and the majority who have retained a Kurd- 
ish identity. Militant Kurdish political groups such as the PKK 
have exploited these class differences since 1984. 

Arabs 

In 1995 Turkey's ethnic Arab population was estimated at 
800,000 to 1 million. The Arabs are heavily concentrated along 
the Syrian border, especially in Hatay Province, which France, 
having at that time had mandatory power in Syria, ceded to 
Turkey in 1939. Arabs then constituted about two-thirds of the 
population of Hatay (known to the Arabs as Alexandretta) , and 
the province has remained predominantly Arab. Almost all of 
the Arabs in Turkey are Alevi Muslims, and most have family 
ties with the Alevi (also seen as Alawi or Alawite) living in Syria. 
As Alevi, the Arabs of Turkey believe they are subjected to state- 
condoned discrimination. Fear of persecution actually 
prompted several thousand Arab Alevi to seek refuge in Syria 
following Hatay's incorporation into Turkey. The kinship rela- 



101 



Turkey: A Country Study 



tions established as a result of the 1939-40 emigration have 
been continually reinforced by marriages and the practice of 
sending Arab youths from Hatay to colleges in Syria. Since the 
mid-1960s, the Syrian government has tended to encourage 
educated Alevi to resettle in Syria, especially if they seem likely 
to join the ruling Baath Party. 

Peoples from the Caucasus 

Three small but distinct ethnic groups (aside from the more 
numerous Armenians) have their origins in the Caucasus 
Mountains: the Circassians, the Georgians (including the 
Abkhaz), and the Laz. Approximately 70,000 Circassian Muslim 
immigrants, most originally from Russia, gradually settled, 
beginning in the late eighteenth century, in the Adana region, 
where they and their descendants continue to live as farmers 
and farm laborers. 

The Muslim Georgians and Laz are concentrated in the 
northeastern provinces. The Laz, who are primarily Black Sea 
fisherfolk, live in villages near the coastal city of Rize. The term 
Georgian actually refers to several different peoples who speak 
similar but mutually unintelligible languages. One distinct 
group of Georgians are the Abkhaz, who are primarily cultiva- 
tors and herders. Most Georgians live in Artvin Province, par- 
ticularly east of the Qoruh River and along the border with 
Georgia. 

Ddnme 

The Donme are descendants of the Jewish followers of a self- 
proclaimed messiah, Sabbatai Sebi (or Zevi, 1626-76), who was 
forced by the sultan to convert to Islam in 1666. Their doctrine 
includes Jewish and Islamic elements. They consider them- 
selves Muslims and officially are recognized as such. Their 
name is the Turkish word for convert, but it carries overtones of 
turncoat as well. 

The Donme have been successful in business and in the pro- 
fessions, but historically they have not been part of the social 
elite because neither Jews nor Muslims fully accept them. Expe- 
rience with prejudice inclines some Donme to hide their iden- 
tity to avoid discrimination and also has encouraged the 
Donme to become a tightly knit, generally endogamous group. 
Since the early 1980s, however, overt discrimination has less- 
ened, and intermarriage between Donme and other Muslims 
has grown common. 



102 



Men drinking tea, eastern 
Turkey 

Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 




Greeks 

In 1995 fewer than 20,000 Greeks still lived in Turkey. Most 
of them are Eastern or Greek Orthodox Christians and live in 
Istanbul or on the two islands of Gokceada (Imroz) and Bozca 
Ada (Tenedos), off the western entrance to the Dardanelles. 
They are the remnants of the estimated 200,000 Greeks who 
were permitted under the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne 
to remain in Turkey following the 1924 population exchange, 
which involved the forcible resettlement of approximately 2 
million Greeks from Anatolia. Since 1924 the status of the 
Greek minority in Turkey has been ambiguous. Most Turks do 
not accept the country's Greek citizens as their equals. Begin- 
ning in the 1930s, the government encouraged the Greeks to 
emigrate, and thousands, in particular the educated youth, did 
so, reducing the Greek population to about 48,000 by 1965. 
Although the size of the Greek minority has continued to 
decline, the Greek citizens of Turkey generally constitute one 
of the country's wealthiest communities. 

Armenians 

The tiny Armenian minority, estimated at 40,000 in 1995, 
also is a remnant of a once-larger community. Before World 
War I, some 1.5 million Armenians lived in eastern Anatolia. 



103 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Starting in the late nineteenth century, intergroup tensions 
prompted the emigration of possibly as many as 100,000 Arme- 
nians in the 1890s. In 1915 the Ottoman government ordered 
all Armenians deported from eastern Anatolia; at least 600,000 
of the Armenians, who numbered up to 2 million, died during 
a forced march southward during the winter of 1915-16. Arme- 
nians believe — and Turks deny — that the catastrophe that 
befell their community was the result of atrocities committed 
by Turkish soldiers following government directives. Arme- 
nians outside Turkey refer to the deaths of 1915-16 as an 
instance of genocide, and over the years various Armenian 
political groups have sought to avenge the tragedy by carrying 
out terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats and officials 
abroad (see Armenian Terrorism, ch. 5). 

Most Armenians living in Turkey are concentrated in and 
around Istanbul. Like the Greeks, they are bankers and mer- 
chants with extensive international contacts. The Armenians 
support their own newspapers and schools. They are intensely 
attached to their Christian faith and their identity as Arme- 
nians rather than Turks. In addition, they have relatives in the 
Armenian diaspora throughout the world. The establishment 
of an independent Armenia on Turkey's eastern border follow- 
ing the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a source of 
ethnic pride for the Armenians of Turkey. However, Armenia's 
conflict with Turkic Azerbaijan, combined with the jingoistic 
support of Azerbaijan in the Turkish media, has raised appre- 
hensions among the Armenian minority about their future sta- 
tus in Turkey. 

jews 

In 1995 an estimated 18,000 to 20,000 Jews lived in Turkey. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Jewish popu- 
lation remained relatively stable at around 90,000. Following 
the establishment of Israel in 1948, an estimated 30,000 Jews 
immigrated to the new state. An average of 1,000 Jews annually 
left for Israel during the 1950s and early 1960s. By 1965 the 
Jewish minority had been reduced to an estimated 44,000, most 
of whom lived in Istanbul, where many Jewish men operated 
shops and other small businesses. 

Unlike the Armenians and Greeks, the Jewish minority is 
neither ethnically nor linguistically homogeneous. Most of its 
members are Sephardic Jews whose ancestors were expelled 
from Spain by the Roman Catholic Inquisition in 1492. They 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



speak Ladino, a variant of fifteenth-century Spanish with bor- 
rowings from several other languages. The Ashkenazic minor- 
ity — Jews from central and northern Europe — speak Yiddish, a 
German-derived language. Both languages are written in the 
Hebrew script. Most Jews also speak Turkish. The Karaites — 
viewed by most other Jews as heretics — speak Greek as their 
native language. In general, the different Jewish communities 
have tended not to intermarry and thus have retained their 
identities. 

Religious Life 

The institutional secularization of Turkey was the most 
prominent and most controversial feature of Ataturk's reforms. 
Under his leadership, the caliphate — office of the successors to 
Muhammad, the supreme politico-religious office of Islam, and 
symbol of the sultan's claim to world leadership of all Mus- 
lims — was abolished. The secular power of the religious author- 
ities and functionaries was reduced and eventually eliminated. 
The religious foundations (evkaf; sing., vakif) were national- 
ized, and religious education was restricted and for a time pro- 
hibited. The influential and popular mystical orders of the 
dervish brotherhoods also were suppressed. 

Although Turkey was secularized at the official level, religion 
remained a strong force at the popular level. After 1950 some 
political leaders tried to benefit from popular attachment to 
religion by espousing support for programs and policies that 
appealed to the religiously inclined. Such efforts were opposed 
by most of the political elite, who believed that secularism was 
an essential principle of Kemalism. This disinclination to 
appreciate religious values and beliefs gradually led to a polar- 
ization of society. The polarization became especially evident in 
the 1980s as a new generation of educated but religiously moti- 
vated local leaders emerged to challenge the dominance of the 
secularized political elite. These new leaders have been asser- 
tively proud of Turkey's Islamic heritage and generally have 
been successful at adapting familiar religious idioms to 
describe dissatisfaction with various government policies. By 
their own example of piety, prayer, and political activism, they 
have helped to spark a revival of Islamic observance in Turkey. 
By 1994 slogans promising that a return to Islam would cure 
economic ills and solve the problems of bureaucratic ineffi- 
ciencies had enough general appeal to enable avowed religious 



105 



Turkey: A Country Study 

candidates to win mayoral elections in Istanbul and Ankara, 
the country's two most secularized cities. 

Islam 

Islam is a monotheistic religion. A believer is a Muslim, liter- 
ally, "one who submits to God." Muslims believe that Allah 
(Arabic for God) gave revelations through the angel Gabriel to 
the Prophet Muhammad (A.D. 570-632 ), a native of the Ara- 
bian Peninsula city of Mecca. Muhammad's efforts to convert 
people to monotheism disturbed the merchant elite, who 
feared that his preaching would adversely affect the pilgrims 
who regularly visited Mecca, which in the early seventh century 
had shrines to several gods and goddesses. Mecca's principal 
destination for pilgrims was the Kaaba, a shrine housing a ven- 
erated black rock which over the years had been surrounded by 
various idols. The lack of acceptance by Meccans of Muham- 
mad's preaching caused him and his followers in A.D. 622 to 
migrate to Medina in response to an invitation by that city's 
leaders. Muhammad's migration to Medina enabled him to 
organize the politico-religious community — the umma — that 
marked the beginning of Islam as a political movement as well 
as a religious faith. Thus, the date of the migration, or hicret 
(from the Arabic hijra), was adopted by the Muslim community 
as the beginning of the Islamic era. The Islamic calendar is 
based on a lunar year, which averages eleven days less than a 
solar year. The Islamic calendar is used in Turkey for religious 
purposes. 

By the time of the Prophet's death ten years after his migra- 
tion to Medina, most of the Arabian Peninsula, including the 
city of Mecca, had converted to Islam. During the last two years 
of his life, Muhammad led fellow Muslims on pilgrimages to 
Mecca, where the Kaaba was relieved of its idols and dedicated 
to the worship of Allah. Since then, praying at the Kaaba has 
been the ultimate goal of the pilgrimage, or hajj, which every 
able-bodied adult Muslim is expected to make at least once in 
his or her lifetime. 

Tenets of Islam 

Muslims believe that all of Allah's revelations to the Prophet 
are contained in the Kuran (in Arabic, Quran), which is com- 
posed in rhymed prose. The Kuran consists of 114 chapters, 
called suras, the first of which is a short "opening" chapter. The 
remaining 113 segments are arranged roughly in order of 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



decreasing length. The short suras at the end of the book are 
early revelations, each consisting of material revealed on the 
same occasion. The longer suras toward the beginning of the 
book are compilations of verses revealed at different times in 
Muhammad's life. 

The central beliefs of Islam are monotheism and Muham- 
mad's status as the "seal of the Prophets," that is, the final 
prophet to whom God revealed messages for the spiritual guid- 
ance of humanity. Jesus Christ and the prophets of the Old Tes- 
tament are also accepted as Islamic prophets. Muslims who 
profess belief in God and Muhammad's prophethood, pray reg- 
ularly, and live by Islamic ethical and moral principles are 
assured that their souls will find eternal salvation in heaven. 
The profession of belief in one God and the prophethood of 
Muhammad is known as the sahadet (in Arabic, shahada), and is 
one of the five basic obligations or "pillars" of Islam. The pro- 
fession of faith — "There is no God but God and Muhammad is 
his Prophet" — always is recited in Arabic. It is repeated during 
prayer and on many other ritual occasions. 

The four other pillars of Islam are prayer (namaz; salat in 
Arabic), giving alms to the needy (zekat; zakah in Arabic), fast- 
ing (oru£ sawm in Arabic) during the month of Ramazan (from 
the Arabic, Ramadan) , and the pilgrimage (hac, from the Ara- 
bic hajj) to Mecca. The prescribed prayers are recited in Arabic 
and are accompanied by a series of ritual body movements 
meant to demonstrate submission to God: standing, bowing, 
kneeling, and full prostration. Muslims say the prayers at five 
prescribed times a day, always while facing in the direction of 
Mecca. Prayers are preceded by a ritual ablution, and, unless 
the prayer is said in a mosque, a ritual purification of the 
ground is achieved by the unrolling of a clean prayer rug. 
Although it is permissible to pray almost anywhere, men pray 
in congregation at mosques whenever possible, especially on 
Fridays. Women are not required to pray in public but may 
attend worship at mosques, which maintain separate sections 
for women. Despite more than sixty years of secularist govern- 
ment policies, a majority of Turkey's Muslims continue to recite 
prayers at least occasionally. In fact, mosque attendance in the 
urban areas, which formerly was significantly less than in rural 
areas, increased considerably during the 1980s. During the 
early 1990s, most city mosques were filled to capacity on Fridays 
and religious holidays. 



107 



Turkey: A Country Study 

The third pillar of Islam, almsgiving, is required of all Mus- 
lims. The faithful are expected to give in proportion to their 
wealth. In various historical periods, zekat assumed the status of 
a tithe that mosques collected and distributed for charitable 
purposes. In addition to zekat, Muslims are encouraged to 
make free-will gifts (sadaka, from the Arabic sadaqa). 

Abstinence from dawn to dusk from all food and beverages 
during the Islamic month of Ramazan is the fourth pillar of the 
faith required of Muslims. Persons who are ill; women who are 
pregnant, nursing, or menstruating; soldiers on duty; travelers 
on necessary journeys; and young children are exempted from 
the fast. However, adults who are unable to fast during Rama- 
zan are expected to observe a fast later. Ramazan is a period of 
spiritual renewal, and the daytime fasting is meant to help con- 
centrate a Muslim's thoughts on religious matters. Many 
mosques, especially in urban areas, sponsor special prayer 
meetings and study groups during the month. The evening 
meal that breaks the fast has special religious significance and 
also is an occasion for sharing among families and friends. 
Muslims who can afford to do so often host one or more fast- 
breaking meals for indigents during Ramazan. The month of 
fasting is followed by a three-day celebration, Seker Bayrami 
(in Arabic, Id al Fitr), which is observed in Turkey as a national 
holiday. 

The fifth pillar of Islam is the hac. Each Muslim who is finan- 
cially and physically able is expected at least once in his or her 
lifetime to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and participate in 
prescribed religious rites performed at various specific sites in 
the holy city and its environs during the twelfth month of the 
lunar calendar. In one of their most important rites, pilgrims 
pray while circumambulating the Kaaba, the sanctuary Muslims 
believe Ibrahim (Abraham) and his son Ismail (Ishmael) built 
to honor the one God. During the hac, pilgrims sacrifice 
domesticated animals such as sheep and distribute the meat 
among the needy. Known as the Feast of Sacrifice, Kurban 
Bayrami (in Arabic, Id al Adha), this occasion is celebrated not 
only by the pilgrims but by all Muslims, and is observed in Tur- 
key as a national holiday. The returning pilgrim is entitled to 
use the honorific had (in Arabic, hajji) before his or her name, 
a title that indicates successful completion of the pilgrimage. 

A pious Muslim strives to follow a code of ethical conduct 
that encourages generosity, fairness, chastity, honesty, and 
respect. Certain acts, including murder, cruelty, adultery, gam- 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



bling, and usury, are considered contrary to Islamic practice. 
Muslims also are enjoined not to consume carrion, blood, 
pork, or alcohol. Many of the precepts for appropriate behav- 
ior are specified in the Kuran. Other spiritual and ethical 
guidelines are found in the hadis (in Arabic, hadith), an authen- 
ticated record of the sayings and actions of Muhammad and his 
earliest companions. Devout Muslims regard their words, acts, 
and decisions — called collectively the sunna — as models to be 
emulated by later generations. Because of its normative charac- 
ter, the sunna is revered along with the Kuran as a primary 
source of seriat (in Arabic, sharia), or Islamic law. 

Islamic law evolved between the eighth and tenth centuries. 
Islamic scholars reputed for their knowledge of the Kuran, 
hadis, and sunna were accepted as authoritative interpreters of 
seriat. Several of them compiled texts of case law that formed 
the basis of legal schools. Eventually, Sunni Muslims came to 
accept four schools of law as equally valid. Two schools of seriat 
exist in contemporary Turkey: the Hanafi, founded by Iraqi 
theologian Abu Hanifa (ca. 700-67), and the Shafii, founded 
by the Meccan jurist Muhammad ash Shafii (767-820). Most 
Muslim Turks follow the Hanafi school, whereas most Sunni 
Kurds follow the Shafii school. 

Early Development 

Following the death of the Prophet in 632, the Muslim com- 
munity failed to reach consensus on who should succeed him 
as the caliph. A majority of Muhammad's close followers sup- 
ported the idea of an elected caliph, but a minority believed 
that leadership, or the imamate, should remain within the 
Prophet's family, passing first to Muhammad's cousin, son-in- 
law, and principal deputy, Ali ibn Abu Talib, and subsequently 
to Ali's sons and their male descendants. The majority, who 
believed they were following the sunna of the Prophet, became 
known as Sunni Muslims. To them, the caliph was the symbolic 
religious head of the community; however, caliphs would also 
rule as the secular leaders of a major empire for six centuries. 
The first four caliphs — Abu Bakr, Omar, Osman, and Ali — were 
chosen by a consensus of Muslim leaders. Subsequently, how- 
ever, the caliphate was converted by its holders into a heredi- 
tary office, the first two dynasties being the Umayyad, which 
ruled from Damascus, and the second being the Abbasid, 
which ruled from Baghdad. After the Mongols captured Bagh- 
dad and executed the Abbasid caliph in 1258, a period of more 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

than 250 years followed when no one was recognized as caliph 
by all Sunni Muslims. During the sixteenth century, the Otto- 
man Dynasty resurrected the title, and gradually even Muslims 
outside the Ottoman Empire came to accept the Ottoman sul- 
tan as the symbolic leader — caliph — of Sunni Islam. 

The partisans of Ali — the Shiat Ali — evolved into a separate 
Islamic denomination that became known as the Shia. By the 
ninth century, however, the Shia Muslims split into numerous 
sects as a result of disagreements over which of several brothers 
was the legitimate leader, or imam, of the community. The 
major divisions occurred over the question of succession to the 
fourth, sixth, and twelfth imams. Consequently, the origins of 
almost all Shia sects can be traced to the followers of the fifth, 
seventh, or twelfth imam. By the fifteenth century, the sect 
known as the Twelve Imam Shia — a group that recognized Ali 
and eleven of his direct descendants as the legitimate succes- 
sors to the Prophet — had emerged as the predominant Shia 
sect. 

In addition to the orthodox Twelve Imam Shia, several sects 
that revered the twelve imams but otherwise subscribed to het- 
erodox beliefs and practices emerged between the ninth and 
twelfth centuries. One of these heterodox sects, the Nusayri, 
originated in the mid-ninth century among the followers of the 
religious teacher Muhammad ibn Nusayr an Namiri. The 
Nusayri became established in what is now northern Syria and 
southern Turkey during the tenth century when a Shia dynasty 
based in Aleppo ruled the region. Because of the special devo- 
tion of the Nusayri to Ali, Sunni Muslims historically and pejo- 
ratively referred to them as Alevi (see The Alevi, this ch.). 

Development of Islam in Turkey 

By the end of the seventh century, conversion to Islam had 
begun among the Turkish-speaking tribes, who were migrating 
westward from Central Asia. The initial wave of Turkish 
migrants converted to Sunni Islam and became champions of 
Islamic orthodoxy. As warriors of the Islamic faith, or gazis, they 
colonized and settled Anatolia in the name of Islam, especially 
following the defeat of the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzi- 
kert (1071). Beginning in the twelfth century, new waves of 
Turkic migrants became attracted to militant Sufi orders, 
which gradually incorporated heterodox Shia beliefs. One Sufi 
order that appealed to Turks in Anatolia after 1300 was the 
Safavi, based in northwest Iran. During the fourteenth and fif- 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



teenth centuries, the Safavi and similar orders such as the Bek- 
tasi became rivals of the Ottomans — who were orthodox Sunni 
Muslims — for political control of eastern Anatolia. Concern 
about the growing influence of the Safavi probably was one of 
the factors that prompted the Ottomans to permit unorthodox 
Bektasi Sufism to become the official order of the janissary sol- 
diers (see The Ottoman Empire, ch. 1). Although the Bektasi 
became accepted as a sect of orthodox Sunni Muslims, they did 
not abandon their heterodox Shia beliefs. In contrast, the 
Safavi eventually conquered Iran, shed their heterodox reli- 
gious beliefs, and became proponents of orthodox Twelve 
Imam Shia Islam. 

The conquest of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople — 
which the Turks called Istanbul (from the Greek phrase eis tin 
polin, "to the city") — in 1453 enabled the Ottomans to consoli- 
date their empire in Anatolia and Thrace. The Ottomans 
revived the title of caliph, based their legitimacy on Islam, and 
integrated religion into the government and administration. 
Despite the absence of a formal institutional structure, Sunni 
religious functionaries played an important political role. Jus- 
tice was dispensed by religious courts; in theory, the codified 
system of seriat regulated all aspects of life, at least for the Mus- 
lim subjects of the empire. The head of the judiciary ranked 
directly below the sultan and was second in power only to the 
grand vizier. Early in the Ottoman period, the office of grand 
mufti of Istanbul evolved into that of seyhillislam (shaykh, or 
leader of Islam), which had ultimate jurisdiction over all the 
courts in the empire and consequently exercised authority over 
the interpretation and application of seriat. Legal opinions pro- 
nounced by the seyhillislam were considered definitive interpre- 
tations. 

Sufism and Folk Islam 

From the earliest days of Islam, some Muslims have been 
attracted to mystical interpretations of their religion. In Tur- 
key, at least since the thirteenth century, Islamic mysticism has 
been expressed through participation in Sufi brotherhoods 
that serve as centers of spiritual and social life. The term Sufi 
derives from the Arabic suf, which means wool. Early Muslims 
used the term Sufi to refer to fellow believers who wore simple 
woolen garments to demonstrate their rejection of materialism 
and worldly temptations and their devotion to a life of asceti- 
cism and prayer. Eventually, some Sufis who had acquired repu- 



111 




112 



View of Istanbul and the Blue Mosque 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfuss 



113 



Turkey: A Country Study 

tations for their learning and piety attracted disciples who 
aspired to learn from and emulate these Sufi masters. Initially, 
Sufi followers were like students whose bonds to a Sufi teacher 
were based on personal loyalty. Since the twelfth century, how- 
ever, most Sufis have organized themselves into orders or 
brotherhoods (tarikat; pi., tarikatlar — see Glossary) that follow 
the teachings of a particular Sufi master. 

Many Sufi tarikatlar established institutional bases, called 
tekke or dergah (lodges), that lasted for several generations and, 
in some instances, even for centuries. For example, two of con- 
temporary Turkey's largest tarikatlar, the Naksibendi and the 
Kadiri, date back at least to the fourteenth century. Some 
tarikatlar carry the name of the founding Sufi master, the seyh 
(in Arabic, shaykh). One example is the Mevlevi brotherhood. 
Its members popularly are called whirling dervishes because of 
the rhythmic whirling they engage in as a spiritual exercise and 
a means to achieve ecstatic proximity to God. The brotherhood 
is named after its founder, Mevlana (Jalal ad Din Rumi, d. 
1273). Ordinarily, a designated successor to the seyh inherited 
his position of leadership as well as the mantle of his spiritual 
power. Induction into a particular tarikat became regulated 
and usually depended on the performance of prescribed initia- 
tion procedures. Initiates were placed at different levels, 
depending on the instruction they had mastered. Some of the 
larger Sufi tarikatlar established branches and through evkaf 
accumulated land and buildings, which functioned as tekkes, 
Kuran schools, residential monasteries, orphanages, and hos- 
pices. 

The early tarikatlar were strongly influenced by Shia doc- 
trines. Consequently, the political conflicts between the Sunni 
Ottoman and Shia Safavi dynasties affected the Sufi orders in 
Turkey. Sunni tarikatlar eventually deemphasized such prac- 
tices as the veneration of Ali ibn Abu Talib and received official 
patronage from some Ottoman sultans. However, at least one 
Shia tarikat, the Bektasi, supported the Ottomans and actually 
exercised significant political influence without changing their 
heterodox beliefs. The Bektasi and the Sunni tarikatlar also 
served an important social function by providing educational 
and social welfare services, constituting a means of social 
mobility, and offering spiritual guidance to the people, espe- 
cially in rural areas. 

Folk Islam in Turkey has derived many of its popular prac- 
tices from Sufism. Particular Sufi seyhs — and occasionally other 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



individuals reputed to be pious — were regarded after death as 
saints having special powers to mediate between believers and 
God. Veneration of saints (both male and female) and pilgrim- 
ages to their shrines and graves represent an important aspect 
of popular Islam in both the city and the country. Folk Islam 
has continued to embrace such practices although the venera- 
tion of saints officially has been discouraged since the 1930s. 
Plaques posted in various sanctuaries forbid the lighting of can- 
dles, the offering of votive objects, and related devotional activ- 
ities in these places. 

The Alevi 

A significant Shia minority lives in Turkey. As in the Otto- 
man period, a census of the Shia population has never been 
taken in the republican period. Thus, there is no accurate 
information on the size of the Shia community, which has been 
estimated to constitute as little as 7 percent and as much as 30 
percent of Turkey's total population. Sunni in Turkey tend to 
refer to all Shia as Alevi. In actuality, Alevi constitute but one of 
four Shia sects in the country. But Alevi are by far the largest 
Shia sect in Turkey, accounting for at least 70 percent of the 
country's Shia. Twelve Imam Shia and followers of the hetero- 
dox Ahl-i Haq and Bektasi have resided in Turkey for centuries. 
Twelve Imam Shia comprise a majority of all Shia worldwide, 
although their numbers in Turkey are estimated at only 20 to 
25 percent of all Shia in the country. Scholars believe that the 
unorthodox Ahl-i Haq, whose adherents are almost exclusively 
Kurds, and the equally unorthodox Bektasi, whose followers 
primarily are ethnic Turks, are even fewer in number than the 
Twelve Imam Shia. 

Even though scholars of the contemporary Middle East tend 
to associate Alevi with Syria, where they have played an influen- 
tial political role since the 1960s, a majority of all Alevi actually 
live in Turkey. Alevi include almost all of Turkey's Arab minor- 
ity, from 10 to 30 percent of the country's Kurds, and many eth- 
nic Turks. In fact, a majority of Alevi may be Turks. Historically, 
Alevi resided predominantly in southeastern Turkey, but the 
mass rural-to-urban migration that has been relatively continu- 
ous since 1960 has resulted in thousands of Alevi moving to cit- 
ies in central and western Anatolia. Consequently, Alevi 
communities of varying size were located in most of the coun- 
try's major cities by the mid-1990s. 



115 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Because of centuries of persecution by Sunni Muslims, Alevi 
became highly secretive about the tenets of their faith and 
their religious practices. Consequently, almost no reliable 
information about Alevi Islam is available. Unsympathetic pub- 
lished sources reported that Alevi worshiped Ali ibn Abu Talib, 
observed various Christian rituals, and venerated both Chris- 
tian and Muslim saints. Prior to the twentieth century, informa- 
tion on the sect was so sparse and distorted that even Twelve 
Imam Shia regarded Alevi as heretics. However, the tendency 
among most contemporary Twelve Imam clergy is to recognize 
the Alevi as a distinct legal school within the Twelve Imam tra- 
dition. In addition, major Twelve Imam Shia theological col- 
leges in Iran and Iraq have accepted Alevi students since the 
1940s. 

Secularist Policies 

In 1922 the new nationalist regime abolished the Ottoman 
sultanate, and in 1924 it abolished the caliphate, the religious 
office that Ottoman sultans had held for four centuries. Thus, 
for the first time in Islamic history, no ruler claimed spiritual 
leadership of Islam. The withdrawal of Turkey, heir to the Otto- 
man Empire, as the presumptive leader of the world Muslim 
community was symbolic of the change in the government's 
relationship to Islam. Indeed, secularism or laicism (laiklik) 
became one of the "Six Arrows" of Ataturk's program for 
remaking Turkey. Whereas Islam had formed the identity of 
Muslims within the Ottoman Empire, secularism was seen as 
molding the new Turkish nation and its citizens. 

Ataturk and his associates not only abolished certain reli- 
gious practices and institutions but also questioned the value of 
religion, preferring to place their trust in science. They 
regarded organized religion as an anachronism and contrasted 
it unfavorably with "civilization," which to them meant a ratio- 
nalist, secular culture. Establishment of secularism in Turkey 
was not, as it had been in the West, a gradual process of separa- 
tion of church and state. In the Ottoman Empire, all spheres of 
life, at least theoretically, had been subject to religious law, and 
Sunni religious organizations had been part of the state struc- 
ture. When the reformers of the early 1920s opted for a secular 
state, they removed religion from the sphere of public policy 
and restricted it exclusively to that of personal morals, behav- 
ior, and faith. Although private observance of religious rituals 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



could continue, religion and religious organization were 
excluded from public life. 

The policies directly affecting religion were numerous and 
sweeping. In addition to the abolition of the caliphate, new 
laws mandated abolition of the office of seyhulislam; abolition of 
the religious hierarchy; the closing and confiscation of Sufi 
lodges, meeting places, and monasteries and the outlawing of 
their rituals and meetings; establishment of government con- 
trol over the evkaf, which had been inalienable under seriat; 
replacement of seriat with adapted European legal codes; the 
closing of religious schools; abandonment of the Islamic calen- 
dar in favor of the Gregorian calendar used in the West; restric- 
tions on public attire that had religious associations, with the 
fez outlawed for men and the veil discouraged for women; and 
the outlawing of the traditional garb of local religious leaders. 

Atatvirk and his colleagues also attempted to Turkify Islam 
through official encouragement of such practices as using 
Turkish rather than Arabic at devotions, substituting the Turk- 
ish word Tanri for the Arabic word Allah, and introducing Turk- 
ish for the daily calls to prayer. These changes in devotional 
practices deeply disturbed faithful Muslims and caused wide- 
spread resentment, which led in 1933 to a return to the Arabic 
version of the call to prayer. Of longer-lasting effect were the 
regime's measures prohibiting religious education, restricting 
the building of new mosques, and transferring existing 
mosques to secular purposes. Most notably, the Hagia Sophia 
(Justinian's sixth-century Christian basilica, which had been 
converted into a mosque by Mehmet II) was made a museum 
in 1935. The effect of these changes was to make religion, or 
more correctly Sunni Islam, subject to the control of a hostile 
state. Muftis and imams (prayer leaders) were appointed by the 
government, and religious instruction was taken over by the 
Ministry of National Education. 

Retreat from Secularism 

The expectation of the secular ruling elite that the policies 
of the 1920s and 1930s would diminish the role of religion in 
public life did not materialize. As early as 1925, religious griev- 
ances were one of the principal causes of the Seyh Sait rebel- 
lion, an uprising in southeastern Turkey that may have claimed 
as many as 30,000 lives before being suppressed. Following the 
relaxation of authoritarian political controls in 1946, large 
numbers of people began to call openly for a return to tradi- 



117 



Turkey: A Country Study 

tional religious practice. During the 1950s, even certain politi- 
cal leaders found it expedient to join religious leaders in 
advocating more state respect for religion (see Multiparty Poli- 
tics, 1946-60, ch. 1). 

A more direct manifestation of the growing reaction against 
secularism was the revival of the Sufi brotherhoods. Not only 
did suppressed tarikatlar such as the Kadiri, Mevlevi, and Naksi- 
bendi reemerge, but new orders were formed, including the 
Nurcular, Suleymanci, and Ticani. The Ticani became espe- 
cially militant in confronting the state. For example, Ticani 
damaged monuments to Ataturk to symbolize their opposition 
to his policy of secularization. Throughout the 1950s, there 
were numerous trials of Ticani and other Sufi leaders for anti- 
state activities. Simultaneously, however, some tarikatlar, notably 
the Suleymanci and Nurcular, cooperated with those politi- 
cians perceived as supportive of pro-Islamic policies. The Nur- 
cular eventually advocated support for Turkey's multiparty 
political system, and one of its offshoots, the Isikcilar, has 
openly supported the Motherland Party since the mid-1980s. 

The demand for restoration of religious education in public 
schools began in the late 1940s. The government initially 
responded by authorizing religious instruction in state schools 
for those students whose parents requested it. Under Democrat 
Party rule during the 1950s, religious education was made com- 
pulsory in secondary schools unless parents made a specific 
request to have their children excused. Religious education 
was made compulsory for all primary and secondary school 
children in 1982. 

Inevitably, the reintroduction of religion into the school cur- 
riculum raised the question of religious higher education. The 
secular elites, who tended to distrust traditional religious lead- 
ers, believed that Islam could be "reformed" if future leaders 
were trained in state-controlled seminaries. To further this 
goal, the government in 1949 established a faculty of divinity at 
Ankara University to train teachers of Islam and imams. In 
1951 the Democrat Party government set up special secondary 
schools {imam hatip okullari) for the training of imams and 
preachers. Initially, the imam hatip schools grew very slowly, but 
their numbers expanded rapidly to more than 250 during the 
1970s, when the pro-Islam National Salvation Party partici- 
pated in coalition governments. Following the 1980 coup, the 
military, although secular in orientation, viewed religion as an 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



effective means to counter socialist ideas and thus authorized 
the construction of ninety more imam hatip high schools. 

During the 1970s and 1980s, Islam experienced a kind of 
political rehabilitation because right-of-center secular leaders 
perceived religion as a potential bulwark in their ideological 
struggle with left-of-center secular leaders. A small advocacy 
group that became extremely influential was the Hearth of 
Intellectuals, an organization that maintains that true Turkish 
culture is a synthesis of the Turks' pre-Islamic traditions and 
Islam. According to the Hearth, Islam not only constitutes an 
essential aspect of Turkish culture but is a force that can be reg- 
ulated by the state to help socialize the people to be obedient 
citizens acquiescent to the overall secular order. After the 1980 
military coup, many of the Hearth's proposals for restructuring 
schools, colleges, and state broadcasting were adopted. The 
result was a purge from these state institutions of more than 
2,000 intellectuals perceived as espousing leftist ideas incom- 
patible with the Hearth's vision of Turkey's national culture. 

The state's more tolerant attitude toward Islam encouraged 
the proliferation of private religious activities, including the 
construction of new mosques and Kuran schools in the cities, 
the establishment of Islamic centers for research on and con- 
ferences about Islam and its role in Turkey, and the establish- 
ment of religiously oriented professional and women's 
journals. The printing of newspapers, the publication of reli- 
gious books, and the growth of innumerable religious projects 
ranging from health centers, child-care facilities, and youth 
hostels to financial institutions and consumer cooperatives 
flourished. When the government legalized private broadcast- 
ing after 1990, several Islamic radio stations were organized. In 
the summer of 1994, the first Islamic television station, Chan- 
nel 7, began broadcasting, first in Istanbul and subsequently in 
Ankara. 

Although the tarikatlarhave played a seminal role in Turkey's 
religious revival and in the mid-1990s still published several of 
the country's most widely circulated religious journals and 
newspapers, a new phenomenon, Islamci aydin (the Islamist 
intellectual) unaffiliated with the traditional Sufi orders, 
emerged during the 1980s. Prolific and popular writers such as 
Ali Bulac, Rasim Ozdenoren, and Ismet Ozel have drawn upon 
their knowledge of Western philosophy, Marxist sociology, and 
radical Islamist political theory to advocate a modern Islamic 
perspective that does not hesitate to criticize genuine societal 



119 



Turkey: A Country Study 

ills while simultaneously remaining faithful to the ethical values 
and spiritual dimensions of religion. Islamist intellectuals are 
harshly critical of Turkey's secular intellectuals, whom they 
fault for trying to do in Turkey what Western intellectuals did 
in Europe: substitute worldly materialism, in its capitalist or 
socialist version, for religious values. 

Although intellectual debates on the role of Islam attracted 
widespread interest, they did not provoke the kind of contro- 
versy that erupted over the issue of appropriate attire for Mus- 
lim women. During the early 1980s, female college students 
who were determined to demonstrate their commitment to 
Islam began to cover their heads and necks with large scarves 
and wear long, shape-concealing overcoats. The appearance of 
these women in the citadels of Turkish secularism shocked 
those men and women who tended to perceive such attire as a 
symbol of the Islamic traditionalism they rejected. Militant sec- 
ularists persuaded the Higher Education Council to issue a reg- 
ulation in 1987 forbidding female university students to cover 
their heads in class. Protests by thousands of religious students 
and some university professors forced several universities to 
waive enforcement of the dress code. The issue continued to 
be seriously divisive in the mid-1990s. Throughout the first half 
of the 1990s, highly educated, articulate, but religiously pious 
women have appeared in public dressed in Islamic attire that 
conceals all but their faces and hands. Other women, especially 
in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, have demonstrated against such 
attire by wearing revealing fashions and Ataturk badges. The 
issue is discussed and debated in almost every type of forum — 
artistic, commercial, cultural, economic, political, and reli- 
gious. For many citizens of Turkey, women's dress has become 
the issue — at least for the 1990s — that defines whether a Mus- 
lim is secularist or religious. 

Non-Muslim Minorities 

Because of the absence since 1965 of census data on the eth- 
nic background and religious affiliation of Turkish citizens, the 
size of non-Muslim communities in Turkey in 1995 was difficult 
to estimate. The 1965 census enumerated about 207,000 Chris- 
tians, about 169,000 of whom resided in urban areas and about 
38,000 in the countryside. The Christians included Armenian, 
Greek, and Syrian Orthodox; Armenian and Syrian Catholics; 
and members of various Protestant denominations. The Jewish 
population in 1965 numbered about 44,000, all but a tiny frac- 



120 



Muslim woman with prayer 
beads, Ortahisar, central 
Anatolia 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfuss 



People praying on Ulu Dag 
Mountain, near Bursa, in 



northwestern Turkey 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfuss 



tion of whom were urban residents. By 1995 it was estimated 
that the size of these populations had decreased substantially, 
the Christians to just under 140,000 and the Jews to about 
20,000. The members of these religious minorities are found 
primarily in the coastal cities and towns, but some live in the 
mountainous regions of eastern Anatolia near the borders with 
Armenia and Georgia. 

In 1995 members of religious minorities continued to 
occupy an anomalous position in Turkish society. Non-Muslims 
remain to some extent second-class citizens, although they gen- 
erally are not subject to overt discrimination. A disproportion- 
ately large segment of the minority population is represented 
among the wealthy business and professional groups. Prosely- 
tizing by non-Muslim religions is strongly discouraged by the 
government. Under the law, a Muslim man or woman may 
marry a non-Muslim spouse, but such marriages are infrequent 
and usually do not entail conversion. 



121 



Turkey: A Country Study 

The Syrian Orthodox, or Jacobite, community, which num- 
bered about 50,000 in 1995, ranks as the largest Christian 
denomination in Turkey. An Arabic-speaking community that 
uses ancient Aramaic in its liturgy, the Syrian Orthodox histori- 
cally have lived in villages in the vicinity of Mardin and Midyat 
in southeastern Turkey Since the late 1980s, intense fighting in 
this region between government forces and the PKK has threat- 
ened many villages and prompted a migration to local cities 
and even to Istanbul, where a community of Syrian Orthodox, 
initially established during the Ottoman era, was estimated to 
number 10,000 in 1995. The Syrian Orthodox Church has its 
own head, referred to as a metropolitan. The metropolitan 
(Timotheos Samuel Aktash in 1995) resides in an ancient 
mountain monastery near Midyat. Also, an estimated 2,000 Syr- 
ian Catholics, whose ancestors converted from the Syrian 
Orthodox rite, are scattered in small communities in the south- 
east. Syrian Catholics retain the distinct Syrian Orthodox rite 
but recognize the spiritual authority of the Roman Catholic 
pope. 

The Armenian Orthodox (or Gregorian) community, with 
some 35,000 members in 1995, ranks as the second largest 
Christian denomination in Turkey. In addition, an estimated 
7,000 other Armenians belong to an autonomous Orthodox 
church, to an Armenian Catholic church in union with Rome, 
or to various Protestant denominations. In 1995 the Armenian 
Orthodox Church's patriarch, Karekin Bedros Kazandjian, 
resided in Istanbul. In 1995 the Armenian Orthodox Church 
maintained more than thirty churches and chapels; seventy-five 
elementary and middle schools, and two orphanages. Arme- 
nian Catholics maintained ten churches in Istanbul, as well as 
six elementary and middle schools. 

The Greek Orthodox Church, the largest Christian church 
in Turkey as recently as 1960, had fewer than 20,000 members 
in 1995. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, 
located in the Fener quarter of Istanbul, is the central church 
authority for Greek Orthodox Christians in most of Europe 
and beyond. Because the patriarch's authority extends to all 
Orthodox believers outside Greece and the Middle East, he is 
considered the honorary head of the church for communities 
of Orthodox Christians living in the United States, Canada, 
Central and South America, Australia, and New Zealand. From 
these communities, the patriarchate in Istanbul receives moral 
and financial support. The ecumenical patriarch's status has 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



been affected by the continual tension in Turkish-Greek rela- 
tions. During the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of members of 
the Greek Orthodox community left Turkey on account of the 
discrimination or overt hostility they experienced following 
Greco-Turkish conflicts over the status of Cyprus. The diminu- 
tion of the community has weakened the patriarchate and 
undermined its status in its dealings with the Turkish govern- 
ment. Nevertheless, the patriarchate's importance has 
remained considerable because of its ecumenical and interna- 
tional connections. 

Other Christian communities present in Turkey include sev- 
eral small groups affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. 
Melchites (Greek Catholics) and Maronites live among the 
Arabs in southeast Hatay Province. Although accepted by the 
Vatican as part of the Roman Catholic Church, Melchites and 
Maronite Catholics retain their own separate liturgies. 
Chaldean-rite Catholics live in the Diyarbakir region, while Bul- 
garian, Greek, and Latin-rite Catholics live in Istanbul and 
Izmir. The total number of Catholics of various persuasions in 
early 1995 has been estimated at 25,000. 

Since 1948 the Jewish population has decreased steadily. In 
1995 the Jewish community, estimated at 18,000 to 20,000, con- 
sisted primarily of Sephardic Jews. At least 90 percent of Tur- 
key's Jews live in Istanbul, where a chief rabbi presides. In 1995 
the Jewish community maintained one high school and four 
elementary schools offering limited courses in Hebrew. 

Structure of Society 

Contemporary Turkish society has evolved both as a conse- 
quence of and a response to the major socioeconomic changes 
initiated by the republican government since the early 1920s. A 
predominantly agrarian society with little industry and high 
illiteracy rates when the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end 
of World War I, Turkey by the 1990s had become a predomi- 
nantly urban and industrialized society in which mass public 
education and the ability to vote for government leaders in 
competitive elections are regarded as basic rights. Accompany- 
ing the changes has been the growth of new classes and interest 
groups, especially in the large cities, where the demands of 
entrepreneurs and industrial workers are championed by vari- 
ous political parties. A notable characteristic of many govern- 
ment programs aimed at inducing specific socioeconomic 
changes, however, has been the penchant of ruling civilian and 



123 



Turkey: A Country Study 

military elites for implementing policies without consulting 
those who might be affected and for using force whenever pop- 
ular resistance is encountered. One consequence of this 
approach has been the gradual creation of two distinct cultures 
in Turkey: a secular, elitist culture that defines what is progres- 
sive and modern; and a mass culture that continues to be influ- 
enced by Islam, whether in its traditional, mystical, modern, or 
radical interpretations. 

The Changing National Elite 

Turkey's national political elite is a self-perpetuating group; 
membership is based on a demonstrated commitment to secu- 
larism and the other principles of Ataturk. During the initial 
years of the republic, the elite was recruited from the Ottoman 
bureaucracy and military. Its members thus shared a sense that 
they knew best how to carry out policies that served the inter- 
ests of the state and country. In addition, most of the early 
republican elite had been involved with or sympathetic to the 
pre-World War I Ottoman political parties that had espoused 
major political and economic reforms. Ataturk himself, for 
example, had been a member of the Unionist Party while serv- 
ing as an Ottoman army officer in Macedonia (see The Young 
Turks, ch. 1). During the 1920s and 1930s, the ruling elite 
accepted the need for significant, even revolutionary, reforms 
and generally embraced Ataturk's programs enthusiastically. In 
effect, service to the country and higher education, rather 
than wealth per se, became primary qualifications for accep- 
tance into the political elite as early as 1930. 

The national political elite essentially ruled Turkey unchal- 
lenged for more than thirty years. Beginning in the 1950s, how- 
ever, the socioeconomic changes resulting from government 
policies provided numerous and varied opportunities for the 
accumulation of private capital in finance, commerce, trade, 
and industry. The emergence of a wealthy business class inevi- 
tably led to the development of class-specific political interests 
and ambitions. Because of this new business elite's experience 
in entrepreneurial activities rather than the bureaucracy, its 
members' views differed sharply from those of the established 
ruling elite, which generally supported state intervention in 
the economy. Increasing competition between the two elites 
over appropriate state policies was one of the reasons for the 
polarization that characterized Turkey's national politics dur- 
ing the 1970s. 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



A nongovernment professional elite also gradually emerged 
after 1950, including architects, engineers, lawyers, managers, 
physicians, and university professors, who were not necessarily 
unified in their political views. Nevertheless, as a group they 
tended to resent what they perceived as the patronizing, even 
authoritarian, political attitudes of the ruling elite. This 
group's frustration with the political system, emerging at the 
same time as dissatisfaction within the business elite, high- 
lighted the need for genuine political reform. During the 
1970s, some members of the ruling elite recognized this need, 
but they were unable to enact remedial legislation. 

The 1980 military coup symbolized the deep divisions that 
had emerged within the ruling elite over strategies for dealing 
with the political demands of diverse and competitive interest 
groups. The officers and their civilian supporters, who 
included some factions of the business elite, wanted the state to 
impose social order through the type of authoritarian methods 
they believed had worked successfully under Ataturk. They 
were sufficiently angry with dissenting members of the ruling 
elite to arrest the most prominent politicians, including two 
former prime ministers. The coup in effect split the ruling elite 
into two ideological factions that continue to coexist uneasily 
in the mid-1990s. One elite group believes in the efficacy of a 
strong government to maintain social and political stability; the 
other elite faction believes in accommodating interest group 
demands that do not threaten the national cohesion of the 
country and generally supports broadening political pluralism. 

Urban Life 

By 1995 approximately two-thirds of Turkey's population 
lived in urban areas, which continued to grow rapidly (see Pop- 
ulation Density, Distribution, and Settlement, this ch.). Urban- 
ization and industrialization have helped to create social-class 
structures that are similar in all large cities (population of 
more than 100,000) and most smaller ones (population 20,000 
to 100,000). Government officials, wealthy businesspeople, and 
professionals together constitute the urban upper class. The 
business elite in most cities is very diverse and generally 
includes industrialists, financiers, large-scale retailers and 
wholesalers, real estate developers, construction firm owners, 
transportation company operators, and, in Ankara and Istan- 
bul, owners of commercial publishing and broadcasting com- 
panies. The business elite, which constitutes the largest 



125 



Turkey: A Country Study 



component of the upper class, has been expanding since the 
early 1980s as a result of government incentives for private 
investors and entrepreneurs. However, because statistics on 
personal income in Turkey are neither complete nor reliable, 
there is no accurate means of determining the composition of 
the upper class. Political power and education continue to be 
significant, albeit much less so than before the 1980 coup, as 
qualifications for upper-class status. The upper class makes up 
about 10 percent of the total population of all cities. 

The urban middle class is larger and more diverse than the 
upper class. It includes various types of administrators; middle- 
level bureaucrats and public employees; engineers lacking 
advanced college degrees; journalists and other writers; manag- 
ers of industrial enterprises, commercial offices, and social-ser- 
vice centers; owners of small-scale retail establishments and 
restaurants; technicians; self-employed artisans; professionals; 
and tradespeople. Education, particularly a college degree, has 
been key to joining the middle class. Although the middle class 
was continuing to expand during the early 1980s, most of its 
members felt threatened by persistently high inflation rates 
that had eroded their savings and impeded their upward social 
mobility. In 1995 the middle class was estimated to constitute 
20 to 25 percent of the total urban population. It was larger in 
prosperous cities but smaller in economically depressed areas. 

The phenomenal growth of cities since the 1950s has been 
the result of large-scale migration of lower-class people from 
the villages; in 1995 more than 60 percent of Turkey's urban 
population belonged to the lower class. Most villagers who 
came to the cities in search of work were unable to find afford- 
able housing. Thus, they built temporary shelters on undevel- 
oped land on the outskirts of Ankara and Istanbul and other 
large cities. These squatter settlements, or gecekondus, soon 
became permanent neighborhoods, albeit ones that lacked 
urban amenities such as piped water, electricity, and paved 
streets. Eventually, some gecekondus were incorporated into the 
cities and provided with electricity. By 1980 up to 60 percent of 
the residents of Ankara, Adana, Bursa, Istanbul, and Izmir lived 
in new gecekondus or in city neighborhoods that had originated 
as gecekondus. During the 1970s, researchers affiliated with gov- 
ernment-funded institutes tried to depict the expanding 
gecekondus as settlements that facilitated the adaptation of rural 
migrants to the urban environment. In actuality, all such neigh- 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



borhoods were urban slums where poverty and its associated 
social ills remained pervasive in the mid-1990s. 

Obtaining work in private manufacturing or state industries 
is a typical goal of lower-class men because of the steady 
employment and wages offered. Among industrial workers, 
there has been a long tradition of group identification and sol- 
idarity. By 1975, when more than 79 percent of all industrial 
workers had been unionized, labor leaders were able to exer- 
cise political influence on behalf of legislation protecting work- 
ers' rights. This situation changed dramatically following the 
1980 coup. The military government forcibly dissolved existing 
labor unions, arrested prominent labor leaders, and banned 
strikes. Subsequently, to ensure that unions remained under 
supervision, the civilian government of Turgut Ozal encour- 
aged the formation of tradespeople-artisan guilds. By 1995 
these guilds, however, represented only 10 percent of the 
entire labor force and lacked the political influence of their 
predecessors (see Human Resources and Trade Unions, ch. 3). 

In the prevailing climate of economic and political uncer- 
tainty following the coup, several factories ceased production, a 
situation that meant immediate job and income loss for thou- 
sands of workers. Even after the restoration of civilian rule, eco- 
nomic conditions for the lower class did not improve. Up to 25 
percent of adult males in the gecekondus were unemployed in 
the mid-1980s; throughout the first half of the 1990s, the level 
of industrial unemployment remained at the 10 to 11 percent 
level. An excess labor supply relative to available industrial jobs 
has tended to keep wages depressed. 

There are more nonindustrial than industrial jobs in the cit- 
ies, and as many as two-thirds of all lower-class urban families 
depend on nonindustrial, unskilled work for their livelihood. 
Such work includes crafts; automotive repair; brick masonry; 
butchering; carpentry; deliveries; bus and taxi driving; enter- 
tainment; equipment operation in bakeries; laundry, machine 
shop, and dockyard work; home painting and repairs; mainte- 
nance of grounds and buildings; personal services in public 
bathhouses, barbershops, beauty salons, and private homes; 
operation of small retail shops; service jobs in hotels, institu- 
tions, offices, restaurants, and retail establishments; street 
cleaning and maintenance; street vending of products and ser- 
vices; textile piecework in the home; and various transport and 
haulage jobs. 



127 



Turkey: A Country Study 
Towns 

In addition to large and small cities, Turkey has scores of 
semiurban places that officially are classified as towns. A town 
{kasaba) is defined as an incorporated settlement with a popu- 
lation between 2,000 and 20,000. Towns generally provide basic 
economic and political services to the regions in which they are 
located. The social structure of larger towns is similar to that of 
the cities. There is an elite composed of government officials, 
military officers, and a few wealthy landowning, mercantile, 
and professional families; a middle class made up of adminis- 
trators, merchants, shopkeepers, soldiers, and teachers; and a 
lower class consisting of artisans and various categories of work- 
ers. Some of these diverse occupational groups may be absent 
in the smaller towns. 

Traditionally, elite status in towns derived from both wealth 
and family descent. Political and economic influence was exer- 
cised for several generations by local landowning families that 
had intermarried with Ottoman officials sent by the govern- 
ment to administer the towns. The policies introduced by 
Ataturk during the 1920s and 1930s changed the composition 
of most town elites, however. Families unable or unwilling to 
adapt lost influence and power, whereas those families who 
embraced the new values continued to wield local influence. 
Since the 1960s, the educated descendants of some members 
of the traditional landed elite have become governors, mayors, 
doctors, lawyers, judges, and merchants, as well as large land- 
owners employing modern farm technology and business prac- 
tices. These individuals also have assumed leadership of the 
local hierarchies of the political parties. 

Village Life 

Until the early 1950s, more than 80 percent of the inhabit- 
ants of Turkey lived in villages, which numbered more than 
36,000. As defined by the government, a village {hoy) is any set- 
tlement with a population of less than 2,000. Although Turkey's 
rural population has continued to grow, the percentage of the 
total population living in villages has declined as a result of 
rural-to-urban migration. In 1970 about 67 percent of the pop- 
ulation lived in villages; five years later, this proportion had 
shrunk to 59 percent. In 1980 more than 54 percent still lived 
in villages, but by 1985 most people lived in urban areas. In 
1995 less than 35 percent of the population lived in villages. 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



Since the 1950s, agriculture has become increasingly mecha- 
nized, and this gradual change has affected land tenure pat- 
terns and village society (see Land Tenure, ch. 3). Small 
landowners and landless families generally have not benefited 
from this change, and consequently they have been the rural 
residents most likely to migrate to the cities. In contrast, larger 
landowners have profited from the new agricultural methods 
by increasing their holdings and investing their increased 
wealth in industry. By the early 1980s, the personal and share- 
cropping relationships between landowners and agricultural 
laborers and tenants had been replaced by new and impersonal 
wage relations. This development prompted agricultural wage 
earners with grievances against landowners to seek advice and 
relief from labor unions or labor-oriented groups in the towns. 

In the 1990s, the extended family network remains the most 
important social unit in village society, even though most 
households tend to be composed of nuclear families. The 
extended family serves a crucial economic function in villages 
by fostering cooperation among related households by way of 
informal arrangements concerning shared machinery, shared 
labor, and even shared cash income. The extended family also 
is expected to provide support if one of its constituent nuclear 
households faces an economic, political, or social crisis. An 
extended family may be composed of a father, his married 
adult sons, and their children and wives, but usually it is a 
broader concept embracing several generations headed by one 
or more senior males who can trace common descent from a 
male ancestor. In this sense, an extended family is a patrilin- 
eage. Although such kin groups lack status as corporate entities 
in custom or law, they have an important role in defining fam- 
ily members' rights and obligations. 

There are important similarities among villages within a 
given region, as well as differences from one region to the 
next. In this sense, it is possible to distinguish among villages in 
three distinct geographic regions: Anatolia, the coastal area, 
and southern and eastern Turkey. 

Anatolian Villages 

The family (aile) is the basic structure of Anatolian village 
life. The word lacks a single specific meaning in peasant usage, 
referring instead to the conceptual group of coresidents, 
whether in a household, lineage, village, or nomadic band. The 
unit functions as the primary element in any concerted group 



129 



Turkey: A Country Study 

action. The two most frequent referents of the concept are 
household and village community; every sedentary (i.e., non- 
nomadic) villager in the Anatolian countryside belongs to at 
least these two groups. Consequently, household and village 
are what the Anatolian Turk means by aile. 

The household provides the framework for the most inti- 
mate and emotionally important social relations, as well as for 
most economic activities. The activities of the household, then, 
form the nucleus of village economic and social life. House- 
hold members are expected to work the household's fields 
cooperatively and reap the harvests that sustain its life. Because 
household members share an identity in the eyes of the village 
at large, every member is responsible for the actions of any 
other member. Wider kinship ties of the extended patrilineal 
family are also important. 

Because of the pervasiveness and significance of kinship 
groups and relationships defined on the basis of kinship, nonk- 
inship groups in Anatolian villages tend to be few in number 
and vague in their criteria for membership. Generally, three 
kinds of voluntary associations can be found in Anatolian vil- 
lages: religious associations and brotherhoods headed by der- 
vishes, local units of the main political parties, and gossip 
groups that meet in the guest rooms (misafir odasi) of well-to-do 
villagers. 

Prior to the 1950s, most Anatolian villagers owned the land 
they farmed, and within individual villages there were relatively 
small differences in wealth. Three criteria influenced social 
rank: ascribed characteristics such as age, sex, and the position 
of a person in his or her own household, lineage, and kinship 
network; economic status as indicated by landholding, occupa- 
tion, and income; and moral stature as demonstrated by piety, 
religious learning, and moral respectability. However, by 1995 
absentee landlordism and large landholdings had become 
common, and wealth alone tended to be the determining fac- 
tor in ascribing social status. Thus, resident large landowners 
often dominated the political, economic, and social life of the 
villages. 

The relationship of wealth to influence and social rank is 
illustrated by the institution of the guest room. It is estimated 
that only 10 percent of homes in Anatolian villages have guest 
rooms because they are very expensive to maintain. Village 
men gather most evenings in guest rooms and spend much of 
their time there during the winter months. Regular attendance 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



at a particular guest room implies political and social support 
of its owner because, by accepting his hospitality, a villager 
places himself in the owner's debt and acknowledges his supe- 
rior status. 

Every village in Anatolia, as well as elsewhere in Turkey, has 
an official representative of the central government, the head- 
man (muhtar), who is responsible to Ankara and the provincial 
administrators. The headman is elected every two years by vil- 
lagers (see Provincial and Local Government, ch. 4). The posi- 
tion generally is not considered a prestigious one because most 
villagers distrust the government. Thus, in Anatolia, it is not 
unusual to find relatively young men serving as village head- 
men. 

Coastal Villages 

Unlike the traditionally isolated villages of Anatolia, villages 
in European Turkey and along the Black Sea and Aegean Sea, 
and to a lesser degree along the Mediterranean Sea, have been 
exposed to urban influences for several generations. Agricul- 
ture tends to be specialized and is generally undertaken in 
association with fishing and lumber production. Economic 
links with market towns historically have been very important. 
Although the extended family plays a significant role through- 
out a villager's life, economic considerations rather than kin- 
ship tend to shape social relations. The commercial nature of 
these villages has resulted in the substitution of nonkinship 
roles — such as employer and employee, buyer and seller, and 
landlord and tenant — for most interactions outside the home. 

In coastal villages, the elite is primarily a landed group. 
Large landowners, by providing employment and — to a lesser 
degree — land to their laborers and tenants, and by serving as 
an economic link between the village and urban markets, 
acquire influence and power. Their personal contact with the 
laborers and tenants on their lands, however, has lessened 
since the 1950s. By the 1990s, urban businesspeople with both 
the resources and the inclination to serve as middlemen 
between village production and city markets generally wielded 
as much influence as local large landowners. Businesspeople's 
influence continues to expand as a result of increasing crop 
specialization and market dependency. 

Villages in the South and East 

The villages of southeastern Turkey are predominantly Arab 



131 



Turkey: A Country Study 

and Kurdish. Tribal organization — the grouping of several 
patrilineages claiming a common historical ancestor — remains 
important in some Kurdish villages. However, the political 
autonomy once enjoyed by tribal leaders was usurped by the 
central government during the 1920s and 1930s. Tribal leaders 
who retain local influence do so because they are large land- 
owners. Large landholdings are typical of the region. In most 
villages, one or two families own most of the arable land and 
pasturage; the remainder is divided into small plots owned by 
several families. Most of the small landowners have holdings fit 
only for subsistence agriculture. From 10 to 50 percent of all 
families may be landless. Villagers who do not own land work as 
agricultural laborers or herders for the large landlords. The 
poverty of most villagers compels them to enter into depen- 
dent economic, political, and social relations with the wealthier 
landlords. 

The fighting between the PKK and the government in south- 
eastern Turkey since 1984 has disrupted life in many villages. 
About 850 Kurdish villages have been uprooted by the govern- 
ment and their inhabitants forcibly removed to western Anato- 
lia. Thousands of other villagers have migrated to cities to 
escape the incessant fighting. The migrants have included all 
types of villagers: the landless, small landowners, and large 
landlords. The long-term effects of these changes were difficult 
to assess in the mid-1990s. 

The Individual, the Family, and Gender Relations 

Prior to the establishment of the republic, matters of per- 
sonal status, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance, 
were regulated by Islamic law and influenced by cultural cus- 
toms that had evolved during several centuries of Ottoman 
rule. Atatiirk and his associates regarded both religious rules 
and traditional cultural practices as hindrances to the creation 
of their shared vision of a modern society. In fact, their societal 
ideal for Turkey was the pattern of personal and family rela- 
tions that prevailed among the educated upper classes of 
Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. Consequently, many poli- 
cies enacted during the early republican period were designed 
explicitly to remold Turkish society according to an urban 
European model. One of the most significant measures on 
behalf of this goal was the abolition of Islamic law. In 1926 a 
new civil code derived from Swiss civil laws replaced the reli- 
gious legal system. The disestablishment of Islam as the state 



132 



A dervish whirling to induce 
a trance for prayer 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 




religion and other measures aimed at religion reduced the 
influence of Islam in life-cycle rituals. 

The social changes induced by state policies after 1923 failed 
to create a new Turkish culture. Instead, at least two distinct 
cultures had emerged in Turkey by the 1950s. One was an elite 
culture characterized by secular values and patterns of family 
and gender relationships similar to those found in much of 
urban, middle-class Europe. The majority popular culture, in 
contrast, was influenced by a melange of secular ideas learned 
in the compulsory state education system (through middle 
school), religious values learned within the family and from 
community organizations such as the mosques, and traditional 
views about the appropriate public role of the sexes. 

Marriage 

As part of their rejection of the symbols of Islam, Atatiirk 
and his associates outlawed traditional marriage practices. The 
1926 civil code mandated that all marriages be registered with 
civil authorities. Marriages contracted before a member of the 
religious establishment henceforth were not recognized as law- 
ful unions, and the children of such unions were considered 
illegitimate. The male prerogative to have up to four wives 
simultaneously, enshrined in Islamic law, was prohibited. Mar- 



133 



Turkey: A Country Study 

riage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man, a prac- 
tice forbidden under Islamic law, became legal. 

Traditionally, marriage has been — and frequently continues 
to be — a contract negotiated and executed by the families of 
the betrothed and blessed by a member of the religious estab- 
lishment. Representatives of the bride and groom negotiate 
the contract, which stipulates such terms as the size and nature 
of the bride-price paid by the family of the groom to the family 
of the bride and whatever conditions of conjugal life are mutu- 
ally agreeable. After a series of meetings between the two fami- 
lies, an exchange of gifts, and the display of the trousseau, the 
marriage is formalized at a ceremony presided over by a reli- 
gious official. The civil code requires only that the bride and 
groom, as individuals, swear vows before two witnesses and a 
representative of the state who registers the union. Despite the 
legal necessity for civil marriage, traditional courtship and mar- 
riage practices persist. Many couples, especially among the 
lower classes in cities and in rural areas, hold two ceremonies, a 
religious one to satisfy their families and a civil one to entitle 
them to government social benefits, as well as to confer legiti- 
macy on future children. 

Despite government attempts to outlaw the bride-price, dur- 
ing the 1990s this traditional prenuptial practice has continued 
in both urban and rural areas. The payment of the bride-price 
involves considerable expenditures and often requires finan- 
cial cooperation from a number of kinfolk. The exact amount 
and the terms of payment form a part of the premarital negoti- 
ations. For example, the families sometimes agree to postpone 
payment of the full bride-price until after the wedding, stipulat- 
ing that the full amount must be paid in the event of divorce, a 
practice that provides some protection for the bride if the 
match subsequently proves incompatible. Ordinarily the 
amount of the bride-price is directly related to the status of the 
families involved. However, the amount tends to be less if the 
two families have a close blood relationship. For these reasons, 
among, others, most rural and urban families continue to pre- 
fer that their children marry closely related kin — first or sec- 
ond cousins. 

Divorce also is affected by the civil code. Under Islamic law, a 
man can initiate divorce easily and is not required to cite any 
reasons; the grounds on which a woman can seek divorce, how- 
ever, are tightly restricted, and she is obligated to prove fault 
on her husband's part. Under the civil code, divorce, like mar- 



134 



The Society and Its Environment 



riage, is not recognized as legitimate unless registered with civil 
authorities. The code permits either partner to initiate divorce 
proceedings, but the state, which claims an interest in main- 
taining marriage unions, especially in cases involving children, 
decides whether to grant a request for divorce. 

The Extended Family 

Although a majority of households in Turkey are nuclear 
family units, the larger extended family continues to play an 
important social role in the lives of most individuals. The 
extended family always includes all relatives by blood or mar- 
riage through an individual's paternal grandfather, or some- 
times, great-grandfather. In addition, many individuals, 
especially those of middle-class and elite social status, consider 
the parents and siblings of their own mother to be part of the 
extended family. In general, the extended family functions as 
pn emotional support network during life-cycle events such as 
birth, marriage, and death, or during major family crises. It 
often functions as an economic support network by providing 
loans for exceptional personal expenses, finding employment 
for new graduates, and caring for indigent members who are 
elderly or disabled. In urban areas, the extended family — espe- 
cially fathers and sons or two or more brothers — can serve as a 
means for the formation of business partnerships. In rural 
areas, members of an extended family may work together to 
farm large acreages or raise large herds of sheep. 

By expressing approval or disapproval of its members' social 
behavior, the extended family also functions as an effective 
mechanism of social control. Every individual is expected to 
comport himself or herself in ways that do not bring dishonor 
to the family. There are many types of behavior that might 
bring shame to a family, but sexual promiscuity, especially 
among women, is considered the most serious offense. Regard- 
less of class, women are expected to avoid any activity that 
might raise suspicions about their sexual conduct. Thus, 
unmarried females are expected to abstain from all sexual 
activity before marriage, and married women are expected to 
remain faithful to their husbands. Female adultery carries 
heavy social sanctions; among the lower classes in cities and in 
villages, it still is socially — albeit not legally — acceptable for a 
betrayed husband to redeem his family's honor by killing his 
adulterous wife. 



135 



Turkey: A Country Study 

The unequal burden placed upon women to uphold family 
honor highlights the ambiguous role of women in society. Offi- 
cial state ideology extols the equality of men and women. Intel- 
lectually, men tend to accept women as equals, and elite 
women have been able to achieve high positions in profes- 
sional careers since the 1960s. Since the mid-1980s, women also 
have been active in politics; one, Tansu filler, became prime 
minister in 1993. Nevertheless, men traditionally view women 
as emotionally and physically inferior and thus in need of male 
protection, which in practice means male control. Both men 
and women traditionally have judged a woman's social status 
not on the basis of her personal accomplishments but by the 
number of sons she has borne. Thus, women — like their hus- 
bands — customarily have prized boys over girls. Mothers have 
tended to socialize their sons and daughters differently, rearing 
boys to be assertive and girls to be obedient and passive. The 
relationship between a mother and a son tends to be warm and 
intimate throughout life. 

The traditional status of women continues to be established 
during the early years of marriage for most lower-middle-class 
and lower-class women. Within the extended family, a new 
bride tends to be under the critical surveillance of her hus- 
band's relatives, especially his mother. Whether the new couple 
lives in a separate household — this often is a requirement of 
the bride-price — or resides temporarily in the home of the 
groom's parents, the bride is isolated from her own family and 
friends and is expected to learn from her mother-in-law how to 
care for her husband. Her situation is recognized in the lan- 
guage: the expression gelinlik etmek, used to refer to the status of 
a new bride, means to be "on call." Although a bride may estab- 
lish a close personal relationship with her mother-in-law, espe- 
cially if the latter is also her aunt, friction and tension are more 
common. In such cases, the mother-in-law expects her son to 
side with her against his wife. A new bride only gains status and 
security within a traditional extended family after she has pro- 
duced a son. 

The status of a wife changes as she matures because within 
all extended families, whether traditional or modern, consider- 
able respect is accorded to age. Younger family members are 
expected to show respect toward their elders regardless of their 
gender. Respect has many dimensions, but usually it means not 
speaking in the presence of one's elders unless requested, and 
refraining in their presence from arguing, smoking, or behav- 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



ing in a casual way. Thus, a woman whose children are nearly 
grown is accorded respect and does not expect to be harassed 
by her mother-in-law. The authority of a mature wife and her 
opinions in family matters are important. If she also has 
employment outside the home, her influence increases. The 
migration of husbands to cities or foreign countries in search 
of work also changes the role of married women within fami- 
lies. Left at home to rear the children on remittances sent by 
her spouse, the wife often is forced to assume many of the daily 
decision-making roles previously filled by her husband. In addi- 
tion, since the late 1960s, thousands of migrant workers have 
sent for their wives and children to join them in the foreign 
countries where they are employed. These prolonged resi- 
dences abroad have tended to alter traditional extended-family 
relationships. 

Gender Relations 

Male-female relations remain an area of some tension in 
Turkish society. The conflict between traditional and modern 
values and between patterns of socialization within the family 
and at school affect the social relationships that both men and 
women establish. Even among modernized urban dwellers, 
family loyalty, family obligations, and family honor remain 
strong considerations. Thus, even though Turks professing to 
have modern values may define the "ideal" family as one in 
which equality exists between spouses, wives who actually 
attempt to establish themselves as equal partners usually meet 
with resistance from their husbands. Among more traditional 
families, both men and women generally expect husbands to 
be dominant, especially with respect to matters involving 
household interactions with the public; wives are expected to 
be obedient. Even in traditional families, however, wives may 
not accept passive roles, and their efforts to assert themselves 
can come up against strong disapproval. 

The conflicting tensions of traditional and modern values 
also influence social relations outside the family. The mass 
media and modern education popularize ideas such as social 
equality, openness between spouses, romantic love, and pla- 
tonic friendships between the sexes, concepts that men and 
women with traditional values find objectionable but that their 
adolescent children may find appealing. Furthermore, whereas 
some young women have been readopting headscarves and 
modest dress to demonstrate their commitment to Islam, oth- 



137 



Turkey: A Country Study 

ers have been attracted to the latest Western fashions in clothes 
and cosmetics, which traditionalists perceive as evidence of a 
general decline in female morality. 

Men and women generally constitute largely separate subso- 
cieties, each with its own values, attitudes, and perceptions of 
the other. Even among modernized urbanites, gender roles 
constrain social relations. For example, friendships between 
men and women who are unrelated generally are not accept- 
able. Among elite youth, men and women do meet socially and 
dating is fashionable, but parents try to monitor such relation- 
ships and discourage their daughters from becoming involved 
with any man unless marriage is contemplated. Among more 
traditional families, dating would ruin the reputation of a 
young woman and dishonor her family. 

The Status of Women 

Traditional views of gender roles and relations have per- 
sisted in tandem with changes in the status of women both 
within and outside the family. These changes began during the 
latter years of the Ottoman Empire, when women were given 
opportunities to work as teachers, clerks, and industrial work- 
ers. Change accelerated during the early republican era. The 
1926 civil code granted women unprecedented legal rights, 
and in 1934 they received the right to vote and to stand for 
election. Since the 1950s, their participation in the labor force, 
the professions, and in politics has increased steadily but 
unevenly. By 1991 women made up 18 percent of the total 
urban labor force. But not all changes have resulted in 
improved conditions. In some instances, especially among 
rural and newly urbanized women, changes have disturbed a 
traditional order that has provided meaningful, guaranteed 
roles for women without introducing new ones. 

During the 1950s, rural women who migrated to the urban 
gecekondus generally found work as maids in private homes. 
Since the 1960s, employment opportunities for women in 
industry, especially light manufacturing, have been expanding. 
By 1991, the most recent year for which detailed statistics are 
available, almost 20 percent of employees in manufacturing 
were women. Nevertheless, a majority of women in the gecekon- 
dus do not work outside the home. Most urban working-class 
women are single and hold jobs for less than five years; they 
tend to leave paid employment when they get married. While 



138 



The Society and Its Environment 



working and contributing to family income, women enjoy 
enhanced status and respect. 

Urban middle-class and upper-middle-class women tend to 
have more education than working-class women and generally 
are employed in teaching, health care, and clerical work. Since 
1980 more than one-third of all bank clerks have been women. 
Upper-class women tend to work in the prestigious professions, 
such as law, medicine, and university teaching. On average 
about 18 percent of all professionals in Turkey were women in 
1991; they were concentrated in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and a 
few other large urban centers. 

In 1995 the status of women in Turkey remained a multifac- 
eted, complex issue. Although the government guarantees 
women equal work and pay opportunities, the traditional value 
system elevates gender segregation in the workplace and other 
public spaces as a social ideal. Even urban, educated, profes- 
sional women may encounter the persistence of traditional, 
religiously colored values about gender roles among their puta- 
tively modern, secular husbands. 

Education 

The contemporary Turkish education system was established 
in 1924 after Atatiirk closed the religious schools, set up new 
secular schools, and made elementary school attendance com- 
pulsory. It was many years before the country had the educa- 
tional infrastructure to provide universal primary education, 
but since the early 1980s almost all children between the ages 
of six and ten have been enrolled in school. The most recent 
data on literacy (1990) put Turkey's overall adult literacy rate 
around 81 percent. This statistic broke down as 90 percent lit- 
eracy among males aged fifteen and over, and 71 percent 
among females in that age-group. 

The public education system provides for five stages of edu- 
cation: preschool, primary school, middle school, high school, 
and university. Noncompulsory preschool programs estab- 
lished in 1953 offer education to children between the ages of 
four and six. The demand for preschool education has been 
limited, apparently because of parents' unwillingness to entrust 
the education of small children to institutions outside the fam- 
ily. Preschool programs are most common in large cities, 
where, since the 1980s, they have been increasing in popularity 
and in numbers. Primary education is coeducational as well as 
compulsory, and encompasses a five-year program for ages six 



139 



Turkey: A Country Study 

to eleven. Attendance at the country's estimated 46,000 pri- 
mary schools was reckoned at 97 percent for the 1994-95 
school year. Education officials believe school attendance is 
lower in villages than in urban areas because it is easier for par- 
ents to keep older children, especially girls, at home. 

The two-year middle-school program, for ages twelve to four- 
teen, also is coeducational and has been compulsory since 
1972. However, authorities generally do not enforce middle- 
school attendance, especially in rural areas, where middle 
schools are few in number and most students must travel long 
distances to attend. The Ministry of National Education does 
not publish data on middle-school attendance, but overall it 
probably does not exceed 60 percent of the relevant age-group. 
To encourage higher levels of attendance, a 1983 law prohib- 
ited the employment of youths younger than fourteen. Middle- 
school graduation is a prerequisite to access to general, voca- 
tional, and technical high schools, and is deemed advanta- 
geous for admission to many vocational training programs. 

Secondary school education is not compulsory but is free at 
all of the country's estimated 1,300 public high schools. The 
Ministry of National Education supervises the high schools, 
which are divided into lycee (general) and vocational schools. 
The lycees are coeducational and offer three-year college pre- 
paratory programs. A select number of lycees in the largest cit- 
ies are bilingual, teaching classes in Turkish and either English, 
French, or German. Twelve lycees are open to students from 
the three legally recognized minorities — Armenians, Greeks, 
and Jews — and teach classes on some subjects in Armenian or 
Greek. In contrast, many of the vocational high schools offer 
four-year programs. Vocational high schools include technical 
training schools for men; domestic science schools for women; 
teacher-training schools; auxiliary health care, commercial, 
and agricultural schools; Muslim teacher-training schools; and 
other specialized institutions. The Muslim teacher-training 
schools, called imam hatip okullari, have expanded dramatically 
since the late 1970s. During the early 1990s, they numbered 
about 350 and enrolled 10 percent of all high school students. 
Except for the emphasis on religious subjects, the curriculum 
of the imam hatip okullari resembles that of the lycees rather 
than the vocational schools. 

Higher education is available at several hundred institutions, 
including professional schools and academies, institutes, and 
conservatories, but primarily at the twenty-seven public univer- 



140 



Istanbul University 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



sides, which enrolled more than 450,000 students in 1993-94. 
In the mid-1980s, when Ozal was prime minister, his govern- 
ment authorized Turkey's first private university, Bilkent, in 
Ankara. The university law of 1946 granted academic auton- 
omy to Turkey's universities. However, government policies 
since the 1980 coup, especially a 1981 law on higher education, 
have institutionalized extensive government interference in 
university affairs. The military leaders believed that the univer- 
sities had been the center of political ideas they disliked and 
perceived as harmful to Turkey's stability. They thus sought 
through the 1981 higher education law and applicable provi- 
sions of the 1982 constitution to introduce both structural and 
curricular changes at the universities. For example, the consti- 
tution stipulates that the president of the republic may appoint 
university rectors, establishes the government's right to found 
new universities, and assigns duties to the Council of Higher 



141 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Education ( Yuksek Ogretim Kurumu — YOK) . The higher edu- 
cation law prohibits all teachers and matriculated students 
from belonging to or working for a political party and requires 
curricular standardization at all universities. 

The YOK consists of twenty-five members, of whom eight are 
appointed directly by the president, eight by the Interuniversity 
Council, six by the Council of Ministers, two by the Ministry of 
National Education, and one by the General Staff of the armed 
forces. The chair of the YOK is appointed by the president of 
the republic. The YOK's powers include recommending or 
appointing rectors, deans, and professors; selecting and assign- 
ing students; and planning new universities. The YOK also has 
authority to transfer faculty members from one university to 
another. The YOK effectively has reduced the faculty senates, 
which prior to 1980 had authority to enact academic regula- 
tions, to mere advisory bodies. 

Education has continued to serve as an important means of 
upward social mobility. Annually since at least 1975, the num- 
ber of students applying for university admission has exceeded 
the number of available spaces. To qualify for admission, every 
applicant must pass the nationwide university entrance exam, 
which is designed, administered, and evaluated by the Center 
for Selection and Placement of Students. During the early 
1990s, more than 100,000 applicants sat for the entrance exam 
each year. Scoring is based on a complicated system that 
assures that the number who pass does not exceed the number 
of available spaces. Even if an applicant qualifies for admission, 
the individual's actual score determines whether he or she may 
study a chosen discipline or must take up a less preferred one. 

In addition to the five levels of education described above, 
the system provides special education for some children with 
disabilities, as well as a wide range of adult education and voca- 
tional programs. Labor specialists consistently have cited inade- 
quate skills as a key factor in Turkey's high level of 
unemployment, which during the early 1990s averaged 10 per- 
cent annually. In 1995 half of the urban unemployed had only 
a primary education, and an estimated 40 percent of pupils 
dropped out of school upon completing this level of education. 
Since 1980 the Ministry of National Education has conducted 
major literacy campaigns aimed at the population between 
ages fourteen and forty-four, with emphasis on women, resi- 
dents of the urban gecekondus, and agricultural workers. The 
ministry also has provided primary, middle school, and second- 



142 



The Society and Its Environment 



ary equivalency program courses to upgrade education levels. 
In addition, through its Directorate of Apprenticeship and 
Nonformal Education, the ministry provides nonformal voca- 
tional training to people lacking required skills, such as school 
dropouts, seasonal agricultural workers, and people in the 
urban informal sector. 

The World Bank (see Glossary), which has provided funds 
for industrial training programs since the early 1970s, has been 
a major source of support for nonformal vocational training 
programs. These programs are intended to provide skilled per- 
sonnel above and beyond the supply from the formal voca- 
tional education system, which was projected to meet 86 
percent of the estimated industrial demand for skilled and 
semiskilled workers through 1995. Government plans have pro- 
vided for a major expansion of the nonformal vocational train- 
ing system; 650,000 additional people are expected to receive 
training in employment-related trades, including 150,000 to be 
trained in industrial skills during 1994 and 1995. Although the 
government program was expected to improve the quality and 
availability of skill education in less-developed regions such as 
eastern Turkey, the intense fighting there since 1991 has dis- 
rupted training. 

Health and Welfare 

Health care and related social welfare activities in the 1990s 
remain the responsibility of the Ministry of Health. Legislation 
has directed and authorized the ministry to provide medical 
care and preventive health services, train health personnel, 
make preservice and in-service training available, establish and 
operate hospitals and other health care centers, supervise pri- 
vate health facilities, regulate the price of medical drugs, and 
control drug production and all pharmacies. In addition, the 
ministry supervises all medical and health care personnel in 
the public sector. 

Availability of health care in the mid-1990s is significantly 
better than it was twenty years earlier, but its quality remains 
uneven. Medical facilities are concentrated in the cities and 
larger towns, leaving most rural areas without adequate access 
to medical care. This situation is especially acute in eastern 
Anatolia, where medical care is generally available only in the 
provincial capitals. The salaries paid to state-employed physi- 
cians are low compared with what doctors in private practice 



143 



Turkey: A Country Study 

earn. Consequently, most Turkish physicians prefer to work in 
the more highly developed urban centers or even to emigrate. 

The overall ratio of inhabitants to physicians has continued 
to improve significantly. Whereas there was one physician for 
every 2,860 individuals in 1965, that ratio improved to one to 
1,755 in 1976, one to 1,391 in 1985, and an estimated one to 
1,200 in 1995. From 1977 to 1995, the number of all health 
care facilities — hospitals, health centers, clinics, and dispensa- 
ries — rose from 7,944 to 12,500. Simultaneously, the number of 
available hospital beds increased even more rapidly than the 
rate of population growth; the ratio was one bed per 400 citi- 
zens in 1995. 

Turkey has achieved progress in controlling various debilitat- 
ing and crippling diseases and in treating major infectious dis- 
eases. The incidence of measles, pertussis, typhoid fever, and 
diphtheria all declined dramatically between 1969 and 1994. 
The greater availability of potable water in both urban and 
rural areas has contributed to a general fall in the former prev- 
alence of water-borne illnesses, especially of diarrhea among 
children and infants. Infant mortality, which at 120 per 1,000 
live births in 1980 was among the highest rates worldwide, had 
declined to fifty-five per 1,000 live births by 1992. Nevertheless, 
this rate was still very high by European standards, being six 
times the rate of neighboring Greece, which had an infant 
mortality rate of nine per 1,000 live births. 

Turkey had reported sixteen cases of acquired immune defi- 
ciency syndrome (AIDS) to the World Health Organization in 
the first nine months of 1994. The rate of AIDS cases per 
100,000 population was 0.1 for both 1992 and 1993, with 
twenty-nine cases reported in 1992 and thirty in 1993. 

In the early 1990s, the most important underwriters of social 
security plans were the Government Employees' Retirement 
Fund, the Social Insurance Institution, and the Social Insur- 
ance Institution for the Self-Employed. In 1995 at least 15 per- 
cent of the working population participated in the social 
welfare system. If the agricultural sector is excluded, this per- 
centage rises to 40 percent. Less than 1 percent of agricultural 
workers were part of the social security system in 1995, but the 
government has made efforts for at least a decade to increase 
their participation. Employers pay insurance premiums to 
cover work-related injuries, occupational diseases, and mater- 
nity leave. Both employers and employees contribute specified 
proportions to cover premiums for illness, disability, retire- 



144 



The Society and Its Environment 



ment, and death benefits. Thus, in these and other instances, 
Turkey is moving toward a more Westernized approach to 
socioeconomic, educational, and health matters, and is seeking 
to lay a firmer basis for participation in the EU. 

* * * 

Feroz Ahmad' s The Making of Modern Turkey includes a 
detailed analysis of Ataturk's secularist and linguistic reforms, 
as well as an excellent overview of the impact of social changes 
from the 1930s to the end of the 1980s. With the exception of 
the Kurds, studies on the experience of Turkey's ethnic and 
religious minorities have not been published for more than 
two decades. Martin van Bruinessen has written extensively 
about the social and economic conditions of Turkey's Kurds. 
His book Agha, Shaikh, and State analyzes how state policies 
have induced changes in the social organization of Kurdistan 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Numerous arti- 
cles about contemporary Islam in Turkey have appeared since 
the mid-1980s. An excellent collection that examines social and 
educational issues is a volume edited by Richard Tapper, Islam 
in Modern Turkey. Insight into the effect of the post-1980 eco- 
nomic reforms on labor relations and class structure can be 
obtained from articles in The Political and Socioeconomic Transfor- 
mation of Turkey, edited by Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and 
Birol Yesilada. Nermin Abadan-Unat has published books and 
articles about the changing status of women in Turkey; see 
especially her Women in the Developing World: Evidence from Tur- 
key, which contains a wealth of statistical data. Jenny B. White's 
Money Makes Us Relatives is a detailed study of the intertwined 
cultural, social, and economic aspects of the lives of women 
who undertake at-home contract labor in Istanbul's lower-class 
neighborhoods. (For further information and complete cita- 
tions, see Bibliography.) 



145 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



i 



Ferry on the Bosporus with Istanbul and the Galata Tower in the background 



THE TURKISH ECONOMY is being transformed in the 1990s 
from a state-led to a market-oriented economy. As in most 
economies undergoing market reforms, the process of change 
has caused severe internal dislocations. External economic 
"shocks" such as the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the resulting 
United Nations (UN) embargo on Iraq have complicated the 
transition. 

The Turkish economy's ongoing and turbulent reorienta- 
tion has left the economy a study in contrasts. Modern indus- 
tries coexist with pockets of subsistence agriculture. The major 
cities of western Anatolia are cosmopolitan centers of industry, 
finance, and trade, whereas the eastern part of the country is 
relatively underdeveloped. Several decades of state planning 
followed by economic liberalization have made industry Tur- 
key's leading economic sector, even as most Turks continue to 
work on farms. Industry has undergone a fairly rapid transfor- 
mation as a consequence of the far-reaching market reforms 
implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s. Despite the 
reforms, however, public enterprises continue to dominate raw- 
materials processing and the manufacture of heavy industrial 
and military goods. The smaller firms that dominate the pri- 
vate sector produce intermediate and consumer goods for 
domestic and foreign markets. The services sector is perhaps 
the most diverse, embracing large export-oriented marketing 
groups and world-scale banks as well as small shops and individ- 
ual domestic workers. 

To a large extent, the last 200 years in Turkey have been 
marked by its rulers' attempts to transform it into a modern 
European industrial nation. The Ottoman Empire encoun- 
tered serious economic problems beginning in the eighteenth 
century with the imposition of unequal treaties, the capitula- 
tions (see Glossary), which affected trade and taxation. The 
tanzimat (reorganization) reforms of 1839-78, an important 
component of which was the reorientation of the economy 
toward development of an indigenous industrial base, led to 
deepening indebtedness to Western imperial powers by the 
end of the nineteenth century. This dependence on the West, 
which was seen as one of the main causes of Turkey's "back- 
wardness," created the context for the economic policy of the 
new republic formed in 1923. The other important influence 



149 



Turkey: A Country Study 

on the new leaders of the republic was the example of state 
planning in the Soviet Union. Given these influences, state 
planning was the route Turkey's new leaders took to modernize 
the country. 

From the 1930s until 1980, the state pursued import-substi- 
tution industrialization by means of public enterprises and 
development planning. This policy created a mixed economy 
in which industrial development was rapid. However, during 
the post-World War II period the drawbacks of excessive state 
intervention became ever more apparent to policy makers and 
the public. State enterprises, which came to account for about 
40 percent of manufacturing by 1980, were often overstaffed 
and inefficient; their losses were a significant drain on the gov- 
ernment budget. State planning targets were often excessively 
ambitious, yet they neglected such essential sectors as agricul- 
ture. Concentration on import substitution deemphasized 
exports, resulting in chronic trade deficits and a pattern in 
which periods of rapid growth, financed in part by foreign bor- 
rowing, led to balance of payments crises that necessitated aus- 
terity programs. 

The rapid transition from an agricultural to an industrial 
society also produced distortions in the country's labor markets 
and led to unequal income distribution. As was the case in 
most developing countries, there was a high birth rate, which 
contributed to unemployment in the postwar period by causing 
the labor force to grow rapidly. In addition, the modernization 
of agriculture tended to make small farms economically nonvi- 
able. As a result, many rural people migrated to urban areas. 
Those who left farming, however, often lacked skills needed in 
modern industry and could find employment only in the infor- 
mal sector of the urban economy. Meanwhile, industrial enter- 
prises became more capital intensive, which increased 
productivity but reduced the demand for unskilled labor. At 
the same time, firms had trouble recruiting skilled employees. 

In January 1980, the Turkish government undertook a 
major reform program to open the Turkish economy to inter- 
national markets. Leading the reform was Turgut Ozal, then 
deputy prime minister and minister for economic affairs. Ozal 
became prime minister in 1983, following a three-year military 
regime, and served as president from 1989 until his death in 
1993. Ozal's reform program included a reduced state role in 
the economy, a realistic exchange rate and realistic monetary 
policies, cutbacks on subsidies and price controls, and encour- 



150 



The Economy 



agement of exports and foreign direct investment. During its 
early years, the liberalization program achieved considerable 
success in reducing external deficits and restoring economic 
growth. Despite significant foreign direct investment during 
the 1980s and early 1990s, however, Turkey's balance of pay- 
ments remained burdened by an external debt of more than 
US$65 billion at the end of 1993. A balance of payments crisis 
occurred in 1994 in the aftermath of a domestic political crisis 
in the wake of deep divisions within the administration over 
economic policy and a sharp decrease in exports to Turkey's 
beleaguered neighbors, Iraq and Iran. This situation led to a 
steep fall in the Turkish lira (TL; for value of the lira — see Glos- 
sary) . 

The success of the Ozal program was predicated on develop- 
ing satisfactory relationships with the country's economic part- 
ners and continued access to export markets. Rapid 
development required large capital imports because domestic 
savings were insufficient for needed investments. Foreign inves- 
tors, attracted by Turkey's great economic potential and 
increasingly liberal economic policies, made major commit- 
ments to infrastructure projects during the mid-1980s. How- 
ever, continued high inflation, as well as memories of the 
political instability of the late 1970s, caused investors to hesi- 
tate. These insecurities were heightened after the Iraqi inva- 
sion of Kuwait in 1990, the rise of strong Islamist (sometimes 
seen as fundamentalist) parties in the early 1990s, and persis- 
tent macroeconomic problems. 

Whatever short-term difficulties Turkey faces, most observ- 
ers believe the country's long-term economic prospects are 
good. Mining and agriculture provide raw materials for indus- 
try, and the growing and resourceful population provides 
abundant labor. Turkey is one of the few countries that is self- 
sufficient in food; indeed it can export food to European and 
Middle Eastern markets. Economic reforms have led to 
increases in exports of processed foods, textiles, motor vehi- 
cles, and consumer durables. Considerable investments in tour- 
ism, the revitalization of banking, and upgraded transportation 
facilities should allow Turkey to compete in the international 
services market in the 1990s. 

Turkey has made great strides toward building close eco- 
nomic ties with Europe, and Turkey's leaders have promoted 
the country as a vital link between the industrial economies of 
Europe and the underdeveloped economies of the Middle East 



151 



Turkey: A Country Study 

and Central Asia. On several fronts, however, Turkey suffered a 
number of setbacks in the early 1990s. A critical one was the 
embargo on Iraq. Because of it, Turkey lost a huge export mar- 
ket as well as fees for allowing Iraqi oil to pass through a pipe- 
line on Turkish territory. In addition, Iran, a major trading 
partner in the 1980s, reoriented its trade directly with Europe 
and Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Early expectations 
for commerce with the Central Asian countries have gone 
unfulfilled because of the economic and social dislocations 
they have suffered in breaking away from the Soviet Union. 
Worst of all, Turkey's political relations with Europe have dete- 
riorated, mainly because of human rights abuses of its Kurdish 
population and increasing intolerance in Europe of Turkish 
immigrants. As a result, Turkey's accession to the European 
Union (EU — see Glossary) appeared increasingly unlikely to 
happen as targeted in 1995, despite its having been an associ- 
ate member since 1963 of the EU's predecessor body, the Euro- 
pean Community (EC — see Glossary), and having applied for 
full membership in 1987. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

At the time of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during 
World War I, the Turkish economy was underdeveloped: agri- 
culture depended on outmoded techniques and poor-quality 
livestock, and the few factories producing basic products such 
as sugar and flour were under foreign control. Between 1923 
and 1985, the economy grew at an average annual rate of 6 per- 
cent. In large part as a result of government policies, a back- 
ward economy developed into a complex economic system 
producing a wide range of agricultural, industrial, and service 
products for both domestic and export markets. 

Economic Development 

At the birth of the republic, Turkey's industrial base was 
weak because Ottoman industries had been undermined by 
the capitulations. World War I and the War of Independence 
(1919-22) also had extensively disrupted the Turkish econ- 
omy. The loss of Ottoman territories, for example, cut off Ana- 
tolia from traditional markets. Agricultural output — the source 
of income for most of the population — had dropped sharply as 
peasants went to war. Even the production of wheat, Turkey's 
main crop, was insufficient to meet domestic demand. In addi- 



152 



The Economy 



tion, massacres and the emigration of Greeks, Armenians, and 
Jews, who had dominated urban economic life, caused a short- 
age of skilled laborers and entrepreneurs. 

Turkey's economy recovered remarkably once hostilities 
ceased. From 1923 to 1926, agricultural output rose by 87 per- 
cent, as agricultural production returned to prewar levels. 
Industry and services grew at more than 9 percent per year 
from 1923 to 1929; however, their share of the economy 
remained quite low at the end of the decade. By 1930, as a 
result of the world depression, external markets for Turkish 
agricultural exports had collapsed, causing a sharp decline in 
national income. The government stepped in during the early 
1930s to promote economic recovery, following a doctrine 
known as etatism (see Glossary). Growth slowed during the 
worst years of the depression but between 1935 and 1939 
reached 6 percent per year. During the 1940s, the economy 
stagnated, in large part because maintaining armed neutrality 
during World War II increased the country's military expendi- 
tures while almost entirely curtailing foreign trade. 

After 1950 the country suffered economic disruptions about 
once a decade; the most serious crisis occurred in the late 
1970s. In each case, an industry-led period of rapid expansion, 
marked by a sharp increase in exports, resulted in a balance of 
payments crisis. Devaluations of the Turkish lira and austerity 
programs designed to dampen domestic demand for foreign 
goods were implemented in accordance with International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) guidelines. These mea- 
sures usually led to sufficient improvement in the country's 
external accounts to make possible the resumption of loans to 
Turkey by foreign creditors. Although the military interven- 
tions of 1960 and 1971 were prompted in part by economic dif- 
ficulties, after each intervention Turkish politicians boosted 
government spending, causing the economy to overheat. In 
the absence of serious structural reforms, Turkey ran chronic 
current account deficits usually financed by external borrow- 
ing that made the country's external debt rise from decade to 
decade, reaching by 1980 about US$16.2 billion, or more than 
one-quarter of annual gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary). Debt-servicing costs in that year equaled 33 percent of 
exports of goods and services. 

By the late 1970s, Turkey's economy had perhaps reached 
its worst crisis since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish 
authorities had failed to take sufficient measures to adjust to 



153 



Turkey: A Country Study 



the effects of the sharp increase in world oil prices in 1973-74 
and had financed the resulting deficits with short-term loans 
from foreign lenders. By 1979 inflation had reached triple-digit 
levels, unemployment had risen to about 15 percent, industry 
was using only half its capacity, and the government was unable 
to pay even the interest on foreign loans. It seemed that Turkey 
would be able to sustain crisis-free development only if major 
changes were made in the government's import-substitution 
approach to development. Many observers doubted the ability 
of Turkish politicians to carry out the needed reforms. 

Reforms under Ozal 

In January 1980, the government of Prime Minister Stiley- 
man Demirel (who had served as prime minister 1965-71, 
1975-78, and 1979-80) began implementing a far-reaching 
reform program designed by then Deputy Prime Minister Tur- 
gut Ozal to shift Turkey's economy toward export-led growth. 

The Ozal strategy called for import-substitution policies to 
be replaced with policies designed to encourage exports that 
could finance imports, giving Turkey a chance to break out of 
the postwar pattern of alternating periods of rapid growth and 
deflation. With this strategy, planners hoped Turkey could 
experience export-led growth over the long run. The govern- 
ment pursued these goals by means of a comprehensive pack- 
age: devaluation of the Turkish lira and institution of flexible 
exchange rates, maintenance of positive real interest rates and 
tight control of the money supply and credit, elimination of 
most subsidies and the freeing of prices charged by state enter- 
prises, reform of the tax system, and encouragement of foreign 
investment. In July 1982, when Ozal left office, many of his 
reforms were placed on hold. Starting in November 1983, how- 
ever, when he again became prime minister, he was able to 
extend the liberalization program. 

The liberalization program overcame the balance of pay- 
ments crisis, reestablished Turkey's ability to borrow in interna- 
tional capital markets, and led to renewed economic growth. 
Merchandise exports grew from US$2.3 billion in 1979 to 
US$8.3 billion in 1985. Merchandise import growth in the 
same period — from US$4.8 billion to US$11.2 billion — did not 
keep pace with export growth and proportionately narrowed 
the trade deficit, although the deficit level stabilized at around 
US$2.5 billion. Ozal's policies had a particularly positive impact 
on the services account of the current account. Despite a jump 



154 



Atatiirk Dam, major part of Southeast Anatolian Project ( GAP) 

Courtesy Turkish Information Office 

in interest payments, from US$200 million in 1979 to US$1.4 
billion in 1985, the services account accumulated a growing 
surplus during this period. Expanding tourist receipts and 
pipeline fees from Iraq were the main reasons for this improve- 
ment. Stabilizing the current account helped restore creditwor- 
thiness on international capital markets. Foreign investment, 
which had been negligible in the 1970s, now started to grow, 
although it remained modest in the mid-1980s. Also, Turkey 
was able to borrow on the international market, whereas in the 
late 1970s it could only seek assistance from the IMF and other 
official creditors. 

The reduction in public expenditures, which was at the 
heart of the stabilization program, slowed the economy sharply 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Real gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary) declined 1.5 percent in 1979 and 1.3 per- 
cent in 1980. The manufacturing and services sectors felt much 



155 



Turkey: A Country Study 

of the impact of this drop in income, with the manufacturing 
sector operating at close to 50 percent of total capacity. As the 
external-payments constraint eased, the economy bounced 
back sharply. Between 1981 and 1985, real GNP grew 3 percent 
per year, led by growth in the manufacturing sector. With tight 
controls on workers' earnings and activities, the industrial sec- 
tor began drawing on unused industrial capacity and raised 
output by an average rate of 9.1 percent per year between 1981 
and 1985. The devaluation of the lira also helped make Turkey 
more economically competitive. As a result, exports of manu- 
factures increased by an average rate of 45 percent per annum 
during this period. 

The rapid resurgence of growth and the improvement in 
the balance of payments were insufficient to overcome unem- 
ployment and inflation, which remained serious problems. The 
official jobless rate fell from 15 percent in 1979 to 11 percent 
in 1980, but, partly because of the rapid growth of the labor 
force, unemployment rose again, to 13 percent in 1985. Infla- 
tion fell to about 25 percent in the 1981-82 period, but it 
climbed again, to more than 30 percent in 1983 and more than 
40 percent in 1984. Although inflation eased somewhat in 1985 
and 1986, it remained one of the primary problems facing eco- 
nomic policy makers. 

Economic Performance in the Early 1990s 

Turkey benefited economically from the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-88). Both Iran and Iraq became major trading partners, 
and Turkish business supplied both combatants, encouraged 
by government export credits. With limited access to the Per- 
sian Gulf, Iraq also came to depend heavily on Turkey for 
export routes for its crude oil. Iraq had financed two pipelines 
located next to one another from its northern Kirkuk oilfields 
to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Qeyhan, slightly north- 
west of Iskenderun. The capacity of the pipelines totaled 
around 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd). Not only did Turkey 
obtain part of its domestic supplies from the pipeline, but it 
was paid a sizable entrepot fee. Some sources have estimated 
this fee at US$300 million to US$500 million. 

Turkey's economy was battered by the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War. The UN embargo on Iraq required the ending of oil 
exports through the £eyhan pipelines, resulting in the loss of 
the pipeline fees. In addition, the economy may have lost as 
much as US$3 billion in trade with Iraq. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 



156 



The Economy 



and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) moved to compensate 
Turkey for these losses, however, and by 1992 the economy 
again began to grow rapidly. 

The Turkish economy again was plunged into crisis in 1994. 
The central government's moves in 1992 and 1993 to grant 
large salary increases to civil servants and to increase transfers 
to state enterprises enlarged the public-sector borrowing 
requirement to a record 17 percent of GDP in 1993. This high 
government spending sharply boosted domestic demand's rate 
of growth to 6.4 percent in 1992 and 7.6 percent in 1993. In 
turn, inflation rates went up, with the annual rate peaking at 73 
percent in mid-1993. The resulting rise in the real exchange 
rate translated into increased imports and slowed the expan- 
sion of exports. The trade deficit rose in 1993 to US$14 billion, 
while the current account deficit reached US$6.3 billion, or 5.3 
percent of GDP. 

Turkey's impressive economic performance in the 1980s 
won high marks from Wall Street's credit-rating agencies. In 
1992 and 1993, the government used these ratings to attract 
funds to cover its budget deficits. International bond issues 
over this period amounted to US$7.5 billion. These capital 
flows helped maintain the overvalued exchange rate. In a mar- 
ket economy, a high level of government borrowing should 
translate into higher domestic interest rates and even possibly 
"crowd out" private-sector borrowers, thereby eventually slow- 
ing economic growth. But the government's foreign borrowing 
took the pressure off domestic interest rates and actually 
spurred more private-sector borrowing in an already over- 
heated economy. Sensing an easy profit opportunity during 
this period, commercial banks borrowed at world interest rates 
and lent at Turkey's higher domestic rates without fear of a 
depreciating currency. As a result, Turkey's foreign short-term 
debt rose sharply. External and internal confidence in the gov- 
ernment's ability to manage the impending balance of pay- 
ments crisis waned, compounding economic difficulties. 

Disputes between Prime Minister Tansu (filler (1993- ) and 
the Central Bank governor undermined confidence in the gov- 
ernment. The prime minister insisted on monetizing the fiscal 
deficit (selling government debt instruments to the Central 
Bank) rather than acceding to the Central Bank's proposal to 
issue more public debt in the form of government securities. 
The Central Bank governor resigned in August 1993 over this 
issue. In January 1994, international credit agencies down- 



157 



Turkey: A Country Study 

graded Turkey's debt to below investment grade. At that time, a 
second Central Bank governor resigned. 

Mounting concern over the disarray in economic policy was 
reflected in an accelerated "dollarization" of the economy as 
residents switched domestic assets into foreign-currency depos- 
its to protect their investments. By the end of 1994, about 50 
percent of the total deposit base was held in the form of for- 
eign-currency deposits, up from 1 percent in 1993. The down- 
grading by credit-rating agencies and a lack of confidence in 
the government's budget deficit target of 14 percent of GDP 
for 1994 triggered large-scale capital flight and the collapse of 
the exchange rate. The government had to intervene by selling 
its foreign-currency reserves to staunch the decline of the 
Turkish lira. As a result, reserves fell from US$6.3 billion at the 
end of 1993 to US$3 billion by the end of March 1994. Before 
the end of April, when the government was forced to 
announce a long-overdue austerity program following the 
March 1994 local elections, the lira had plummeted by 76 per- 
cent from the end of 1993 to TL41,000 against the United 
States dollar. 

The package of measures announced by the government on 
April 5, 1994, was also submitted to the IMF as part of its 
request for a US$740 million standby facility beginning in July 
1994. Measures included a sharp increase in prices the public- 
sector enterprises would charge the public, decreases in bud- 
getary expenditures, a commitment to raise taxes, and a pledge 
to accelerate privatization of state economic enterprises 
(SEEs). Some observers questioned the credibility of these 
measures, given that the tax measures translated into a revenue 
increase equivalent to 4 percent of GDP and the expenditure 
cuts were equivalent to 6 percent of GDP. 

The government actually succeeded in generating a small 
surplus in the budget during the second quarter of 1994, 
mainly as a result of higher taxes, after running a deficit of 17 
percent of GDP in the first quarter. The slowdown in govern- 
ment spending, a sharp loss in business confidence, and the 
resulting decline in economic activity reduced tax revenues, 
however. The fiscal crisis resulted in a decline in real GDP of 5 
percent in 1994 after the economy had grown briskly in 1992 
and 1993. Real wages also fell in 1994: average nominal wage 
increases of 65 percent were about 20 percent below the rate of 
consumer price inflation. 



158 



The Economy 



Analysts pointed out that despite the fragility of the macro- 
economic adjustment process and the susceptibility of fiscal 
policy to political pressures, the government continued to be 
subject to market checks and balances. Combined with a stron- 
ger private sector, particularly on the export front, the econ- 
omy was expected to bounce back to a pattern of faster growth. 

Structure of the Economy 

In the years after World War II, the economy became capa- 
ble of supplying a much broader range of goods and services. 
By 1994 the industrial sector accounted for just under 40 per- 
cent of GDP, having surpassed agriculture (including forestry 
and fishing), which contributed about 16 percent of produc- 
tion. The rapid shift in industry's relative importance resulted 
from government policies in effect since the 1930s favoring 
industrialization (see fig. 8). In the early 1990s, the govern- 
ment aimed at continued increases in industry's share of the 
economy, especially by means of export promotion. 

Services increased from a small fraction of the economy in 
the 1920s to just under half of GDP by 1994. Several factors 
accounted for the growth of the services sector. Government— 
already sizable under the Ottomans — expanded as defense 
expenditures rose; health, education, and welfare programs 
were implemented; and the government work force was 
increased to staff the numerous new public organizations. 
Trade, tourism, transportation, and financial services also 
became more important as the economy developed and diver- 
sified. 

Human Resources and Trade Unions 

In the early 1990s, Turkey suffered from serious structural 
unemployment, although the country continued to lack skilled 
workers and managers. The number of people engaged in sub- 
sistence agriculture and in informal labor complicated efforts 
to make accurate estimates of unemployment and underem- 
ployment. In the absence of direct surveys, available statistical 
data only broadly indicated trends in labor markets (see table 
5, Appendix A). In 1992 the civilian labor force totaled almost 
18.5 million; the government estimated that unemployment 
was about 8.7 percent, but unofficial sources put it at 15 per- 
cent for 1993. In a study, the State Institute of Statistics esti- 
mated that unemployment in urban areas among those aged 



159 



Turkey: A Country Study 



GDP 1985 ■ TL25,770 MILLION 1 

OTHER 
SERVICES 




CONSTRUCTION 

3.9% 




1 Current prices; for value of the Turkish lira — see Glossary. 

2 Agriculture includes forestry and fishing, 
industry includes mining, utilities, and manufacturing, 
transportation includes communications. 



Figure 8. Structure of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1985 and 
1993 



160 



The Economy 



fifteen to twenty-four was 30.2 percent. According to official 
figures for 1992, about 44 percent of those employed worked 
in agriculture — down from more than 75 percent in the early 
1960s. Employment in industry and construction amounted to 
about 20 percent in 1994, and the services sector employed 
about 35 percent. 

During the postwar period, as agriculture modernized and 
grew more productive, many agricultural workers became 
redundant. Many now-jobless farmers, attracted by higher 
wages in the urban economy, migrated to the cities. Although 
industry and services grew rapidly after 1950, these sectors did 
not create enough jobs to meet the demand. 

Demographic trends portend continued unemployment 
problems. Population growth rates declined somewhat after 
the 1970s, but in the mid-1990s demographers were predicting 
that the active population (those between fifteen and sixty-four 
years of age) would increase at more than 2 percent per year 
until at least 2000. The labor force grew at an estimated aver- 
age annual rate of 2 percent during the 1960s and 1970s, at 1.5 
to 2.0 percent during the early 1980s, and at 2.2 percent per 
year from 1985 to 1992. The several austerity programs since 
1980 exacerbated the unemployment situation in the mid- 
1980s, with an estimated 3 million Turks unemployed in 1985. 
The recovery of the economy in the late 1980s appeared to 
improve the overall situation; manufacturing employment 
increased 3.4 percent per year. However, the economic crisis of 
early 1994 and the austerity program once again were expected 
to slow employment growth. 

The labor force would have grown even faster during the 
1970s and 1980s had it not been for a fall in the work force par- 
ticipation rate from about 73 percent in the 1970s to 35 per- 
cent in the early 1990s. This decline resulted from increased 
enrollments in secondary and postsecondary education and 
from the tendency of rural women who migrated to the city to 
refrain from entering the work force. Most demographers 
believed that participation rates would continue to fall as a 
result of higher overall school and female education rates. By 
1991 the secondary school enrollment ratios, particularly for 
females, lagged significantly behind primary school enrollment 
ratios, implying room for higher future enrollment. Even if 
participation rates continue to fall, however, projected popula- 
tion growth rates will make unemployment a continuing prob- 
lem. 



161 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Unemployment has caused distortions in rural and urban 
labor markets. Many farmers have remained on unproductive 
farms to avoid more uncertain fates in the cities. In addition, 
the large postwar increase in employment in the services sector 
probably reflects wide-scale underemployment, as unemployed 
persons resort to working as street vendors and domestic work- 
ers. The largest groups of the unemployed include educated 
youths from urban areas, migrants dislocated from the villages 
and living in shantytowns, and Turks returning from working 
abroad. 

Emigration has provided a partial safety valve for excess 
labor, especially during the period between 1969 and 1973, 
when more than 100,000 workers left each year to seek jobs 
abroad. The capital-intensive, labor-short countries of north- 
western Europe began recruiting workers from southern 
Europe and the Mediterranean basin in the 1950s. Turkish 
workers began emigrating to Western Europe in large numbers 
in the early 1960s, as the demand for labor increased in north- 
ern Europe and as the supply from southern Italy dried up 
because of increased domestic demand. Although Turks 
worked in many European counties, most went to the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany). Many Turkish workers 
also went to France, Austria, and the Netherlands. The number 
of Turkish workers going abroad peaked near 136,000 in 1973. 
The oil shock of that year and the 1974-75 recession led to 
restrictions on new guest workers throughout Western Europe, 
including a ban in West Germany. These measures caused a 
sharp decline in Turkish emigration to Western Europe — 
which averaged only 18,000 per year from 1974 to 1980 — and 
became an important issue between Turkey and the European 
Community. Despite the restrictions, in 1981 there were still 
about 1 million Turkish workers in Western Europe, half of 
them in West Germany. 

After the unification of Germany in 1989, pressure mounted 
to return so-called foreign workers to their home countries 
even though many had been born in Europe. High unemploy- 
ment rates, especially in eastern Germany, spurred neo-Nazi 
political parties to agitate for forced repatriation, and some 
groups used violence against immigrants. In one celebrated 
case in Rostock, members of a Turkish family were burned to 
death in their own home. Other European states also witnessed 
a rise in hostility toward guest workers, including Turks. In 



162 



The Economy 



France, the National Front Party, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
gained much support for its anti-immigrant stance. 

After 1975 Turkish workers went more often to Arab oil 
states than to Western Europe. Each year from 1980 through 
1982, more than 24,000 workers went to Libya and more than 
10,000 to Saudi Arabia. During the same period, a yearly aver- 
age of only 370 Turkish workers went to West Germany. By 
1982 about 150,000 Turks were employed in Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, and the small Arabian Peninsula states. However, eco- 
nomic difficulties faced by oil-producing states in the mid- and 
late 1980s reduced opportunities for further Turkish emigra- 
tion. 

In general, the Turkish government has looked favorably on 
worker emigration, despite concerns that skilled workers are 
being lost because it is better-educated Turks who tend to emi- 
grate. In 1994 an estimated 1.1 million Turkish workers were in 
Western Europe, of whom about 750,000 were in Germany. 
More than 200,000 were in Middle Eastern countries. Workers 
in Europe usually stay abroad several years, remitting funds to 
relatives in Turkey. Most eventually return with their accumu- 
lated savings to start a small business or buy a farm. Turks work- 
ing in the Middle East, in contrast, tend to work for Turkish 
construction firms and typically return after each project is 
completed; these workers tend to remit a larger share of earn- 
ings to their families. The flow of workers' remittances became 
financially significant after 1965, when they reached the equiv- 
alent of US$70 million. By the early 1990s, this figure had 
reached US$3 billion per year. 

Like most developing countries, Turkey lacks an adequate 
number of trained and skilled personnel. In the early 1990s, 
the demand for educated and skilled workers exceeded the 
limited number of technically and scientifically trained gradu- 
ates. 

Trade unions play an important role with reference to labor 
in the more modern sectors of the economy. Most agricultural 
and service workers do not belong to unions, but a substantial 
part of the industrial labor force in larger enterprises and some 
workers in other sectors, such as transportation, trade, and 
finance, are unionized; public-sector workers are the most 
likely to join a union. In the 1960s and 1970s, the wage and 
benefit gains of unionized workers exerted a positive influence 
on the income levels of nonunionized workers. After the 1980s, 
however, the labor movement weakened. Not only are unions 



163 



Turkey: A Country Study 

smaller in terms of membership — Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security figures for 1985 suggested that unions included about 
1.8 million workers, or about 10 percent of the civilian work 
force — but severe limits on their activities have kept them polit- 
ically weak. As a result, during the 1980s organized labor suf- 
fered large cuts in real earnings. 

By the mid-1970s, Turkey had about 800 unions, many of 
which had memberships in the hundreds. Few were what might 
be called nationwide unions; several had extensive member- 
ship in a particular industry, which gave them a leverage that 
most unions lacked. Many unions joined national federations 
to exert more influence. Before the 1980 coup, four main 
trade union federations with differing political orientations 
dominated the labor scene. The main union organization, the 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turkiye Isci 
Sendikalari Konfederasyonu — Turk-Is) was politically moder- 
ate, adhering to legal limits on its activities. The other major 
union group, the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' 
Trade Unions of Turkey (Turkiye Devrimci Isci Sendikalari 
Konfederasyonu — DISK), originated from a faction of Turk-Is 
in 1967. DISK was much smaller than Turk-Is but more mili- 
tant. In addition, small numbers of workers belonged to the 
pro-Islamist Confederation of Turkish Just Workers' Unions 
(Turkiye Hak Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu — Hak-Is) and 
the right-wing Confederation of Turkish Nationalist Workers' 
Unions (Turkiye Milliyetci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu — 
MISK). After the 1980 coup, all union federations except Turk- 
Is were banned for a period. Subsequently, the government 
allowed the other union groups to resume their activities. 

Figures on trade union membership vary, but Ministry of 
Labor statistics at least give an idea of the relative sizes of the 
unions. According to this source, in 1992 Turk-Is had a mem- 
bership of about 1.7 million, Hak-Is had about 330,000 mem- 
bers, and DISK had about 26,000 members. In addition, 
Turkey had twenty-four independent unions that did not 
belong to federations. The size of their memberships was 
uncertain in early 1995, but organized labor totaled almost 2.2 
million workers in 1992. Workers could legally belong to more 
than one union, which explains some of the confusion sur- 
rounding membership statistics. 

Established in 1952, Turk-Is includes many workers 
employed in SEEs and was the only union group actively 
involved in large-scale collective bargaining in the early 1990s. 



164 



The Economy 



Strongly centralized, Turk-Is is dominated by a few large, con- 
servative unions; the social democratic unions that figure 
among its thirty affiliates have little say in federation affairs. In 
adherence to the law, Turk-Is has remained technically aloof 
from party politics but is interested in issues affecting labor. 
Turk-Is is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor- 
Congress of Industrial Organizations through its membership 
in the Asian-American Free Labor Institute, which provides 
training for union leaders. Since 1980 Turk-Is has generally 
refrained from calling strikes, perhaps because of fears that 
labor conflicts might lead to layoffs of surplus SEE personnel. 

Against a background of growing labor unrest in 1994, 
related to deepening economic problems, budget cuts, and 
privatization, Turk-Is coordinated wage talks with the govern- 
ment at the end of the year. Although accused of earlier and 
questionable cooperation with the government, Turk-Is faced 
widespread pressure from affiliated unions and their members 
not to agree to the increase the government was offering. Both 
DISK and Hak-Is had strongly opposed a pay increase of 102 
percent for the Turk-Is-affiliated Teksif union at the end of 
1994 on the grounds that the size of the pay increase did not 
meet the much higher inflation rates and the agreement was 
co-op tive. 

DISK, Tiirk-Is's chief rival, draws its members primarily from 
the private sector and from municipal workers. In the mid- 
1990s, it seemed that supporters of left-wing unions such as 
DISK were shifting to Islamist-oriented ones. Nonetheless, 
DISK-af filiated unions continued to exert some influence as 
part of overall labor pressure to maintain wage and employ- 
ment levels. 

Before 1980 Hak-Is was reportedly tied to the pro-Islamic 
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi — MSP), whereas 
MISK supported the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci 
Hareket Partisi — MHP). In 1980 the two federations claimed 
memberships of 68,000 and 290,000, respectively. After 1984 
they played only a minor role in collective bargaining because 
they lacked sufficient membership to be considered represen- 
tative under new labor legislation. 

The 1980 military intervention severely restricted trade 
union activities. The 1982 constitution and the laws on union 
organization, collective bargaining, strikes, and lockouts passed 
in 1983 have made Turkey's unions the most tightly controlled 
in noncommunist Europe. To have the right to represent the 



165 



Turkey: A Country Study 

workers at a given facility, unions must prove that they have the 
support of at least 10 percent of union membership within the 
industry and a majority at the particular workplace. Political 
and general strikes and many forms of industrial action, includ- 
ing secondary strikes, work slowdowns, and picketing, are pro- 
hibited. About half of the unionized workers, including those 
in the gas, water, electricity, mining, and petroleum industries 
as well as those in banking, urban transit, garbage collection 
and firefighting, are allowed to strike. Strikes can be called only 
after a written announcement to the government, which may 
require a ninety-day cooling-off period followed by compulsory 
arbitration. Workers who strike illegally may be punished with 
as much as eighteen months in prison, and those who partici- 
pate in such strikes can be fired, with the loss of all accumu- 
lated financial claims, including pensions. 

Following the 1980 coup, the military government prohib- 
ited collective bargaining until May 1984, after which time offi- 
cials continued trying to restrain wage settlements in order to 
limit inflation. Although private-sector wage settlements in 
1984 and 1985 included increases ranging from 25 to 60 per- 
cent, pay adjustments generally continued to run behind the 
inflation rate, resulting in declines in real wages. The govern- 
ment took a more relaxed attitude in the late 1980s, but by 
1994 the authorities were once again using antistrike regula- 
tions from the early 1980s to stop strikes and other job actions. 

In the public sector, the government has been even more 
successful at holding the line against wage increases, although 
large increases in 1992-93 led to a sharp jump in government 
expenditures. With a limited endorsement by the IMF, govern- 
ment employees' wages were targeted as the primary means of 
achieving budget cuts in 1994 and early 1995. As part of this 
strategy, Prime Minister (filler attempted to use illegal strikes as 
a pretext for liquidating certain public enterprises; unionized 
workers also would be notified that there were plenty of unem- 
ployed people willing to do their jobs for lower pay. In early 
1995, unions for public-sector workers outside the public enter- 
prises faced the possibility of being abolished altogether. Also, 
seasonal workers with part-time jobs working on village roads, 
irrigation projects, and other infrastructure components were 
to be placed under the authority of provincial authorities, an 
arrangement that would cost them their labor rights. People 
employed with "worker" status, who therefore had certain 
rights under the law, were reclassified as "public servants" with 



166 



The Economy 



no right to bargain collectively or to strike. Members of this 
group fared badly in the mid-1990s, with declining wages 
accompanying their loss of rights. 

Role of Government in the Economy 

The Ottoman Empire established a strong tradition of gov- 
ernment direction of the economy. Ottoman economic doc- 
trine ascribed to the state both the right and the duty to 
control the economy for the common good. The state con- 
trolled a large proportion of the land and suppressed power 
centers, blocking the development of a landed aristocracy. 
One's position in the imperial hierarchy was the primary deter- 
minant of income. Because the sultan confiscated his function- 
aries' wealth when they died, status could be passed on only by 
means of education. For example, candidates for positions in 
the bureaucracy were required to have command of the Otto- 
man language. Peasants and artisans also claimed and received 
protection from the state, often at the expense of economic 
modernization. The bureaucracy had little interest in eco- 
nomic growth, which might lead to the rise of a new class that 
would challenge its dominance. To ensure control of certain 
urban-based production and service functions, they were 
reserved for minority groups. 

Republican Turkey inherited attitudes and memories from 
the Ottomans that continue to play a key role in the country's 
political economy in the late twentieth century. Republican 
leaders believe that the state has a duty to intervene in the 
economy, not only to strengthen the nation against foreign 
intervention but ultimately to further the well-being of the peo- 
ple. 

Liberal Interlude 

Scholars traditionally have stressed the significance of state 
intervention in the economy during the early years of the 
republic, but more recent research indicates that Turkish eco- 
nomic policy was relatively liberal until the 1930s. The govern- 
ment made significant investments in railroad and other 
infrastructure projects, but the Law for the Encouragement of 
Industry of 192V and other measures encouraged private enter- 
prise. Moreover, Turkey's economy was relatively open to inter- 
national markets during the 1920s. Under the provisions of the 
Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the capitulations were abolished, 



167 



Turkey: A Country Study 



but Turkey could not introduce protective tariffs until August 
1929. As a result, tariffs remained low, and the Turkish lira was 
convertible and floating. Foreign interests invested in both 
public and private enterprises, helping to initiate industrial 
development. During these early years, economic growth was 
satisfactory, but the country ran chronic foreign trade deficits 
despite the continued fall in the value of the lira. 

Turkish economic development reached a turning point 
with the Great Depression. By 1930 foreign markets for Turkish 
agricultural products had collapsed, causing sharp declines in 
the prices of agricultural goods and a corresponding decline in 
national income. Dissatisfied with the slow development of 
industry, Turkey's leaders began to look for alternative policies. 
During the late 1920s and the early 1930s, economic and politi- 
cal thinkers discussed alternative approaches to national eco- 
nomic development. The interventionist trend in Western 
economic thinking, represented by works such as John May- 
nard Keynes's The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), influenced the 
theoretical debate. The apparent successes of the Soviet 
Union's drive to develop heavy industry under its First Five-Year 
Plan (1928-33) also impressed Turkish thinkers, although in 
the end Turkish policy borrowed primarily from the West. 

Etatism 

At its 1931 congress, the Republican People's Party (Cum- 
huriyet Halk Partisi — CHP) adopted etatism, one of Ataturk's 
Six Arrows, as its official economic strategy. According to this 
program, individual enterprise was to retain a fundamental 
role in the economy, but active government intervention was 
necessary to boost the nation's welfare and the state's prosper- 
ity. The CHP also declared that etatism was an intermediate 
road between capitalism and socialism. In practice, etatism 
entailed the promotion of industrialization by means of five- 
year plans and the creation of public enterprises. Comprehen- 
sive protective tariffs also were introduced during the 1930s, 
establishing a pattern of import-substitution industrialization 
that would continue for many years. 

After World War II, all major parties claimed to support etat- 
ism. The sharp reorientation of Turkey's economic policies 
after 1980 included a repudiation of much etatist doctrine, 
which, however, still influenced Turkish economic thinking. 
Inasmuch as Ataturk had declared that once Turkey had 
reached a satisfactory level of development certain state enter- 



168 



The Economy 



prises could be returned to private control, the post-1980s eco- 
nomic reforms perhaps could be considered a continuation of 
one aspect of the original etatist program. Moreover, the gov- 
ernment continued to use policy tools such as SEEs and devel- 
opment planning that had originated during the etatist period. 
Nonetheless, by the mid-1990s deepening government indebt- 
edness dictated a faster reduction of the state's economic com- 
mitments. Given Turkey's high inflation, job insecurity, and 
unemployment, etatism could be in vogue again, but in the 
mid-1990s no major opposition party was calling for the whole- 
sale renationalization of the economy. . 

State Economic Enterprises and Privatization 

An important tool of etatism to further government eco- 
nomic policies, State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) are vari- 
ously organized, but the government owns at least a 50 percent 
share in each of them. SEEs are set up by the government, and 
each has a board that reflects the ownership of the particular 
SEE, combining government representatives, who direct the 
enterprise, with private interests. During the etatist industrial- 
ization campaign of the 1930s, the government set up many 
industrial SEEs. In the mid-1990s, SEEs continue to dominate 
sectors considered to be of national importance or sectors 
where private investors have hesitated to invest because capital 
requirements are too great in light of expected returns. SEEs 
include national transportation, communications, and energy 
enterprises; banks that own companies, in particular branches 
such as textiles or refining; and conglomerates with holdings in 
many fields. Some SEEs control companies in which ownership 
is shared with private and foreign investors. In 1964 the State 
Investment Bank was established to provide long-term invest- 
ment credits to SEEs. Credits from the Central Bank of Turkey, 
transfers from the Treasury, and capital markets also finance 
SEEs. 

In the mid-1990s, SEEs accounted for more than 40 percent 
of value added in manufacturing and employed about 550,000 
workers, or about 20 percent of the industrial work force. Until 
1980 SEEs set their prices in accordance with government 
directives, but after the introduction of that year's reform pack- 
age, they were expected to set prices independently. Neverthe- 
less, prices of some major commodities, such as fertilizers, 
continue to be determined by the government. SEEs also influ- 



169 



Turkey: A Country Study 

ence markets, especially those for agricultural goods, by estab- 
lishing guaranteed minimum prices for commodities. 

Aside from their role in industrial development, SEEs are 
charged with social goals. The farm-support program stabilizes 
farmers' incomes, while low consumer prices for food, energy, 
and transportation help the urban poor. SEEs also provide 
training and employ surplus university graduates and constitu- 
ents of influential politicians, contributing to overstaffing. 
Some SEEs are placed in underdeveloped regions to spur 
industrial development, a practice that increases transporta- 
tion and infrastructure costs. 

One objective of the Ozal reforms was to improve SEEs' effi- 
ciency and reduce their need for subsidies. By 1982 the govern- 
ment had freed most SEE prices and had given SEE managers 
greater autonomy and responsibility. The administration 
favored opening state monopolies to outside competition and 
decided in 1983 to limit SEE investments in manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, in the mid-1980s the state sector had to take over 
several failed banks that had significant industrial holdings, 
and the low rate of private investment meant that the public 
share in industrial investment actually rose. By the mid-1990s, 
SEEs remained a major burden on the public exchequer. Of 
the fifty SEEs, only fifteen were expected to report profits in 
1994. Funding the operating losses of the SEEs — TL90 trillion 
in 1994 alone — annually cost the Treasury around TL20 tril- 
lion (about US$70 billion) in 1993 and 1994; the remainder 
was borrowed from banks. The total debt stock of the public 
enterprises by late 1994 was estimated at TL250 trillion, the 
bulk of which was owed to the Treasury and Central Bank. This 
debt generated an interest charge of around TL60 trillion in 
1994 alone on collective sales of TL550 trillion. Deepening eco- 
nomic problems in the 1990s were part of the reason for the 
losses. This situation was exacerbated by a requirement that 
took effect after 1989 stipulating that SEEs borrow at high mar- 
ket rates. 

Major plans for privatization of SEEs were supposed to go 
into effect as early as 1987 but as of early 1995 had not yet 
occurred. Prime candidates for sale include the state airline, 
the cement industry, and the textile industry. Almost all SEEs 
are considered potentially suitable for privatization except for 
certain infrastructure facilities such as power plants and rail- 
roads. 



170 



The Economy 



Some SEE managers and unions oppose privatization, fear- 
ing that, once under private management, the enterprises will 
eliminate unprofitable subsidiaries or aggressively reduce over- 
staffing. Some opposition parties also fear that public assets will 
be allocated among "friends" of government officials, with the 
result being the creation of private monopolies. Observers 
anticipate that certain "strategic" industries, including much 
mining and defense production, will remain in the public sec- 
tor and that the best the administration can hope for would be 
to force them to approximate private- sector practices. More- 
over, certain privatization moves, particularly the sale of 
cement mills belonging to the public enterprise Citosan, and a 
controlling stake in the airport management company Havas, 
were reversed by the Constitutional Court on administrative 
grounds. 

After becoming prime minister, (filler accepted the existing 
legislation on privatization and even sought wider powers to 
hasten the process. Law 3291, passed in 1986, had established 
the Public Participation Administration, which would control 
SEEs designated for privatization and prepare them for the 
process. In late 1994, the National Assembly passed a bill intro- 
duced by (filler to revamp the administrative procedures deal- 
ing with privatization. 

The bill established the Privatization Administration to 
carry out technical work and a Privatization High Board to 
make final decisions. The latter would control the Privatization 
Fund into which revenues were to be channeled. The Privatiza- 
tion High Board would consist of the prime minister, the minis- 
ter of state "responsible for privatization," and the ministers of 
finance and industry and trade. The board was also to be 
responsible for deciding which public enterprises are of special 
strategic importance and in which the state should retain pref- 
erence shares. Turkish Petroleum, Ziraat Bank, Halk Bank, 
Turkish Airlines, and the Soil Products Office Alkaloid Plant 
were placed in the latter category. Railroads, airports, and the 
General Management for Trade in Tobacco, Tobacco Products, 
and Alcoholic Spirits (Tiitun, Tiitun Mamulleri, Tuz ve Alkol 
Isletmeleri Genel Mudurlugii — TEKEL) were not designated 
to be privatized in the mid-1990s. Privatization of telecommuni- 
cations and the electricity production and distribution board 
were to be dealt with in separate legislation. All other types of 
SEEs were again targeted for privatization in various ways, 
including the sale of all or parts of a company through share 



171 



Turkey: A Country Study 

offers, block sales, auctions, and the transfer of plants to pri- 
vate domestic and foreign entities and to companies formed by 
workers and local townspeople. Some of the early candidates 
were the Eregli Iron and Steelworks, the Turkish Petroleum 
Refineries Corporation (Ttirkiye Petrol Refinerileri As — 
TUPRAS), the state oil products distributor (Petrol Ofisi), the 
petrochemicals company (Petkim), the industrial interests of 
the state holding company, Sumerbank, the national airline 
(Turkish Airlines), and the airport company (Havas). The bill 
also set guidelines to prevent the formation of private monopo- 
lies and methods for dealing with workers who lose their jobs. 
Workers made redundant would continue to receive their 
wages for up to eight months and, depending on length of ser- 
vice, would get pensions or severance pay. 

Development Planning 

Turkey first introduced five-year plans in the 1930s as part of 
the etatist industrialization drive. The first five-year plan began 
in 1934. A second plan was drafted but only partially imple- 
mented because of World War II. These early plans were largely 
lists of desirable projects, but they provided guidance for the 
development of infrastructure, mining, and manufacturing. 
During the 1950s, the Democrat Party (DP) eliminated central 
economic planning, but the 1961 constitution made social and 
economic planning a state duty. In 1961 the government estab- 
lished the State Planning Organization (SPO), which was given 
responsibility for preparing long-term and annual plans, fol- 
lowing up on plan implementation, and advising on current 
economic policy. The SPO comes under the prime minister's 
office and receives policy direction from the High Planning 
Council (also seen as the Supreme Planning Council), which is 
chaired by the prime minister and includes cabinet ministers. 
The Central Planning Organization, the secretariat of the High 
Planning Council, formulates the strategy and broad targets on 
which the SPO bases detailed plans. Plan targets are binding 
for the public sector but only indicative for private enterprises. 

SPO plans include — in addition to investment levels — mac- 
roeconomic targets, social goals, and policy recommendations 
for individual subsectors of the economy. Turkey was one of the 
first countries to develop regional planning, a major challenge 
given the limited development of eastern and southeastern 
Anatolia. The SPO has approached planning from a long-term 
perspective and drew up the First Five- Year Plan (1963-67) and 



172 



The Economy 



the Second Five-Year Plan (1968-72) in the context of what 
should be accomplished by the mid-1970s. Similarly, develop- 
ment goals for 1995, including a customs union with the EC, 
were set in the Third Five-Year Plan (1973-77) and the Fourth 
Five-Year Plan (1979-83). Successive plans took stock of prob- 
lems and previous accomplishments, but many policy sugges- 
tions were never effectively implemented. 

Early plans were heavily weighted toward manufacturing, 
import substitution, and the intermediate goods sector. The 
economic and political disorder of the late 1970s, however, 
made it impossible to achieve plan targets. After the 1980 coup, 
the Fourth Five-Year Plan was modified to favor the private sec- 
tor, labor-intensive and export-oriented projects, and invest- 
ments that would pay for themselves relatively quickly. The 
Ozal administration delayed the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1984-89) 
for one year to take account of the structural reform program 
introduced in 1983. Unlike earlier plans, the Fifth Five-Year 
Plan called for a smaller state sector. According to the plan, the 
state would take more of a general supervisory role than it had 
in the past, concentrating on encouraging private economic 
actors. Nevertheless, the state was to continue an aggressive 
program of infrastructure investments to clear bottlenecks in 
energy, transport, and other sectors. 

In May 1989, the government published the 1990-95 Devel- 
opment Plan. The plan called for overall economic growth of 7 
percent per year. The growth of private-sector investment was 
targeted at an average of 11 percent per year, whereas the aim 
was to increase exports 15 percent per year. The inflation rate 
was targeted at 10 percent per year. As it developed, although 
high growth rates were maintained during the 1990-95 period, 
they came at the cost of increased foreign and domestic bor- 
rowing, which funded an inflationary government budgetary 
and monetary policy. Rapid rates of growth also were boosted 
by foreign direct investment. Excessive borrowing and domes- 
tic political problems led to a balance of payments crisis that 
sharply reduced domestic investment rates and ultimately led 
to a decline in incomes. Whereas the development plan had 
called for high growth rates and macroeconomic stability, Tur- 
key actually has experienced high growth rates and macroeco- 
nomic instability. 

Budget 

Public-sector spending is the most important means of state 



173 



Turkey: A Country Study 

intervention in the Turkish economy. The consolidated gov- 
ernment budget comprises central government spending and a 
number of annexed budgets of such partially autonomous enti- 
ties as the State Highway Administration, state monopolies, and 
some universities and academies. Local budgets and most SEE 
budgets generally are not included in the consolidated budget, 
nor are special and extrabudgetary funds. The most important 
of the latter are the Mass Housing Fund, financed from luxury- 
import duties; the Defense Industry Support Fund, financed 
from levies on sales of gasoline, cigarettes, and alcoholic bever- 
ages; and the Public Revenue Sharing Schemes Fund. The par- 
tially autonomous organizations are included in the 
calculations for the public-sector borrowing requirement 
(PSBR). 

Since 1983 the Treasury, under the direct control of the 
prime minister's office, has had sole responsibility to raise 
domestic tax revenues. The Ministry of Finance and the SPO 
are mainly responsible for planning spending policies, but the 
minister of finance presents the annual budget to parliament, 
which approves the annual government budget and legislates 
supplementary appropriations as required during the fiscal 
year, at times making significant modifications. 

Turkish governments have persistently run large budget 
deficits, which have fueled inflation, capital flight, and heavy 
foreign and domestic borrowing. At the heart of this problem 
is the political system, which tends to be largely unrepresenta- 
tive even when democracy is formally operating. Prior to major 
elections, governments have been prone to boost spending, 
particularly salaries for government workers. Despite recent 
modest changes to this system, Turkish governments have been 
averse to increasing taxes to pay for their high spending. Taxes, 
excluding social security contributions, are still around 20 per- 
cent of GNP — the lowest figure among the member countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment. 

Prior to 1980, local administrations had limited revenue- 
earning power and depended heavily on funds transferred 
from the central government. Even with such transfers, local 
governments were often short of funds needed to provide ser- 
vices required during a period of rapid urbanization when 
many city dwellers lacked even the most basic services. After 
1980 reforms significantly strengthened the revenue base of 
municipalities, in part by providing that 5 percent of govern- 



174 



The Economy 



ment tax revenues would be withheld at the local level. In 1994 
(filler also attempted to increase the revenues that local gov- 
ernments might raise. 

During the early and mid-1980s, the government made seri- 
ous attempts to reduce Turkey's inflationary budget deficits, 
implementing policies to streamline government, improve 
public resources allocation, and modernize the tax system. The 
government, for example, designed tax reforms to increase rev- 
enues and to reduce inequities. In addition, the introduction 
of a lump sum tax on small businesses and a new system of 
income tax payments for self-employed people reduced tax 
evasion. The government also started to tax farmers' incomes 
systematically for the first time since the 1920s. Other reforms 
strengthened tax administration, established new tax courts, 
and instituted heavier penalties for tax evasion. 

Overall, the consolidated budget deficit declined during the 
1980s as a result of the reform measures. During the decade, 
the deficit averaged 3 percent of GNP. However, the deficit 
went up in the 1990s, reaching 7.4 percent in 1991, 6.1 percent 
in 1992, 9.8 percent in 1993, and 8 percent in 1994 (see table 6, 
Appendix A). The 1994 figure includes a first-quarter budget 
deficit of 17 percent, which was sharply offset in subsequent 
quarters after the promulgation of the April 5 measures and 
tight supervision by the IMF. These measures more than 
reversed some of the increases in wages and other spending 
made in 1992 and 1993. Public-sector borrowing requirements 
have been much higher as a percentage of GNP. After averag- 
ing around 6 percent during the 1980s, they ranged from 
about 10 to 17 percent in the 1990s. 

Agriculture 

Agriculture — the occupation of the majority of Turks — con- 
tinued to be a crucial sector of the economy in the mid-1990s, 
although industrial production was rising. Turkey's fertile soil 
and hard-working farmers make the country one of the few in 
the world that is self-sufficient in terms of food. Turkey's great 
variety of microclimates and adequate rainfall permit a broad 
range of crops. Farming is conducted throughout the country, 
although it is less common in the mountainous eastern 
regions, where animal husbandry is the principal activity. In 
the mid-1990s, crop cultivation accounted for about two-thirds 
and livestock for one-third of the gross value of agricultural 



175 



Turkey: A Country Study 

production; forestry and fishing combined contributed a mini- 
mal amount. 

Agriculture's share in overall income has fallen progres- 
sively, declining from almost 50 percent of GDP in 1950 to 
around 15 percent of GDP by 1993. During the same period, 
the sector grew only about 1 percent faster than the country's 
population, and per capita food production declined in abso- 
lute terms. The relatively poor showing of the agricultural sec- 
tor reflected in part government policies that had made rapid 
industrialization a national priority since the 1930s. In addi- 
tion, farmers were slow to adopt modern techniques, with agri- 
cultural output suffering from insufficient mechanization, 
limited use of fertilizer, excessive fallow land, and unexploited 
water resources. The result has been low yields. 

Despite agriculture's relative decline in the 1980s as a per- 
centage of GDP, the sector played an important role in foreign 
trade. Turkey enjoys a comparative advantage in many agricul- 
tural products and exports cereals, pulses, industrial crops, 
sugar, nuts, fresh and dried fruits, vegetables, olive oil, and live- 
stock products. The main export markets are the European 
Union and the United States — to which Turkey primarily 
exports dried fruit and nuts, cotton, and tobacco — and the 
Middle East, which primarily imports fresh fruit, vegetables, 
and meat from Turkey. As late as 1980, agricultural exports 
accounted for nearly 60 percent of the total value of exports. In 
the early 1990s, agricultural products accounted for 15 percent 
of total exports. Around 50 percent of manufactured exports 
originate in the agricultural sector; counting these exports, the 
agricultural sector's contribution to exports again would rise to 
around 60 percent. 

Agriculture has great potential for further development, 
provided that the state can implement successful agrarian 
reforms and development projects. Observers believe that to 
achieve balanced growth, Turkey needs to improve the training 
of farmers, make better seed available, upgrade livestock herds, 
standardize products, expand food-processing facilities 
(including cold storage and refrigerated transport), and reor- 
ganize marketing networks. Since 1980 the government has 
encouraged investments in packaging, processing, livestock, 
and slaughterhouses, and has imported new seed varieties. 
These efforts had a modest impact on overall production by 
the mid-1990s. 



176 



Irrigation of an olive grove in 
the Izmit area 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



Tea plantation nearArtvin, 
northeastern Turkey; olives 



and tea are major 
Turkish crops. 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfus s 



The failure to exploit the country's great agricultural poten- 
tial has contributed to Turkey's periodic economic crises and 
poses serious problems for future development. Glaring ine- 
qualities of income between urban and rural residents — and 
among segments of the farm population — have created social 
tensions and contributed to emigration from rural to urban 
areas. Malnutrition continues to threaten segments of the rural 
population, especially children. The Kurdish insurgency in 
eastern Turkey has added to problems in some rural areas. Ris- 
ing incomes in the urban areas have caused increased demand 
for more "exotic" foodstuffs, especially meat and poultry. Since 
1984 Turkey has liberalized its policy on food imports, partly to 
meet this urban demand and partly to offset domestic price 
pressure. Many previously banned luxury food imports and 
imports that compete with domestically produced staples are 
permitted for these reasons; in turn, the growth of these 



177 



Turkey: A Country Study 

imports has contributed to pressures on foreign trade 
accounts. Overall, agricultural output needs to expand along 
with the rest of the economy to maintain adequate supplies for 
industry and exports. Longer-term economic growth prospects 
and macroeconomic stability, therefore, depend on the perfor- 
mance of Turkey's agricultural sector and rural incomes. 

Agricultural Policy 

By 1980 Turkey was self-sufficient in food, and agricultural 
output was growing at a respectable rate, albeit more slowly 
than the economy as a whole. Starting in the early 1970s, crop 
intensification resulted from a reduction of fallow areas and 
increased use of fertilizer, fuel, and pesticides. The livestock 
industry, however, showed little improvement in productivity, 
and the later years of the decade saw the stagnation of all agri- 
culture. Although production became less dependent on the 
weather as a result of irrigation and high-yielding varieties of 
seeds, these methods required adequate supplies of fertilizers, 
chemicals, equipment, and fuel, much of which had to be 
imported. 

Productivity shortcomings, along with the new export-ori- 
ented development strategy, led to the adoption of different 
agricultural policies after 1980. Under the new approach, the 
government switched from promoting food self-sufficiency to 
maximizing agriculture's net contribution to the balance of 
trade. The incentive system was partially dismantled, fertilizer 
and pesticide subsidies were curtailed, and the remaining price 
supports were gradually converted to floor prices. The tight 
monetary policy limited agricultural credit, but real interest 
rates on loans to farmers remained negative. Nonetheless, a 
high proportion of defaults by farmers occurred on loans with 
high interest rates. In some cases, this led to the confiscation of 
land, tractors, or other property by the state, prompting one 
Turkish daily, Milliyet, to run an article entitled, "Bailiff Officer: 
The New Lord of the Peasants." The elimination of export 
licenses and minimum export prices, along with currency 
devaluation, an export-incentive system, and flat domestic 
demand, encouraged agricultural exports. In addition, a wider 
range of food imports was permitted, providing competition 
for domestic products. 

The government's hope of rapidly increasing agricultural 
exports was slow in materializing, and total values fell sharply in 
the mid-1980s. This decline reflected both softer demand 



178 



The Economy 



abroad (especially in the Arab oil-producing countries) and 
Turkey's own attempts to increase the share of agricultural 
products processed prior to export. Still, by the early 1990s 
agricultural exports had risen, with the most dramatic increase 
occurring in textiles and clothing, which depend on indige- 
nously grown cotton. 

Despite the turn toward liberal agricultural policies, govern- 
ment intervention in agriculture remained pervasive in the 
mid-1990s. Many of the institutions established between 1930 
and 1980 continue to play important roles in the daily life of 
the farmer, and many old attitudes and practices remain. A 
large number of ministries, agencies, SEEs, and banks adminis- 
ter government price supports, credit measures, extension and 
research services, and irrigation projects. In the past, overlap- 
ping responsibilities and lack of coordination had often 
diluted the effectiveness of government activities. Some 
progress was made in the 1980s, however, when the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Affairs reorganized its eleven 
departments into five general directorates. Subsequently, the 
ministry was divided into the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs and the Ministry of Forestry. 

After 1980 the government reduced budget transfers to 
agricultural SEEs and decreased the level of price supports, but 
the state still controlled most markets in the sector. Public mar- 
keting agencies and marketing or credit cooperatives adminis- 
tered prices and handled a large share of exports. Several of 
the SEEs involved in agricultural production had been slated 
for privatization in the early 1990s. The Meat and Fish Board, 
the Fodder Industry (Yem Sanayili), and the Milk Industry 
Board (SEK) were targeted for immediate privatization when 
they were placed under the control of the Public Participation 
Administration. However, officials in 1994 stated that they 
lacked sufficient funds to pay the sizable debts these organiza- 
tions had accumulated, a necessary step before privatization. 

Nearly all farm produce except livestock and fresh fruits 
and vegetables has support prices, which became more effec- 
tive when the ministry started announcing them in the fall, giv- 
ing farmers time to choose which crops would be most 
profitable. For most crops (except tea, sugar beets, and opium, 
for which the state is the only buyer), farmers can choose 
between selling to private buyers or to the state. Supports stabi- 
lize crop prices and improve aggregate farm income but add to 
the disparities of income between large and small farmers. Sup- 



179 



Turkey: A Country Study 

port prices grew slowly in the 1980s and did not keep up with 
inflation. However, in the summer of 1991, in anticipation of 
the forthcoming elections, Ozal's Motherland Party govern- 
ment raised all support prices by 60 to 70 percent. Subsequent 
governments under Demirel and (filler maintained increases 
in support prices roughly in line with the high inflation rate. 
During 1994, however, these increases were not maintained. In 
addition, the Agricultural Supply Organization provides many 
farm materials at subsidized prices, including fertilizers, pesti- 
cides, and insecticides. 

The Agricultural Bank of Turkey (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Ziraat Bankasi — TCZB) provides most loans to farmers and 
cooperatives and closely watches agricultural credit. Although 
the TCZB was intended to favor small farmers in the distribu- 
tion of credit, its loan requirements restrict credit for the many 
small farmers who either rent or lack a secure title to land or 
other properties needed as collateral. Much of the bank's lend- 
ing consists of short-term loans extended to cooperatives for 
commodity price support. Farmers also obtain credit from mer- 
chants, wealthy farmers, and money lenders, often at extortion- 
ate interest rates. Much of the World Bank's lending for 
agricultural projects in Turkey is channeled through the TCZB. 

Agricultural extension and research services are poorly 
organized and generally inadequate because of shortages of 
qualified advisers, transportation, and equipment. Well-trained 
personnel willing to work in the field are difficult to find, and 
agricultural research is fragmented among more than ninety 
government and university institutes. Research is organized by 
commodity, with independent units for such major crops as 
cotton, tobacco, and citrus fruit. Observers note that coordina- 
tion of the efforts of different research units and links between 
extension services are inadequate. During the mid-1980s, the 
government attempted to strengthen and rationalize research 
and extension services, but the organizational complexity of 
the entities involved made reform difficult. 

Irrigation 

Getting enough water to crops is a major problem for many 
Turkish farmers. Rainfall tends to be relatively abundant and 
regular in the coastal areas because of the mountains behind 
them. However, the bulk of the agricultural land is on the Ana- 
tolian Plateau, which receives less rainfall because it is ringed 
by mountains. Although rainfall on the plateau varies consider- 



180 



The Economy 



ably among regions, it is barely adequate over large areas. In 
addition, the amount and time of rains vary sharply from year 
to year, causing sharp fluctuations in harvests. Since World War 
II, officials have stressed irrigation as a means of increasing and 
stabilizing farm output, and irrigation projects have consumed 
more than half of public investment in agriculture. 

In the mid-1980s, observers estimated that private irriga- 
tion, depending on weirs and small barrages to direct water 
into fields, reached up to 1 million hectares. In addition, some 
farmers pumped water from wells to irrigate their own fields. 
Development of large-scale irrigation was delayed until the 
1960s. Public-sector irrigation systems, built and operated by 
the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su 
Isleri — DSI) under the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources, tend to be large and costly. Most provide water for 
entire valleys, and some large projects — for example, the 
Southeast Anatolian Project (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi — 
GAP) — combine water supplies for urban areas, protection 
from flooding, hydroelectric power, and irrigation. Irrigation 
projects are dispersed throughout the country, but most are 
concentrated in the coastal regions of the Aegean and Mediter- 
ranean seas, where the longer growing seasons are particularly 
favorable to crops. Public irrigation water was available to 3.7 
million hectares in the mid-1990s, although the area irrigated 
with public water totaled about 3 million hectares. 

Deficiencies in irrigation included a serious lag between the 
construction of the main parts of an irrigation system and the 
completion of land leveling and drainage on farms. Also, crop 
research and farmer training were inadequate to assure the 
planting of suitable crops to obtain maximum yields from irri- 
gated land. In the late 1970s, government officials estimated 
that only one-third of the irrigated land was being cultivated to 
its full potential. Moreover, low user fees did not initially per- 
mit the authorities to regain their initial investments; the fees 
were adjusted in the 1980s, however. 

Major projects were planned to expand the irrigation sys- 
tem because government surveys had indicated that irrigation 
of up to 8.7 million hectares was possible. The most important 
project of the late 1980s and early 1990s is the GAP, which is 
linked with the 2,400-megawatt Atatiirk Dam on the Euphrates 
River and is expected to irrigate 1.7 million hectares when it is 
completed in 2002. The system consists of a twin-bore 24.6-kilo- 
meter tunnel, which will take water from the reservoir to irri- 



181 



Turkey: A Country Study 

gate the plains around Harran, Mardin, and Ceylanpinar in 
southeastern Turkey. In the GAP region, farmers face a six- 
month dry season allowing them only one cash harvest per 
year. Irrigation will probably enable expansion to two or even 
three harvests. Crop rotation, which is largely unknown in 
areas without irrigation, has been introduced in the GAP 
region. Winter vegetables are expected to alternate with cotton 
as the summer crop. Although wheat and pulses dominate 
cropping patterns, cotton could take a larger share as access to 
water increases. The government projects that the GAP will 
increase Turkish wheat production by more than 50 percent, 
barley by a similar figure, and the region's production of cotton 
by more than four times by 2005, thus increasing national cot- 
ton production by 60 percent. The value of food surpluses 
expected to result from this project is estimated at US$5 bil- 
lion. 

Land Use 

Turkey's land surface totals about 78 million hectares, of 
which roughly 48 million hectares were being used for some 
form of agriculture by 1991. There were almost 24.2 million 
hectares in field crops, of which 5.2 million lay fallow. Another 
3.7 million hectares were in use as vineyards, orchards, and 
olive groves, and 20.2 million hectares were covered by forests 
and other woodlands. Other land areas accounted for about 29 
million hectares; included in this figure was land classified as 
lakes, marshes, wasteland, and built-up areas. The "other" cate- 
gory also included about 9 million hectares of permanent pas- 
tureland. 

During the twentieth century, population pressure resulted 
in the expansion of farmland. The cultivated area increased 
from about 8 million hectares in the 1920s to nearly 19 million 
hectares in 1952 and to almost 28 million hectares by 1991. 
Using Marshall Plan credits that first became available in 1948, 
Turkey began to import large numbers of tractors, which made 
it feasible to expand cultivation of marginal lands, especially on 
the Anatolian Plateau. Although total production grew rapidly, 
average yields did not. By about 1970, nearly all arable land was 
under cultivation. 

Cultivation increased primarily at the expense of meadows 
and grasslands, which diminished from about 46 million hec- 
tares in the mid-1920s to about 14 million hectares in the mid- 
1980s. Although cultivation of the larger area made greater 



182 



Pickers of sultana grapes in 
fields east of Izmir, 
western Turkey 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



Turkey: A Country Study 



agricultural production possible over the short run, it created 
long-term problems for livestock production. It also resulted in 
the destruction of tree cover and the plowing of marginal fields 
that were too steep and that received barely sufficient rainfall 
even in normal years. By the early 1960s, government agents 
were encouraging farmers to practice contour plowing and to 
take other measures to minimize erosion, but to little effect. By 
the late 1970s, more than half the country's land was judged to 
have serious erosion problems, and some plains regions were 
experiencing dust-bowl conditions. All of Turkey was affected, 
with the mountainous eastern provinces hit hardest. Some 
areas lost all topsoil and could support few plants. 

In the 1970s, the government conducted land-use studies 
and found that more than one-fifth of the land should have 
been used differently to achieve optimum long-term produc- 
tion. Misuse was greatest in rain-fed cropped fields, but some 
grazing land and wasteland were found better suited to other 
uses such as cropping and forestry. Turkey's unusually high 
proportion of fallow land also limited production; in 1981 the 
government began encouraging double cropping and the 
planting of feed crops on fallow fields. The government also 
was considering a broad land-use policy. However, reform 
proved difficult because of government inefficiency and the 
lack of alternative crops in areas cut off from markets, where 
farmers had little choice but to use their land to grow grain to 
feed their families. Expansion of the road network, irrigation 
facilities, and extension services continued to offer hope for 
eventual improvements in land use. 

Land Tenure 

From the time of Ataturk, it has been generally recognized 
that land reform would speed rural development. Most atten- 
tion focused on land redistribution — a highly charged political 
issue. People who favored land reform pointed to the higher 
yield achieved by owner-operators and attacked absentee land- 
lords. Opponents pointed out that land reform would not solve 
the difficulties of the rural population because there was insuf- 
ficient land to establish farms large enough to support families. 
Whatever the merits of land reform proposals, large landown- 
ers effectively blocked most action, and governments often 
lacked the will to implement those measures that were enacted. 
Moreover, landless peasants continued to migrate to the cities 
in sufficient numbers to reduce the pressure for reform. 



184 



The Economy 



Historically, Turkey has been a land inhabited by indepen- 
dent peasants. The Ottoman state restricted the growth of a 
landowning class; and in the early years of Ottoman rule, the 
central government retained ownership of most of the land, 
which was leased to farmers under relatively secure tenure 
arrangements. To maintain farms large enough to support a 
family and a pair of oxen, the Ottomans exempted land from 
Muslim inheritance policy, a practice subsequently reversed as 
the state reinstituted Islamic inheritance practices, sold land to 
gain revenues, and authorized land transfers. These changes 
favored the growth of a class of large landowners during the lat- 
ter decades of the empire. By 1923 landownership had shifted 
in favor of a small group with large holdings. However, during 
the republican period land concentration declined, a develop- 
ment that perhaps reflected the effects of division through 
inheritance or the attraction of alternative investments. At the 
same time, the opening of new areas to cultivation made land 
available to those farmers without holdings. 

Because no comprehensive cadastral surveys have been car- 
ried out, landownership data are still poor in the mid-1990s, 
but a general picture of ownership patterns emerges. Accord- 
ing to the 1980 agricultural census, about 78 percent of the 
farms consisted of five hectares or less and together accounted 
for 60 percent of farmland. About 23 percent of the farms were 
between five and twenty hectares in size, accounting for 
another 18 percent of the land. Fewer than 4 percent of the 
farms covered more than twenty hectares, although these occu- 
pied more than 15 percent of the farmland. Few farms 
exceeded 100 hectares. Although experts believed that land- 
ownership was more concentrated than data on farm size 
implied, it was clear that Turkey had more equal distribution of 
land than did many other developing countries. 

Some observers estimate that, despite widespread leasing 
and sharecropping, a majority of farms are owner operated. 
However, tenure patterns vary significantly among regions, 
reflecting different geographical conditions and historical 
developments. In general, Islamic inheritance practices, which 
establish set shares for each male and female child, cause frag- 
mented holdings and make leasing and sharecropping exten- 
sive. Joint ownership of land is common, and even very small 
farms normally consist of several noncontiguous plots. Farmers 
often rent out some of their own land while leasing or share- 
cropping other plots in order to till areas reasonably close 



185 



Turkey: A Country Study 

together and large enough to support their families. Owners of 
small plots may rent out their land and work on other farms or 
in town. Owners of large holdings, sometimes whole villages, 
usually rent out all or most of their land. Between one-tenth 
and one-fifth of farmers lease or sharecrop the land they till, 
and landless rural families also work as farm laborers. 

Tenancy arrangements are many and complex. Some lease- 
holds can be inherited, but many tenants lack sufficient secu- 
rity to make a long-term commitment to the soil they till. 
Sharecroppers generally receive about half of the crop, with 
the owner supplying inputs such as seed and fertilizer. Grazing 
rights are often held by groups rather than individuals. Many 
villages have common pastures open to the village herd. Culti- 
vated areas have expanded as individuals appropriate village 
pastureland to grow grains, a process that not only has caused 
village strife but also has worsened erosion. 

After 1950 the commercialization of agriculture accelerated 
changes in land-use and tenure patterns. Many of the large 
holdings on the coastal plains of the Aegean Sea and Mediter- 
ranean Sea were converted to modern farms, often benefiting 
from irrigation projects and specializing in high-value fruits, or 
industrial crops. Landless families supplied the labor for such 
modern farms, while sharecroppers and owners of small farms 
tilled the adjacent land. In these more fertile areas, a five-hect- 
are farm might produce as much income as a twenty-hectare 
farm in the semiarid central Anatolian Plateau. Southeastern 
Anatolia, one of the poorest regions of Turkey, included feu- 
dal-style landlords who controlled entire villages and many 
landless families. 

Although Atatiirk had stressed the need for upper and 
lower limits on landownership, the latter to halt the fragmenta- 
tion process, little in the way of effective land reform had been 
carried out by the early 1990s. Nevertheless, more than 3 mil- 
lion hectares had been distributed to landless farmers between 
the 1920s and 1970, most of it state land. 

The problems of land tenure remain, and some have wors- 
ened. Many farms are too small to support a family and too 
fragmented for efficient cultivation. Tenancy arrangements 
foster neither long-term soil productivity nor the welfare of 
tenants. In many areas, the rural poor are becoming poorer 
while land better suited to grazing continues to be converted to 
grain fields. At the same time, however, many large landhold- 
ings have been turned into productive modern farms that con- 



186 



The Economy 



tribute to the country's improved agricultural performance. 
Major irrigation projects in the Euphrates River Valley and else- 
where offer the prospect of increasing the supply of productive 
land. The declining population growth rate has reduced the 
pressure for land reform, and industrialization offers an alter- 
native for landless farm workers, who prefer city life to that of 
rural areas. 

Cropping Patterns and Production 

Turkey's varied ecology allows farmers to grow many crops, 
yet the bulk of the arable land and the greater part of the farm 
population traditionally have been dedicated to producing 
cereal crops, which supply 70 percent of Turkey's food con- 
sumption in terms of calories. As of 1992, cereal crops occu- 
pied 12.5 million hectares or more than half of the country's 
cultivated area. Wheat accounted for about 9 million hectares 
of this area, and barley for about 3 million hectares. Other 
grain crops include rye, millet, corn, and rice. Grains are pro- 
duced in most parts of the country (see fig. 9). 

Small or subsistence farmers produce most of Turkey's 
grain. Because most fields depend on rainfall, production var- 
ies considerably from year to year. Farmers traditionally have 
left grain fields fallow for a year to allow water to accumulate in 
the soil. Although the government encourages planting soy- 
beans as a secondary crop following the wheat crop, farmers 
have been slow to adopt the practice. The integration of forage 
crops into crop rotation and the elimination of fallow periods 
offer the possibility of increased soil fertility and moisture 
retention. 

Wheat has long been the basic food in the Turkish diet, gen- 
erally eaten in the form of bread — of which Turkish per capita 
consumption ranks among the highest in the world. Farmers 
consume about half of the crop; the other half moves through 
commercial channels. The Soil Products Office buys up to one- 
fifth of the crop at support prices, which largely determine the 
prices for the open market, and handles most imports and 
exports of grain. 

Production increases in the late 1970s turned the country 
into a wheat exporter. After 1980 the country also imported 
small amounts of high-quality wheat to improve baked prod- 
ucts. Steady increases continued in the 1980s, with wheat pro- 
duction averaging 15 million tons. Even in the drought- 
stricken 1989 harvest, wheat production totaled 16.2 million 



187 



The Economy 



tons. By the early 1990s, wheat production was averaging 20 
million tons per year. 

Barley production did not rise substantially after the 1960s; 
crops averaged 6 million tons per year in the 1980s and 7 mil- 
lion tons in the early 1990s. One reason for the slow growth in 
barley production was a change in dietary habits: whereas bar- 
ley previously had been a staple food, it came to be used almost 
exclusively as animal feed or for export. Harvests of corn, 
which is also used for feed, increased from an average of about 
1.1 million tons per year during the 1970s to around 2 million 
tons per year in the early 1990s (see table 7, Appendix A). 

Turkey is the main pulse producer in the Middle East, and 
pulse output increased dramatically from an annual average of 
617,000 tons in the 1970-75 period to more than 1.1 million 
tons in the 1980-85 period. By the early 1990s, however, pulse 
output had fallen to about 860,000 tons in 1990 and 610,000 
tons in 1992. The country made a major effort to meet the 
increased demand for dry beans, lentils, and peas in the Mid- 
dle East, and exported increasing amounts during the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, declining export demand in the 1990s and better 
opportunities in raising other crops led to falling output. 

Cotton is the major industrial crop in terms of value, supply- 
ing seed for vegetable oil and fiber for textiles, a major export. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, cotton cultivation increased rapidly fol- 
lowing the introduction of new varieties and the extension of 
irrigation. The main cotton areas are on the coastal plains of 
the south and southwest, where yields have exceeded interna- 
tional averages since the 1950s. Annual output of cotton lint 
rose from about 145,000 tons in the early 1950s to about 
600,000 tons in the early 1990s. Exports averaged 10 percent of 
production in the early 1990s, having fallen from around 30 
percent in the 1980s. 

Tobacco is a classic industrial crop, but output rose rela- 
tively slowly after World War II, reaching about 200,000 tons 
per year by the 1980s and 300,000 tons by the early 1990s. 
European consumers' preference for Virginia tobacco was a 
factor in the slow expansion, although foreign investment in 
the domestic tobacco industry in the 1980s spurred produc- 
tion. 

Sugar beet production expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, 
leveling off at a rate sufficient to produce an annual average of 
677,000 tons during the first half of the 1970s. The yield met 
domestic needs and allowed limited exports. Production 



189 



Turkey: A Country Study 

jumped sharply, to about 1.5 million tons in 1981, and ended 
the decade at around 11 million tons in 1989. The annual aver- 
age in the early 1990s was 14 million tons. 

Oilseed cultivation expanded during the 1980s and 1990s, 
but harvests averaging about 2 million tons in the latter half of 
the 1980s and early 1990s continued to lag behind consump- 
tion, causing Turkey to import vegetable oils. Production of 
sunflower seeds, the main source of edible oil, declined, and 
the use of degenerated seed resulted in lower oil production. 
In 1987 Turkey produced 1.1 million tons of sunflower seeds; 
by 1992 production had declined to 950,000 tons. Olive pro- 
duction has experienced a two-year cycle with small crops every 
other year. 

Cultivation of opium poppies as a field crop traditionally 
was fairly extensive in parts of the Anatolian Plateau. The 
opium gum had cash value, and the plant served villagers as 
food, forage, and thatch. Official figures showed that during 
the second half of the 1960s, annual production of opium gum 
averaged about 110 tons per year. During this period, the crop 
played an important role in the international illegal drug 
trade. With the United States pushing for a ban on poppy culti- 
vation, after 1974 the Turkish government strictly controlled 
poppy harvesting, requiring that the mature pod be removed 
and processed at a state-run plant. During the first half of the 
1990s, the area sown with opium ranged from 7,000 to 19,000 
hectares, producing between 3,700 and 13,700 tons of opium 
pods. Most observers believed that government measures were 
effective in keeping opium derivatives in legal channels with- 
out causing undue hardship to farmers. 

During the mid-1990s, cultivation of fruit, nuts, and vegeta- 
bles contributed nearly 33 percent of the value of crop produc- 
tion, although such cultivation occupied only about 13 percent 
of cultivated land. Improved export possibilities led to the 
expansion of fruit and vegetable hectarage during the 1980s 
and 1990s; in 1991 about 593,000 hectares were devoted to 
green vegetables, tomatoes, and other produce, of which about 
20,000 hectares were grown in greenhouses. Turkey is a major 
producer of high-quality hazelnuts, despite stiff competition in 
international markets from rising production in Spain, the 
United States, and Italy. The annual crop averages 400,000 tons 
per year, roughly half of which is exported. Turkey is also a 
major producer and exporter of various fruits, including 
grapes, sultana raisins, citrus fruits, and melons. Total fruit and 



190 



The Economy 



vegetable exports yielded Turkey nearly US$1 billion per year 
in the early 1990s. 

Livestock 

Animal husbandry is an important part of Turkey's agricul- 
tural sector and economy. Livestock products, including meat, 
milk, eggs, wool, and hides, contributed more than 33 percent 
of the value of agricultural output in the mid-1990s. Sheep and 
cattle are kept mainly on the grazing lands of Anatolia. Despite 
growing demand for animal products in Turkey's cities as 
incomes rose, animal numbers were static in the 1980s and fell 
in the early 1990s. Although yields were growing, traditional 
methods kept the livestock industry from achieving its consid- 
erable potential. Only 20 percent of cattle, for example, were 
high-yielding variety breeds. The oil boom in the Persian Gulf, 
however, led to an expansion of export markets and to major 
investments in the meat industry of the eastern Turkish towns 
of Erzurum and Van. In 1992 meat exports totaled US$140 mil- 
lion; exports, however, were being hurt by the UN embargo on 
Iraq. Wool is also a significant export. Traditional Turkish 
sheep varieties produce a coarse wool suitable for carpets and 
blankets rather than clothing. Merino sheep, which produce a 
finer wool, have been introduced in the Bursa region. 

During the 1950s, officials expected that livestock produc- 
tion would decline as grain cultivation increased at the expense 
of grazing lands. In fact, the period of most rapid expansion of 
grain cultivation also saw an upswing in the number of farm 
animals. One result was overgrazing of grasslands, wasteland, 
forests, and mountain meadows, which damaged the soil, 
although not enough to reduce the size of herds. Another 
result was smaller, less productive animals. Cattle, which pro- 
cess coarse forage less efficiently than sheep and goats, suf- 
fered most from the loss of grazing land, but nearly all animals 
produced less meat and milk and fewer offspring. 

Farmers made a modest beginning toward improving live- 
stock production techniques in the 1980s, but traditional prac- 
tices were hard to change. Even if they have no land, most 
village families own a few animals. Animals essentially scrounge 
for an existence, foraging on crop stubble, weeds, and grass on 
fallow land, and on uncultivable grazing areas. Few farmers 
integrate livestock production with cropping activities or match 
feed supply to their animals' requirements. Rural families raise 
livestock on land that lacks alternative uses, but the system does 



191 



Turkey: A Country Study 

not allow the high levels of production necessary to meet the 
needs of the rapidly expanding population. Moreover, over- 
grazing has caused environmental damage that is difficult to 
repair. 

Data on the livestock industry are poor but indicative of 
general trends. Official statistics reveal that recent years have 
seen changes in the relative roles of various animals in the farm 
economy. Given Turkish dietary preferences, sheep have rela- 
tively high value and increased in number from about 36.8 mil- 
lion head in 1970 to about 40.4 million head in 1992. The 
number of goats declined during the same period, from about 
18.9 million to about 10.7 million because of grazing restric- 
tions in forests and government policies encouraging herd 
reduction. The use of tractors probably has caused the decline 
in the number of oxen. Cattle, which have risen in value as 
farmers strive to meet the growing urban demand for milk, 
increased in number from about 2.1 million in 1970 to about 
11.9 million in 1992. 

Livestock output has increased over the years, although less 
rapidly than demand. In the early 1980s, the country was essen- 
tially self-sufficient in milk products, producing about 5.2 mil- 
lion tons per year. By the early 1990s, milk output had doubled, 
to 10 million tons per year. Annual meat production averaged 
660,000 tons per year; this figure, however, represents only an 
estimate because most slaughtering occurs outside official 
slaughterhouses. During the 1980s, the price for red meat 
increased sharply, leading to a fall in domestic meat demand 
and an increase in poultry consumption. However, meat 
demand was partially sustained by exports of live animals — 
some of them smuggled over borders — to Middle Eastern 
countries, especially Iran and Iraq. The UN embargo on Iraq 
hurt domestic meat exporters after 1990. 

Poultry production expanded rapidly after 1980 and 
appears capable of rising with demand as incomes increase and 
diets begin to include animal products. Poultry exports to Iran 
and Iraq also grew in the 1980s but fell somewhat in the 1990s. 
Many Turkish poultry operations are small, producing between 
5,000 and 10,000 fowl at a time. However, larger, integrated 
operations have also been established, particularly in urban 
areas. One, Yupi of Izmir, claims to be one of the largest poul- 
try producers in the world. By 1992 Turkey had 134 million 
head of poultry, double the number that it had had in 1987. 



192 



The Economy 



Forestry and Fisheries 

Forestry contributes little to the economy, but it holds 
potential for future development. In the early 1990s, Turkey's 
forests covered an estimated 20.2 million hectares, or 201,990 
square kilometers (26 percent of the land area). Official statis- 
tics indicate that forests have doubled in size since 1950; the 
figures do not reflect actual growth in forested areas but rather 
continuing survey efforts and the inclusion of less productive 
wooded areas under the jurisdiction of the forestry administra- 
tion. The most productive lumber area is the Black Sea region, 
followed by central, western, and southern Anatolia, where 
mostly pine wood is produced. The forests in the eastern part 
of the country are in poor condition and yield little besides 
firewood. Many forests are overmature because of poor man- 
agement and infrequent cutting, and thus only about 20 per- 
cent of the total forested area is commercially exploitable. 

By the mid-1950s, the state had taken over all forest areas 
from private owners. Compensation was largely in the form of 
access to fuel wood at low prices. The one-third of the rural 
population that lives in or near forests includes many of the 
country's poorest families. The bulk of their income comes 
from farming; forest products provide supplemental income 
and fuel. The main objective of forest management is control 
of traditional logging and grazing rights; the lack of alternative 
fuel supplies makes it impossible to stop illegal wood harvests 
in state forests. 

The General Directorate of Forestry in the Ministry of For- 
estry has assumed responsibility for logging and reforestation 
operations and for reducing erosion. Whereas wood produc- 
tion has been substantially below potential, partly because of a 
lack of equipment and roads, reforestation efforts increased 
Turkey's wooded area by about 2 percent between 1977 and 
1981. During the early 1980s, annual wood production aver- 
aged 5.2 million cubic meters of lumber. By 1991 production 
had risen to about 6.5 million cubic meters. 

Despite the country's long coastline and large freshwater 
bodies, fishing is an underdeveloped industry. The Black Sea 
and the Sea of Marmara constitute the main fishing grounds. 
The tonnage of the fishing fleet has increased, but in the early 
1990s it still included about 7,000 traditional boats, some 1,500 
of which lacked motors. The annual catch rose from around 
430,000 tons in 1981 to about 625,200 tons in 1988, but 



193 



Turkey: A Country Study 



declined to about 365,000 tons in 1991. Frogs' legs, snails, 
shrimp, and crayfish are exported to Europe. 

Industry 

Turkish modernizers have long struggled to build an indus- 
trial system that would help restore the country's economic 
power. The import-substitution strategy followed until 1980 was 
designed to make the country an independent producer of 
manufactured goods. The result was a striking unfolding of 
industry, especially between 1950 and 1977, when the sector 
(including energy and natural resources) grew at an annual 
average rate of 8.6 percent in real terms, expanding its share of 
GDP from about 12 percent to about 25 percent. Despite the 
retrenchment of the early 1980s, the recovery of the industrial 
sector — which registered an average annual growth rate of 5.9 
percent between 1987 and 1992 — restored the sector to its pre- 
1980 proportion of more than 23 percent of GDP in 1993. By 
the early 1990s, industry was broadly based; the only individual 
industries accounting for more than 5 percent of industrial 
output were food processing, petroleum, textiles, and iron and 
steel. 

Under the republic, the Turks have vastly improved their 
country's infrastructure and have achieved the ability to pro- 
duce a wide range of products. The country's first factories pro- 
cessed food, such as sugar and flour, and nondurable 
consumer goods, such as textiles and footwear. Next came 
intermediate industrial products, including iron and steel, 
chemicals, cement, and fertilizer. By the end of the 1970s, the 
country was developing capital goods industries and high-tech- 
nology products. Production of trucks and buses in coopera- 
tion with the West German firm Mercedes-Benz, and of F-16 
fighter aircraft with the United States firm General Dynamics, 
indicated Turkey's industrial ambitions. 

The press for rapid industrialization minimized the atten- 
tion given to efficiency, and excessive protection forestalled 
competition that would have promoted efficiency; selling in 
the protected home market was much more attractive than 
attempting to export. Moreover, the rise of montage industries, 
which assembled such products as motor vehicles, consumer 
durables, and elecUonic goods primarily using imported com- 
ponents, meant that industrial growth required ever more 
imports. Hence, attempts at import substitution paradoxically 
tended to aggravate the country's trade balance. The 



194 



Fish vendor on the Bosporus 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfus s 



Fisherman mending his 
net, Trabzon 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



Turkey: A Country Study 



capital-intensive nature of many industrial investments, espe- 
cially those in the intermediate goods sector, caused employ- 
ment in industry to grow relatively slowly, contributing to 
structural unemployment. Dependence on imported petro- 
leum made the country highly vulnerable to increases in oil 
prices. 

By the end of the 1970s, industry had reached a turning 
point. In the short run, the sector needed to overcome short- 
ages of energy, imported machinery, parts, and processing 
materials that had caused a decline in industrial output during 
the last years of the decade. In the longer run, to become more 
efficient and to enable increased exports, the industrial struc- 
ture had to be adjusted in accordance with the country's com- 
parative advantages. In effect, industry would have to transfer 
resources out of uncompetitive industries to favor those that 
could compete in world markets. The difficult adjustment pro- 
cess started during the early 1980s, and substantial progress was 
made under the Ozal team. Under the new outward-oriented 
development strategy, as under the old import-substitution pol- 
icies, industry was to be the leading sector of the economy. 
Industrial performance — especially in export markets — would 
determine if that strategy would be successful. 

Many of the problems of import substitution had not yet 
been overcome by the mid-1990s. Much progress had been 
made in spurring private-sector-led industrialization, particu- 
larly in light manufacturing and export promotion, however. 
Light manufactures and iron and steel accounted for an 
increasing proportion — and since the 1980s, the majority — of 
exports. Moreover, foreign investment in the industrial sector, 
made either directly or through the stock market, had begun 
to have a positive impact on Turkish industry. However, much 
of industry was still dominated by the public sector in early 
1995, and private-sector companies still depended on crucial 
inputs from public-sector industries. 

Industrial Policy 

In line with the shift to an outward-oriented development 
strategy, in 1980 Turkey's policy makers began to revamp the 
country's industrial policy. The new policy set forth four 
related goals for industry: upgrading the role of market signals 
in decision making, increasing manufacturing exports, enlarg- 
ing the private share in manufacturing, and reforming the 
SEEs to reduce inefficiency. In the early 1990s, a fifth goal was 



196 



The Economy 



added: privatization of public-sector entities. Policy makers 
were also concerned with obtaining adequate energy supplies 
and providing enough work for the growing labor force. 

Energy 

Turkey is relatively well endowed with energy and mineral 
resources. The extensive mountainous terrain provides numer- 
ous hydroelectric sites, although most are far from the main 
population and consumption centers. The country also has 
substantial exploitable lignite resources and small reserves of 
hard coal, petroleum, and natural gas. Commercially exploit- 
able deposits of many minerals have been located, but the terri- 
tory has been surveyed only partially. Exploitation of these 
natural resources has occurred relatively slowly. 

The combined demands of industrialization and urbaniza- 
tion nearly tripled energy consumption in the 1960s and 1970s. 
An inappropriate pricing policy, especially the subsidy of petro- 
leum that led to unduly cheap products, was one cause of shifts 
in the sources of energy that exacerbated shortages. In 1960 
more than half of the primary energy consumed came from 
noncommercial sources, mainly firewood but also manure and 
other agricultural wastes. These noncommercial sources, plus 
domestic coal and lignite, accounted for more than 80 percent 
of all primary energy consumed; oil supplied only 18 percent. 
By 1980, in contrast, oil supplied about 47 percent of the pri- 
mary energy consumed, coal and lignite about 21 percent, 
hydroelectric power 8 percent, and noncommercial sources 
such as firewood and animal wastes only 23 percent. By 1992, 
43.5 percent of final energy came from petroleum, 31.1 per- 
cent from lignite and hard coal, 4.1 percent from hydroelectric 
power, 6.9 percent from natural gas, and 14.4 percent from 
other energy sources, including solid fuels, geothermal, solar 
power, and wind power. 

During the 1970s, the demand for electricity began to 
exceed supply, and by the late 1970s the power gap began to 
constrain industry. After 1977 rotating blackouts affecting 
industrial, commercial, and residential consumers were neces- 
sary to meet demand. By 1979 the shortage of foreign 
exchange had so restricted imports of crude oil that fuel for 
cars, trucks, and tractors had to be rationed. In the mid-1980s, 
in an attempt to deal with the energy shortage the Ozal admin- 
istration launched the build, operate, and transfer (BOT) sys- 
tem, under which foreign investors would provide the capital 



197 



Turkey: A Country Study 



and technology to build plants, operate them for a number of 
years with guaranteed revenues, and finally transfer the units to 
the government when the investment had been fully returned. 
The Ataturk Dam was a major project designed to increase 
electricity output. Its first two power units came on line in 
1992. 

Although Turkey's energy resources remained underdevel- 
oped in early 1995, the country had relatively good energy pro- 
duction potential. One estimate places the economically 
feasible hydroelectric potential at around 29,500 megawatts, 
which would allow annual production to reach roughly 100,000 
gigawatt-hours in years with normal rainfall. Lignite is the sec- 
ond most important potential source of energy, with proven 
and probable deposits put around 6.4 billion tons. However, 
Turkish lignite, containing high amounts of water and sulfur, is 
hard to burn and pollutes the air. Turkey's proven and esti- 
mated petroleum stocks are equivalent to about three years' 
consumption. Proven reserves are estimated at about 16 mil- 
lion tons, and enhanced oil-recovery techniques may allow 
extraction of another 30 million tons. Proven reserves of natu- 
ral gas total about 12.4 billion cubic meters, and reserves of 
hard coal about 1 billion tons. Turkey's geothermal resources 
are considerable, but they have not yet been systematically 
explored. 

Imports of petroleum averaged more than 15 million tons 
per year in the early 1980s and increased to about 23 million 
tons in the early 1990s. Most of Turkey's oil fields are located in 
southeastern Anatolia near the borders with Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria (see fig. 10). Because of the country's fractured substrata, 
deposits are often contained in small pockets, which makes 
exploration and extraction difficult. In 1985 exploration 
proved that Turkey has oil deposits at very deep levels, but it 
was not known how large the deposits might be. Shell Oil 
determined that oil at Paleozoic levels would be recoverable, 
and other investigations proved significant deposits in central 
Anatolia under the salt flats in the plain north of Konya. In 
1991 British Petroleum began exploring for oil in offshore 
areas of the Black Sea. It is also suspected that the Aegean shelf 
contains considerable petroleum deposits, but as long as rela- 
tions with Greece remain strained, conflicting claims to the 
Aegean seabed limit prospects for exploration. To speed up the 
exploration process, the Turkish government in 1983 eased 
regulations on such activities by foreign oil companies, allow- 



198 



The Economy 



ing them to export 35 percent of production from fields they 
discovered in Anatolia and 45 percent from offshore fields. 
Although several foreign concerns started exploration after the 
liberalization package went into effect, up to the mid-1990s no 
major finds had been reported. 

The state-owned oil company, Turkish Petroleum Corpora- 
tion (TPAO), Shell Oil, and Mobil control most petroleum out- 
put, which had climbed gradually to a peak of 3.6 million tons 
in 1969 but declined to about 2.1 million tons in 1985 as depos- 
its were depleted (see table 8, Appendix A.). By the early 1990s, 
output had increased once again to nearly 4.4 million tons. 
The main petroleum project during the 1980s was an attempt 
at secondary recovery at the Bati Raman fields in southeastern 
Anatolia, which were expected to produce roughly 1.5 million 
tons a year over a twenty-year period. 

TPAO stepped up oil exploration efforts at home and 
abroad in the hope of raising output. But prospects for new 
domestic finds were endangered by the escalating conflict with 
Kurdish rebels in southeastern Turkey. Western operators in 
the area were nervous after a sharp increase in the number of 
attacks on oil installations. Mobil suspended operations at its 
3,200-bpd Selmo field and other small sites after Kurdish 
attacks on its staff. In the early 1990s, talks were underway on a 
possible transfer of the Selmo operation to TPAO. Shell Oil's 
rig near the 25,000-bpd Batman refinery was also hit, although 
operations there continued. TPAO reported no attacks. Total 
Turkish production in 1993 of about 78,600 bpd — down from 
about 84,500 bpd in 1991 — met 17 percent of the country's 
458,000-bpd needs. The state firm in 1993 pumped about 
60,550 bpd, Shell Oil about 14,500 bpd, Mobil about 3,230 
bpd, and Aladdin Middle East about 330 bpd. On several aging 
fields, rising water content has halved productivity. TPAO 
drilled sixty exploration wells in 1993, only one of which hit oil. 
In 1994 it planned to drill eighty-one, stepping up work outside 
the affected southeast. Meanwhile, Mobil was doing seismic 
work in central and southern Turkey, and Shell Oil and United 
States Arco were both exploring in the southeast. 

TPAO's joint venture in Kazakhstan, which holds seven con- 
cessions, should help to increase the company's oil reserves. In 
addition, preliminary tests in 1993 near Aktyubinsk and Atyrau 
were promising. It is expected to be several years, however, 
before the oil or gas reaches Turkey, given the need to work 
out export routes or an exchange agreement with Russia. Turk- 



199 



Turkey: A Country Study 




200 



The Economy 



ish sources are cofinancing the venture with the Kazakh state 
oil company. The project is TPAO's first major overseas enter- 
prise, although its subsidiary, the Turkish Petroleum Interna- 
tional Corporation, holds concessions in Australia, Pakistan, 
and Egypt. 

Five refineries with a total capacity of about 713,000 bpd 
meet most of the country's need for petroleum products. Until 
early 1995, about 85 percent of refinery capacity was in public 
hands in four refineries located at Aliaga near Izmir, Kocaeli, 
Kirikkale, and Batman. A fifth refinery, jointly owned by Mobil, 
Shell Oil, British Petroleum, and a Turkish company, is located 
at Mersin. 

In early 1995, Turkey's privatization program appeared to 
be back on track after a period of wrangling over the legality of 
the sale of the state refinery company TUPRAS and the retail 
company Petrol Ofisi. The sale of part or all of each company is 
scheduled to take place before the end of 1995. 

Petrol Ofisi's 4,000 stations control 56 percent of a domestic 
gasoline market that since 1987 has grown by an average of 5.5 
percent a year to 94,000 bpd. Full privatization is expected by 
the end of 1995. 

A TPAO pipeline extends for nearly 500 kilometers from 
the oil fields near Batman to Dortyol on the Mediterranean 
coast. The corporation also owns and operates the Turkish sec- 
tion of the pipeline from Iraq's Kirkuk fields to a port facility 
near Dortyol. This pipeline was enlarged in 1984 to carry 1.1 
million bpd, a share of which Turkey purchased at preferential 
rates. A second, smaller-capacity Kirkuk-Dortyol pipeline was 
built in the late 1980s, which increased capacity to 1.5 million 
bpd. Oil flows through the two pipelines ceased after the UN 
embargo on Iraq was imposed in 1990. The pipeline cannot be 
used for domestic oil because according to international law 
the oil in the pipeline at the time of the embargo must be 
stored, awaiting UN disposition. 

Apart from the country's own oil prospects in the Black Sea, 
Turkish officials see their nation as a strategic hub bringing oil 
from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to the Mediterranean and 
connecting Turkmenistan and possibly Iran to the European 
gas network. Turkish officials have pushed their own brand of 
pipeline diplomacy, encouraging the nations of Central Asia 
and the Caucasus — as well as Iran — to cooperate so that they 
can start exporting their prime resources to the outside world 
via Turkey. 



201 



Turkey: A Country Study 

The Turks are convinced that at least some of the projects 
eventually will come to fruition, beginning with a projected 
pipeline to bring Azerbaijani crude to the eastern Mediterra- 
nean. In the early 1990s, the governments of Turkey and Azer- 
baijan officially approved plans for such a line. But a series of 
obstacles remained to be overcome, including rival pipeline 
projects that would bypass Turkey, border disputes that would 
render key intervening areas dangerous, and even a degree of 
antagonism toward Turkey on the part of some neighboring 
states. The most immediate challenge was the effort to bring 
oil from Kazakhstan's Tengiz field to the Russian Black Sea port 
of Novorossiysk, which would mean an upsurge in tanker traffic 
not only in the Black Sea, but also in the Bosporus and Dar- 
danelles. Turkey has opposed this project vehemently but is 
constrained by international conventions that guarantee pas- 
sage between the Black and the Mediterranean seas. In some 
places, the straits are only 800 meters wide, and the Bosporus 
bisects Turkey's largest city, Istanbul. The threat to one of the 
nation's greatest attractions has turned Turkish officials into 
ardent environmentalists. 

Natural gas became important in the 1980s. Gas tapped in 
Thrace (Trakya, European Turkey) was piped to the Istanbul 
region and used to produce electricity, thereby reducing the 
need for energy imports from Bulgaria. In 1986 Turkey began 
construction of a pipeline to carry Soviet natural gas from the 
Bulgarian border to Ankara; the line was completed in the late 
1980s. In 1990 government officials announced that they also 
desired to purchase natural gas from Algeria, a move that 
would help balance Turkey's large purchases from the Soviet 
Union. 

Policy makers in the early 1970s had targeted lignite as the 
most abundant domestic source of hydrocarbons, and produc- 
tion grew rapidly from an average of about 7.9 million tons for 
the 1970-75 period to more than 31 million tons in 1985. 
Mines operated by the state-owned Turkish Lignite Company 
are responsible for about two-thirds of output; private firms 
produce the remainder. Production of hard coal is entirely 
controlled by the government-owned Turkish Coal Company, 
which suffers from poor management and outmoded technol- 
ogy. Coal production is also hampered by the great depth of 
the country's deposits. Hard coal output fell from around 6.5 
million tons in 1976 to about 3.8 million tons in 1983, and unit 
costs exceeded those of coal imports. As a result of these 



202 



The Economy 



trends, Turkey is beginning to import coal for use in power 
plants. In 1992 Turkey produced about 12 million tons of coal 
and imported a net of about 4.2 million tons. 

The Turkish Electricity Authority (Tiirkiye Elektrik 
Kurumu — TEK) is responsible for most electric power genera- 
tion and distribution. In Adana the Cukurova Electrical Com- 
pany produces some electricity privately. In Kepez, a city in 
Antalya Province, another private company produces electric- 
ity. Upgrading of the national distribution grid began in the 
1980s, and by 1985 about 70 percent of Turkey's villages were 
receiving electricity. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1984-89) called 
for the completion of village electrification by 1989; by the 
mid-1990s no village was without electricity. 

Demand for electricity has increased rapidly, in large part 
because of the growth of industry, which consumed more than 
56 percent of electricity in 1992. By 1985 thermal plants pro- 
duced 53 percent of total installed capacity; hydroelectric 
plants produced the remainder. During the early 1980s, short- 
ages of electricity had to be covered with imports from Bulgaria 
and the Soviet Union. In 1984 Turkey and the Soviet Union 
agreed to build a second transmission line that would allow 
future increases in Soviet electricity deliveries. Although in the 
1990s electricity imports meet less than 1 percent of Turkey's 
needs, the Turks want to be independent of supplies from 
unreliable neighbors. 

Sources for generating such electricity varied. By 1992 elec- 
tricity generated by coal accounted for 36 percent of total 
installed capacity, with hydroelectric plants accounting for 40 
percent. The rest was generated using petroleum products. 

Turkey's chronic energy shortages make development of 
hydroelectric power imperative. In 1994 the General Director- 
ate of State Hydraulic Works was building or planning to build 
about 300 hydroelectric plants. The centerpiece of Turkey's 
ambitious hydroelectric program, the Southeast Anatolia 
Project, which includes dams on the Tigris and Euphrates riv- 
ers, will increase Turkey's irrigable land about 25 percent and 
its electricity-generating capacity about 45 percent. As of early 
1987, the first two of the three large dams in the program (the 
Keban Dam and the Karakaya Dam, both on the Euphrates, 
northeast of Malatya) had been built, and the third, the 
Atatiirk Dam, was under construction, completed in 1994. The 
World Bank refused to help finance the construction of the 
Atatiirk Dam because Turkey had not reached an agreement 



203 



Turkey: A Country Study 



on sharing the water of the Euphrates River with Syria and 
Iraq; Turkey, however, arranged independent financing. 

Turkish officials had long discussed the possibility that 
nuclear power might help the country address its energy prob- 
lems. During the 1980s, the military government drew up a 
nuclear energy program and established the Nuclear Power 
Plants Division of the Turkish Electricity Authority to make fea- 
sibility studies and to build nuclear plants. Given Turkey's 
desire to diversify its energy sources, nuclear power was 
expected to remain on the agenda. By early 1995, however, no 
electricity had been generated from nuclear power. 

Although Turkey has made a good start at addressing its 
energy problems, some analysts feel that more attention needs 
to be paid to conservation and pricing policies to limit the 
growth of demand. Industry is the major consumer of energy, 
and industrial consumption is expected to grow rapidly if left 
unchecked. The most energy-intensive sectors of industry, such 
as iron and steel, food processing, textiles, mining and nonfer- 
rous metals, chemicals, cement, and bricks and ceramics, prob- 
ably could reduce demand significantly if required to do so. 
However, the government needs to audit major energy users to 
discover which could cut back consumption. In addition, a shift 
in relative energy prices to reflect long-run costs might induce 
industrial restructuring that would take Turkey's energy 
endowment into account. Moreover, energy policy makers 
need to improve management of firewood and agricultural 
wastes, which continue to play an important role in the rural 
energy economy. 

Mineral Resources 

Turkey's most important minerals are chromite, bauxite, 
and copper. The country also exploits deposits of other miner- 
als such as iron, manganese, lead, zinc, antimony, asbestos, 
pyrites, sulfur, mercury, and manganese. Mining contributed 
slightly under 2 percent of GDP in 1992, but the subsector pro- 
vides the raw material for such key manufacturing industries as 
iron and steel, aluminum, cement, and fertilizers. Turkey 
exports a variety of minerals, the most important of which are 
blister copper, chrome, and boron products. Minerals 
accounted for an average of about 2 percent of export earnings 
in the mid-1990s. The public sector dominates mining, 
accounting for about 75 percent of sales. Etibank, set up in 
1935 to develop Turkey's natural resources, manages most of 



204 



Market in Bodrum, in 
central Anatolia 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



Vendor of simit, the 
traditional bread, in 
Istanbul 

Courtesy Hermine Dreyfus s 



the state's mineral interests, particularly bauxite, boron miner- 
als, chromite, and copper. 

Private-sector mining enterprises are generally small, con- 
centrating on lead, zinc, and marble; some operate intermit- 
tently depending on market conditions. A 1978 law 
nationalized all private holdings, but it was only partially imple- 
mented before being invalidated by the Constitutional Court. 
In 1980 the government began to encourage foreign invest- 
ment, and in 1983 and 1985 mining laws were revised to pro- 
vide incentives for private investment. Etibank sought to 
encourage joint ventures with private firms in Turkey and for- 
eign investors. Although some partnerships were struck, mainly 
for copper production, foreign and private investors in 1995 
continued to hesitate to make major investments. 

Manufacturing 

Turkey's manufacturing industries are diverse and growing. 
Public-sector entities dominate manufacturing, accounting for 



205 



Turkey: A Country Study 

about 40 percent of value added. Private-sector firms are domi- 
nated by a number of large conglomerates that have diversified 
across several industries. 

The manufacture of textiles is Turkey's largest industry, very 
competitive in international markets, and the most important 
foreign-exchange earner. Domestic cotton and wool provide 
much of the raw material for the industry, but synthetics pro- 
duction has also expanded. The textile sector contributed 20 
percent of total manufacturing output and employed 33 per- 
cent of all workers in the mid-1990s. Textiles are produced by 
factories controlled by the country's largest SEE, Sumerbank, 
and a number of private firms. Installed capacity is equivalent 
to around 33 percent of that of the EU in terms of cotton spin- 
ning and around 11 percent of EU woolen yarn and textiles. In 
1994 Sumerbank was identified as a likely candidate for privati- 
zation. 

Textile exports grew rapidly after 1980, but protectionism in 
industrial countries, including the EC nations and the United 
States, threatened the sector's growth. Nonetheless, between 
1987 and 1992 textile export values expanded at an average 
annual rate of 19 percent. By 1992 textiles accounted for 35 
percent of total exports. Investment in increased capacity in 
the 1980s resulted in increased exports of finished products 
and ready-made garments. In 1990 the administration of Presi- 
dent George Bush increased the quota for United States textile 
imports from Turkey by 50 percent to compensate for Turkey's 
economic problems caused by sanctions on Iraq. 

Agroprocessing is one of the most dynamic branches of 
Turkish industry, supplying both domestic and export markets. 
Main product lines are sugar, flour, processed meat and milk, 
and fruits and vegetables. Processed food exports grew at an 
average rate of 8 percent per year between 1987 and 1992, 
accounting for 9 percent of total exports. 

SEEs are the most important producers of intermediate 
goods, although private firms are also active. The iron and steel 
sector has become more competitive in adjacent Middle East- 
ern markets, where Turkey's location is an advantage. However, 
competitiveness results largely from heavy subsidies to the state 
companies. Two-thirds of Turkey's steel is produced by three 
public-sector steel mills, which remain heavily subsidized. 
Twenty smaller private plants produce steel from arc furnace 
operations. Public plants include the old and outmoded mill at 
Karabuk, the Eregli works completed in 1965, and the plant at 



206 



Women crocheting lace 
edgings on head scarves, 
Goreme 

Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



Woman beating and 
washing wool near Lake Van 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



Iskenderun, which was built with Soviet aid and opened in 
1975. The overstaffed Iskenderun plant, although the largest 
and most modern, performs poorly. Private plants, often more 
profitable than state plants, tend to use scrap as a raw material 
and to export to neighboring countries. In December 1994, 
the government indicated that 51.7 percent of the Eregli Iron 
and Steel Works would be privatized in 1995. This company was 
cited as one of the most profitable in Turkey, especially after a 
US$1.5 billion upgrade designed to raise raw steel capacity by 
one-third, to about 3 million tons annually. 

Capacity use in the iron and steel sector increased rapidly in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Total output of crude iron grew 
from about 3.1 million tons in 1985 to about 4.5 million tons in 
1992. Steel ingot output rose from about 7 million tons in 1987 
to 10.3 million tons in 1992. The value of exports of iron and 
steel rose from US$34 million in 1980 to US$1.6 billion in 
1992. Such exports accounted for around 10 percent of total 
exports. 



207 



Turkey: A Country Study 

The demand for cement also increased in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s as a result of an upswing in domestic construction 
stimulated by infrastructure and housing projects. The cement 
industry consists of a large SEE, the Turkish Cement Corpora- 
tion, and a number of smaller companies. Until 1970 the coun- 
try imported most of its cement, but it has since become 
self-sufficient. Total output increased from 22.7 million tons in 
1987 to 28.5 million tons in 1992. Exports of cement, especially 
to the Middle East, grew rapidly in the early 1980s because of 
the construction boom in that region. 

The chemical industry, one of the country's largest in terms 
of value, is concentrated in a few large state enterprises, includ- 
ing the Petrochemical Corporation (Petrokimya Anonimsir- 
keti — Petkim) and Etibank, and some 600 private enterprises. 
Chemicals produced in Turkey include boron products, caustic 
soda, chlorine, industrial chemicals, and sodium phosphates. 
The high quality of the country's minerals gives it a compara- 
tive advantage in several products. Chemical exports increased 
during the second half of the 1980s but fell sharply in the early 
1990s, mainly because of increasing competition and lower 
prices elsewhere. In the late 1980s, petrochemical production, 
dominated by Petkim, started with a complex at Yarmica, near 
Kocaeli, followed by a second at Aliaga, near Izmir. The com- 
plex includes twelve plants, seven subplants, a thermal power 
station, and a water supply dam. These plants supply small 
private-sector plants, which in turn manufacture finished prod- 
ucts. The sector's goal is to make the country self-sufficient in 
petrochemicals rather than to export. In 1992 Turkey pro- 
duced about 144,000 tons of polyvinyl chloride, about 238,000 
tons of polyethylene, about 85,000 tons of benzine, and about 
32,000 tons of carbon black. 

Turkey's automobile industry, established in the mid-1960s, 
was gradually exposed to imports after 1980. Although the sec- 
tor recovered from low production levels after 1983, domestic 
producers remain weak. Industry observers believe that Tur- 
key's automobile makers are too numerous and too inefficient, 
but market prospects appear fairly favorable because of the low 
per capita ownership of cars. Car output rose from about 
55,000 units in 1985 to about 300,000 units in 1993. Including 
trucks, buses, and tractors, Turkey produced about 345,000 
units in 1992. Some 60,000 vehicles were imported in that year, 
a figure that should increase in the near future if Turkey gains 



208 



The Economy 



entrance into the European customs union. Turkish producers 
benefit from a 20 percent tariff on foreign imports. 

The Turkish automobile industry in 1995 consisted of three 
producers, each affiliated with a foreign manufacturer: Tofas, 
which assembles Fiat passenger cars; Oyak-Renault, which 
assembles Renaults; and General Motors, builder of Opel Vec- 
tras. Toyota in partnership with local conglomerate Sabanci 
Holding completed a plant in 1994 designed to produce 
100,000 cars per year, and a Hyundai factory that would pro- 
duce 100,000 units is scheduled to open in 1996. 

Construction 

Turkey has several relatively large, internationally com- 
petitive construction firms, some of which specialize in particu- 
lar types of projects such as dam or pipeline construction. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, domestic demand was 
relatively weak, but Turkish firms were quite successful at sell- 
ing their services abroad, especially in the oil-producing states 
of the Middle East. However, by the mid-1980s construction 
projects in the Middle East had slowed down because of falling 
oil prices. Fortunately, Turkey's major infrastructure program 
and housing projects saved contracting firms from financial 
ruin. For example, the establishment of the Mass Housing 
Fund in the 1980s offered opportunities to Turkish contrac- 
tors. A number of large infrastructure projects — particularly 
the GAP and the construction of state highways — provided 
enormous contracts for local builders. With the demise of the 
Soviet Union, Turkish contractors set their sights on Central 
Asia and Russia, with estimates of potential business in this 
region around US$700 million. The end of the Iran-Iraq War 
in 1988 also promised new opportunities for Turkish contrac- 
tors; however, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Per- 
sian Gulf War damaged such hopes. Contractors estimated 
their combined losses as a result of the crisis at US$800 million. 
Nonetheless, the external market accounted for a substantial 
portion of the industry's revenues. At the end of 1992, Turkish 
contractors had contracts worth US$20.6 billion; Libya 
accounted for US$10.3 billion, Saudi Arabia US$5.4 billion, 
and the republics of the former Soviet Union US$1 billion. 

Policy makers have made housing — perhaps the most defi- 
cient sector of the economy — a priority. The combination of 
rapid population growth and high rates of urbanization has 
overwhelmed available housing. In the mid-1980s, perhaps 



209 



Turkey: A Country Study 

more than half of the inhabitants of urban centers lived in 
shanties lacking sewers, water, and electricity. According to a 
tradition dating back to Ottoman rule, shelters built overnight 
had been tolerated by the authorities. These shanties, or 
gecekondus (see Glossary), had been a problem since the 1950s. 
In the early 1980s, the government took several steps to 
improve the housing situation. A law was passed transferring 
ownership of existing gecekondus to their inhabitants but declar- 
ing that any new structures would be destroyed. In addition, a 
housing fund, set up in 1984 and financed by a tax on tobacco, 
liquor, and luxury imports, offered financing for the construc- 
tion of up to 100,000 houses a year. Monies could be used to 
improve existing gecekondus or for new construction and could 
be lent to homeowners, cooperative associations, or contrac- 
tors. Analysts believed it unlikely that the fund would grow fast 
enough to eliminate the gecekondus, although it might stem 
their proliferation. 

Services 

After seventy years of development, the services sector has 
grown to account for more than half of the labor force but nev- 
ertheless remains relatively unproductive. In addition to tradi- 
tional enterprises, services include modern activities such as 
banking and engineering. The development of government 
services has been significant, but the state has paid little atten- 
tion to increasing the efficiency of private-sector service enter- 
prises. Services have traditionally produced only a small 
fraction of exports; however, after 1980 the government 
encouraged development of service earnings and allowed for- 
eign enterprises to enter previously protected markets such as 
those in finance. 

Banking and Finance 

The government, banks, and industry form a complex sys- 
tem through which legislation and government policies direct 
credit flows. Most state-owned banks were established to 
finance particular industries, whereas private banks generally 
have intimate connections with large industrial groups. The 
Central Bank of Turkey often provides credit to other banks at 
negative real interest rates. Banks, in turn, funnel credit to 
industries or groups they serve. The amounts available to par- 
ticular sectors of the economy thus depend largely on the 



210 



Man making brooms, 
Trabzon 

Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



Rug vendor displaying his 
wares, central Anatolia 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 




211 



Turkey: A Country Study 

resources available to the institutions for that sector, rather 
than on market assessments. 

The Central Bank set up a system of quarterly reporting in 
the mid-1980s, enabling timely warning of banks in difficulties. 
This reform was a start toward making banking more transpar- 
ent, but it is still difficult to assess the condition of the banks. 
Strong political pressures to keep weak industries and groups 
afloat during the adjustment period make it likely that several 
years will pass before standard accounting rules can be system- 
atically applied. Legislation introduced in 1993 sought to bring 
the Turkish banking sector into line with European standards 
on capital adequacy and other prudential ratios. However, in 
December 1993, the Constitutional Court blocked this legisla- 
tion because the executive had enacted it without approval of 
the legislature. No further action had occurred as of early 
1995. 

Despite some setbacks, the government's new policies have 
effected rapid changes in the financial sector. The banking sys- 
tem in early 1995 consisted of the Central Bank and fifty-eight 
banks, including twenty-one foreign banks, divided between 
Ankara, where most state-owned banks are located, and Istan- 
bul, the center for most privately owned banks. Turkey also had 
three state investment and development banks. The Develop- 
ment Bank is funded from the Treasury and invests in the pri- 
vate sector. The Export Credit Bank of Turkey (Turkiye Ihracat 
Kredi Bankasi) provides export finance. The Municipalities 
Bank (Iller Bankasi) supports local institutions. In 1995 nine 
merchant banks also operated in Turkey, six domestically 
owned and three foreign owned. 

The Central Bank, founded in the early 1930s, has the usual 
central bank responsibilities, such as issuing banknotes, pro- 
tecting the currency, and regulating the banking system and 
credit. The Central Bank also finances the government's bud- 
get deficits and makes loans to public and private banks. Start- 
ing in 1983, however, the Central Bank began to reduce 
lending and stepped up its supervisory functions. 

Six of Turkey's commercial banks are in the public sector, 
and twenty-one are partly or wholly foreign owned. Of the 
banking sector's assets, 46 percent are concentrated in four 
banks: the oldest and largest public bank, the Agricultural 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey (Turkiye Cumhuriyet Ziraat 
Bankasi — TCZB); the Real Estate Bank (Turkiye Emlak Ban- 
kasi As); and two private banks, Isbank and Akbank TAS. The 



212 



The Economy 



TCZB has many branches in rural areas, a strong deposit base, 
and favored access to state credits, which it uses partly for the 
agricultural commodity price-support program. After 1983 the 
TCZB was forced to take over other banks that had failed, a 
move that reduced earnings. 

Much as in Germany and Japan, the major private banks are 
closely linked to industrial groups. Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi, Pam- 
ukbank, and Interbank are owned by the Cukurova Group con- 
glomerate. Akbank, reputed to be the most profitable private 
bank in Turkey, is owned by the Sabanci Group. Partially pub- 
licly traded Kocbank is owned by the Koc Holding Company. 
Tiitunbank is owned by the Yasar Holding Corporation. 

Before 1980 there were only four foreign banks in Turkey, 
but their numbers grew rapidly during the 1980s as the govern- 
ment liberalized conditions. Several joint ventures were cre- 
ated in the 1980s, as well as two Islamic banks specializing in 
trade finance. 

Private banks remain the most vulnerable sector of the 
banking system because the public banks enjoy de facto state 
guarantees. During the 1980s, most private banks engaged in 
trade financing or in sales of state bonds because investment 
activity was depressed. The largest private banks maintained 
their ties to Turkey's major corporations despite a 1983 bank- 
ing law enacted to discourage such links. Although a few pri- 
vate banks were able to eliminate nonperforming loans, many 
remained vulnerable to their customers' difficulties. By 1986 
private-bank balance sheets began to improve, as several years 
of high-interest earnings made it possible for banks to write off 
bad loans. 

Although the government, public enterprises, and private 
undertakings increased their use of stocks and bonds after 
1970, capital markets remained underdeveloped in the 1970s. 
After the passing of the Capital Markets Law in 1982, a Capital 
Markets Board was established to issue regulations for institu- 
tions marketing bonds and other financial instruments. Most 
Turkish corporations were closely held and tended to finance 
expansion through their own funds from their small circles of 
stockholders. But in the 1980s, companies were allowed to 
issue profit-and-loss-sharing certificates with liability limited to 
the face value of the certificate. The Ozal administration also 
took steps to revive Istanbul's stock market, which had closed 
down in the late 1970s. The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) 
reopened in December 1985. With the rise of "emerging mar- 



213 



Turkey: A Country Study 

ket" funds, trading on the ISE expanded rapidly in the early 
1990s; indeed, it was the best performing of any market in 
1993. Foreign investment accounted for 25 percent of the daily 
trading volume. In early 1994, however, the stock market 
crashed in the wake of the currency and balance of payments 
crisis. Plans for privatization of SEEs were expected to revive 
the stock market, if foreign investment and confidence in the 
government's attempts to stabilize the macroeconomic situa- 
tion increased. 

Government securities are quite liquid in secondary mar- 
kets; this has been true especially since the Treasury began issu- 
ing T-bills in 1986 and an interbank market was established in 
1987. Government T-bill issues jumped in the early 1990s as the 
budget deficit exploded. In 1986 the public snapped up 
revenue-sharing certificates used to finance the Keban hydro- 
electric project on the Euphrates; the Oymapinar Dam, also on 
the Euphrates south of Malatya; and a second bridge across the 
Bosporus. Such certificates were popular, in part because they 
conformed to Islamic strictures prohibiting interest. Low 
returns discouraged the government from using such certifi- 
cates in the 1990s. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Under the Ottomans, foreign companies constructed the 
portion of the Berlin-to-Baghdad railroad that crossed Turkey, 
as well as a few other lines used mostly for mining development 
and the export of agricultural products. Ataturk and the 
nationalists took an active interest in the development of the 
railroad system for strategic reasons, setting up the Turkish 
Republic State Railways (Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Demir- 
yollari Isletmesi Genel Mudurlugu — TCDD) in 1920. The 
nationalists set two priorities for railroad development: extend- 
ing lines to major areas, such as eastern Anatolia and the new 
capital at Ankara, and buying out foreign railroad interests. 
The TCDD invested large sums during its first two decades, 
bringing all railroads under state control by 1948 and increas- 
ing track lengths from 4,018 kilometers in 1923 to 7,324 kilo- 
meters in 1950. By 1950 the rail system linked the major areas 
and accounted for about three-quarters of surface freight traf- 
fic. 

After 1950 the railroads received only small investments and 
insufficient maintenance because of increasing emphasis on 
road transport. By the 1970s, the tracks and rolling stock were 



214 



The Economy 



in poor condition and the TCDD was running chronic deficits, 
partly because of its low rate structure. In the 1970s, as mining 
expanded to support the metalworking and fuel industries, the 
railroads received additional funds to expand and upgrade ser- 
vice. 

Between 1985 and 1992, the rail network grew modestly, 
from 8,193 kilometers of track to 8,430 kilometers. Almost all 
rail was single-tracked and nonelectrified. Although rail lines 
linked most important cities, there were few cross connections 
between lines, and routes were often circuitous. Passengers 
preferred other means of transport because the railroads were 
slow and unsafe; in 1982 there were 210 train collisions and 737 
derailments. As a result of increased use of trucks, the railroads 
carried only one-quarter of surface freight, mostly long-haul 
bulk commodities. 

After World War II, transportation development concen- 
trated on the road system. As a result, by early 1995 Turkey had 
nearly 59,770 kilometers of all-weather highways, of which 
about 27,000 kilometers were paved. There were also some 
308,000 kilometers of gravel and earth roads in rural areas. 
The government planned to build 3,000 additional kilometers 
by the year 2000 and to upgrade existing roads. 

The Ozal administration in the early 1980s began a major 
project that was expected to result in highways that would 
traverse the country, making it possible for Turkey to handle 
increased levels of freight between Europe and the Middle 
East. This project, along with the second bridge across the 
Bosporus, would form a 3,600-kilometer link in a 
10,000-kilometer trans-European highway going from Gdansk 
on the Baltic Sea to cities on the Caspian Sea and the Persian 
Gulf. 

Several road and highway improvements were underway in 
the mid-1990s. The four-lane highway linking Ankara, Istanbul, 
and Edirne is complete except for a thirty-kilometer stretch 
under construction west of Bolu (see fig. 11). Another four- 
lane highway in the southeast, designed to link Gaziantep with 
Mersin via Adana, lacks about eighty kilometers west of 
Gaziantep. Another offshoot of this highway that would con- 
nect with Iskenderun via Dortyol is under construction. Other 
highways in the planning stage include improved links between 
Iskenderun and Antalya, Ankara and Adana, and Istanbul and 
Izmir. Additional highways are needed because traffic is 
extremely dense around major cities in western Anatolia, creat- 



215 



Turkey: A Country Study 




The Economy 



ing frequent traffic jams and contributing to a high accident 
rate. 

Truck transport of surface freight increased from about 25 
percent of the total of such freight in 1950 to more than 75 
percent by the mid-1980s. According to one source, in 1984 
trucks carried about 40 percent of exports by tonnage. As the 
oil boom hit the Persian Gulf states and imports clogged their 
ports during the mid-1970s, heavy truck traffic passed through 
Turkey. By 1985, however, transit traffic had fallen off some- 
what as a result of the fall in demand from oil-exporting coun- 
tries and a cutback on purchases by Iran and Iraq. The end of 
the Iran-Iraq War modestly helped revive transit traffic, which 
was disrupted again by the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
the resulting UN embargo. In the mid-1990s, goods moved by 
truck accounted for 27 percent of total export tonnage. 

Shipping is much less important than land transport, but 
capacity expanded rapidly in the early 1990s. The Ozal admin- 
istration encouraged the growth of Turkey's merchant marine 
by granting tax rebates to companies registering their ships 
under the Turkish flag. As a result, the fleet grew from about 
1.7 million gross registered tons (GRT) in 1975 to about 2.5 
million GRT in 1983. In 1990 the merchant marine's 2,996 
cargo ships had a combined capacity of about 3.8 million GRT. 
A large number of these ships were owned by the Maritime 
Bank (Denizcilik Bankasi) and Deniz Nakliyati, a large private 
company. In the 1980s and early 1990s, private cargo lines 
expanded rapidly. Aside from the ferry across Lake Van, inter- 
nal shipping is insignificant because few of Turkey's rivers are 
navigable. 

Five ports handle the bulk of the country's sea freight. Istan- 
bul is the most important port, followed by Mersin, Izmir, Isk- 
enderun, and Kocaeli. There are also many small ports along 
the country's extensive coastline; coastal shipping is substan- 
tial, particularly of such bulk commodities as coal and iron ore. 
Cargo handling is slow and storage limited, however. The main 
oil terminals near Iskenderun handle both domestic and Iraqi 
crude. In 1992 ships brought 60 million tons of cargo to Tur- 
key; 26 million tons were exported by sea. 

Turkey has 105 usable airports, sixty-nine of which have 
paved runways. Turkish Airlines (Turk Hava Yollari — THY), 
plagued by a poor safety record in the 1970s, fought its way 
back to profitability during the 1980s, although heavy capital 
expenditures in the 1990s put it back in the red. By 1995 it was 



217 



Turkey: A Country Study 

a prime candidate for partial privatization, which was expected 
to net the government US$300 million. By 1985 Turkish Air- 
lines was serving thirty-six international and sixteen domestic 
destinations with a fleet that had been recently augmented by 
the purchase of several Airbus Industrie A-310 passenger air- 
craft. Much of the company's international business involves 
serving the many Turks who work in Europe and the Middle 
East. Domestic flights are popular because surface travel 
between major cities is time consuming; THYs domestic ser- 
vices probably will be further upgraded. In 1992 the total num- 
ber of passengers carried to, from, or within Turkey on all 
airlines landing in Turkey reached about 13.8 million (about 
2.8 million domestic and 11 million international); the domes- 
tic carrier transported about 2.4 million passengers within Tur- 
key and about 1.7 million international passengers. Private 
airlines entered the market in the 1980s; Istanbul Airlines and 
Green Air handle both domestic and foreign routes. 

Turkey's archaic telecommunications system, which had 
long been overloaded, received expanded domestic and inter- 
national lines in the 1980s and early 1990s. Until the 1980s, 
more than half of Turkey's villages lacked telephone connec- 
tions, and customers had to wait years to get telephones 
installed. In the early 1980s, authorities designed a program to 
eliminate the waiting list for telephones; make service available 
to all of the country's settlements; and install countrywide auto- 
matic dialing, a new telex system, and a connection with the 
European telecommunications satellite. The number of tele- 
phones increased from about 351,000 in 1966 to an estimated 
7.96 million by the end of 1991. 

The Turkish Radio-Television Corporation (Turkiye Radyo- 
Televizyon Kurumu — TRT) has flagship radio stations in 
Ankara and Istanbul, with subsidiary networks in fifteen other 
urban centers. Frequency modulation (FM) transmitters are 
located in ten cities, including Ankara and Istanbul. In addi- 
tion to Turkish, broadcasts are made in Albanian, Arabic, Azer- 
baijani, Bulgarian, Chinese, English, French, German, Greek, 
Hungarian, Persian, Romanian, Serbo-Croatian, and Urdu. 
Turkish television has two main channels that reach more than 
forty population centers. The Istanbul area has three addi- 
tional channels. In early 1995, the Turkish population had 
some 8.8 million radios and some 10.53 million television sets. 



218 



The Economy 



Tourism 

Turkey's long and varied sea coast, high mountains and 
lakes, and its many historical, religious, and archaeological sites 
(possibly including more Greek ruins than survive in Greece) 
give the country unrivaled tourist potential. Until the 1980s, 
Turkish tourism lagged far behind its counterparts in other 
Mediterranean countries, and visitors tended to stay for shorter 
periods of time and spend less money than in countries such as 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The Ozal government's promo- 
tion of tourism in the 1980s led to dramatic change. The num- 
ber of visitors grew rapidly during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
and Turkey was able to appeal to tourists from many different 
countries. Including business travelers, Turkey hosted about 
1.3 million visitors in 1983 and 2.1 million in 1984, whereas 
Greece during the same period received at least 6 million and 
Spain 40 million visitors annually. By 1987 visits to Turkey had 
increased to about 2.9 million, and by 1992 close to 7 million. 

In the ear \f\ 980s, most tourists came from European coun- 
tries, especially Greece and West Germany, but the number of 
Middle Eastern tourists also increased. Even in the late 1980s, 
however, European tourists accounted for nearly 61 percent of 
total arrivals. By 1992 the European proportion had fallen to 
45 percent.The largest increase was registered in tourists from 
the republics of the former Soviet Union. By 1992 they 
accounted for 43 percent of tourists, whereas the Middle East- 
ern share had shrunk from 11 percent to 8 percent. 

Regional origin is a good predictor of the type of tourism 
and destination. Middle-class Turks, who started to take vaca- 
tions in the early 1980s, usually prefer the beach resorts on the 
Aegean and Mediterranean seas. Tourists from Western 
Europe, Israel, and the United States tend to visit beaches and 
historical sites. East European tourists, particularly from the 
former Soviet Union, typically come to Istanbul or Black Sea 
towns to shop or barter goods. Tourists from Iran and other 
Middle Eastern countries generally take longer holidays in 
Istanbul and Bursa, also coming to shop in Turkey. 

Although tourism earnings reached US$770 million in 1985 
and jumped to US$3.6 billion by 1992, the industry has been 
plagued by political, economic, and environmental problems. 
The fallout from the nuclear power plant disaster at Chernobyl 
in the Soviet Union, terrorist attacks by Kurdish insurgents, 
and economic problems in Europe and the Middle East have 
tended to discourage tourism. Turkey has attempted to over- 



219 



Turkey: A Country Study 

come these impediments by improving domestic services. The 
number of beds for visitors rose from about 49,000 in 1980 to 
about 206,000 in 1992, for example. The total will probably 
reach 600,000 by the end of the 1990s. One important effort, 
the South Antalya Project, involves transforming a 
seventy-four-kilometer stretch of Mediterranean beaches into a 
base for resort villages. Istanbul, the main tourist center, still 
lacks sufficient beds, however, and there is a tendency to 
concentrate on luxury hotels that are too expensive for 
middle-class tourists. Nevertheless, the mid-1990s saw a notice- 
able improvement in the average spending per day by tourists: 
US$141 compared with the world average of US$70-US$100. 
Shopping tours helped raise the average significantly. 

Foreign Economic Relations 
Foreign Trade 

Trade played a minor role in the economy until 1980 but 
grew rapidly thereafter, the sum of exports and imports reach- 
ing about 49 percent of GNP by 1985. By 1994 this total had 
fallen somewhat, to 42 percent of GNP. The trend toward 
increased trade had begun in the 1970s as imports increased — 
primarily as a result of the rise in oil prices — and limited incen- 
tives for exports were implemented. The turning point came 
after 1980, when a realistic exchange rate, strict monetary pol- 
icy, and efforts to strengthen bilateral cooperation with the 
country's trading partners led to sharply increased exports. 
Improvements in the balance of trade, in turn, allowed gradual 
liberalization of the import regime. 

Turkey's trade policy traditionally has been subordinate to 
the country's etatist development strategy. The demand for 
imports historically has exceeded the country's supply of for- 
eign currency, forcing the government to set up extensive con- 
trols to mobilize foreign exchange for products deemed 
essential for investment or production. As Turkish industry 
developed, the proportion of finished goods declined as a 
share of imports. Despite liberalization of import regulations 
after 1980, in the mid-1990s petroleum, machinery, and indus- 
trial raw materials continued to account for the bulk of Turkish 
imports. 

Turkey's export performance since 1980 has been particu- 
larly striking. Traditionally, Turkey has exported agricultural 
products and minerals. As of 1980, total merchandise exports 



220 




221 



Turkey: A Country Study 

amounted to about US$2.9 billion, or 5 percent of GNP, of 
which 58 percent was agricultural products, 22 percent pro- 
cessed agricultural products and textiles, and 6.5 percent min- 
eral products. By 1992, when exports reached 17 percent of 
GNP, the share of processed and manufactured products had 
risen to 82 percent, whereas the share of agricultural exports 
had declined to 15.0 percent and that of minerals to 1.7 per- 
cent (see table 9, Appendix A). The shift in the structure of 
exports resulted largely from the trend toward domestic pro- 
cessing of agricultural products before exportation, which 
caused them to be reclassified as industrial exports. Textile 
exports also increased during the 1980s, becoming twice as 
important as agricultural exports by 1992. Observers had 
expected that limitations on textile imports implemented by 
industrialized countries would hamper growth in textile 
exports during the late 1980s, but special concessions by the 
United States in 1990 — related to compensation for Turkey's 
effort in the Persian Gulf crisis — helped open export markets 
even further. Industrial diversification has enabled Turkey to 
export a wide range of products, including rubber, plastics, 
petroleum products, glass, ceramics, and cement. 

Turkey's trade is largely with Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) members, particularly 
the European countries, notwithstanding a sharp upswing in 
trade with Middle Eastern oil-producing countries in the early 
1980s. Exports to the EG increased from 35 percent of total 
exports in 1950 to almost 45 percent in 1992, while imports 
from the EC grew from 33 percent to about 40 percent during 
the same period. Turkey's most important trading partner, Ger- 
many, accounted for 15 percent of imports and 24 percent of 
exports in 1993. Trade with Middle Eastern countries 
increased considerably after 1970, partly as a result of Turkey's 
increased expenditures for petroleum imports, and peaked in 
1982 at 45 percent of total trade, declining to about 15 percent 
by the early 1990s. Turkey's commerce with Iran and Iraq was 
important because they bought food and other products and 
provided petroleum to Turkey in exchange (see table 10, 
Appendix A). Turkey remained neutral in the Iran-Iraq War, 
hoping for further improvement in trade when the two coun- 
tries made peace. The embargo on Iraq after its invasion of 
Kuwait dramatically reduced Turkish-Iraqi trade. In 1988 Tur- 
key sent 8.8 percent of its exports to Iraq and bought 10 per- 



222 



The Economy 



cent of its imports from that country. Trade between the two 
countries was almost nonexistent in 1994. 

Trade with the United States was much greater in the 1950s 
and 1960s than in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1992 imports from 
the United States constituted a little over 11 percent of Tur- 
key's total imports, but exports to the United States repre- 
sented only 6 percent of Turkey's exports (see table 11, 
Appendix A). Although trade with the Soviet Union began in 
the 1930s and the Soviet Union supplied much aid, in 1992 
imports from the former Soviet Union constituted less than 1 
percent of Turkey's imports, while exports were about 5 per- 
cent of the total. Historically, trade with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe had increased to more than 10 percent of total 
trade during periods, such as the late 1970s, when Turkey expe- 
rienced balance of payments difficulties. 

After 1980 Turkey shifted its emphasis in trade policy from 
strictly limiting imports to actively encouraging exports. In 
March 1985, Turkey signed the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), which committed the country to abolish- 
ing most export subsidies over a three-year period. In January 
1993, in accordance with its commitments under the GATT 
agreement, Turkey consolidated and reduced most import 
charges. 

Turkey and the EC entered into an association agreement 
on December 1, 1964, with the aim of full membership for Tur- 
key after the implementation of a customs union, which the 
Turkish government hoped would occur in 1995. Turkey's 
record in meeting the European body's tariff-reduction sched- 
ule has undergone several permutations. It was adhered to 
until 1976, when it was abandoned, only to be reinstituted in 
December 1987. Several Turkish industries — in particular the 
automobile industry — fear total integration, whereas the EU in 
the mid-1990s fears the competitive strength of the Turkish tex- 
tile industry. 

Balance of Payments 

Throughout the twentieth century, Turkey has suffered 
from a shortage of foreign exchange, a problem that has con- 
tinued despite the improved export performance of the 1980s 
and the early 1990s. During the 1950-80 period, three balance 
of payments crises followed periods of rapid economic growth. 
After the crisis of the late 1950s, brought on by inflationary 
financial policies and excessive use of short-term commercial 



223 



Turkey: A Country Study 

credits, Turkey received substantial aid from an OECD consor- 
tium, and the country's external debt had to be rescheduled. 
The foreign-exchange shortage of the 1960s was less the result 
of inflation than of increased demand for imports. The 1970 
devaluation, along with increased workers' remittances during 
the early 1970s, sufficed to overcome the problem. Turkey's 
improved balance of payments status during the first half of the 
1970s allowed the government to resort to foreign borrowing 
to finance rapid economic growth. However, the 1970 devalua- 
tion, government deficits, and the 1973 oil price increase wors- 
ened inflation. After 1976 Turkey tried several reform 
packages, none of which effectively addressed the underlying 
causes of the deficits. In 1979 Turkey's creditors had to 
reschedule some US$14 billion in debt in an arrangement that 
delayed repayments of principal for five years. 

The policy package introduced after 1980 enabled growth 
to resume, largely by improving the balance of trade. Exports 
grew at an annual average rate of more than 20 percent from 
1980 to 1985, much more rapidly than imports, reducing the 
trade deficit from more than US$4.6 billion in 1980 to an aver- 
age of slightly less than US$3 billion a year from 1983 to 1985. 
Nevertheless, Turkey's merchandise trade balance remained in 
deficit because of continued high levels of imports. 

In 1993-94, Turkey experienced its fourth major balance of 
payments crisis in the past forty years, despite a decade of 
reforms and structural adjustment. An expansionist fiscal and 
monetary policy had led to a sharp deterioration in the trade 
balance in 1993 as imports soared to US$29 billion, while 
exports lagged sharply behind at US$15.6 billion (see table 12, 
Appendix A). A draconian adjustment program accompanied 
by an IMF standby agreement helped sharply reduce imports in 
1994, but the trade deficit remained around US$4 billion and 
was projected at about the same level for 1995. 

Economic reforms had strengthened the services account of 
the balance of payments in the 1980s, although this increase 
was insufficient to offset the periodic deterioration of the trade 
account in the 1990s. Meanwhile, remittances from Turkish 
workers abroad remained an important source of foreign 
exchange. Remittances averaged roughly US$2 billion annually 
from 1980 to 1985 but fell during that period from a peak of 
almost US$2.5 billion in 1981 to US$1.7 billion in 1985. In the 
late 1980s, they once again recovered, reaching a level of US$3 
billion during the first half of the 1990s. The flow of remit- 



224 



The Economy 



tances through legal channels is very sensitive to the real 
exchange rate and to foreign-exchange regulations. 

Tourism was a relatively small source of services income 
until 1985 when earnings jumped to US$770 million, reaching 
around US$4 billion in 1994 as investments in this sector paid 
off. Interest payments on Turkey's foreign debt, which aver- 
aged about US$1.5 billion from 1980 to 1985, grew to US$3.2 
billion in 1990 and were US$3.6 billion in 1994. They 
remained a major burden on the services account. 

Turkey's deficit on the current account declined from 
US$3.4 billion in 1980 to about US$1 billion in 1985 as a result 
of the decline in the trade deficit and the increased surplus on 
the services account. Despite fluctuations mid-decade, by the 
end of the 1980s the current- account deficit was sharply 
reduced, although 1990 saw the deficit at US$2.6 billion as a 
result of high oil prices and loss of income stemming from the 
Persian Gulf War. Aid payments and certain policy measures 
led to a small surplus in 1991, but a lax fiscal and monetary pol- 
icy by 1993 pushed the deficit to its highest level at US$6.4 bil- 
lion. The policy measures enacted in coordination with the 
IMF helped the current account register a surplus of US$3 bil- 
lion in 1994. 

Turkey's capital account suffered from the heavy foreign- 
debt payments that came due in increasing amounts after 1985. 
Heavy borrowing in the late 1980s and early 1990s pushed prin- 
cipal payments up to US$4.4 billion in 1993, US$5.9 billion in 
1994, and a projected US$7.7 billion in 1995. As a percent of 
exports of goods and services, Turkey's debt-service ratio rose 
to 33 percent in 1994, close to crisis levels. 

Domestic savings were insufficient for the country's develop- 
ment plans, making continued foreign borrowing necessary. 
Direct foreign investment averaged only US$70 million from 
1980 to 1985, as foreign investors hesitated to put money into 
the country. The growth of emerging market funds in the 
developed countries, combined with Turkey's economic- and 
financial-sector reforms, had led to a sharp increase in foreign 
direct and portfolio investment in the 1990s. In 1994 such 
investments were estimated at US$300 million. However, the 
country's 1994 balance of payments crisis was expected to 
dampen near-term enthusiasm for Turkish stocks and bonds. 

Turkey's short-term debt increased in the mid- and late 
1980s as the country scrambled to meet debt payments. In 1985 
Turkey broke off negotiations with the IMF concerning a 



225 



Turkey: A Country Study 

standby agreement and turned to commercial banks for 
short-term loans. In 1986 alone, Turkey's outstanding 
short-term debt increased by more than 40 percent to at least 
US$9.4 billion. As a result, short-term debt amounted to about 
33 percent of total foreign debt, a development that sparked 
concerns abroad. By early 1987, it was reported that some for- 
eign banks were limiting long-term loans to Turkey pending 
the outcome of the 1987 local elections. A similar situation 
transpired in 1993 in the run-up to the 1994 local elections. 
Short-term debt jumped from US$9.5 billion in 1990 to 
US$12.7 billion in 1992 and US$18.5 billion in 1993. The aus- 
terity measures enacted by the government and a surplus on 
the current account helped reduce the short-term debt to 
US$12.6 billion by the end of 1994, when long-term debt was 
US$52.8 billion. A little more than half of this amount was 
owed to private-sector creditors, which was a sign of the success 
of the economic reforms of the 1980s. Nonetheless, bilateral 
and multilateral creditors accounted for nearly US$18 billion. 
The relative shares of private and public creditors were 
expected to change during the mid-1990s as Turkey was 
obliged to borrow more from international agencies to stabi- 
lize its balance of payments. 

Regional Economic Integration 

After 1980 Turkey's need for foreign markets led the coun- 
try to try to strengthen cooperation with trading partners 
worldwide. Trade ties with the Middle East received particular 
attention under Ozal, but Turkish businesspeople also worked 
to improve trade with countries in North America, East Asia, 
and Eastern Europe. In the protectionist climate of the mid- 
and late 1980s, policy makers also took up proposals for 
regional integration with the economies of Turkey's West Euro- 
pean and Middle Eastern neighbors. 

For many years, Turkish policy makers and politicians had 
expressed interest in closer multilateral cooperation with other 
Islamic countries, especially with oil-producing Middle Eastern 
states. Starting in the late 1970s, Turkey's increased attention to 
Middle Eastern markets boosted exports of manufactured 
goods and construction services, attracted tourists from Middle 
Eastern countries, and provided additional sources of foreign 
direct investment and commercial financing. During the early 
1980s, exports to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia grew rap- 
idly but then declined again after 1982 as oil revenues fell. In 



226 




Fatih Bridge over the Bosporus in Istanbul 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfus s 



the mid-1980s, Turkey served as a conduit for West European 
exports to Iran under a countertrade arrangement according 
to which Turkey received oil and other commodities in 
exchange for manufactures. Trade with Iraq was reduced after 
the latter announced in late 1985 that it could not make more 
than US$1.2 billion in payments, thereby forcing credit from 
Turkey. Although the Turks remained open to discussions of 
an "Islamic common market," disappointment with Middle 
Eastern markets in the mid-1980s refocused their attention on 
upgrading economic ties with Western Europe. 

During the early 1970s, both European countries and Tur- 
key adhered to the terms of a 1973 protocol for reducing trade 
barriers. The EC began granting preferential treatment to 
most Turkish agricultural imports, and Turkey was given a 
period of twenty-two years to align its agricultural policies with 
the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (see Glossary). In 1977, 



227 



Turkey: A Country Study 

however, Turkey stopped reducing tariffs on EC goods because 
of the deterioration of the domestic economy. By the late 
1970s, relations had deteriorated between Turkey and the EC. 
The EC imposed quotas and other restrictions on certain Turk- 
ish imports, including cotton yarn and T-shirts; in retaliation, 
Turkey applied levies on imports of European iron and steel. 
In 1980 the military coup froze relations between Turkey and 
the EC, although the EC continued to apply the commercial 
provisions of the association agreement. After 1981 the EC sus- 
pended financial assistance in the amount of 600 million Euro- 
pean Currency Units (see Glossary) because of reservations 
concerning human rights violations under Turkey's military 
government. 

After Turkey's return to civilian government in 1983, politi- 
cal relations between Turkey and the EC countries began to 
improve, and in September 1986 the EC-Turkey Association 
Council held its first meeting since the 1980 coup. In early 
1987, West European diplomats seemed to be united in urging 
Turkey to pursue the advantages offered by the association 
agreement, including the provision for a customs union by 
1995, before making an application for membership. In April 
1987, the Ozal government overrode both Turkish hesitation 
and European misgivings and made a formal application for 
EC membership. The European Commission issued an official 
opinion on the Turkish application in December 1989, which 
was later adopted unchanged by the community's Council of 
Ministers. In this opinion, the commission proposed that nego- 
tiations should not begin until 1993. Negotiations thereafter 
led the EU to vote for Turkey's inclusion in the free-trade area 
in 1995. 

Some observers have postulated that the EU will never 
admit Turkey. In addition to criticizing Turkey's human rights 
policies, they cite three main reasons. First, the level of indus- 
trialization in Turkey lags behind that of the European econo- 
mies. Second, the degree of budgetary transfers from the EU 
necessary to lift Turkey to the levels of even the poorest Euro- 
pean countries would place a huge burden on Europe's 
resources. Third, given that entry into the union permits labor 
mobility, Turkey's economic structure, relatively high unem- 
ployment, and low wages particularly discourage Europeans at 
a time when violence in Europe against foreigners has 
increased dramatically, mainly as a result of high levels of job- 
lessness there. 



228 



The Economy 



Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey has shown a keen 
interest in developing strong economic ties with the states of 
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea region. In 1990 
Turkey and the other states — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine — 
surrounding the Black Sea initiated the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) project to broaden and deepen coopera- 
tion and trade relations among themselves, nonmember states, 
and other regional structures. Despite obstacles, on June 24, 
1992, a basic structure, including concrete plans for integra- 
tion, was articulated. The most ambitious aspect of the BSEC is 
an attempt to create a free-trade area to promote easy move- 
ment of capital, labor, and goods. The wide range of generally 
complementary economies in the BSEC area is seen as a factor 
encouraging integration. Nonetheless, one important differ- 
ence among the economies — particularly between the Turkish 
economy and those of the republics of the former Soviet 
Union — is that many of them are only in the early stages of 
transition from statist structures. Some observers consider this 
an impediment to smooth integration. Another major project 
of the BSEC is the creation of a development bank to finance 
projects in the region. Some observers, however, have noted 
that in a capital-poor area the ability of such an institution to 
mobilize sufficient funds from within the region must be 
doubted. 

Outlook 

Regionally, Turkey faces a host of potential political and 
security threats, largely as a consequence of the end of the 
Cold War and conflicts in the Middle East, which have forced 
the government to devote extensive resources to the military. 
Also, Turkey's attempts to forge regional cooperation arrange- 
ments and exploit economic opportunities have been largely 
stillborn. Strong nationalist sentiment at home, combined with 
a poor human rights record, also contributes to an uncertain 
domestic economic future. The Kurdish insurgency has taken 
its toll on government resources and foreign confidence. Tur- 
key's long-standing attempt to integrate its economy into that 
of Europe has been jeopardized by the opposition of European 
governments to Turkey's incursion into Iraq in late 1994 and its 
repression of its Kurdish population. 

Despite setbacks, the steady liberalization of the economy 
and integration into the world economy begun by former Pres- 



229 



Turkey: A Country Study 

ident Ozal has continued without interruption. Turkey's trade 
sector accounts for a growing proportion of GDP, and foreign 
funds are a major source of investment. Despite crises in mid- 
1994 such as the devaluation of the currency, the stock market 
crash, and a number of bank failures, Turkey has been desig- 
nated a major emerging market by the main international 
financial centers. And because a large proportion of foreign 
investments has gone into industrialization, most observers 
have expressed confidence in the economy and the govern- 
ment's ability to steer it carefully toward the objective of mak- 
ing Turkey a major regional and international industrial power. 

* * * 

The OECD's annual economic survey, Turkey, is an authori- 
tative and readily available summary of the Turkish economy 
that includes up-to-date statistical tables. The International 
Energy Agency's Energy Statistics and Balances ofOECD Countries 
provides energy sector data on Turkey. Economic data on Tur- 
key can also be found in the publications of the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. 

The Turkish weekly journal Briefing provides insightful, 
lively, and independent analysis of the Turkish economy. 
Among non-Turkish journals, regular economic and political 
coverage can be found in the Financial Times, Middle East Eco- 
nomic Digest, and the Economist Intelligence Unit's annual 
Country Profile: Turkey. The Middle East Journal and Middle East 
Report offer in-depth articles on Turkey. Three excellent books 
on Turkey that include discussion of the economic and politi- 
cal consequences of structural adjustment are Ziya Onis and 
James Riedel's Economic Crises and Long-Term Growth in Turkey, 
F.T. Nas and Mehmet Odekon's Liberalization and the Turkish 
Economy, and The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of 
Turkey by Atila Eralp et al. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



230 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Double-headed eagle, symbol of the ancient Seljuk Turks 



TURKEYS POLITICAL SWEM faced four distinct but inter- 
twined challenges in early 1995: accommodating the disaf- 
fected Kurdish ethnic minority; reconciling the growing 
differences, expressed with increasing stridency, between the 
secular elite and groups using traditional Islamic symbols to 
manifest their opposition to the political status quo; establish- 
ing firm civilian control over the military, which had a long his- 
tory of intervening in the political process; and strengthening 
weak democratic practices and institutions. Turkey displays the 
trappings of a Western-style democratic government: a legisla- 
ture whose deputies are elected by secret ballot, multiple and 
competitive political parties, and relatively free news media. 
However, Turkey also is a country where, on three occasions 
since 1960, military coups have overthrown elected civilian gov- 
ernments. The most recent military government, which seized 
power in September 1980, governed for three years. During 
the period of military rule, strict limits were imposed on per- 
sonal and political rights and liberties. Political parties were 
banned, and prominent civilian politicians were barred from 
participating in political activity for up to ten years. The mili- 
tary justified its intervention on the premise that it was return- 
ing the country to the principles of Kemal Atatiirk (see Ataturk 
and the Turkish Nation, ch. 1). 

The supervised restoration of civilian rule began in Novem- 
ber 1983 with National Assembly elections for which every can- 
didate needed to obtain military approval. A civilian 
government with Turgut Ozal as prime minister was formed 
after Ozal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi — ANAP) won a 
majority of the seats in the new assembly. Ozal worked with the 
president, General Kenan Evren, a leader of the 1980 coup, to 
reestablish the primacy of civilian authority. By November 
1987, martial law decrees had been repealed in most of Turkey 
except Istanbul and the predominantly Kurdish provinces of 
the southeast, and the military refrained from interfering in 
the selection of candidates for National Assembly and local 
elections. 

The strengthening of democratic practices, however, was 
hindered by a lack of consensus within the political elite on the 
issue of granting cultural freedom and local government 
autonomy to the country's Kurdish minority. The Kurdish ques- 



233 



Turkey: A Country Study 



tion began to reemerge in 1984 after the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan — PKK) initiated armed strug- 
gle against the state by attacking rural police posts in southeast- 
ern Turkey. The military's inability to suppress the militant 
PKK, combined with the international media attention gener- 
ated in 1988 by the arrival of tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish 
refugees fleeing chemical weapons attacks by their own govern- 
ment, made the Kurdish situation a leading topic of public dis- 
course. Ozal, whom the National Assembly elected president in 
1989, became the first prominent politician to acknowledge 
openly that the Kurds were not merely "mountain Turks" but a 
separate ethnic group whose culture merited respect. Kurdish 
politicians opposed to the violent tactics and separatist ideol- 
ogy of the PKK responded by participating actively in the Social 
Democratic Party (Sosyal Demokrat Parti — Sodep) and the 
Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci 
Parti — SHP). Following the October 1991 National Assembly 
elections, a group of SHP-aligned Kurdish deputies, who previ- 
ously had formed the People's Labor Party (Halkin Emek Par- 
tisi — HEP) to promote the full equality of Kurds and Turks 
within Turkey, organized themselves as a separate parliamen- 
tary party. However, many Turkish leaders were unable to dis- 
tinguish between a separate Kurdish political party and a 
Kurdish separatist movement, and they campaigned to have 
the HEP banned and its members arrested, even though HEP 
deputies enjoyed parliamentary immunity. In a severe blow to 
democratic procedures, seven Kurdish deputies were arrested 
in March 1994; they were sentenced to long prison terms in 
December after being convicted of "crimes against the state." 

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the intensification of 
the PKK insurgency in southeastern Turkey tended to enhance 
the status of the military as the guardian of the country's terri- 
torial integrity and security. Consequently, Turkish politicians 
tended to treat the armed forces cautiously, apparently as part 
of a strategy to dissuade senior officers from initiating yet 
another coup. Civilian wariness was evident in the govern- 
ment's acquiescence to a number of extrajudicial measures 
that violated basic due process rights, for example, military 
censorship of news coverage of operations against the Kurdish 
guerrillas. In 1993 and 1994, scores of Turkish journalists 
whose reportage was perceived by the military as endangering 
state security were detained for trials in special military courts. 
The military also forcibly deported more than 150,000 Kurds 



234 



Government and Politics 



from some 850 villages in the southeast. Most of the evicted vil- 
lagers subsequently resettled in the cities of western Turkey, 
where as many as one-half of the country's Kurdish minority 
was estimated to be residing in 1994. The presence of so many 
Kurds in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and other large cities has con- 
tributed to a transformation of the Kurdish situation from a 
regional problem to a national one, whose characteristics 
include increasing ethnic polarization between Kurds and 
Turks. 

Another cause of polarization is the ideological competi- 
tion between Turkey's elite, which is imbued with the secular 
philosophy of Ataturk, and a new generation of grassroots lead- 
ers, influenced by Islamic ideas. Islamic political activists began 
organizing in 1983, after the government authorized the for- 
mation of political parties, and subsequently founded the Wel- 
fare Party (Refah Partisi — RP; also seen as Prosperity Party). Its 
candidates competed in both national and local elections, cam- 
paigning in middle- and lower-class urban neighborhoods with 
a consistent message. They blamed the country's economic and 
political problems on the alleged indifference of secular lead- 
ers to Muslim values. The Welfare Party steadily increased its 
share of the popular vote, and won more than sixty seats out of 
a total of 450 in the 1991 National Assembly elections. In 
nationwide local elections held in March 1994, Welfare Party 
candidates won 19 percent of the total vote, placing the party 
third behind the ruling True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi — 
DYP) of President Svileyman Demirel and Prime Minister 
Tansu (filler and the main opposition Motherland Party. The 
Welfare Party's electoral successes included winning the 
mayor's office in Ankara, Istanbul, and twenty-seven other 
major cities, as well as in 400 smaller municipalities, including 
almost all the towns in the Kurdish provinces of the southeast. 

In early 1995, Turkey was still in the process of trying to 
redefine its regional foreign policy in the wake of the two 
major international developments on its borders during 1991: 
the Persian Gulf War fought by the United States-led interna- 
tional coalition against Iraq and the unexpected collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Turkey's de facto participation in the Persian 
Gulf War — Ankara permitted United States aircraft to use a 
Turkish air base for bombing missions over Iraq — helped to 
strengthen ties with the United States, a fellow member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary). 
However, the aftermath of that same war — hundreds of thou- 



235 



Turkey: A Country Study 

sands of Iraqi Kurds trying to flee into Turkey following the 
collapse of their uprising against the Iraqi government — was 
one of the factors that contributed to the intensification of the 
Kurdish problem within Turkey. The military efforts to sup- 
press the PKK and the political efforts to silence Kurdish politi- 
cal leaders prompted international human rights organizations 
to accuse the Turkish government of systematic human rights 
violations. These charges complicated relations with the Euro- 
pean Union (EU — see Glossary), an economic organization 
that Turkey aspired to join as a full member, because several 
EU countries opposed Turkish membership on grounds that 
the country's practice of democracy fell short of EU standards. 
In addition, Turkey and its neighbor Greece, an EU state and a 
member of NATO, had failed to resolve their dispute over the 
status of Cyprus and their conflicting offshore claims in the 
Aegean Sea. 

The consequences of the Soviet Union's dissolution poten- 
tially are more promising for Turkish diplomacy than the con- 
sequences of the Persian Gulf War. The fifteen countries that 
replaced the Soviet Union include five Asian states whose peo- 
ples speak Turkic languages. Ozal and his successor as presi- 
dent, Demirel, promoted Turkey as a political and economic 
model for these Turkic-speaking countries. In keeping with this 
role, they sought to expand Turkey's influence through numer- 
ous bilateral agreements pertaining to cultural and economic 
relations. However, the long-term success of Turkey's efforts is 
not assured because both Iran and Russia are trying to extend 
or maintain their respective influence in Azerbaijan and Cen- 
tral Asia. Initially, Turkish leaders seemed to welcome the pros- 
pect of competition with Iran for influence in the region, and 
they confidently asserted the superiority of their secular state 
over Iran's Islamic model. By the end of 1993, however, Tur- 
key — perhaps out of concern about Russian intentions — began 
to stress the need to work with Iran through multilateral 
regional arrangements such as the Economic Cooperation 
Organization. 

The Constitutional System 

The government of Turkey functions in accordance with 
the constitution of 1982, which was drafted and adopted dur- 
ing the period of military rule following the September 1980 
coup. The National Security Council (NSC — see Glossary), 
composed of the commanders of the army, navy, air force, and 



236 



Government and Politics 



gendarmerie, and headed by the president, established a Con- 
sultative Assembly in June 1981 to draft a new constitution. 
This assembly consisted of 160 members, forty of whom were 
appointed directly by the NSC and the remaining 120 selected 
from a list of about 10,000 names compiled with the aid of pro- 
vincial governors. In July 1982, a fifteen-member constitutional 
committee of the Consultative Assembly produced a draft that 
subsequently was amended by the Consultative Assembly and 
the NSC. The constitution was submitted to a public referen- 
dum on November 7 and approved by 91.4 percent of the vot- 
ers; 91.3 percent of the registered electorate cast ballots. A 
factor in this high turnout was Provisional Article 16 of the con- 
stitution, which stipulated that registered voters who failed to 
vote would lose their electoral rights for five years. 

The 1982 constitution replaced the constitution of 1961, 
which also had been drafted following a military coup (see The 
Armed Forces Group and Interim Rule, 1960-61, ch. 1). Under 
the 1961 constitution, an elaborate system of checks and bal- 
ances had limited the authority of the government; the powers 
of the president were curtailed, and individual rights and liber- 
ties were given greater emphasis. In contrast, the 1982 constitu- 
tion expands the authority of the president and circumscribes 
the exercise of individual and associational rights. The 1982 
constitution also limits the role and influence of political par- 
ties, which are governed by more detailed and restrictive regu- 
lations than under the 1961 document. For example, political 
parties are required to obtain a minimum percentage of the 
total vote cast before any candidates on their lists can qualify 
for seats in the National Assembly. The 1982 constitution also 
provides for the enactment of electoral laws to regulate the for- 
mation of parties and the rules for their participation in elec- 
tions. 

Provisions of the 1982 Constitution 

Article 2 of the 1982 constitution stipulates that the Repub- 
lic of Turkey is a "democratic, secular, and social state governed 
by the rule of law," respecting human rights and loyal to the 
political philosophy of Kemal Atatiirk. Article 5 vests sover- 
eignty in the nation, stipulating that it is not to be delegated to 
"any individual, group, or class." The fundamental objective 
and duty of the state is defined as safeguarding the indepen- 
dence and integrity of the democratic Turkish nation and 
ensuring "the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual 



237 



Turkey: A Country Study 

and society." The constitution divides the powers of the state 
among the three branches of government. The legislative 
branch consists of a unicameral parliament, the National 
Assembly, composed of 400 members (later increased by 
amendment to 450) elected to five-year terms. The executive 
branch consists of the president, who is elected to a seven-year 
term by the National Assembly, and a prime minister, who is 
appointed by the president from among National Assembly 
deputies. The prime minister heads the Council of Ministers, 
members of which are nominated by the prime minister and 
appointed by the president. The judicial branch is indepen- 
dent of the legislature and the executive. 

Like its predecessor, the 1982 constitution includes a 
detailed bill of rights covering the social, economic, and politi- 
cal rights and liberties of citizens. According to Article 5, all 
individuals are equal before the law and possess "inherent fun- 
damental rights and freedoms which are inviolable and inalien- 
able." However, articles 10 through 15 authorize the 
government to restrict individual rights in the interest of safe- 
guarding the "integrity of the state" and "the public interest." 
The government may impose further limitations on individual 
rights "in times of war, martial law, or state of emergency." 

Articles 28 and 67 of the 1982 constitution stipulate that the 
individual is entitled to privacy and to freedom of thought and 
communication, travel, and association; that the physical integ- 
rity of the individual must not be violated; that torture and 
forced labor are prohibited; that all persons have access to the 
courts and are assumed innocent until proven guilty; that all 
Turkish citizens over twenty years of age have the right to vote 
in elections and to take part in referenda; and that the news 
media are free and not liable to censorship, except by a court 
order when national security or the "indivisible integrity of the 
state" are threatened. According to articles 35, 44, and 46, all 
citizens have the right to own and inherit property. The state is 
obligated to provide land to landless farmers or to farmers with 
insufficient land, and, if the public interest so requires, the 
state may expropriate private property, provided that compen- 
sation is paid in advance. 

Articles 49 through 54 of the 1982 constitution pertain to 
labor. The constitution stipulates that it is the right and duty of 
all people of working age to work and that all have the freedom 
to work in the field of their choice. The state is given responsi- 
bility to take necessary measures to raise the standard of living 



238 



Government and Politics 



of workers, to protect them, and to create suitable economic 
conditions for the prevention of unemployment. Workers have 
the right to rest and leisure; minors, women, and people with 
disabilities are to be provided special protection at work. Work- 
ers and employers are free to form labor unions and employ- 
ers' associations without prior permission, but no one may be 
compelled to join a union or association. Workers are allowed 
to bargain collectively and to strike, but not in a manner "detri- 
mental to society." General and politically motivated strikes are 
prohibited. 

According to Article 42, primary education is compulsory 
and free in public schools. Only Turkish may be taught as the 
primary language, and all schools must follow the principles 
and reforms of Atatiirk. Education is to be based on "contem- 
porary science and education methods" and is provided under 
the supervision and control of the state. The state provides 
scholarships and other means of assistance "to enable students 
of merit lacking financial means to continue their education." 

Article 24 guarantees freedom of religion, provided that the 
exercise of this right does not threaten the "indivisible integrity 
of the state." No one may be compelled to worship or to partic- 
ipate in religious ceremonies or rites. Primary and secondary 
schools are required to provide religious instruction under 
state supervision and control. Secularism, a primary principle 
of Ataturk's reforms, is reaffirmed in the provision forbidding 
"even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, polit- 
ical, and legal order of the state on religious tenets." 

Articles 68 and 69 of the 1982 constitution stipulate that cit- 
izens may form or join political parties without prior permis- 
sion from the government. However, political parties must act 
according to the principles of the constitution and may be dis- 
solved by the Constitutional Court if that body determines that 
their activities "conflict with the indivisible integrity of the 
state." Political parties may not have ties with any association, 
union, or professional organization. Judges, teachers at institu- 
tions of higher education, students, civil servants, and mem- 
bers of the armed forces may not join political parties. 

Other articles of the constitution obligate citizens to pay 
taxes and to render national service in the armed forces or 
elsewhere in the public sector, grant them the right to petition 
competent authorities and the National Assembly for redress of 
complaints, and stipulate that the constitutionality of all laws 
and decrees is subject to review by the Constitutional Court. To 



239 



Turkey: A Country Study 

amend the constitution, at least one-third of the members of 
the National Assembly first must propose an amendment. The 
actual proposal then must win the votes of a two-thirds majority 
of all members of the assembly. If the amendment is vetoed by 
the president, the votes of a three-quarters majority of the 
members are required to override the veto. 

The 1982 constitution also included a set of provisional arti- 
cles, the first of which stipulated that the chair of the NSC and 
head of state would become president of the republic for seven 
years following approval of the constitution in a referendum. 
Another provisional article stipulated that the NSC would be 
transformed into an advisory Presidential Council after the for- 
mation of a civilian government following elections for the 
National Assembly. This Presidential Council would function 
for a period of six years and then be dissolved. Yet another pro- 
visional article made permanent a 1981 NSC decree that 
barred more than 200 politicians from joining new political 
parties or becoming candidates for a period of ten years. Some 
of the provisional articles were later rescinded. 

Once the 1982 constitution had been approved but before it 
was implemented, the NSC in April 1983 issued a Political Par- 
ties Law (Law No. 2820) that placed further restrictions on 
political activities. This law, which was intended to regulate the 
formation of political parties in advance of the November 1983 
National Assembly elections, stipulates that political organiza- 
tions cannot be based on class, religion, race, or language dis- 
tinctions. To qualify for registration, a political party is 
required to have at least thirty founders, each of whom must be 
approved by the minister of interior. New political parties are 
prohibited from claiming to be continuations of any parties in 
existence before 1980. The law also requires each party to 
establish organizations in at least half the country's provinces 
and in one-third of the districts within those provinces. Politi- 
cal parties are prohibited from criticizing the military interven- 
tion of September 1980 or the actions or decisions of the NSC. 
The Political Parties Law empowers the NSC and its successor, 
the Presidential Council, to investigate all party members and 
candidates for office and to declare any unsuitable. 

Electoral System 

The 1982 constitution stipulates that elections are to be 
held on the basis of free universal suffrage with direct, equal, 
and secret balloting. Ballots are to be sorted and counted pub- 



240 



Government and Politics 



licly under the supervision of judicial authorities. The 
Supreme Electoral Council, composed of eleven judges elected 
by the Court of Appeals (also known as the Court of Cassation) 
and the Council of State from among their own members, has 
jurisdiction over all electoral proceedings. The Supreme Elec- 
toral Council is empowered to rule in cases of complaints con- 
cerning the validity of elections and may declare a particular 
election invalid. The executive and legislative branches of the 
government are prohibited from exercising any control over 
the electoral process. 

Prior to the first elections under the new constitution, the 
NSC issued the Electoral Law of June 1983 (Law No. 2839), 
which stipulates that only parties obtaining 10 percent or more 
of the total national vote can be represented in the National 
Assembly. Law No. 2839 maintains the system of proportional 
representation on a provincial basis, but subdivides the more 
populous provinces for electoral purposes so that no single 
constituency can elect more than seven deputies. Each prov- 
ince automatically is assigned at least one seat, regardless of 
population. These measures work to the advantage of the 
larger parties and the rural provinces. 

Government 

Following the military coup of September 1980, Turkey was 
ruled by the NSC, a five-member collective body representing 
all branches of the armed forces. The NSC scheduled the first 
elections under the 1982 constitution for November 1983. The 
new National Assembly convened soon after the elections, and 
subsequently a civilian government consisting of a prime minis- 
ter and a Council of Ministers was formed. In late 1983 and 
early 1984, the NSC turned over its executive and legislative 
functions to these new institutions. 

National Assembly 

The 1982 constitution vests the power to enact legislation in 
the unicameral National Assembly (Millet Meclis). The first 
National Assembly, consisting of 400 deputies, was elected in 
November 1983 to a five-year term. The new Motherland Party 
headed by Turgut Ozal won a majority of seats (211) and 
formed Turkey's first civilian government since the 1980 coup. 
In 1987 Ozal convinced the National Assembly to adjourn itself 
one year short of its five-year mandate and hold new elections, 



241 



Turkey: A Country Study 

a procedure that is permitted under the constitution. Prior to 
these elections, the assembly approved two constitutional 
amendments that affected its future structure and composi- 
tion. One amendment expanded the assembly from 400 to 450 
seats. A second amendment repealed the provisional article of 
the constitution that had banned more than 200 political lead- 
ers from all political activity for a ten-year period ending in 
1991. This article had permitted the military to retain a degree 
of control over the electoral process, both at the national and 
local levels. Its repeal enabled Turkey's best-known politicians, 
including Suleyman Demirel and Biilent Ecevit, to participate 
openly in the electoral process. Consequently the National 
Assembly elections held in November 1987 constituted the first 
genuinely free balloting in the country since the 1980 coup. 

Ozal's party won a majority (292 of 450 seats) in the 1987 
assembly elections, and he continued to head the government 
until 1989, when he was elected president. In 1991 the 
National Assembly again voted to schedule elections one year 
early. However, as a result of the October balloting, the Mother- 
land Party won only 24 percent of the vote, coming in second 
behind Demirel's True Path Party, which obtained 27 percent 
of the vote. Because none of the political parties had won a 
clear majority, Demirel obtained the agreement of the Social 
Democratic Populist Party to form a coalition government. The 
next National Assembly elections are due to be held in October 
1996. 

Although the constitution stipulates that by-elections to fill 
vacant seats may be held once between general elections — 
unless the number of vacancies reaches 5 percent of the total 
assembly membership — the National Assembly has not sched- 
uled such elections on a regular basis. The assembly holds a 
convocation following elections, but does not open its annual 
legislative term until the first day of September. By law, it can- 
not be in recess for more than three months in a year. Article 
93 of the constitution empowers the president during an 
assembly adjournment to summon the deputies for an extraor- 
dinary session, either on his or her own initiative or at the writ- 
ten request of one-fifth of the members. 

The National Assembly's powers include exclusive authority 
to enact, amend, and repeal laws. It also can pass legislation 
over the veto of the president. The assembly supervises the 
Council of Ministers and authorizes it to issue government 
decrees. The assembly is responsible for debating and approv- 



242 



Government and Politics 



ing the government's budget and making decisions pertaining 
to the printing of currency. In addition, the assembly approves 
the president's ratification of international treaties and has 
authority to declare war. The constitution stipulates that the 
assembly can request that the executive respond to written 
questions, investigations, and interpellations, and can vote the 
Council of Ministers out of office. 

According to Article 76 of the constitution, every Turkish 
citizen over the age of thirty is eligible to be a National Assem- 
bly deputy, provided that he or she has completed primary edu- 
cation and has not been convicted of a serious crime or been 
involved in "ideological and anarchistic activities." In addition, 
men are required to have performed their compulsory military 
service. Members of higher judicial and education institutions 
as well as civil servants and members of the armed forces must 
resign from office before standing for election. Article 80 of 
the constitution stipulates that deputies represent the whole 
nation, not just their own constituencies. 

Articles 83 and 84 of the constitution grant deputies parlia- 
mentary immunities, such as freedom of speech and, with 
some qualifications, freedom from arrest. These freedoms were 
put to a severe test in March 1994, when the National Assembly 
voted to strip the parliamentary immunities of seven deputies 
who had spoken out within the assembly on behalf of civil 
rights for the country's Kurdish minority. The seven deputies 
were arrested at the door of the National Assembly building in 
Ankara and charged with making speeches that constituted 
"crimes against the state." 

Articles 83 and 84 also provide for a deputy to be deprived 
of membership in the National Assembly by vote of an absolute 
majority of its members. Furthermore, a deputy who resigns 
from his or her political party after an election may not be 
nominated as a candidate in the next election by any party in 
existence at the time of that resignation. 

As was also the case before the 1980 coup, deputies in the 
National Assembly in early 1995 typically were fairly young, 
well-educated members of the elite, with as many as two-thirds 
having college degrees. However, since 1983 there has been a 
shift in occupational representation away from a predomi- 
nance of government officials. In the three assemblies elected 
starting in 1983, a large percentage of deputies were lawyers, 
engineers, businesspeople, and economists (see The Changing 
National Elite, ch. 2). 



243 



Turkey: A Country Study 

President, Council of Ministers, and Prime Minister 

The 1982 constitution vests executive authority in the presi- 
dent, who is the designated head of state. The president 
ensures implementation of the constitution and the orderly 
functioning of the government (see fig. 12). The president 
serves a seven-year term and cannot be reelected. Under a pro- 
visional article of the constitution, General Evren, who was 
chair of the NSC, automatically assumed the presidency when 
the constitution took effect at the end of 1982. Article 102 of 
the constitution provides the procedures for electing subse- 
quent presidents, who must be chosen by the National Assem- 
bly from among its members. A deputy nominated for the 
presidency must obtain a two-thirds majority vote of the assem- 
bly. If a two-thirds majority cannot be obtained on the first two 
ballots, a third ballot is held, requiring only an absolute major- 
ity of votes. If a presidential candidate fails to obtain a majority 
on the third ballot, a fourth and final ballot is held, the choice 
being between the two candidates who received the greatest 
number of votes on the third ballot. If this procedure fails to 
produce a winner, new assembly general elections must be held 
immediately. 

When Evren's seven-year term ended in November 1989, 
the assembly failed to produce a two-thirds vote for any candi- 
date on the first two ballots. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal won a 
majority on the third ballot and became Turkey's second presi- 
dent under the 1982 constitution. Ozal died of a heart attack in 
April 1993 before completing his term in office. In the subse- 
quent assembly vote for a new president, no candidate won a 
two-thirds majority on the first two ballots. Suleyman Demirel, 
who had become prime minister in November 1991, garnered 
the simple majority required for the third ballot and became 
the country's third president since the 1980 coup. 

A candidate for president must have completed secondary 
education and must be at least forty years old. Articles 101 and 
102 of the constitution provide that a presidential candidate 
can be nominated from outside the membership of the 
National Assembly if the candidate meets the stipulated qualifi- 
cations and if the nomination is presented to the assembly in 
the form of a written resolution that has the endorsement of at 
least one-fifth of the deputies. In accordance with the require- 
ment that the president-elect terminate relations with his or 
her political party, both Ozal and Demirel resigned as heads of 



244 



Government and Politics 



their respective parties following their election to the presi- 
dency. 

The 1982 constitution gives the president a stronger and 
more extensive role than did the 1961 constitution, under 
which the presidency was a largely ceremonial office. The pres- 
ident is empowered to summon meetings of the National 
Assembly, promulgate laws, and ratify international treaties. 
The president also may veto legislation passed by the National 
Assembly, submit constitutional amendments proposed by the 
assembly to popular referenda, and challenge the constitution- 
ality of assembly laws and cabinet decrees. The president's 
responsibilities include appointing the prime minister, conven- 
ing and presiding over meetings of the Council of Ministers, 
and calling for new elections to the National Assembly. The 
president also is authorized to dispatch the Turkish armed 
forces for domestic or foreign military missions and to declare 
martial law 

The constitution also provides the president with appointive 
powers that he or she may exercise independently of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers. For example, the president is empowered to 
appoint the members of the Constitutional Court, one-quarter 
of the members of the Council of State, all diplomatic repre- 
sentatives, the chief of the General Staff, members of the 
Supreme Military Administrative Court, the Supreme Council 
of Judges and Public Prosecutors, the State Supervisory Coun- 
cil, the Council of Higher Education, and all university presi- 
dents. 

The president may be impeached for high treason at the 
recommendation of one-third of the members of the National 
Assembly and removed from office by the vote of a three-quar- 
ters majority. Otherwise, Article 105 of the constitution stipu- 
lates that "no appeal shall be made to any legal authority, 
including the Constitutional Court, against the decisions and 
orders signed by the president of the Republic on his own ini- 
tiative." The constitution also provides for the establishment of 
a State Supervisory Council to conduct investigations and 
inspections of public organizations at the president's request. 

The president presides over the National Security Council, a 
body that contains civilian as well as military members. It 
should not be confused with the former NSC, an all-military 
body, which ruled the country following thel980 coup and sub- 
sequently became the advisory Presidential Council. The 
present National Security Council is composed of the prime 



245 



Turkey: A Country Study 








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246 



Government and Politics 



minister, the chief of the General Staff, the ministers of 
national defense, interior, and foreign affairs, and the com- 
manders of the branches of the armed forces and the gen- 
darmerie. This body sets national security policy and 
coordinates all activities related to mobilization and defense. 
An advisory Presidential Council, composed of the armed 
forces commanders who had joined Evren in the 1980 military 
coup and the military government that lasted until 1983, con- 
tinued to advise the president until 1989. At that time, in accor- 
dance with the provisional articles appended to the 1982 
constitution, the Presidential Council was dissolved (see Politi- 
cal Developments since the 1980 Coup, this ch.). 

The Council of Ministers, or cabinet, is headed by the prime 
minister, who is appointed by the president from among the 
elected deputies of the National Assembly. In practice, the 
president asks the head of the party with the largest number of 
deputies to form a government. The prime minister then nom- 
inates ministers for appointment by the president. Within one 
week of being selected, each new cabinet must be presented to 
the full assembly for a vote of confidence; a simple majority is 
required. If at any time during the Council of Ministers' tenure 
an absolute majority of the assembly should support a motion 
of no confidence, the ministers must resign. In the event that 
no party obtains a majority in National Assembly elections, a 
coalition of parties is allowed up to six weeks to form a govern- 
ment. If no new cabinet can be formed within forty-five days, 
the president may dissolve the assembly and call for new elec- 
tions. 

The prime minister supervises the implementation of gov- 
ernment policy. Members of the Council of Ministers have joint 
and equal responsibility for the implementation of this policy. 
In addition, each minister is responsible for the conduct of 
affairs under his or her jurisdiction and for the actions of sub- 
ordinates. In early 1995, the prime minister was Tansu Ciller, 
the first woman to hold this office. Her cabinet consists of a 
deputy prime minister and the following ministers: agriculture 
and rural affairs, communications and transport, culture, edu- 
cation, energy and natural resources, environment, finance, 
foreign affairs, forestry, health, industry and trade, interior, jus- 
tice, labor, national defense, public works and housing, and 
tourism, (filler's Council of Ministers also includes a number of 
ministers of state with cabinet rank. 



247 



Turkey: A Country Study 

In the area of national defense, the Council of Ministers is 
responsible to the assembly for national security and for the 
readiness of the armed forces. However, the president nor- 
mally serves as commander in chief of the armed forces. With 
the president as chair, the cabinet is empowered to declare 
martial law or a state of emergency and to issue decrees without 
restriction during such periods. 

The 1982 constitution strengthens the role of the Council of 
Ministers vis-a-vis the National Assembly by empowering the 
cabinet to issue regulations pertaining to the implementation 
of laws. However, the cabinet also is weakened in terms of its 
relationship to the president. The constitution grants the presi- 
dent the right to dismiss any minister upon the suggestion of 
the prime minister. In effect, individual ministers are subject to 
removal at the discretion of either the president or the prime 
minister. 

Judiciary 

Since legal reforms instituted in 1926, Turkey's judicial sys- 
tem has been based on the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal 
Code, and the Neuchatel (Swiss) Code of Civil Procedure. The 
1982 constitution guarantees judicial independence and pro- 
hibits any government agency or individual from interfering 
with the operations of the courts and judges. Members of the 
National Assembly also are not allowed to discuss or make state- 
ments concerning pending court cases. Although trials nor- 
mally are held in open court, the constitution provides that 
they can be closed "for reasons of public morality or public 
security." 

Headed by the minister of justice, the High Council of 
Judges and Public Prosecutors is the principal body charged 
with responsibility for ensuring judicial integrity. This council 
acts on matters pertaining to the careers of judges, including 
appointments, promotions, transfers, and supervision. The 
high council is empowered to remove judges and abolish 
courts and the offices of judges and public prosecutors. How- 
ever, judges themselves are protected against arbitrary removal 
from office by a constitutional provision stipulating that they 
cannot be dismissed without due cause or retired involuntarily 
before age sixty-five. 

In early 1995, Turkey's legal system consisted of three types 
of courts: judicial, military, and administrative. Each system 
includes courts of first instance and appellate courts. In addi- 



248 



Government and Politics 



tion, a Court of Jurisdictional Disputes rules on cases that can- 
not be classified readily as falling within the purview of one 
court system. 

The judicial courts form the largest part of the system; they 
handle most civil and criminal cases involving ordinary citi- 
zens. The two supreme courts within the judicial system are the 
Constitutional Court and the Court of Appeals. 

The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of 
laws and decrees at the request of the president or of one-fifth 
of the members of the National Assembly. Its decisions on the 
constitutionality of legislation and government decrees are 
final. The eleven members of the Constitutional Court are 
appointed by the president from among candidates nominated 
by lower courts and the High Council of Judges and Public 
Prosecutors. Challenges to the constitutionality of a law must 
be made within sixty days of its promulgation. Decisions of the 
Constitutional Court require the votes of an absolute majority 
of all its members, with the exception of decisions to annul a 
constitutional amendment, which require a two-thirds majority. 

The Court of Appeals (also known as the Court of Cassa- 
tion) is the court of last instance for review of decisions and 
verdicts of lower-level judicial courts, both civil and criminal. 
Its members are elected by secret ballot by senior judges and 
public prosecutors. Below the Court of Appeals are the ordi- 
nary civil and criminal courts. At the lowest level of the judicial 
system are justices of the peace, who have jurisdiction over 
minor civil complaints and offenses. Single-judge criminal 
courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanors and petty crimes, 
with penalties ranging from small fines to brief prison sen- 
tences. Every organized municipality (a community having a 
minimum population of 2,000) has at least one single-judge 
court, with the actual number of courts varying according to 
the total population. Three-judge courts of first instance have 
jurisdiction over major civil suits and serious crimes. Either of 
the parties in civil cases and defendants convicted in criminal 
cases can request that the Court of Appeals review the lower- 
court decision. The Turkish courts have no jury system; judges 
render decisions after establishing the facts in each case based 
on evidence presented by lawyers and prosecutors. 

The administrative court system consists of the Council of 
State, an appellate court, and various administrative courts of 
first instance. The Council of State reviews decisions of the 
lower administrative courts, considers original administrative 



249 



Turkey: A Country Study 

disputes, and, if requested, gives its opinion on draft legislation 
submitted by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. 
The president appoints 25 percent of the Council of State's 
judges. The other 75 percent are appointed by the High Coun- 
cil of Judges and Public Prosecutors. 

The military court system exercises jurisdiction over all mili- 
tary personnel. In areas under martial law, the military also has 
jurisdiction over all civilians accused of terrorism or "crimes 
against the state." The military court system consists of military 
and security courts of first instance, a Supreme Military Admin- 
istrative Court, an appellate State Security Court, and the Mili- 
tary Court of Appeals, which reviews decisions and verdicts of 
the military courts. The decisions of the Military Court of 
Appeals are final. 

Provincial and Local Government 

The 1982 constitution retains Turkey's centralized adminis- 
trative system. Each province is administered by a governor 
{vagi) appointed by the Council of Ministers with the approval 
of the president. The governors function as the principal 
agents of the central government and report to the Ministry of 
Interior. The constitution grants governors extraordinary pow- 
ers during a state of emergency, powers similar to those of mili- 
tary authorities in areas under martial law. The constitution 
also stipulates that the central administration oversee elected 
local councils in order to ensure the effective provision of local 
services and to safeguard the public interest. The minister of 
interior is empowered to remove from office local administra- 
tors who are being investigated or prosecuted for offenses 
related to their duties. 

In early 1995, Turkey was divided into seventy-six provinces 
(vilayetlar) . Each province was further subdivided into an aver- 
age of about eight districts, or kazalar, each roughly equivalent 
in size to a county in a United States state. Each district was seg- 
mented into an average of 493 subdistricts, or bucaklar. Each 
provincial capital, each district seat, and each town of more 
than 2,000 people is organized as a municipality headed by an 
elected mayor. Government at the provincial level is responsi- 
ble for implementing national programs for health and social 
assistance, public works, culture and education, agriculture 
and animal husbandry, and economic and commercial matters. 

As chief executive of the province and principal agent of the 
central government, each governor supervises other govern- 



250 



Government and Politics 



merit officials assigned to carry out ministerial functions in his 
or her province. Civil servants head offices of the national gov- 
ernment that deal with education, finance, health, and agricul- 
ture at the provincial level. In each province, these directors 
form the provincial administrative council (vilayet genel meclisi), 
which, with the governor as chair, makes key administrative 
decisions and, when necessary, initiates disciplinary actions 
against errant provincial employees. 

The governor also heads the provincial assembly and several 
service departments concerned mainly with local trade and 
industrial matters. The provincial assembly, which advises and 
works closely with the provincial administrative council, is 
elected every five years and, with the governor chairing, meets 
annually to approve the provincial budget and to select one 
person from each district to serve on the province's administra- 
tive commission. With the governor presiding, the administra- 
tive commission meets weekly for mutual consultation. 
Provincial budgets derive their income from rents, payments 
for services, fines, state aid, and a 1 percent share of national 
tax revenues. In most provinces, provincial funds are spent pri- 
marily on agricultural and reforestation programs, irrigation, 
and schools. 

Each district in a province has its own administration based 
in the district seat. The district administration consists of a dis- 
trict chief (kaymakam) , central government representatives, 
and a district administrative board. The more than 500 district 
chiefs are appointed by the president upon nomination by the 
minister of interior. Each district chief is responsible to the gov- 
ernor, serving essentially as his or her agent in supervising and 
inspecting the activities of government officials in the district. 
The district in which a provincial capital is located may not 
have a district chief but instead be headed directly by the gover- 
nor. Each subdistrict director (bucak mudur) is appointed by the 
minister of interior on the nomination of the governors. The 
subdistrict directors, who number about 40,000, are responsi- 
ble for law enforcement in the villages. They are assisted by 
officials in charge of rural security; land titles; vital statistics; 
schools; and postal, telephone, and telegraph services. 

Municipal governments exist in each provincial and district 
capital, as well as in all communities with at least 2,000 inhabit- 
ants. Municipal governments are responsible for implementing 
national programs for health and social assistance, public 
works, education, and transportation. Each municipality 



251 



Turkey: A Country Study 



(belediye) is headed by a mayor (belediye reisi), who is elected by 
the citizens to a five-year term and is assisted by deputy direc- 
tors of departments and offices. Municipal councils, also 
elected for five years, vary in size according to each town's pop- 
ulation. Municipal councils meet three times a year to decide 
on such issues as the budget, housing plans, reconstruction 
programs, tax rates, and fees for municipal services. A variety 
of municipal standing committees, appointed by the mayor 
and municipal department directors or selected by municipal 
council members from among themselves, deal with financial 
issues and decide on the appointment and promotion of 
municipal personnel. 

The smallest unit of local government in Turkey is the vil- 
lage (kdy derneg), a locality with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. 
The principal authority in a village, the headman (muhtar), is 
chosen by an assembly of all the village's adults. This informal 
assembly also makes decisions pertaining to village affairs and 
elects a council of elders (ihtiyar meclisi) that includes the vil- 
lage schoolteacher and the imam (see Glossary). The headman 
supervises the planning and operation of communal projects 
and services and administers directives from higher authori- 
ties. The headman receives government officials, maintains 
order, collects taxes, and presides at civil ceremonies. The vil- 
lage council supervises village finances, purchases or expropri- 
ates land for schools and other communal buildings, and 
decides on the contributions in labor and money to be made 
by villagers for road maintenance and other community 
improvements. The village council also arbitrates disputes 
between villagers and imposes fines on those who fail to per- 
form the services allotted to them. 

Civil Service 

Since the early years of the Turkish republic, the civil 
bureaucracy has played an important role in politics. It became 
one of the bases of Ataturk's power and was a key instrument of 
his reform policy, which emphasized adherence to the "Six 
Arrows" of secularism, republicanism, populism, nationalism, 
etatism (see Glossary), and reformism (see Ataturk's Reforms, 
ch. 1). During the 1930s and 1940s, a consistently high percent- 
age of parliament members had a civil service background. 
However, the power and social prestige of the official elite 
declined with the emergence of competitive political parties in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. Civil bureaucrats generally 



252 



Government and Politics 



believed they worked in the service of the entire nation, and 
they tended to view politicians, especially those affiliated with 
the Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi — DP), as being too par- 
tisan to comprehend the difference between policies beneficial 
to the nation and those merely serving special interests. Demo- 
crats and their Justice Party (Adalet Partisi — AP) successors did 
not appreciate these attitudes, and consequently bureaucrats 
lost credibility and influence among these politicians, who 
tried, generally with little success, to restrict the autonomy of 
the civil service. 

The military regime that seized power in 1980 was less toler- 
ant of an independent bureaucracy than its predecessor had 
been in 1960. Accordingly, it took measures designed to reduce 
the bureaucracy's autonomy and involvement in partisan poli- 
tics. For example, civil servants lost the right to challenge or 
appeal decisions made by members of the Council of Ministers 
or the Council of State. Martial law commanders were empow- 
ered to remove or reassign civil servants under their jurisdic- 
tion at their own discretion. In April 1981, a Supreme Board of 
Supervision was established to oversee the bureaucracy. Its 
investigations resulted in a large number of officials receiving 
administrative or penal punishments and prompted many 
senior bureaucrats to leave government service. The tension 
between the military government and the civil service did not 
cease with the end of military rule. When Turgut Ozal became 
prime minister at the end of 1983, he proclaimed that stream- 
lining the bureaucracy was part of the fundamental administra- 
tive reform he intended to implement. Gradually, however, 
cooperation between bureaucrats and political leaders was 
restored; by the early 1990s, it was no longer fashionable to 
blame civil servants for the country's problems. 

In early 1995, the civil service operated in accordance with 
provisions stipulated in the 1982 constitution and subsequent 
regulations. For example, civil servants are appointed for life 
on the basis of competitive examinations and can be removed 
from their posts only in exceptional cases. They must remain 
loyal to the constitution and may not join political parties. If a 
public employee wishes to compete in National Assembly elec- 
tions, that individual first must resign from government ser- 
vice. All disciplinary decisions pertaining to civil servants are 
subject to judicial review. 



253 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Political Dynamics 

Since the military coup of 1960, Turkish politics have been 
characterized by two opposing visions of government. Accord- 
ing to the "rule from above" view, which has been dominant 
among the military elite and some of the civilian political elite, 
government is an instrument for implementing the enduring 
principles of Kemalism. Thus, if a government fails to carry out 
this mandate, it must be replaced by those who are the guard- 
ians of Ataturk's legacy, which is identified as synonymous with 
Turkish nationalism. In contrast, the "rule from below" view, 
which predominates among more populist-oriented politicians 
and thinkers, tends to regard government as an instrument for 
protecting the civic rights and individual freedoms of Turkish 
citizens. Thus, if elected leaders fail in their responsibilities, 
they should be voted out of office. Supporters of the first view 
tend to interpret democracy as a political order in which all 
Turks share common goals and national unity is not disrupted 
by partisan politics. When they perceive partisan politics as 
threatening this democratic ideal, they back military interven- 
tion as a corrective measure. Those favoring rule from below 
tend to accept diversity of opinion, and its organized expres- 
sion through competitive political parties, as normal in a 
healthy democracy. These two very different conceptions of 
government have contributed significantly to Turkey's political 
history since 1960, an era in which periods of parliamentary 
democracy have alternated with periods of military authoritari- 
anism. 

The legacy of military intervention, in particular a general 
fear among politicians that it may recur, has adversely affected 
democratic practices in Turkey. For instance, the successor 
civilian governments have lifted only gradually the harsh 
restrictions imposed on political rights by the 1980-83 regime. 
In early 1995, various restrictions on the formation of political 
parties and free association remained in effect; civilians 
accused of "crimes against the state" continued to be 
remanded to military courts for detention, interrogation, and 
trial. 

Political Developments since the 1980 Coup 

Immediately following the September 1980 coup, the mili- 
tary government arrested Turkey's leading politicians, dis- 
solved the bicameral Grand National Assembly, declared 



254 



Painting of Atatilrk, the 
father of modern Turkey 
Courtesy Hermine Drey fuss 



martial law, and banned all political activity (see Military Inter- 
lude, ch. 1). In October 1981, all political parties then in exist- 
ence were disbanded and their property and financial assets 
confiscated by the state. In April 1983, the NSC issued regula- 
tions for the formation of new political parties — which could 
have no ties to the disbanded parties — in anticipation of elec- 
tions for a new single-chamber National Assembly to be held 
later that year. Subsequently, the ban on political activity was 
lifted, except for 723 politicians active before the coup who 
were forbidden to participate in politics. About 500 — former 
deputies and senators of the dissolved Grand National Assem- 
bly — were barred until 1986. The remaining group of more 
than 200 was not allowed to be involved in politics until 1991. 
In addition to these restrictions, each party had to submit its 
list of candidates for NSC approval in order to compete in the 
assembly elections. Although fifteen parties were established by 
August 1983, the NSC disqualified all but three of them on the 
grounds that they had ties to banned political leaders such as 
Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit. For a variety of other 
political reasons, the NSC also vetoed several proposed candi- 
dates on the lists presented by the three approved parties. 

The parties allowed to participate in the November 1983 
National Assembly elections were the Nationalist Democracy 
Party (Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi — MDP), headed by retired 



255 



Turkey: A Country Study 

general Turgut Sunalp, an ally of NSC chair and president 
Kenan Evren; the Motherland Party, led by Turgut Ozal, a civil- 
ian who had served in the military government from 1980 to 
1982 as deputy prime minister for economic affairs; and the 
Populist Party (Halkci Partisi— HP), led by Necdet Calp. The 
military publicly supported Sunalp's party and expected it to 
win a majority of seats in the new assembly. However, the elec- 
tions proved to be a stunning repudiation of the military gov- 
ernment: the Nationalist Democracy Party won only 23.3 
percent of the total votes cast and obtained only seventy-one of 
the assembly's 400 seats. Ozal's Motherland Party won an abso- 
lute majority of seats (211 total); subsequently, Evren asked 
Ozal to form a new government, which took office in Decem- 
ber 1983. 

The restoration of civilian government did not mean an 
immediate restoration of civilian rule. Although the NSC had 
dissolved itself, Evren, as president of the republic, was in a 
position to veto any policies that might displease the military. 
In addition, most of Turkey remained under martial law, which 
meant that military officers retained ultimate decision-making 
authority at the local level. Although Ozal proceeded cau- 
tiously to reassert civilian authority, he recognized that easing 
various military-imposed restrictions was essential to improve 
Turkey's international image, especially in Western Europe. 

Following the 1980 coup, the members of the European 
Community, which Turkey aspired to join, had frozen relations 
with Ankara. The pan-European parliament, the Council of 
Europe, had cited the military regime's record of human rights 
violations as justification for banning Turkish participation in 
1982 (see Foreign Relations, this ch.). To demonstrate his com- 
mitment to democracy, Ozal allowed three political parties 
whose participation in the 1983 general elections had been 
vetoed by the military to contest the municipal elections his 
government had scheduled for March 1984. All three parties 
seemed to be obvious continuations of dissolved precoup par- 
ties, and they did not try very hard to disguise their ties to 
banned politicians. For example, the True Path Party had been 
formed by former members of the Justice Party, and its de facto 
leader was widely acknowledged to be Suleyman Demirel. Sup- 
porters of the old Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi — CHP) had formed the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal 
Demokrat Parti — Sodep) under the leadership of Erdal Inonu, 
the son of Ismet Inonu, a former president and close political 



256 



Government and Politics 



ally of Ataturk. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi — RP) was 
headed by Necmettin Erbakan, an Islamic activist whose politi- 
cal views had been irksome to the military since the early 
1970s. 

The local elections held on March 25, 1984, constituted a 
further repudiation of the military, with Sunalp's Nationalist 
Democracy Party obtaining less than 10 percent of the vote. At 
the level of local politics, Sodep and the True Path Party 
emerged as the second and third strongest parties behind 
Ozal's Motherland Party, which won 40 percent of the vote. 
The Populist Party, which had the second largest contingent in 
the National Assembly, did poorly in the municipal elections, 
probably because most of its potential support went to Sodep, a 
party with which it shared ideological affinities, as well as com- 
mon origins in the old Republican People's Party. Subse- 
quently, in November 1985 a majority of Populist Party 
deputies voted to dissolve their party and merge with Sodep to 
form a single party, the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sos- 
yal Demokrat Halkci Parti — SHP) . The local elections and the 
lifting of martial law in several Turkish provinces had a positive 
effect on some European governments, and in May 1984, the 
Council of Europe voted to readmit Turkey as an associate 
member of the European Community. 

Following the 1984 municipal elections, former political 
leaders challenged restrictions on their activities by appearing 
at political meetings and making public speeches. Demirel and 
Ecevit were the most prominent of the leaders who openly 
defied the bans on political activities. The Ozal government 
was under pressure from the military to enforce the bans but 
under equal pressure from both domestic public opinion and 
international human rights organizations to relax the restric- 
tions on the country's former leaders. The government 
responded with alternating tolerance and legal harassment. 
Inconsistency also characterized the government's treatment of 
other democratization issues. For example, by the end of 1987 
martial law had been lifted in most of Turkey's provinces, but 
the number of civilians being tried in military courts actually 
had increased. In addition, the government was embarrassed 
by reports published by Amnesty International and similar 
organizations charging the continuation of systematic torture 
in Turkish prisons, press censorship, and the denial of civil 
rights for the Kurdish minority. Although the Ozal government 



257 



Turkey: A Country Study 



dismissed these reports, they tended to complicate already deli- 
cate relations with members of the European Community. 

In 1986 the expiration of the law banning political activity 
by some 500 minor politicians of the precoup era served to 
highlight the anomalous situation of a self-proclaimed democ- 
racy that continued to deny the right of political participation 
to more than 200 major political figures, including former 
prime ministers and cabinet members. Ozal persuaded Presi- 
dent Evren and the other senior military officers who sup- 
ported the ban that the issue should be put to a referendum. 
The vote took place in September 1987, with a large majority of 
voters approving repeal. Demirel and Ecevit almost immedi- 
ately assumed leadership of the parties they had controlled 
from behind the scenes, respectively the True Path Party and 
the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi — DSP), and 
began campaigning for the National Assembly elections sched- 
uled for November. 

The 1987 National Assembly elections were held under the 
most democratic conditions since the 1980 coup. In contrast to 
its actions during the 1983 election, the government pro- 
scribed no political parties or individual candidates on party 
lists. From the perspective of the individual parties, the only 
drawback was the requirement that each must win at least 10 
percent of the national vote in order to obtain a seat in the 
assembly. Parties competing in the elections included the Dem- 
ocratic Left Party, the Motherland Party, the Nationalist Labor 
Party (Milliyetci (^alisma Partisi — MQP), the SHP, the True 
Path Party, and the Welfare Party (see Political Parties, this 
ch.). However, only three parties exceeded the 10 percent 
threshold to qualify for assembly seats. Ozal's Motherland Party 
upheld its dominance in parliament by winning 36 percent of 
the national vote — slightly less than the 40 percent it had won 
in 1983 — and more than 60 percent of the assembly seats — 292 
out of a total of 450. Inonu's SHP, a 1985 merger of Sodep and 
the Populist Party (the latter had won the second highest num- 
ber of seats in 1983), ranked second with ninety-nine seats. 
Demirel' s True Path Party, which had not been allowed to par- 
ticipate in the 1983 elections, ranked third with fifty-nine seats. 

The four years following the 1987 elections witnessed the 
political comeback of Demirel, who had been prime minister at 
the time of the 1980 military coup. Following the takeover by 
the armed forces, he and other members of his government 
had been arrested. His Justice Party and all other parties subse- 



258 



Government and Politics 



quently were forcibly dissolved. During Demirel's eleven-year 
exclusion from politics, his former protege, Ozal, emerged as 
the country's most prominent civilian politician. Because Ozal 
had been a rising star in the Justice Party prior to the coup and 
had been chosen to take charge of the government's economic 
reform program, Demirel resented Ozal's initial cooperation 
with the military and his later establishment of the Motherland 
Party, which competed directly with the True Path Party for the 
allegiance of former Justice Party supporters. Consequently, 
once the ban on his political activities was lifted, Demirel cam- 
paigned tirelessly against Ozal and the Motherland Party. 
Demirel's persistent criticism of Ozal's policies probably was an 
important factor in the major electoral setback suffered by the 
Motherland Party in the March 1989 municipal council elec- 
tions. The Motherland Party's share of the popular vote fell to 
22 percent — compared with 26 percent for Demirel's True 
Path Party — and it lost control of several municipal councils, 
including those in the country's three largest cities: Istanbul, 
Ankara, and Izmir. Whatever satisfaction Demirel may have 
derived from his party's electoral edge over the Motherland 
Party, the True Path Party nevertheless did not receive the larg- 
est plurality of ballots. That distinction went to the SHP, which 
obtained 28 percent of the total vote (see fig. 13). 

Encouraged by the results of the municipal council elec- 
tions, Demirel devoted the next two-and-one-half years to 
building up his party for the National Assembly elections. His 
goal was for the True Path Party to win a majority of seats, a vic- 
tory that would enable him to reclaim the post of prime minis- 
ter from which he had been ousted so unceremoniously in 
1980. Ozal may have provided unintentional support for 
Demirel's efforts when he decided at the end of 1989 to be a 
candidate for president to replace General Evren, whose seven- 
year term was expiring. Because Ozal's Motherland Party still 
controlled a majority of seats in the assembly, his nomination 
was approved, albeit on the third ballot. However, in accor- 
dance with the constitution, Ozal had to sever his political ties 
to the Motherland Party upon becoming president. Because he 
had been so closely identified with the party and because none 
of its other leaders, including Yildirim Akbulut, who succeeded 
Ozal as prime minister in November 1989, had achieved 
national prominence, Ozal's departure tended to weaken the 
Motherland Party politically. 



259 



Turkey: A Country Study 






Province boundary 


® 


National capital 


DID 


Motherland Party 


& 


Republican People's Party 


m 


True Path Party 




Nationalist Action Party 


□ 


Welfare Party 




Social Democratic Populist Party 


□ 


Independent 




100 200 Kilometers 




100 200 Miles 




Figure 13. Provincial Elections, 1989 and 1994 



The decline — at least temporarily — of the Motherland Party 
was demonstrated in the October 1991 National Assembly elec- 
tions. The party received only 24 percent of the total vote and 
won only 115 seats. In comparison to four years earlier, these 



260 



Government and Politics 



results represented a severe defeat. However, the Motherland 
Party remained a serious competitor in the political arena, fall- 
ing only from first to second place in terms of overall parlia- 
mentary representation. Whereas the True Path Party emerged 
from the elections with the largest number of votes and the 
greatest number of assembly seats, its overall performance — 27 
percent of the total vote and 178 assembly seats — was less 
impressive than Demirel had hoped and insufficient to give the 
party the 226 seats needed for parliamentary control. For 
Demirel to become prime minister, it would be necessary for 
the True Path Party to form a coalition with the Motherland 
Party — a very unrealistic prospect — or at least one of the three 
other parties that had obtained 10 percent or more of the total 
vote and thus qualified for representation in the assembly The 
three parties were the SHP, eighty-eight seats; the Welfare 
Party, sixty-two seats; and the Democratic Left Party, seven 
seats. In November 1991, Demirel announced a DYP-SHP coali- 
tion government, with himself as prime minister and SHP 
leader Inonii as deputy prime minister. Thus, eleven years after 
being overthrown by the military, Demirel returned as head of 
government. More significantly, in May 1993 the National 
Assembly elected Demirel president of the republic following 
the unexpected death of Ozal. 

The Welfare Party and other parties also perceived the 
Motherland Party's weakness and shared Demirel's hope of 
benefiting from it. The Welfare Party built steady support in 
middle- and lower-class urban neighborhoods by focusing on 
widespread dissatisfaction with government policies and attrib- 
uting official abuses of authority to the failure of leaders to 
adhere to traditional religious values. It had received 10 per- 
cent of the total vote in the 1989 municipal council elections 
and won control of several small town councils. In the October 
1991 National Assembly elections, the party obtained 16.9 per- 
cent of the total vote and won sixty-two seats. Its base in the 
assembly provided the Welfare Party with a strong platform 
from which to criticize the DYP-SHP coalition government, 
which Welfare Party leaders accused of being as insensitive on 
issues of social injustice and civil rights abuses as its Mother- 
land predecessor. In the March 1994 municipal elections, the 
Welfare Party demonstrated its ability to draw some of the sup- 
port base of the DYP, whose share of the total vote fell to 22 
percent. In contrast, the Welfare Party won 19 percent of the 
total vote — placing it a very close third after the DYP and the 



261 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Motherland Party. Its mayoralty candidates won in both Ankara 
and Istanbul, the country's two most secular cities, as well as in 
scores of other cities and towns. 

Political Parties 

Prior to 1950, the Republic of Turkey was essentially a one- 
party state ruled by the Republican People's Party, which had 
been created by Ataturk to implement the Six Arrows of Kemal- 
ism. Although there had been abortive experiments with "loyal 
opposition" parties in the mid-1920s and in 1930, it was not 
until 1946 that the CHP permitted political parties to form and 
contest elections, albeit in a politically controlled environment. 
The Democrat Party was founded in 1946 by CHP members 
who were dissatisfied with the authoritarian style of the CHP 
but who otherwise supported the party's Kemalist principles. 
The DP emphasized the need to end various restrictions on 
personal freedom so that Turkey could become a democracy. 
Reform of laws governing political parties and electoral activi- 
ties — measures that would enable the DP to compete on an 
equal basis with the CHP — were enacted prior to the 1950 par- 
liamentary elections. Consequently, those elections were the 
first free ones since the founding of the republic in 1923. The 
DP won a large majority of seats in the assembly and thus took 
over the government from the CHP. 

The DP retained control of the government throughout the 
1950s, a period during which it enacted legislation that 
restricted news media freedom and various civil liberties. As 
the DP steadily became less tolerant of dissent, the CHP gradu- 
ally moved in the opposite direction, abandoning its authori- 
tarian stance and becoming an advocate of civil rights. The 
DP's efforts to suppress opposition to its policies provoked a 
political crisis that culminated in a May 1960 military coup. 
The DP subsequently was dissolved, but the Justice Party, which 
was established in 1961, was widely perceived as its successor 
and attracted most of its supporters. In the 1961 parliamentary 
elections that led to the restoration of civilian government, the 
Justice Party won the second largest number of seats and thus 
established itself as the principal competitor of the CHP, which 
had won a plurality of seats. In the subsequent nineteen years, 
the rivalry between the Justice Party and the CHP remained a 
significant feature of Turkish politics. Although both parties 
proclaimed their loyalty to Kemalist ideals, they evolved distinct 
ideological positions. Suleyman Demirel, who became leader 



262 



Government and Politics 



of the Justice Party in 1964, favored economic policies that ben- 
efited private entrepreneurs and industrialists. In contrast, 
Biilent Ecevit, who became leader of the CHP in 1965, believed 
in a form of democratic socialism that included government 
intervention aimed at regulating private business and protect- 
ing workers and consumers. The views of these two men and 
the positions of their respective parties became increasingly 
polarized after 1972. 

The inability of either the Justice Party or the CHP to win 
parliamentary majorities and the refusal of both Demirel and 
Ecevit to cooperate politically necessitated the formation of 
numerous coalition and minority-party governments. These 
governments proved ineffective at devising policies to cope 
with Turkey's economic and social problems, which became 
steadily more serious throughout the 1970s. Various groups on 
the extreme right and the extreme left formed illegal political 
organizations that resorted to violence in pursuit of their objec- 
tives, which for certain groups included the overthrow of the 
government. The apparent inability of governments — whether 
dominated by the Justice Party or by the CHP — to control 
increasing terrorism in urban areas contributed to a general 
sense of insecurity and crisis and served as the catalyst for the 
1980 coup. Blaming politicians for the country's political 
impasse, the military sought to end partisan politics by dissolv- 
ing the old parties and banning all activity by the politicians 
deemed responsible for the crisis. Although the formation of 
new parties was authorized in 1983, none was allowed to use 
the name of any of the banned parties from the precoup past. 
Nevertheless, most of Turkey's existing parties in early 1995 
were transparent continuations of earlier parties. 

True Path Party 

In January 1995, the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi — 
DYP) was the senior partner in Turkey's coalition government. 
It was a continuation of the Justice Party, and its leader from 
1987 until 1993 was Demirel. Because Demirel was barred from 
political activity prior to late 1987, his close associate, Husamet- 
tin Cindoruk, became the party's titular chair when the True 
Path Party was established in 1983. However, Demirel was the 
driving force behind the party, raising money and campaigning 
on its behalf despite being banned from political action. 
Demirel promoted economic policies similar to those he had 
advocated as leader of the Justice Party, updated, however, to 



263 



Turkey: A Country Study 

reflect changing economic conditions resulting from interna- 
tional political developments between 1989 and 1991. 

The True Path Party's rise from political pariah to ruling 
party was gradual. In 1983 the military government prohibited 
the party's participation in the parliamentary elections, effec- 
tively shutting it out of the legal political process. However, a 
gain of thirty-five seats in the National Assembly resulted in 
1986 when the Nationalist Democracy Party dissolved itself and 
most of its deputies joined the True Path Party. Subsequently 
the party won fifty-nine seats in the 1987 parliamentary elec- 
tions, and Demirel returned to the National Assembly as a dep- 
uty for the first time since the military coup. The party's 
performance four years later was even more impressive: the 
True Path Party tripled its representation to 178 seats and 
emerged from the 1991 elections with a plurality in the assem- 
bly. Demirel, who had served three times as prime minister 
before the 1980 coup and twice had been deposed by the mili- 
tary, succeeded in forming his fourth government by negotiat- 
ing a coalition agreement with the SHP. 

When the Demirel government assumed office in Novem- 
ber 1991, it faced several political and economic challenges. 
Two important political issues eluding resolution were the 
increasing militancy of Kurdish demands for civil rights and 
the growing stridency of the confrontation between religious 
and secular elements of society. Although the True Path Party 
had no sympathy for Kurdish aspirations, its SHP partners 
tended to support cultural freedom for the Kurds and had a 
relatively strong political base in the Kurdish provinces. How- 
ever, the SHP's ability to influence overall government policy 
on the Kurdish issue was limited because the military had 
assumed de facto decision-making authority for matters per- 
taining to southeastern Turkey and expected that civilian poli- 
ticians would accept this role. There was also no consensus 
among either True Path Party or SHP leaders on how to handle 
Islamist aspirations. Whereas some True Path Party members 
believed it was possible to accommodate Islamist concerns, mil- 
itant secularists opposed any concessions to those whom they 
termed "Islamic fundamentalists." 

After President Ozal suffered a fatal heart attack in April 
1993, Demirel decided he wanted to be president. In accor- 
dance with the constitution, which mandated that the presi- 
dent be nonpartisan, Demirel resigned as the True Path Party's 
secretary general in May, after the National Assembly had 



264 



Government and Politics 



elected him president. In June 1993, the party's deputies in the 
assembly chose as their new leader Tansu (filler (b. 1946), the 
first woman to head a Turkish political party, (filler, who had 
done graduate studies in economics in the United States, put 
together a new DYP-SHP coalition government that was 
approved by the assembly in July 1993, enabling her to become 
Turkey's first female prime minister. 

Social Democratic Populist Party 

In early 1995, the junior partner in the (filler government 
was the Social Democratic Populist Party, known by the Turkish 
acronym SHP, for Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti. The SHP was 
one of several parties formed since 1983 that presented itself as 
an heir to the CHP. In fact, the SHP leader, Erdal Inonii, was 
the son of Ismet Inonii, a close associate of Atatiirk and a 
cofounder of the CHP. The SHP had been created in 1985 
when Inonti's Sodep (disqualified by the military from partici- 
pating in the 1983 parliamentary elections) merged with Nec- 
det Calp's Populist Party, which had been allowed to take part 
in the 1983 elections and had won the second largest number 
of assembly seats. 

The decision to join the True Path Party in a coalition gov- 
ernment brought to the fore the internal divisions within the 
SHP. Civil rights activists, both Turkish and Kurdish, opposed 
the SHP's participation in the government because they associ- 
ated Demirel with government abuses of human rights during 
the late 1970s and doubted his willingness to terminate martial 
law in the Kurdish provinces. Consequently eighteen SHP dep- 
uties resigned from the party and, led by Ahmet Turk, estab- 
lished the People's Labor Party (Halkin Emek Partisi — HEP) in 
1990 as a separate group in the National Assembly, although 
they agreed to continue voting with the SHP on certain issues. 
Because the HEP emphasized civil rights issues, its primary 
appeal was among Kurds, and a majority of the party's execu- 
tives were Kurdish. The alliance with the HEP enabled the SHP 
to broaden its support base — the urban working-class neigh- 
borhoods of western and northeastern Turkey — to include the 
Kurdish areas of the southeast. Meanwhile the security situa- 
tion in the southeast deteriorated as guerrillas affiliated with 
the PKK intensified attacks on government sites and personnel 
as part of a proclaimed effort to create a separate Kurdish state. 

Many Turkish leaders, both civilian and military, tended not 
to distinguish between the HEP, which was committed to work- 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

ing for civil rights within the political process, and the PKK, 
which aimed to overthrow the political system through armed 
struggle. When the military initiated proceedings against HEP 
founders in 1992 for allegedly promoting "separatist propa- 
ganda," the HEP deputies accused the SHP of not actively pro- 
tecting them from official persecution. The Constitutional 
Court outlawed the HEP in 1993 and its successor, the Democ- 
racy Party (Demokrasi Partisi — DEP), the following year. These 
developments, plus the arrest of DEP deputies in the National 
Assembly in March and June 1994, adversely affected the SHP's 
image, especially among its Kurdish supporters. Consequently 
the SHP did very poorly in the 1994 municipal council elec- 
tions — virtually all SHP incumbents in the cities and towns of 
southeastern Turkey lost. It remained unclear in early 1995 
whether the SHP could regain the confidence of its Kurdish 
base. A failure to do so would diminish the SHP's chances in 
the 1996 parliamentary elections to maintain its status as the 
third largest party in the National Assembly. 

Motherland Party 

In early 1995, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi — 
ANAP) was the main parliamentary opposition party, after hav- 
ing served as the governing party from 1983 to 1991. Turgut 
Ozal founded the Motherland Party in May 1983, and his per- 
sonality and energy were instrumental to the party's subse- 
quent success. Even after Ozal officially resigned as party 
leader in 1989 to become president, his influence — and that of 
his wife and brothers — continued in Motherland Party affairs. 
For example, Ozal handpicked his successor as party leader, 
Yildirim Akbulut. However, after Akbulut proved ineffective, 
both as party chair and as prime minister, Ozal pressured him 
to resign in June 1991. In anticipation of the forthcoming par- 
liamentary elections, Ozal approved the younger and more 
dynamic Mesut Yilmaz as Akbulut's successor. Yilmaz cam- 
paigned energetically, used his position as prime minister to 
woo voters with incentives such as wage increases for public-sec- 
tor employees, and performed well against other political lead- 
ers in Turkey's first-ever televised political debate. However, the 
Motherland Party's total share of the national vote in the Octo- 
ber 1991 balloting fell by 12 percent compared to 1987, and 
the party won sixty-three fewer assembly seats than its rival, the 
True Path Party. 



266 



Government and Politics 



The Motherland Party's policies and constituency were simi- 
lar to those of the True Path Party, but the intense personal 
rivalry between Demirel and Ozal had precluded political 
cooperation between the two parties prior to Ozal's death in 
1993. The president's death represented both a major loss and 
a potential opportunity for the Motherland Party. The party's 
cohesion had depended on the force of Ozal's personality, and 
in early 1995 it was unclear whether Yilmaz would succeed in 
transforming the Motherland Party into an effective organiza- 
tion based on a coherent political program and ideology. In 
addition, because the party's past electoral strength had 
derived from Ozal's own popular appeal, it was not evident 
what long-term impact his death would have. Despite Yilmaz's 
relative youth and limited political experience, he appeared to 
be the party's chief asset, and even before Ozal's death he had 
been trying to chart a course independent of the party's influ- 
ential founder. Nevertheless, many members were dissatisfied 
with Yilmaz's leadership; in late 1992 and early 1993, more 
than fifteen Motherland Party deputies, citing differences with 
Yilmaz, resigned from the party in a move that reduced its over- 
all strength in the National Assembly to fewer than 100 seats. 
More than fifty former deputies, including five founding mem- 
bers of the party, also resigned to demonstrate their opposition 
to Yilmaz. Yilmaz now faced the challenge of developing a new 
party identity that would appeal to a broader constituency; 
otherwise the Motherland Party would expend all its energies 
competing with the ideologically similar True Path Party. 

Welfare Party 

The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi — RP), which had received 
only 7 percent of the total vote in the 1987 parliamentary elec- 
tions and thus had not qualified for assembly seats, was the 
main electoral surprise in the 1991 balloting. Nearly 17 percent 
of the electorate voted for the Welfare Party, enabling it to win 
sixty-two seats in the National Assembly. The Welfare Party was 
widely considered an Islamic party. Its leader, Necmettin Erba- 
kan, had been identified with Islamic political activism since 
the early 1970s. He was the founder in 1972 of the National Sal- 
vation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi — MSP), which became the 
third largest party in parliament in 1973. The MSP openly sup- 
ported a religious political agenda calling for the restoration of 
traditional "morals and virtues" and a reduction of economic 
ties to the Christian countries of Western Europe. In 1974 the 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

MSP gained a measure of political legitimacy by participating 
in a CHP-led coalition government. In fact, Turgut Ozal briefly 
was a member of the MSP in the 1970s and was at one time an 
unsuccessful candidate on its parliamentary list. 

Following the 1980 coup, the military not only dissolved the 
MSP, along with other political parties, but also prosecuted 
Erbakan and other MSP leaders for violating a law forbidding 
the use of religion for political purposes. When new political 
parties were authorized in 1983, Erbakan founded the Welfare 
Party on a platform stressing themes similar to those espoused 
by the defunct MSP. The ruling generals — and most civilians — 
perceived the Welfare Party as a continuation of the MSP. It was 
therefore disqualified from participation in the 1983 parlia- 
mentary elections. However, the party did sponsor candidates 
in the 1984 municipal elections and since then has steadily 
expanded its support base. 

The Welfare Party's strength is in middle- and lower-class 
urban neighborhoods and in the Kurdish areas of the south- 
east. This strength was first demonstrated during the municipal 
elections of 1989, when the party's candidates for mayor won in 
five large cities and 100 towns. The 1991 parliamentary elec- 
tions provided further evidence of the Welfare Party's growing 
popularity and its ability to consolidate an electoral base. 
Inspired by the party's achievements in 1991, Welfare Party 
activists, including a new generation of university students, 
campaigned tirelessly to recruit new supporters. As a result of 
these efforts, the Welfare Party's share of the total vote 
increased to 19 percent in the municipal elections of March 
1994. The symbolic importance of the 1994 balloting because 
of its religious implications, probably exceeded the actual sig- 
nificance of the party's turnout. Tayyip Erdogan, the Welfare 
Party's candidate for mayor of Istanbul, and Melih Gokchek, its 
mayoral candidate for Ankara, both won. In addition, Welfare 
Party candidates for mayor won in twenty-seven other cities and 
in 400 towns, including almost all of the predominantly Kurd- 
ish municipalities in the southeast. 

The Welfare Party's electoral appeal stems from the popu- 
larity of its call for a return to traditional values — widely inter- 
preted as meaning Islamic morals and behavior. Its slogans are 
sufficiently vague with respect to specific policies to attract 
diverse support. Thus, self-identified Welfare Party loyalists 
range from professionals who dress in expensive Western fash- 
ions and interpret Islam liberally to individuals, especially 



268 



Government and Politics 



women, who adopt a contemporary version of traditional 
Islamic dress and give Islam a fundamentalist interpretation. 
Whereas the Welfare Party has adopted certain well-defined 
positions, such as opposition to Turkey's goal of full member- 
ship in the European Union, its adherents tend to hold diver- 
gent views on most economic and political issues. However, 
they share a common interest in religious practices such as 
daily prayers, fasting during the Islamic holy month of Rama- 
zan (Ramadan in Arabic), avoiding behavior harmful to others, 
and reading the Kuran (Quran in Arabic). Furthermore, the 
Welfare Party's emphasis on common religious bonds tends to 
bring together, rather than to divide, Turkish-speaking and 
Kurdish-speaking Muslims and has impressed secular Kurds 
who have become disillusioned with other political parties. 

Democratic Left Party 

The Democratic Left Party, known by the Turkish acronym 
DSP (for Demokratik Sol Partisi), was the smallest parliamen- 
tary party in January 1995. Because the party received almost 
11 percent of the vote in the 1991 elections, DSP leader Biilent 
Ecevit and six other party officials took seats in the National 
Assembly. Ecevit considered the DSP the legitimate successor 
to the CHP, which he headed prior to the 1980 coup. When the 
DSP was founded in November 1985 — with Ecevit's wife serving 
as chair because he remained barred from political activity — 
Ecevit made known his low opinion of the SHP, which also pre- 
sented itself as the heir to the CHP, and its leader, Erdal Inonu. 
Ecevit's personal animosity toward Inonu prevented DSP-SHP 
cooperation, even though the parties had similar programs 
and appealed to the same constituency. In both 1987 and 1991, 
Ecevit spurned efforts by Inonu and other SHP leaders to per- 
suade him to join an electoral alliance. Ecevit condemned the 
SHP's participation in the Demirel and (filler governments as 
evidence that the party had abandoned social-democratic prin- 
ciples and betrayed the working class. 

Other Parties 

Several small parties existed in early 1995. Two post-1991 
splinters from parliamentary parties included Unity and Peace 
(Birlik ve Baris), whose members left the Welfare Party in 1992, 
and the Freedom and Labor Party (OZEP), formed from a 
breakaway faction of the SHP in 1992. The Nationalist Labor 
Party (Milliyetci £alisma Partisi — MQP), founded in 1985 by 



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Turkey: A Country Study 



the controversial nationalist of the 1970s, Alparslan Turkes, 
espoused pan-Turkism in foreign policy and cooperated with 
the Welfare Party in domestic politics. Deniz Baykel, a politi- 
cian disillusioned by the partisan sniping between the SHP and 
the True Path Party, announced the reactivation of the CHP in 
September 1992 and called on its former members to rejoin. 
Thirteen SHP deputies joined the new CHP, providing it with 
an immediate base in the National Assembly. The former Dem- 
ocrat Party, banned following the 1960 coup, also was reacti- 
vated in 1992. It consisted of politicians who supported the 
economic policies of the Motherland Party and the True Path 
Party but distrusted both Ozal and Demirel. 

In addition to the legal parties, several illegal political orga- 
nizations operated clandestinely in Turkey in 1995. These par- 
ties were considered illegal either because they never had 
registered as required by law or because they had been pro- 
scribed by judicial authorities. Many of these parties advocated 
armed struggle, although some were nonviolent. The illegal 
parties fell into three categories, which reflected the inter- 
twined security and ideological concerns of the Turkish mili- 
tary since 1980: separatist parties, a term used to describe all 
Kurdish groups; communist parties, a term used to describe all 
organizations espousing various versions of Marxism; and irtica 
(religious reaction) parties, a term used to describe all groups 
pushing for the establishment of an Islamic government in 
Turkey. The most important of the illegal parties was the Kurd- 
istan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan — PKK), which 
in 1984 had initiated a steadily escalating armed struggle 
against the government. By mid-1994 at least 12,000 persons 
were estimated to have been killed in southeastern Turkey, 
where the government maintained at least 160,000 troops in 
combat readiness against as many as 15,000 guerrillas. With the 
exception of the Revolutionary Left Party (Devrimci Sol — Dev 
Sol), the illegal communist and Islamic groups were not well 
organized; they functioned in small cells that carried out 
mainly isolated but sensational acts of terrorism in various cit- 
ies. One of the more notorious actions was the January 1993 
car bomb assassination of the nationally prominent journalist 
Ugur Memcu, for which an extreme Islamist group claimed 
responsibility (see Internal Security Concerns, ch. 5). 

Political Interest Groups 

The decades following World War II saw a proliferation of 



270 



Government and Politics 



interest groups that evolved into increasingly active and politi- 
cally conscious associations. The growth of these groups was 
part of a general trend toward a more politicized and pluralis- 
tic society. This trend resulted primarily from factors such as 
the advent of multiparty politics, economic development and 
the accompanying expansion of opportunity, and improve- 
ments in communications (see Mass Media, this ch.). Increas- 
ing urbanization, rising literacy rates, rapid industrial 
expansion, and the exposure of hundreds of thousands of 
Turkish guest workers — most from villages and lower-class 
urban areas — to new ideas and customs in Western Europe also 
contributed to the politicization of the populace. As a conse- 
quence, a growing number of voluntary associations sprang up 
to promote specific interests, either on their own, through rep- 
resentatives in parliament, or through the cabinet and senior 
bureaucrats. These associations enabled various social groups 
to exercise a degree of influence over political matters. The 
activities of groups such as labor unions, business associations, 
student organizations, a journalists' association, and religious 
and cultural associations promoted public awareness of impor- 
tant issues and contributed to a relatively strong civil society. 

The autonomy of civic groups vis-a-vis the state has been a 
persistent political problem since 1960. During periods of mili- 
tary rule and martial law, the independence of such groups 
often was circumscribed (see Crisis in Turkish Democracy, ch. 
1). Following the military takeover in September 1980, for 
example, strict limits were placed on the political activities of 
civic associations; some of these restrictions remained in force 
in early 1995. For example, the 1982 constitution, like that of 
1961, affirms the right of individuals to form associations but 
also stipulates that the exercise of this right must not violate 
the "indivisible integrity of the state." Furthermore, associa- 
tions are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of lan- 
guage, race, or religion, or from trying to promote one social 
class or group over others. Civic associations also are forbidden 
to pursue political aims, engage in political activities, receive 
support from or give support to political parties, or take joint 
action with labor unions or professional organizations. In addi- 
tion, legislation enacted in 1983 prohibits teachers, high 
school students, civil servants, and soldiers from forming asso- 
ciations, and bans officials of professional organizations from 
participating actively in politics. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 



Military 

By dint of the influence it has exerted on politics since the 
early days of the Turkish republic, the military constitutes the 
country's most important interest group. Ataturk and his prin- 
cipal allies all were career officers during the final years of the 
Ottoman Empire. Although Ataturk subsequently endeavored 
to separate the military from political affairs, he nevertheless 
considered the army to be the "intelligentsia of the Turkish 
nation" and "the guardian of its ideals." By the time of Ataturk's 
death in 1938, the military had internalized a view of itself as a 
national elite responsible for protecting the Six Arrows of 
Kemalism. Prior to 1960, the military worked behind the 
scenes to ensure that the country adhered to the guidelines of 
the Kemalist principles. However, in 1960 senior officers were 
so alarmed by government policies they perceived as deviating 
from Kemalism that they intervened directly in the political 
process by overthrowing the elected government and setting 
up a military regime. The military saw its mission as putting the 
country back on the correct path of Kemalism. Believing by 
October 1961 that this goal had been achieved, the officers 
returned to the barracks, whence they exercised oversight of 
civilian politicians. 

The 1960 coup demonstrated the military's special status as 
an interest group autonomous — if it chose to be — from the 
government. On two subsequent occasions, in 1971 and 1980, 
the military again intervened to remove a government it per- 
ceived as violating Kemalist principles. The 1980 coup resulted 
in a longer transition period to civilian government and the 
imposition of more extensive restrictions on political rights 
than had the earlier interventions. At the start of 1995, some 
fourteen years after the coup, senior officers in the armed ser- 
vices still expected the civilian president and Council of Minis- 
ters to heed their advice on matters they considered pertinent 
to national security. For instance, the military defines many 
domestic law-and-order issues as falling within the realm of 
national security and thus both formulates and implements 
certain policies that the government is expected to approve. 

Universities 

College teachers and students have acted as a pressure 
group in Turkey since the late 1950s, when they initiated dem- 
onstrations against university teaching methods, curricula, and 
administrative practices that they alleged resulted in an inade- 



272 



View of Ankara, showing the National Assembly building, 
and view of the interior of the National Assembly 
Courtesy Turkish Information Office 



273 



Turkey: A Country Study 

quate education. The violent repression of student demonstra- 
tions in the spring of 1960 was one of the factors that prompted 
that year's military coup. In 1960 both teachers and students 
generally were held in high public esteem because the universi- 
ties were viewed as the centers where the future Kemalist elite 
was being trained. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the 
universities became the loci of ideological conflicts among a 
multitude of political groups espousing diverse political, eco- 
nomic, and religious ideas. As students became progressively 
more radicalized and violent, armed clashes among rival stu- 
dent groups and between students and police increased in fre- 
quency and magnitude. By 1980 the military regarded the 
universities as a source of threats to Kemalist principles. 

One of the aims of the military government that assumed 
power in 1980 was to regain state control over the universities. 
The regime created a Council of Higher Education, which was 
intended to provide a less autonomous, more uniform system 
of central administration. The regime purged ideologically sus- 
pect professors from the faculties of all universities and issued a 
law prohibiting teachers from joining political parties. Student 
associations lost their autonomy, and students charged with 
participating in illegal organizations became subject to expul- 
sion. A cautious revival of campus political activity began in the 
1990s, mainly around foreign policy issues. However, as of early 
1995 the government's possession of the means and will to pun- 
ish campus activists appeared to be intimidating most faculty 
and students. 

Labor 

The legalization of unions under the Trade Union Law of 
1947 paved the way for the slow but steady growth of a labor 
movement that evolved parallel to multiparty politics. The 
principal goal of unions as defined in the 1947 law was to seek 
the betterment of members' social and economic status. 
Unions were denied the right to strike or to engage in political 
activity, either on their own or as vehicles of political parties. In 
spite of these limitations, labor unions gradually acquired polit- 
ical influence. The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions 
(Tiirkiye Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu — Turk-Is) was 
founded in 1952 at government instigation to serve as an inde- 
pendent umbrella group. Under the tutelage of Turk-Is, labor 
evolved into a well-organized interest group; the organization 
also functioned as an agency through which the government 



274 



Government and Politics 



could restrain workers' wage demands (see Human Resources 
and Trade Unions, ch. 3). The labor movement expanded in 
the liberalized political climate of the 1960s, especially after a 
union law enacted in 1963 legalized strikes, lockouts, and col- 
lective bargaining. However, unions were forbidden to give 
"material aid" to political parties. Political parties also were 
barred from giving money to unions or forming separate labor 
organizations. 

The labor movement did not escape the politicization and 
polarization that characterized the 1960s and 1970s. Workers' 
dissatisfaction with Turk-Is as the representative of their inter- 
ests led to the founding in 1967 of the Confederation of Revo- 
lutionary Workers' Trade Unions of Turkey (Turkiye Devrimci 
Isci Sendikalan Konfederasyonu — DISK). DISK leaders were 
militants who had been expelled from Turk-Is after supporting 
a glass factory strike opposed by the Turk-Is bureaucracy. Both 
Turk-Is and the government tried to suppress DISK, whose 
independence was perceived as a threat. However, a spontane- 
ous, two-day, pro-DISK demonstration by thousands of laborers 
in Istanbul — the first mass political action by Turkish work- 
ers — forced the government in June 1970 to back away from a 
bill to abolish DISK. For the next ten years, DISK remained an 
independent organization promoting the rights of workers and 
supporting their job actions, including one major general 
strike in 1977 that led to the temporary abolition of the mili- 
tary-run State Security Courts. By 1980 about 500,000 workers 
belonged to unions affiliated with DISK. 

Following the 1980 coup, the military regime banned inde- 
pendent union activity, suspended DISK, and arrested hun- 
dreds of its activists, including all its top officials. The 
government prosecuted DISK leaders, as well as more than 
1,000 other trade unionists arrested in 1980, in a series of trials 
that did not end until December 1986. The secretary general 
of DISK and more than 250 other defendants received jail sen- 
tences of up to ten years. Meanwhile, the more complaisant 
Turk-Is, which had not been outlawed after the coup, worked 
with the military government and its successors to depoliticize 
workers. As the government-approved labor union confedera- 
tion, Turk-Is benefited from new laws pertaining to unions. For 
example, the 1982 constitution permits unions but prohibits 
them from engaging in political activity, thus effectively deny- 
ing them the right to petition political representatives. As in 
the days prior to 1967, unions must depend upon Turk-Is to 



275 



Turkey: A Country Study 

mediate between them and the government. A law issued in 
May 1983 restricts the establishment of new trade unions and 
places constraints on the right to strike by banning politically 
motivated strikes, general strikes, solidarity strikes, and any 
strike considered a threat to society or national well-being. 

The government's restrictions on union activity tended to 
demoralize workers, who generally remained passive for more 
than five years after the 1980 coup. However, beginning in 
1986 unions experienced a resurgence. In February several 
thousand workers angered by pension cutbacks held a rally — 
labor's first such demonstration since the 1980 coup — to pro- 
test high living costs, low wages, high unemployment, and 
restrictions on union organizing and collective bargaining. A 
subsequent rally in June drew an estimated 50,000 demonstra- 
tors. Since 1986 workers have conducted numerous rallies, 
small strikes, work slowdowns, and other manifestations of dis- 
satisfaction. By the early 1990s, an average of 120,000 workers 
per year were involved in strike activity. Turk-Is has mediated 
these incidents by bailing detained workers out of prison, nego- 
tiating compromise wage increase packages, and encouraging 
cooperative labor-management relations. 

Business 

The Turkish Trade Association (Turkiye Odalar Birligi — 
TOB) has represented the interests of merchants, industrial- 
ists, and commodity brokers since 1952. In the 1960s and 
1970s, new associations representing the interests of private 
industry challenged TOB's position as the authoritative repre- 
sentative of business in Turkey. Subsequently the organization 
came to be identified primarily with small and medium-sized 
firms. The Union of Chambers of Industry was founded in 
1967 as a coalition within TOB by industrialists seeking to reor- 
ganize the confederation. The Union of Chambers of Industry 
was unable to acquire independent status but achieved 
improved coordination of industrialists' demands. By setting 
up study groups, the union was able to pool research on devel- 
opment projects. In addition, the union organized regional 
Chambers of Industry within TOB. 

Business interests also were served by employers' associa- 
tions that dealt primarily with labor-management relations and 
were united under the aegis of the Turkish Confederation of 
Employers' Unions (Turkiye Isveren Sendikalan Konfederas- 
yonu — TISK). This confederation was established in 1961, 



276 



Government and Politics 



largely in response to the development of trade unions, and 
was considered the most militant of employers' associations. By 
the end of 1980, TISK claimed 106 affiliated groups with a total 
membership of 9,183 employers. Although membership in 
TISK was open to employers in both the private and public sec- 
tors, it was primarily an organization of private-sector employ- 
ers. When the military regime took power in 1980, labor union 
activities were suspended, but TISK was allowed to continue 
functioning. Employers supported the subsequent restrictive 
labor legislation, which appeared to be in accord with TISK 
proposals. 

Another representative of business interests, the Turkish 
Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Turk Sanayicileri 
ve Is Adamlari Dernegi — TUSIAD), was founded by the leaders 
of some of Turkey's largest business and industrial enterprises 
soon after the March 1971 military coup. Its aim was to 
improve the image of business and to stress its concern with 
social issues. At the same time, TUSIAD favored granting 
greater control of investment capital to the large industrialists 
at the expense of the smaller merchant and banking interests 
usually supported by TOB. TUSIAD's leaders also were con- 
cerned with the widening economic inequalities between 
regions and social classes and opposed TISK's extreme antila- 
bor policies, which they perceived as jeopardizing Turkey's 
chances of entering the European Union. 

Religious Interests 

Turkey officially has been a secular state since 1924. Ataturk 
viewed attachment to religion as an impediment to moderniza- 
tion and imposed rigorous restrictions on the practice of Islam 
(see Secularist Reforms, ch. 2). Until the late 1940s, the separa- 
tion of mosque and state was rigidly enforced by the authoritar- 
ian, one-party government. However, secularism remained an 
elite ideology, whereas Islam, the nominal religion of 98 per- 
cent of the population, continued to be a strong influence on 
most of the people, especially in rural areas and lower-class 
urban neighborhoods. The advent of competitive politics in 
1950 enabled religion to reacquire a respected public status. 
Initially the Democrat Party, then most other parties, found it 
politically expedient to appeal to religious sentiments in elec- 
tion campaigns. As the government gradually became more tol- 
erant of religious expression, both public observance of 
religious festivals and mosque construction increased. In addi- 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

tion, there was a resurgence of voluntary religious associations, 
including the tarikatlar (sing., tarikat — see Glossary). Prior to 
1970, however, religion was not a political issue. 

The formation of the MSP in 1972 as Turkey's first republi- 
can party to espouse openly Islamic principles inaugurated the 
politicization of the religious issue (see Retreat from Secular- 
ism, ch. 2). The MSP attracted a following by providing an 
Islamic defense of traditional values that were eroding as a con- 
sequence of the economic and social changes the country had 
begun to experience in the late 1960s. In effect, religion 
became a vehicle for expressing popular discontent. The 
inability of the major political parties to agree on policies to 
counteract this discontent tended to enhance the influence of 
minor parties such as the MSP. Indeed, in 1974 the main expo- 
nent of Kemalist secularism, the CHP, invited the MSP, by then 
the third largest party in parliament, to join it in a coalition 
government. Its participation in the government provided the 
MSP, and the Islamic movement more broadly, with an aura of 
political legitimacy. Subsequently, the MSP sponsored an Islam- 
ist youth movement that during the late 1970s engaged other 
militant youth groups — both socialists on the left and secular 
nationalists on the right — in armed street battles. In the 
mosques, numerous voluntary associations were formed to 
undertake religious studies, devotional prayers, charitable 
projects, social services, and the publication of journals. Even 
the minority Shia (see Glossary) Muslims organized their own 
separate groups (see The Alevi, ch. 2). 

The 1980 coup only temporarily interrupted the trend 
toward increased religious observance. Initially, the military 
regime arrested Erbakan and other MSP leaders and put them 
on trial for politically exploiting religion in violation of Turkish 
law. However, the senior officers, although committed to secu- 
larism, wanted to use religion as a counter to socialist and 
Marxist ideologies and thus refrained from interfering with the 
tarikatlar and other voluntary religious associations. Further- 
more, the generals approved an article in the 1982 constitution 
mandating compulsory religious instruction in all schools. 
When political parties were allowed to form in 1983, Ozal's 
Motherland Party welcomed a large group of former MSP 
members, who probably were attracted to the party because 
Ozal and some of his relatives had belonged to the MSP in the 
1970s. One of Ozal's brothers, Korkut Ozal, held an important 



278 



Government and Politics 



position in the Naksibendi tarikat, the oldest and largest orga- 
nized religious order in Turkey. 

The military regime was preoccupied with eliminating the 
threat from "communists," a term freely applied to anyone with 
socialist ideas. Thousands of persons lost jobs in state offices, 
schools, and enterprises because they were perceived as "left- 
ists," and leftist organizations virtually disappeared. Religiously 
motivated persons assumed many of the vacated positions, 
especially in education, and Islamic groups filled the political 
vacuum created by the state's successful assault on the left. At 
the same time, the policies of neither the military regime nor 
its civilian successors effectively addressed the economic and 
social problems that continued to fuel popular discontent. 

Without competition from the left, the religious orders and 
the religiously oriented Welfare Party enjoyed almost a monop- 
oly on the mobilization of discontent. One tarikat, the boldly 
political Fethullahci, actually tried to recruit cadets in the mili- 
tary academies. By 1986 the increasingly vociferous and mili- 
tant activities of religious groups had forced on the defensive 
the concept of secularism itself — a bedrock of Kemalist princi- 
ples for sixty years. 

In 1987 the military had become persuaded that what it 
called "Islamic fundamentalism" was a potentially serious 
threat to its vision of Kemalism. In January 1987, President 
Evren publicly denounced Islamic fundamentalism as being as 
dangerous as communism. Initially, the secular political elite, 
with the exception of the SHP, was not persuaded by his argu- 
ments. Ozal, then prime minister, seemed to support the 
Islamic wing of his party, which was pushing for the repeal of 
the remaining laws restricting religious practices. The True 
Path Party characterized the trend toward religious observance 
as a healthy development and stressed freedom of practice. 
However, as clandestine religious groups began to carry out 
attacks on noted secularists in the late 1980s, True Path Party 
leaders became concerned, and then alarmed, by the influence 
of Islamism (sometimes seen as fundamentalism). 

The Welfare Party disassociated itself from violent attacks by 
both organized and unorganized religious fanatics, but such 
attacks increased in both frequency and severity in the 1990s. 
The most sensational attack occurred in July 1993, when a mob 
leaving Friday congregational prayers in the central Anatolian 
city of Sivas firebombed a hotel where Turkey's internationally 
renowned author, self-proclaimed atheist Aziz Nesin, and doz- 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

ens of other writers were staying while attending a cultural festi- 
val. Although Nesin escaped harm, thirty-seven persons w r ere 
killed and 100 injured in that incident. Several weeks before 
the attack, Nesin's newspaper, Aydinlik, had published trans- 
lated excerpts of British author Salman Rushdie's controversial 
1988 novel, The Satanic Verses, which many Muslim religious 
leaders had condemned as blasphemous. Following publica- 
tion of the excerpts, the newspaper's offices in Istanbul and 
other cities were attacked by groups of Islamic militants. 

Turkey's religious revival has foreign policy implications 
because the tarikatlar tend to link with religious groups in other 
Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia, for example, has been an 
important source of the extensive financial support that has 
enabled the tarikatlar to proselytize and to operate charitable 
programs that enhance their political influence. Turkish politi- 
cal leaders also fear the influence of neighboring Iran, where 
an Islamic government replaced the secular regime in 1979, 
and since 1987 have tended to blame incidents of religious vio- 
lence on Iranian agents. However, Turkey's religious activists 
are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims who tend to display suspicion 
and prejudice toward Shia Muslims — who make up more than 
90 percent of the Iranian population — and there has been 
scant evidence to support the existence of significant ties 
between the Turkish Sunni and Iran. 

Minorities 

At least 15 percent of Turkey's population consists of ethnic 
and religious minorities. The Kurds are the minority group 
with the greatest impact on national politics. Since the 1930s, 
Kurds have resisted government efforts to assimilate them forc- 
ibly, including an official ban on speaking or writing Kurdish. 
Since 1984 Kurdish resistance to Turkification has encom- 
passed both a peaceful political struggle to obtain basic civil 
rights for Kurds within Turkey and a violent armed struggle to 
obtain a separate Kurdish state. The leaders of the nonviolent 
struggle have worked within the political system for the recog- 
nition of Kurdish cultural rights, including the right to speak 
Kurdish in public and to read, write, and publish in Kurdish. 
Prior to 1991, these Kurds operated within the national politi- 
cal parties, in particular the SHP, the party most sympathetic to 
their goal of full equality for all citizens of Turkey. President 
Ozal's 1991 call for a more liberal policy toward Kurds and for 
the repeal of the ban on speaking Kurdish raised the hopes of 



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Kurdish politicians. Following the parliamentary elections of 
October 1991, several Kurdish deputies, including Hatip Dicle, 
Feridun Yazar, and Leyla Zayna, formed the HEP, a party with 
the explicit goal of campaigning within the National Assembly 
for laws guaranteeing equal rights for the Kurds. 

Turkey's other leaders were not as willing as Ozal to recog- 
nize Kurdish distinctiveness, and only two months after his 
death in April 1993, the Constitutional Court issued its deci- 
sion declaring the HEP illegal. In anticipation of this outcome, 
the Kurdish deputies had resigned from the HEP only days 
before and formed a new organization, the Democracy Party 
(Demokrasi Partisi — DEP). The DEP's objective was similar to 
that of its predecessor: to promote civil rights for all citizens of 
Turkey. When the DEP was banned in June 1994, Kurdish dep- 
uties formed the new People's Democracy Party (Halkin 
Demokrasi Partisi — HADEP). 

The PKK initiated armed struggle against the state in 1984 
with attacks on gendarmerie posts in the southeast. The PKK's 
leader, Abdullah Ocalan, had formed the group in the late 
1970s while a student in Ankara. Prior to the 1980 coup, 
Ocalan fled to Lebanon, via Syria, where he continued to main- 
tain his headquarters in 1994. Until October 1992, Ocalan's 
brother, Osman, had supervised PKK training camps in the 
mountains separating northern Iraq from Turkey's Hakkari 
and Mardin provinces. It was from these camps that PKK guer- 
rillas launched their raids into Turkey. The main characteristic 
of PKK attacks was the use of indiscriminate violence, and PKK 
guerrillas did not hesitate to kill Kurds whom they considered 
collaborators. Targeted in particular were the government's 
paid militia, known as village guards, and schoolteachers 
accused of promoting forced assimilation. The extreme vio- 
lence of the PKK's methods enabled the government to portray 
the PKK as a terrorist organization and to justify its own poli- 
cies, which included the destruction of about 850 border vil- 
lages and the forced removal of their populations to western 
Turkey. 

In March 1993, the PKK dropped its declared objective of 
creating an independent state of Kurdistan in the southeastern 
provinces that had Kurdish majorities. Its new goal was to 
resolve the Kurdish problem within a democratic and federal 
system. The loss of PKK guerrilla camps in northern Iraq in 
October 1992, following defeat in a major confrontation with 
Iraqi Kurdish forces supported by Turkish military interven- 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

tion, probably influenced this tactical change. At the same 
time, Ocalan announced a unilateral, albeit temporary, cease- 
fire in the PKK's war with Turkish security forces. The latter 
decision may also have reflected the influence of Kurdish civil- 
ian leaders, who had been urging an end to the violence in 
order to test Ozal's commitment to equal rights. Whether there 
were realistic prospects in the spring of 1993 for a political 
solution to the conflict in southeast Turkey may never be 
known. Ozal suffered a fatal heart attack in April, and his suc- 
cessor, Demirel, did not appear inclined to challenge the mili- 
tary, whose position continued to be that elimination of the 
PKK was the appropriate way to pacify the region. Fighting 
between security forces and PKK guerrillas, estimated to num- 
ber as many as 15,000, resumed by June 1993. 

In early 1995, Turkey's other minorities — Arabs, Armenians, 
other Caucasian peoples, Circassians, Georgians, Greeks, and 
Jews — tended toward political quiescence. Arabs, who are con- 
centrated in the southeast to the west of the Kurds and north of 
the border with Syria, had demonstrated over language and 
religious issues in the 1980s. Because most of Turkey's Arabs 
belong to Islam's Alawi branch, whose adherents also include 
the leading politicians of Syria, Ankara's often tense relations 
with Syria tend to be further complicated. 

The Armenian issue also adds tension to foreign affairs. The 
60,000 Armenians estimated to be living in Turkey in the mid- 
1990s had refrained from attracting any political attention to 
their community. However, along with Armenians residing in 
Lebanon, France, Iran, and the United States, the Republic of 
Armenia, which borders Turkey's easternmost province of 
Kars, has embarrassed Turkey with highly publicized annual 
commemorations of the Armenian genocide of 1915-16 — 
which the Turkish government denies ever occurred (see 
World War I, ch. 1). The Turkish government also condemns as 
harmful to overall relations the periodic efforts by the United 
States Congress and the parliaments of European states to pass 
resolutions condemning the mass killings. Various clandestine 
Armenian groups — of which the most prominent is the Arme- 
nian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) — 
have claimed responsibility for assassinations of Turkish diplo- 
matic personnel stationed in the Middle East and Europe. 
Such assassinations have continued to occur in the 1990s. Uni- 
dentified Turkish government officials frequently have leaked 
reports to the news media accusing Armenia, Lebanon, and 



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Government and Politics 



Syria of allowing Armenian terrorists to receive training and 
support within their borders. 

Mass Media 

The Turkish news media consist of a state-operated radio 
and television broadcasting system and privately owned press 
and broadcasting operations. Newspapers are not subject to 
prior censorship, but a 1983 press law restricts them from 
reporting information deemed to fall within the sphere of 
national security and prohibits the publication of papers that 
promote "separatism." Violations of these restrictions result in 
the closing down of newspapers and the prosecution of jour- 
nalists. Except for official press releases, most reports on mili- 
tary operations in southeastern Turkey and almost all accounts 
of public speeches calling for Kurdish cultural rights prompt 
state prosecutors to come before security courts calling for 
judicial investigations of possible press law violations. Amnesty 
International has documented the detention of scores of jour- 
nalists who wrote independent articles about conditions in the 
southeast during 1991-92; in some instances, journalists were 
injured during interrogations or held for prolonged periods 
without access to attorneys. Twenty-eight journalists were tried 
and sentenced to prison in the first six months of 1993 alone. 
Many of them worked for the Istanbul daily Ozgur Gundem, 
which has regularly featured stories on conditions in the Kurd- 
ish areas and has carried interviews with both PKK guerrillas 
and Turkish soldiers. In an apparent attempt to halt publica- 
tion of such articles, the government arrested the newspaper's 
editor in chief, Davut Karadag, in July 1993 and charged him 
with spreading separatist propaganda. Subsequently, editors at 
Medya Gunesi, Aydinlik, and other newspapers were detained on 
similar charges. 

The publication of materials thought to offend public mor- 
als is also grounds for suspending a periodical or confiscating a 
book. The Censor's Board on Obscene Publications has 
responsibility for reviewing potentially offensive material and 
deciding on appropriate action. The weekly Aktuel frequently 
questions the value of, and need for, such a board in a democ- 
racy, using biting satire to deliver its message. In 1993 the edi- 
tor of the weekly and one of its freelance columnists were 
arrested and charged with insulting the board. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

Newspapers and Periodicals 

In 1994 there were more than thirty daily newspapers in 
Turkey. The mass-circulation dailies are based in Istanbul and 
are distributed nationally. These include the country's largest 
newspaper, Hitrriyet (Freedom), which has a circulation of 
more than 850,000, and three other papers, each with daily cir- 
culations ranging from 200,000 to 300,000: Giinaydin (Good 
Morning), Tercuman (Interpreter), and Milliyet (Nationality). A 
smaller paper, Cumhuriyet (Republic), is influential because it is 
read widely by the country's economic and political elite. In all, 
more than a dozen dailies are published in Istanbul. Nine dai- 
lies are published in Ankara and three in Izmir. Other major 
cities, including Adana, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Konya, 
and Mersin, have at least one local daily newspaper. In addition 
to the newspapers, twenty weeklies and a variety of biweekly, 
monthly, bimonthly, and quarterly journals also are published. 

The main news agency in Turkey is the official Anadolu 
Ajansi (Anatolian Agency), founded by Atatiirk in 1920. Its pri- 
mary function is to issue news bulletins and printed informa- 
tion within the country and for distribution abroad. As do most 
newspapers, Turkish radio and television depend on the 
agency as a primary source of domestic news. In 1994 it had 
regional offices in Turkey's major cities as well as correspon- 
dents throughout the country. It also had foreign correspon- 
dents in all major world cities. In addition to the Anatolian 
Agency, several private agencies serve the press. 

Radio and Television 

The government of Turkey began radio broadcasting in 
1927. Atatiirk and his colleagues perceived radio as a means to 
promote modernization and nationalism and thus created a 
Bureau of the Press Directorate to oversee programming and 
ensure that it served national goals. In 1964 the government 
established the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation 
(Tiirkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu — TRT) to expand radio 
facilities and develop public television. Subsequently, the trans- 
mission power of radio stations greatly increased, as did the 
number of licensed receivers. (The government required pur- 
chase of a license for ownership of radios, and later of televi- 
sions.) By 1994 almost the entire nation had radio coverage, 
with thirty-six transmitters beaming a total power of 5,500 kilo- 
watts to an estimated 10 million receivers. TRT also broadcasts 



284 



Government and Politics 



programs abroad in Turkish and in several foreign languages, 
including Arabic, Bulgarian, Greek, and Persian. 

Television developed more slowly than radio, mainly 
because the government considered it a luxury. Television 
broadcasting began through a technical-assistance agreement 
between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany). With the aid of the equipment and technical per- 
sonnel provided under this agreement, TRT inaugurated the 
country's first public television station in Ankara in 1968. Grad- 
ually new stations were opened in Istanbul, Izmir, and other cit- 
ies. Investment in television facilities accelerated after 1972, 
and during the following decade television replaced radio as 
the country's most important mass medium. By 1994 the esti- 
mated number of television sets — 10 million — equaled the 
number of radio receivers. 

TRT had a constitutionally mandated monopoly on radio 
and television broadcasting prior to 1993. It financed its opera- 
tions through limited allocations it received from the govern- 
ment's general budget and income derived from radio and 
television license fees. TRT news presentations and documen- 
taries tended to avoid controversy; television viewers often criti- 
cized the programs as dull. Dissatisfaction with public 
television prompted proposals beginning in the late 1980s to 
amend the constitution to permit private, commercial broad- 
casting. Opposition to private broadcasting came from the mil- 
itary and other groups that feared loss of government control 
over programming. It was not until 1993 that the National 
Assembly approved legislation to authorize private radio and 
television in tandem with public broadcasting. Even before 
their legalization, however, private stations had begun to 
broadcast programs, many of which disturbed officials in the 
national security bureaucracy. For example, in the summer of 
1993 the State Security Court opened an investigation into a 
public affairs program of a private Istanbul channel, charging 
that the program had spread separatist propaganda by includ- 
ing Kurdish guests. 

Foreign Relations 

Turkey began reevaluating its foreign policy in 1991, when 
the United States-led war against Iraq and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union totally upset patterns of international relations 
that had been relatively consistent for more than forty years. 
Both of these developments intimately affected Turkey because 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

the former Soviet Union was its neighbor to the north and east, 
and Iraq its neighbor to the south. Political instability has 
plagued both these regions since 1991, causing some Turkish 
national security analysts to fear possible negative conse- 
quences for their own country. However, other Turks believe 
that the international changes since 1991 offer their country a 
unique opportunity to reassert its historical role as a bridge 
between two regions in which it has had only a marginal pres- 
ence since 1918. 

Dissolution of the Soviet Union 

Since the end of World War II, Turkey had regarded the 
Soviet Union, the superpower with which it shared a 590-kilo- 
meter frontier, as its principal enemy. Fear of Soviet intentions 
was powerful enough to persuade Turkish leaders to join the 
United States-European collective defense agreement, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1952. Partici- 
pation in NATO made Turkey a partisan on the side of the 
West in the Cold War that dominated international politics for 
more than forty years. Turkish suspicions of the Soviet Union 
gradually eased during the era of detente that began in the 
1960s, paving the way for several bilateral economic coopera- 
tion agreements in the 1970s. However, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 revived Turkish concerns about Soviet 
expansionism and led to a cooling of relations that lasted more 
than five years. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Turkish fears again 
eased. Ankara and Moscow concluded a number of agree- 
ments, including plans for a pipeline to carry natural gas from 
Soviet gas fields to Turkey. Economic and diplomatic ties 
between the two countries were being expanded when the 
Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen independent nations. 

For Turkey the practical consequence of the Soviet Union's 
demise was the replacement of one large, powerful, and gener- 
ally predictable neighbor with five smaller near neighbors char- 
acterized by domestic instability and troubling foreign policies. 
Like most states, Turkey perceives Russia as the principal inher- 
itor of Soviet power and influence. Turkish officials likewise 
share in the widespread uncertainty over Russia's role in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formed at the 
end of 1991, and thus try to avoid policies that might antago- 
nize a traditional adversary. Diplomatic contacts with Russia 
and the CIS have focused on the renegotiation of numerous 
Soviet-era economic and technical cooperation agreements 



286 



Government and Politics 



that were in force when the Soviet Union was dissolved. Turkey 
also has initiated multilateral discussions with the five states 
that now border the Black Sea — Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Bul- 
garia, and Romania — on an economic cooperation project 
originally proposed before the demise of the Soviet Union. 
The inaugural meetings of the new group called for ambitious 
plans to increase trade among member states, encourage labor 
mobility, and establish a development bank. 

In Transcaucasia and Central Asia, regions where Turkey is 
most keen to project its influence, Ankara has tended to defer 
to Moscow whenever such a course seems prudent. Turkey's 
efforts to make its presence felt in nearby Transcaucasia have 
been limited not so much by Russia as by the political realities 
that emerged in Transcaucasia itself after December 1991. All 
three new countries in the region — Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia — share land borders with Turkey; thus political and 
economic leaders view them as natural partners for trade and 
development projects. Both President Ozal's Motherland Party 
and Prime Minister Demirel's True Path Party embraced the 
idea of expanding ties with Azerbaijan, an oil-producing coun- 
try whose people speak a Turkic language closely related to 
Anatolian Turkish. 

Almost all the major parties have expressed reservations 
about an independent Armenia, probably on account of the 
historical bitterness between Armenians and Turks. In the mid- 
1990s, the revival of Ottoman-era animosities seemed inevita- 
ble because Armenia and Azerbaijan had become independent 
while fighting an undeclared war over the Azerbaijani province 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, whose ethnic Armenian majority has 
been trying to secede. Turkey adopted an officially neutral 
position in the conflict, although its sympathies lie with Azer- 
baijan. Popular opinion against Armenia became especially 
intense in 1992 and 1993, when military successes by Armenian 
forces caused tens of thousands of Azerbaijani refugees to 
enter Turkey. Turkey responded by applying temporary eco- 
nomic pressure on Armenia, such as closing the transborder 
road to traffic bringing goods into the landlocked country and 
cutting Turkish electrical power to Armenian towns. However, 
Turkey's membership in NATO and the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe (from January 1995, the Orga- 
nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), its concerns 
about overall regional stability — adjacent Georgia was engulfed 
in its own civil war in 1993 — and fears of unpredictable Iranian 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

and Russian reactions all combined to restrain Turkey from 
providing direct military assistance to Azerbaijan. 

Disappointment over the inadequacy of Turkish support was 
one of the factors that prompted the 1993 coup against Azer- 
baijan's staunchly pro-Turkish government. This unexpected 
political change in Baku represented a major blow to Turkish 
policy. The new regime in Azerbaijan was not only cool toward 
Turkey but also determined to cultivate friendlier relations 
with Iran and Russia. These developments provoked opposi- 
tion deputies in Turkey's National Assembly to accuse the 
(filler government of having "lost" Azerbaijan. As of late Janu- 
ary 1995, Ankara's political influence in Baku still was limited, 
although Turkey's overall cultural influence in Azerbaijan 
seemed strong. 

Turkey's policy in Central Asia has proved more successful 
than its Transcaucasian policy. As with Azerbaijan, a feeling of 
pan-Turkic solidarity has prompted Turkish interest in expand- 
ing ties with the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmen- 
istan, and Uzbekistan. In April 1992, in his first year as prime 
minister, Demirel traveled to the region to promote Turkey as a 
political and developmental model for the Central Asian states. 
He explicitly represented Turkey not only as a successful exam- 
ple of what an independent Turkic country could achieve but 
also as a more appropriate model than the Islamic alternative 
offered by Iran, which he perceived as Turkey's main rival for 
influence in the region. Subsequently, Turkey concluded 
numerous cultural, economic, and technical aid agreements 
with the Central Asian states, including non-Turkic Tajikistan. 
Turkey also sponsored full membership for the Central Asian 
countries and Azerbaijan in the Economic Cooperation Orga- 
nization, a regional trade pact whose original members were 
Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. In practice, however, Turkey lacks 
adequate economic resources to play the pivotal role in Central 
Asia to which it aspires. Because Iran also has insufficient capi- 
tal for aid to and investment in the region, the anticipated 
rivalry between Iran and Turkey had failed by the mid-1990s to 
develop into a serious contest. By the time President Ozal fol- 
lowed Demirel's trip with his own tour of the region in April 
1993, Turkey recognized, albeit reluctantly, that Russia, rather 
than Turkey or Iran, had emerged as the dominant political 
force in Central Asia, and that this situation would prevail 
indefinitely. Nevertheless, the new countries have professed 
friendship toward Turkey and welcomed its overtures. In 



288 



Government and Politics 



response, Turkey has reoriented its policies to focus on 
strengthening bilateral cultural ties and encouraging Turkish 
private entrepreneurs to invest in the region. As of early 1995, 
Turkey enjoyed close diplomatic relations with the four Turkic 
republics of Central Asia and good relations with Persian- 
speaking Tajikistan. 

Closely related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union was 
the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. This 
development had positive consequences in terms of Turkey's 
relations with Bulgaria, which borders the Turkish province of 
Thrace. Relations between Turkey and Bulgaria had been 
badly strained between 1985 and 1989 as a result of Bulgaria's 
campaign of forcibly assimilating its Turkish minority, esti- 
mated at 900,000 and comprising approximately 10 percent of 
the country's total population. Efforts by Bulgaria's ethnic 
Turks to protest government policies requiring them to change 
their Turkish and Muslim names to Bulgarian and Christian 
ones, end all Islamic teaching and practices, and stop speaking 
Turkish in public had led to increasingly severe repression. 
This repression culminated in the summer of 1989 with a mass 
exodus of an estimated 320,000 Turkish Bulgarians, who fled 
across the border into Turkey during a seven-week period in 
July and August. The exodus overwhelmed Turkey's refugee 
facilities and provoked an international crisis as well as an 
internal crisis within Bulgaria that contributed to the fall of the 
communist government. Subsequently, Bulgaria's new demo- 
cratic government repealed the controversial assimilation 
decrees and invited those who had fled to return home. Rela- 
tions between Turkey and Bulgaria steadily improved during 
the early 1990s, and the two countries have concluded several 
bilateral trade and technical assistance agreements. A similar 
spirit of cooperation was evident in the agreements signed with 
other East European countries, in particular Hungary and 
Romania. 

In contrast to the generally positive evolution of relations 
with Bulgaria, the international politics surrounding the disin- 
tegration of Yugoslavia proved frustrating for Turkish diplo- 
macy. The plight of the Muslim population of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during the civil war that followed Bosnia's 1992 
declaration of independence aroused popular sympathy in 
Turkey and support for interventionist policies to help the Bos- 
nian Muslims. Although the government supported the United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Bosnia and an auxiliary 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

NATO military role, Ankara criticized these efforts as inade- 
quate. In the mid-1990s, Turkey favored firmer measures 
against Bosnian Serbs and the government of Serbia, which 
Turkey, like other countries, had accused of providing military 
aid and other assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. However, as of 
early 1995, Turkey was not prepared to take unilateral steps in 
Bosnia that might antagonize its NATO partners. 

The Middle East 

Turkey shares borders with three major Middle Eastern 
countries: Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey ruled much of the 
region during the Ottoman Empire, but between 1945 and 
1990 Turkish leaders consciously avoided involvement in vari- 
ous Middle Eastern conflicts. President Ozal broke with that 
tradition in 1990 when he sided with the United States-led coa- 
lition confronting Iraq following its invasion and annexation of 
Kuwait. To comply with the economic sanctions that the UN 
imposed on Iraq, Ozal closed down the two pipelines used to 
transport Iraqi oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea. 
Although Turkey did not formally join the military coalition 
that fought against Iraq, it deployed about 150,000 troops 
along its border with Iraq, which caused Baghdad to divert an 
equivalent number of forces from the south to the north of the 
country. Furthermore, Turkey authorized United States air- 
craft to use the military air base at Incirlik for raids over Iraq. A 
likely motive for Turkish support of the war against Iraq was a 
desire to strengthen ties with the United States and other 
NATO allies at a time of considerable uncertainty — at least in 
Turkey — about post-Cold War strategic relations. 

The Persian Gulf War's main consequence for Turkey was 
the internationalization of the Kurdish issue. Following Iraq's 
defeat by the United States-led coalition at the end of February 
1991, Iraq's Kurdish minority, which constituted approximately 
15 percent of the .approximately 19 million population, 
rebelled against the government of Saddam Husayn. Govern- 
ment forces repressed the rebellion within three weeks, precip- 
itating a mass exodus of almost the entire Kurdish population 
of northern Iraq toward the Iranian and Turkish borders. 
Unable to deal with the refugee flood, Turkey closed its bor- 
ders in April after more than 400,000 Kurds had fled into 
Hakkari and Mardin provinces. Turkish soldiers prevented 
about 500,000 more Kurdish refugees on the Iraqi side of the 
border from crossing over to Turkey, forcing them to remain in 



290 



Government and Politics 



makeshift camps; an additional 1 million other Kurds fled into 
Iran. The humanitarian crisis and the international publicity 
surrounding it posed a major dilemma for Turkey, which was 
reluctant to absorb hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refu- 
gees. Furthermore, Turkey opposed the creation of permanent 
refugee camps, believing such camps would become breeding 
grounds for militant nationalism, as had happened in the Pal- 
estinian refugee camps established during the war that fol- 
lowed Israel's creation in 1948. 

Turkey's preferred solution to the Kurdish refugee crisis has 
been for the Kurds to return to their homes in Iraq with guar- 
antees for their safety within a political environment that would 
encourage their integration into a united Iraq. Negotiations 
with Britain, France, and the United States produced an agree- 
ment in June 1991 to establish an interim protected zone in 
northern Iraq in which all Iraqi military activities would be pro- 
hibited. Turkey would permit its allies to use the Incirlik Air 
Base for armed reconnaissance flights over the protected zone. 
The interim period originally was intended to last for six 
months but could be extended for an additional six months at 
the discretion of the National Assembly. Although the agree- 
ment created a de facto safe haven in Iraq's three northern 
provinces and prompted a majority of the Kurdish refugees to 
return home, it did not resolve the political problem between 
the refugees and the Iraqi government. On the contrary, Bagh- 
dad responded by imposing a blockade on the north, effec- 
tively making the Kurds economically dependent on Iran and 
Turkey. The Western powers saw Iraq's attitude as justifying 
prolongation of the safe-haven agreement; as of January 1995, 
it was still in force. 

Turkey has opposed the creation of an autonomous Kurdish 
government in northern Iraq. However, Iraq's intransigence 
toward the UN after the Persian Gulf War and the determina- 
tion of the United States to limit its involvement in the safe- 
haven zone to air patrols made the formation of a local admin- 
istration inevitable. Turkey reluctantly acquiesced after Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders reassured Ankara that an autonomous govern- 
ment would not pursue independence for the Kurds but would 
cooperate with all Iraqi opposition groups to create a demo- 
cratic alternative to Saddam Husayn's regime. Following elec- 
tions for a representative regional assembly in May 1992, an 
autonomous government claiming to operate in keeping with 
the Iraqi constitution was established at Irbil. Turkey has 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

accepted this government as the de facto authority in northern 
Iraq, but has not recognized it as a de jure provincial govern- 
ment. Turkey has made its continued cooperation with this 
autonomous government contingent on the Kurds' support of 
Iraq's territorial integrity and their assistance in controlling 
PKK camps in northern Iraq. 

The Kurdish issue also assumed an important role in Tur- 
key's relations with both Iran and Syria beginning in 1991. 
Ankara was concerned that Damascus and Tehran might 
exploit the Kurdish issue to put pressure on Turkey to compro- 
mise on other issues over which there were deep disagree- 
ments. For example, although Turkey had enjoyed relatively 
close political and diplomatic relations with Iran for more than 
fifty years following the establishment of the Republic of Tur- 
key in 1923, these ties were strained after 1979 when the Ira- 
nian Revolution brought to power an Islamic theocratic regime 
that frequently cites secular governments such as Turkey's as an 
evil that Muslims should resist. Although bilateral trade 
remained important to both countries throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s, their economic ties have not prevented the 
regular eruption of tension. One source of intermittent fric- 
tion has been the presence in Turkey of thousands of Iranians 
who fled their country during the 1980s because they opposed 
the religious government, preferred not to live under its puri- 
tanical legal codes, or wanted to evade military service during 
the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Tehran has periodically protested 
that Ankara allows "terrorists" (i.e., members of various Iranian 
opposition groups) to reside in Turkey. Turkish security offi- 
cials in turn suspect that Iranian diplomats in Turkey have 
been involved in assassinations of Iranian opposition leaders 
and also have assisted some of the militant Turkish Islamists 
who began resorting to violence in the late 1980s. With respect 
to international concerns, Turkey resents Iran's criticism of its 
membership in NATO, distrusts Iran's alliance with Syria and 
its cooperation with Armenia, and perceives Iran as a competi- 
tor for influence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Above all, 
Turkish leaders believe that Iran supports the PKK and even 
provides sanctuary and bases for it in the area of northwest 
Iran that borders Kars, Agri, Van, and Hakkari provinces. 

Turkish suspicions of Iranian support for the PKK probably 
originated in 1987, when Iran strongly protested Turkey's 
bombing of Iraqi Kurdish villages that Ankara claimed were 
bases for PKK guerrillas. At the time Iran condemned this vio- 



292 



Government and Politics 



lation of Iraqi sovereignty, Iran and Iraq were at war, with Ira- 
nian forces occupying parts of southern Iraq. Iran's protest may 
have been prompted by the fact that the area Turkey bombed 
was controlled by an Iraqi Kurdish opposition group to which 
Iran was allied. This group not only helped Iran by fighting 
against Saddam Husayn's regime but also cooperated with Iran 
to suppress Iranian Kurdish opposition. From Turkey's per- 
spective, however, this same Kurdish group was too friendly 
toward the PKK. 

This complex intertwining of domestic and international 
Kurdish politics continued to cause misunderstanding between 
Turkey and Iran for more than five years. However, beginning 
in 1992, Turkish and Iranian views on the Kurdish issue gradu- 
ally converged as Iranian Kurdish opposition groups initiated 
operations in Iran from bases in territory controlled by the 
Kurdish autonomous authority in northern Iraq. Iran not only 
ceased protesting Turkish actions in Iraq, but it even followed 
Turkey's example in bombing opposition bases in Iraq. During 
1993 Iran also responded favorably to Turkish proposals per- 
taining to security cooperation in the region along their com- 
mon border and joined Turkey in affirming opposition to an 
independent Kurdish state being carved out of Iraq. 

Syria joined Iran and Turkey in declaring support for the 
territorial integrity of Iraq, and representatives of the three 
states met periodically after 1991 to discuss mutual concerns 
about developments in northern Iraq. Nevertheless, Turkey 
has had serious reservations about Syria's motives; some Turk- 
ish officials believe that if an appropriate opportunity pre- 
sented itself, Syria would use the Kurdish issue to create a 
Kurdish state in parts of both Iraq and Turkey. Such pessimistic 
views stem from Syria's long support of the PKK. Turks believe 
that Syria permits the PKK to maintain a training base in Leba- 
non — where Syrian troops have been stationed since 1976 — 
and allows PKK leaders to live freely in Damascus. Tensions 
between Turkey and Syria actually had been accumulating long 
before the eruption of the PKK "dispute" in 1984. Like Iraq, 
Syria was an Ottoman province until 1918. Subsequently, it was 
governed by France as a League of Nations mandate. In 1939 
France detached Hatay (formerly Alexandretta) province from 
Syria and ceded it to Turkey, an action bitterly opposed by Arab 
nationalists. Syria thus became independent in 1946 with an 
irredentist claim against Turkey. The Arab-Israeli conflict soon 
developed as another source of Syrian antagonism toward Tur- 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

key, which extended diplomatic recognition to Israel in 1948. 
Syria's staunch Arab nationalists also condemned Turkey's par- 
ticipation in NATO and other Western defense arrangements 
during the 1950s and 1960s. 

Turkey's adoption in 1974 of a more evenhanded policy 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict failed to impress Syria. Much to 
Turkey's disappointment, Syria supported the Greeks in the 
conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities on the 
island of Cyprus. By the mid-1970s, Turkey was convinced that 
Syria was facilitating Armenian terrorist operations against 
Turkish diplomats abroad. Given the coolness and mutual sus- 
picions that have characterized their relations, neither Syria 
nor Turkey was prepared to be sensitive to the other's interests. 
One reflection of this attitude was Turkey's decision to proceed 
with plans for a major dam project on the Euphrates River, 
apparently without adequate consultation with Syria. The 
Euphrates rises in the mountains of northern Anatolia, and 
Syria's territory is bisected by the river before it enters Iraq on 
its way to the Persian Gulf. Upon completion of the project, 
Turkey demonstrated the way control of the flow of water to 
downstream users in Syria could be used for political purposes, 
provoking a minicrisis in already tense relations. Thus the dam 
became yet another source of tension between the two coun- 
tries. 

Turkey's relations with other Arab countries, including Iraq 
prior to 1990, have been more positive than those with Syria. In 
early 1995, trade seemed to be the most important aspect of 
overall relations. Ankara had hoped that its support of the 
United States-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War would pro- 
duce economic rewards. In fact, some Turkish business inter- 
ests won contracts for construction projects in the Persian Gulf 
region, albeit not to the extent anticipated. Turkey's regional 
exports prior to 1990 had gone primarily to Iraq and second- 
arily to Iran. The loss of the Iraqi market because of Turkish 
compliance with sanctions initially represented a severe blow to 
export-dependent businesses and probably contributed to an 
economic recession in 1991. Beginning in 1992, however, Tur- 
key gradually increased the level of its exports — particularly 
processed food and manufactured goods — to Kuwait and other 
Persian Gulf states. Although the prospects for expanding 
trade with Egypt and Israel appear limited because Turkey and 
these countries export similar products that compete in inter- 
national markets, Turkey, nevertheless, has consolidated its 



294 



Government and Politics 



political ties to both countries. Since 1992, for example, Israeli 
and Turkish investors have undertaken several joint-venture 
development projects in Central Asia. Turkey also imports 
most of its oil from Middle Eastern countries, particularly 
Libya. 

European Union 

Since 1963, when it was accepted as an associate member of 
the European Community (EC), Turkey has striven for admis- 
sion as a full member of that body, now called the European 
Union (EU — see Glossary), the association of fifteen West 
European nations that comprises^ the world's wealthiest and 
most successful trading bloc. The Ozal government, which had 
formulated its economic policies with the goal of meeting cer- 
tain EC objections to a perceived lack of competitiveness in 
Turkish industry, formally applied for full membership in 
1987. Much to Turkey's disappointment, the decision was 
deferred until 1993 — or later — on grounds that the EC could 
not consider new members until after the implementation of 
tighter political integration scheduled for the end of 1992. The 
unexpected end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union actually delayed integration by one year, prima- 
rily to allow time for the EU to adjust to West Germany's 
absorption of East Germany. The new Demirel government, 
which strongly supported Ozal's goal of joining the EC, was dis- 
appointed in 1992 when the EC agreed to consider member- 
ship applications from Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
without making a decision on Turkey's long-standing applica- 
tion. By then it seemed obvious that the EC was reluctant to act 
on Turkey's application. In fact, most EC members objected to 
full Turkish membership for a variety of economic, social, and 
political reasons. 

The principal economic objections to Turkish membership 
center on the relative underdevelopment of Turkey's economy 
compared to the economies of EC/EU members and Turkey's 
high rate of population growth. The latter issue is perceived as 
a potentially serious problem because of free labor movement 
among EU members and the fact that Turkey's already large 
population is expected to surpass that of Germany — the most 
populous EU member — by 2010. Closely related to the con- 
cern about there being too many Turkish workers for too few 
jobs is the social problem of integrating those workers into 
European culture. Throughout Western Europe, the early 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

1990s witnessed a rise in anti-immigrant feeling directed prima- 
rily against Muslim workers from North Africa and Turkey. For 
the most part, EU governments have not developed policies to 
combat this resurgence of prejudice. 

The political obstacles to EU membership concern Turkey's 
domestic and foreign policies. Because the European body 
prides itself on being an association of democracies, the 1980 
military coup — in a country enjoying associate status — was a 
severe shock. The harshness of repression under the military 
regime further disturbed the EC — many EG leaders knew per- 
sonally the former Turkish leaders whom the military put on 
trial for treason. The EC responded by freezing relations with 
Turkey and suspending economic aid. A related body, the 
Council of Europe, also expelled Turkey from its parliamen- 
tary assembly. The restoration of civilian rule gradually helped 
to improve Turkey's image. In 1985 Germany's prime minister 
signaled the EC's readiness to resume dialogue with Turkey by 
accepting an invitation to visit Ankara. The following year, the 
EC restored economic aid and permitted Turkey to reoccupy 
its seats in European deliberative councils. Nevertheless, fre- 
quent veiled threats by Turkey's senior military officers of 
future interventions if politicians "misbehaved" did not inspire 
confidence in Europe that democracy had taken permanent 
root in Turkey. As late as 1995, some Europeans remained 
apprehensive about the possibility of another military coup, a 
concern that was shared by various Turkish politicians. 

EU members have also expressed reservations about Tur- 
key's human rights record. Amnesty International and Helsinki 
Watch, two human rights monitoring organizations supported 
by the EU, have reported the persistence of practices such as 
arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture 
in prisons, and censorship. The Turkish Human Rights Associa- 
tion, itself subject to harassment and intimidation tactics, has 
prepared detailed chronologies and lists of human rights 
abuses, including the destruction of entire villages without due 
process, and has circulated these reports widely in Europe. The 
documented reports of human rights abuses, like the coup 
rumors, sustained questions about Turkey's qualifications to 
join a collective body of countries that have striven to achieve 
uniform standards for protecting citizen rights. 

In terms of foreign policy, the main obstacle to EU member- 
ship remains the unresolved issues between Turkey and EU 
member Greece. The most serious issue between the two coun- 



296 



Government and Politics 



tries is their dispute over the island of Cyprus, which dates back 
to 1974. At that time, Turkish troops occupied the northeast- 
ern part of the island to protect the Turkish minority (20 per- 
cent of the population), which felt threatened by the Greek 
majority's proposals for unification with Greece. Years of nego- 
tiations have failed to resolve a stalemate based on the de facto 
partition of Cyprus into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek 
Cypriot south, a division that continues to be enforced by a 
Turkish force estimated at 25,000 troops in early 1995 (see 
Conflict and Diplomacy: Cyprus and Beyond, ch. 1). 

Following the November 1983 declaration of independence 
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus — a government 
recognized only by Turkey in early 1995 — Greece persuaded 
fellow EU members that progress on settling the dispute over 
Cyprus should be a prerequisite to accepting Turkey as a full 
member. Despite Ankara's position that such an obvious politi- 
cal condition was not appropriate for an economic association, 
once the EC agreed in 1990 to consider an application for 
membership from Cyprus, diplomatic efforts aimed at convinc- 
ing individual EC members to veto the condition became 
futile. Since 1990 Turkey has supported UN-mediated talks 
between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders that are 
aimed at devising procedures for the island's reunification. As 
of January 1995, these intermittent discussions had made little 
progress, and the prospects for a resolution of the Cyprus prob- 
lem appeared dim. 

Equally as serious as the Cyprus issue is Turkey's dispute 
with Greece over territorial rights and interests in the Aegean 
Sea. Although both Greece and Turkey are de jure allies in 
NATO, their conflicting claims brought them to the brink of 
war in 1986 and 1987. A fundamental source of contention is 
exploration rights to minerals, primarily oil, beneath the 
Aegean Sea. International law recognizes the right of a country 
to explore the mineral wealth on its own continental shelf. 
Greece and Turkey, however, have been unable to agree on 
what constitutes the Aegean continental shelf. Turkey defines 
the Aegean shelf as a natural prolongation of the Anatolian 
coast, whereas Greece claims that every one of the more than 
2,000 of its islands in the Aegean has its own shelf. The issue is 
complicated further by Greece's claim to the territorial waters 
surrounding its islands. Turkey rejected Greece's attempts to 
extend its six-nautical-mile territorial claim around each island 
to twelve nautical miles on grounds that such a move would 



297 



Turkey: A Country Study 

enable Greece to control 71 percent, rather than 43 percent, of 
the Aegean. Thus, it would be impossible for Turkish ships to 
reach the Mediterranean Sea without crossing Greek waters. 

The issue of the right to control the airspace over the 
Aegean appears similarly intractable. Greece, which was 
granted control of air and sea operations over the entire 
Aegean region by various NATO agreements, closed the 
Aegean air corridors during the 1974 Cyprus crisis and only 
reopened them early in 1980 as part of the compromise 
arrangement for Greek reintegration into NATO. Disputes 
over the median line dividing the Aegean into approximately 
equal sectors of responsibility remain unresolved. In addition, 
Turkey refuses to recognize the ten-mile territorial air limit 
decreed by Greece in 1931; this line extends from the coast of 
Greece's mainland as well as from its islands. These unresolved 
issues contribute to the tensions over Cyprus and mineral 
exploration rights in the Aegean Sea. 

Prime Minister Ozal recognized the potential of Greece to 
block Turkish admission to the EC even before his government 
formally submitted its application. Thus, early in 1987 he 
attempted to defuse tensions by initiating a meeting with his 
Greek counterpart in Switzerland — the first meeting between 
Greek and Turkish heads of government in ten years. Their dis- 
cussions resolved an immediate crisis over oil drilling in the 
Aegean and established channels for further diplomatic discus- 
sions. In June 1988, Ozal accepted an unprecedented invita- 
tion to visit Athens, the first state visit by a Turkish leader in 
thirty-six years. Although Ozal's initiatives did much to clear 
the political atmosphere, leaders in both countries remain 
unable to overcome their mutual suspicions. Thus, no progress 
has been achieved in resolving outstanding differences, 
although both countries are showing more restraint in their 
rhetoric and actions. Beginning in 1989, dramatic political 
developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East caused 
Turkey and Greece to focus their attention beyond the Aegean 
Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. 

The United States 

In early 1995, Turkey's most important international rela- 
tionship was with the United States. Turkey's association with 
the United States began in 1947 when the United States Con- 
gress designated Turkey, under the provisions of the Truman 
Doctrine, as the recipient of special economic and military 



298 



Prime Minister Tansu Qiller with President William J. Clinton 

at the White House in late 1994 
Courtesy The White House 

assistance intended to help it resist threats from the Soviet 
Union (see Politics and Foreign Relations in the 1960s, ch. 1). 
A mutual interest in containing Soviet expansion provided the 
foundation of United States-Turkish relations for the next forty 
years. In support of overall United States Cold War strategy, 
Turkey contributed personnel to the UN forces in the Korean 
War (1950-53), joined NATO in 1952, became a founding 
member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) collec- 
tive defense pact established in 1955, and endorsed the princi- 
ples of the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine. Throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, Turkey generally cooperated with other United 
States allies in the Middle East (Iran, Israel, and Jordan) to 
contain the influence of those countries (Egypt, Iraq, and 
Syria) regarded as Soviet clients. 

The general tendency for relationships between nations to 
experience strain in the wake of domestic and international 
political changes has proved to be the rule for Turkey and the 
United States. The most difficult period in their relationship 
followed Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974. In 
response to the military intervention, the United States halted 
arms supplies to Turkey. Ankara retaliated by suspending 



299 



Turkey: A Country Study 

United States military operations at all Turkish installations 
that were not clearly connected with NATO missions. The 
Cyprus issue affected United States-Turkish relations for sev- 
eral years. Even after the United States Congress lifted the arms 
embargo in 1978, two years passed before bilateral defense 
cooperation and military assistance were restored to their 1974 
level. 

During the 1980s, relations between Turkey and the United 
States gradually recovered the closeness of earlier years. 
Although Ankara resented continued attempts by the United 
States Congress to restrict military assistance to Turkey because 
of Cyprus and to introduce congressional resolutions con- 
demning the 1915-16 massacre of Armenians, the Ozal govern- 
ment generally perceived the administrations of President 
Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bush as sympa- 
thetic to Turkish interests. For example, Washington demon- 
strated its support of Ozal's market-oriented economic policies 
and efforts to open the Turkish economy to international trade 
by pushing for acceptance of an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary) program to provide economic assistance 
to Turkey. Furthermore, the United States, unlike European 
countries, did not persistently and publicly criticize Turkey 
over allegations of human rights violations. Also, the United 
States did not pressure Ozal on the Kurdish problem, another 
issue that seemed to preoccupy the Europeans. By 1989 the 
United States had recovered a generally positive image among 
the Turkish political elite. 

The end of the Cold War forced Turkish leaders to reassess 
their country's international position. The disappearance of 
the Soviet threat and the perception of being excluded from 
Europe have created a sense of vulnerability with respect to 
Turkey's position in the fast-changing global political environ- 
ment. Ozal believed Turkey's future security depended on the 
continuation of a strong relationship with the United States. 
For that reason, he supported the United States position dur- 
ing the Persian Gulf War, although Turkey's economic ties to 
Iraq were extensive and their disruption hurt the country. 
After the war, he continued to support major United States ini- 
tiatives in the region, including the creation of a no-fly zone 
over northern Iraq, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and 
expanded ties with the Central Asian members of the CIS. 
Ozal's pro-United States policy was not accepted by all Turks. 
United States use of Turkish military installations during the 



300 



Government and Politics 

bombing of Iraq in 1991 led to antiwar demonstrations in sev- 
eral cities, and sporadic attacks on United States facilities con- 
tinued in 1992 and 1993. Nevertheless, among Turkey's 
political elite a consensus had emerged by January 1995 that 
Turkey's security depended on remaining a strategic ally of the 
United States. For that reason, both the Demirel and (filler gov- 
ernments undertook efforts to cultivate relations with the 
administrations of presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. 
Clinton. 

* * * 

George S. Harris analyzes Turkey's governmental frame- 
work, political dynamics, and foreign policy from both histori- 
cal and contemporary perspectives in Turkey: Coping with Crisis. 
Frank Tachau describes the tension among authoritarianism, 
democracy, and economic development in Turkey: The Politics of 
Authority, Democracy, and Development. Insight into the break- 
down of Turkish democracy and the framing of a new constitu- 
tion is provided in Clement H. Dodd's The Crisis of Turkish 
Democracy and in Lucille W. Pevsner's Turkey's Political Crisis. 

Religion and religious movements in contemporary Turkey 
are examined in Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey, by 
Serif A. Mardin, and in a volume edited by Richard Tapper, 
Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics, and Literature in a Secu- 
lar State. Information on patterns of political participation 
through specialized associations can be obtained from Robert 
Bianchi's detailed study, Interest Groups and Political Development 
in Turkey. David Barchard examines aspects of Turkey's foreign 
policy in Turkey and the West. The complicated relationship 
between Turkey and Greece and it simplications for the United 
States are examined in Theodore A. Couloumbis's The United 
States, Greece, and Turkey and Monteagle Stearns's Entangled 
Allies: United States Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 5. National Security 




The Rumeli Hisar or castle guards the Bosporus and Istanbul 



THE ARMED FORCES have figured prominently in Turkish 
national life for centuries. Under Ottoman rule, the govern- 
ment and the military establishment were virtually indistin- 
guishable. After World War I, the army commander, Mustafa 
Kemal, later called Atatiirk (meaning Father Turk), evicted the 
occupying forces of the victorious Allies from Anatolia and for- 
mulated the principles underlying the modern Turkish state. 
On three occasions since then, the military leadership has 
intervened to protect the nation's democratic framework. The 
third interlude of military rule, which lasted from 1980 to 
1983, was welcomed by many Turkish citizens because it ended 
the terrorism of the 1970s. The military's actions, however, also 
limited the democratic process. 

A member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) since 1952, Turkey long had the vital mission of 
anchoring the alliance's southern flank against the military 
power of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Turkish armed 
forces defended the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and Tur- 
key's northeastern border with the Soviet Union in the Trans- 
caucasus region. Vessels of the Soviet Union's Black Sea fleet 
had to transit the Turkish-controlled straits to enter the Medi- 
terranean. 

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamen- 
tally changed Turkey's security environment. Fear of Soviet 
aggression no longer looms over the nation, yet Turkey 
remains at the center of a region seething with political and 
economic discord. The stability of Turkey's borders is threat- 
ened by turbulence among the newly independent republics of 
the Caucasus and by hostile states in the Middle East. Turkey's 
concern over the fortunes of the Turkic states of Central Asia 
could bring it into conflict with Russia or Iran. Turkey is an 
advocate of the interests of Muslim peoples in the Balkans, but 
its modest military role as part of the United Nations (UN) 
Protection Force in Bosnia has generated controversy because 
of memories of the Ottoman Empire's long involvement there. 

The Turkish government has taken sweeping measures to 
restructure and modernize the armed forces to deal with the 
new conditions, in which Soviet military might has been super- 
seded by a multiplicity of threats near Turkey's eastern and 
southern borders. The new strategy emphasizes the ability to 



305 



Turkey: A Country Study 

perform a variety of missions, move forces rapidly from one 
region to another, and mount firepower sufficient to meet any 
foreseeable threat. Undergoing the most radical reorganiza- 
tion have been the land forces, which were reduced from about 
525,000 troops in 1990 to about 393,000 in 1994. For added 
flexibility, the army has adopted a brigade structure in place of 
the previous divisional pattern. The army's stocks of tanks and 
armored vehicles have been enlarged and improved; self-pro- 
pelled howitzers and multiple rocket launchers also have been 
added. Troop-carrying helicopters will ensure greater mobility. 

An expanded Turkish defense industry has played a major 
role in the modernization of the armed forces. Under joint- 
venture programs with United States manufacturers, combat 
aircraft, armored vehicles, rocket systems, and tank upgrades 
have been supplied. Submarines and other vessels have been 
produced in cooperation with the German shipbuilding indus- 
try. The centerpiece of the modernization effort has been the 
United States-Turkey F-16 coproduction project, which is 
expected to add 240 high-performance fighter aircraft to the 
Turkish inventory during the 1990s. 

Turkey and the United States developed many defense links 
and common goals after United States military and economic 
assistance began in 1947 in response to the threat of Soviet 
expansion. For instance, Turkey has permitted the United 
States to use forward bases and intelligence installations on 
Turkish territory. During the Cold War, these installations were 
of vital importance in monitoring military activity and weapons 
testing by the Soviet Union. Following the end of the Persian 
Gulf War in 1991, Turkish bases enabled the United States and 
coalition forces to conduct Operation Provide Comfort, an 
effort to supply humanitarian relief to Kurds in northern Iraq 
and enforce a "no-fly zone" in the area against Iraqi aircraft. 

Overshadowing all external threats to Turkish security is the 
Kurdish insurgency, which began in 1984 in the southeastern 
region of the country. This movement, which involves only a 
small minority of Turkey's Kurdish population, is led by the 
extremist Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdis- 
tan — PKK). The conflict became particularly violent beginning 
in 1992. Some 4,000 Kurds and government security personnel 
were killed in 1993 alone, many of them noncombatants. The 
activities of the PKK complicate Turkey's relations with Syria, 
Iraq, and Iran, where the PKK insurgents have maintained sup- 
ply and training bases. By early 1995, the Turkish government 



306 



National Security 



had deployed nearly 200,000 soldiers and police to the region, 
and had adopted a policy of forcibly evacuating and often 
burning Kurdish villages believed to be aiding the insurgents. 
These measures apparently dampened the insurgency, but at 
the cost of alienating large numbers of Kurds not involved in 
the separatist movement. 

Historical Role of the Armed Forces 

The professional armed forces of Turkey trace their origins 
back more than five centuries, to a permanent body of men 
recruited to form the nucleus of the much larger armies mobi- 
lized to conduct annual campaigns against selected objectives. 
A unique feature of the Ottoman military organization was the 
janissary army, whose members were conscripted as youths 
from among the empire's non-Muslim subjects in the Balkans, 
converted to Islam, and given military training. Gradually 
acquiring high status, prominence, and privilege, the janissar- 
ies ultimately constituted a reactionary palace guard resistant 
to reforms and of little military value to the reigning sultan. 

Military conquest permitted the spread of the Ottoman 
Empire through the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, 
and most of Eastern Europe. The sequence of Ottoman victo- 
ries was finally halted and a gradual military eclipse ensued 
after the failure of the siege of Vienna in 1683 (see Koprvilu 
Era, ch. 1). Vast territories were relinquished as a result of a 
century of setbacks in battles with the European powers. 

The need to modernize a military system engaged in a los- 
ing struggle to maintain Ottoman control over the Mediterra- 
nean littoral and the Middle East was recognized by the first of 
the reforming sultans, Selim III (r. 1789-1807). He introduced 
French instructors to train the soldiers of a new volunteer army 
organized along the lines of contemporary European armed 
forces. However, his efforts were successfully resisted by the jan- 
issaries, who concluded that reform foreshadowed an end to 
their traditional privileges. Rising up in 1807, the janissaries 
precipitated the sultan's abdication and the dismantling of the 
new army. Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) eventually became strong 
enough to challenge the power of the traditional military caste. 
He reinstituted the reformed army and, in 1826, crushed the 
janissaries with a massive artillery barrage aimed at their bar- 
racks. 

The internal decay of the Ottoman Empire during the late 
nineteenth century was accompanied by growing disaffection 



307 



Turkey: A Country Study 

and turmoil among younger military officers and civil servants. 
Coming together as the Committee of Union and Progress 
(better known as the Young Turks), and operating as secret 
cells within military units, the dissidents instigated a series of 
upheavals and mutinies within the military that culminated in 
the revolution of 1908 and the fall of Sultan Abdul Hamid II 
(see The Young Turks, ch. 1). Divided between nationalist and 
liberal factions, the Young Turk officers could not prevent for- 
eign powers from seizing portions of the empire's Balkan hold- 
ings. After the empire's defeat at the hands of Bulgaria, Greece, 
Italy, and Serbia in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, a military dic- 
tatorship emerged, under the nominal control of the sultan. 
Motivated by their fear of Russia, the nationalist officers made 
the fateful error of joining the Central Powers in World War I. 
Initially, the Turkish army was successful, stubbornly resisting 
the landing of British and Australian forces at Gallipoli in 1915 
and forcing their withdrawal the following year. But operations 
against Russia went badly, and tsarist forces advanced onto 
Turkish soil. In Mesopotamia and Palestine, British and Arab 
units also prevailed against the Turks (see World War I, ch. 1). 

A new contingent of Young Turks led by the war hero 
Ataturk resisted the postwar occupation of most of Turkey by 
Greek, French, Italian, and British forces. A series of defeats 
were administered to the Greek troops, resulting in their with- 
drawal in 1922. The Turks subsequently forced the occupying 
Allies to accede to a peace treaty recognizing the present bor- 
ders of Turkey and enabling the proclamation in 1923 of the 
Republic of Turkey, with Ataturk as its president (see War of 
Independence, ch. 1). 

Ataturk envisioned Turkey as a modern, secular democracy 
in which the army would distance itself from the civil functions 
of government. The army nevertheless preserved the right to 
intervene as the ultimate guardian of the state if the political 
system became deadlocked or Ataturk's reforms were endan- 
gered. Although active-duty officers were forbidden to engage 
in politics, the interests of the military did not go unrepre- 
sented. Until 1950 many influential leadership posts and at 
least 20 percent of the seats in the Grand National Assembly 
were held by individuals with military backgrounds. For nearly 
thirty years, the nation was governed by two military heroes of 
the War of Independence — first Ataturk and then, after his 
death in 1938, Ismet Inonu — and a single political party in 
which retired senior officers were heavily represented. 



308 



National Security 



The Armed Forces and Society 

The armed forces traditionally have enjoyed a distinguished 
position in Turkish national life. Soldiers receive widespread 
respect as symbols of Turkish national identity and as legatees 
of the country's long martial traditions. A leading Turkish jour- 
nalist has written that "the army is always praised, never criti- 
cized, and, in an emergency, it is seen as the nation's savior." 
Over the centuries, the army has been perceived as a civilizing 
and humanizing factor in society. In the modern era, it is con- 
sidered the embodiment of the enlightened, progressive forces 
that inspired the revolution of 1908 against Ottoman rule and 
later prevented the nation's dismemberment by driving out the 
occupying armies after World War I. The army also has 
received credit for rescuing the nation from the turmoil and 
violence of the late 1970s. 

Turks recognize that a career in the armed forces provides 
the opportunity for a quality education at no cost, followed by a 
lifetime of secure and respected employment. Although some 
members of the middle and upper classes hold the view that 
the specialized education and isolated life of the officer pro- 
duce individuals inflexibly committed to a set of values remote 
from the real world, such criticism is rarely expressed openly. 
In any event, a career in the armed forces has become less of a 
lifetime commitment than in the past. Because of the superior 
technical education it provides, military service is often seen as 
an avenue to a successful civilian career. 

Because of the large number of applicants for places in the 
military high schools and service academies, the standards for 
officer candidates remain high. In the course of their military 
education, students learn the values of Kemalism (the precepts 
of Ataturk) and are taught to take pride in the role of the mili- 
tary in protecting the democratic state against the extremes of 
left and right and the appeal of radical Islamism. Officers tend 
to develop an outlook that is nationalistic and hierarchical. In 
the early 1960s, a minority of junior officers had left-wing sym- 
pathies, but strict background checks, together with the 
emphasis on cohesiveness and discipline, are believed subse- 
quently to have produced an officer corps immune to radical- 
ism. The military maintains intense vigilance against the 
infiltration of leftist thought, as well as against Islamic activism 
(also seen as fundamentalism). 

The officer corps enjoys certain privileges, but the military 
makes efforts to keep these from becoming conspicuous 



309 



Turkey: A Country Study 

enough to provoke civilian criticism. Officers consider clubs, 
attractive housing, vacation resorts, and sports facilities as nec- 
essary to compensate for the modest pay and other disadvan- 
tages of career military service. Officers are also expected to 
meet high standards of personal probity. 

Most individuals entering the service academies are drawn 
from the lower-middle and middle classes. The results of one 
survey showed that about 40 percent of army and air force 
cadets and 55 percent of naval cadets were sons of military ser- 
vice members, gendarmes, or civil servants, in particular teach- 
ers. This suggests, one analyst has noted, a perpetuation of the 
sense of kinship with the spirit of Ataturk and the revolution of 
1908. Less than 10 percent of those entering the army and air 
force academies in the earlyl980s were from rural families; 
naval cadets with an agricultural background were almost 
unknown. Geographically, central Anatolia and areas adjacent 
to the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara were overrepre- 
sented, whereas southeastern Turkey was most underrepre- 
sented, supplying only 1 to 2 percent of cadets (see fig. 1). 
Resistance to assimilation by Kurdish- and Arabic-speaking 
minorities in the southeast and strict political screening may 
account for the limited recruitment from this area to the offi- 
cer corps. 

In contrast to officer candidates, enlisted personnel, espe- 
cially conscripts, are preponderantly from peasant households. 
At least 80 to 85 percent are ethnically Turkish, and the vast 
majority are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims. Once rare, efforts 
to evade the draft or obtain unjustified deferments apparently 
are becoming more common (see Conditions of Service, this 
ch.). Nevertheless, for a young soldier facing doubtful employ- 
ment prospects, active duty means a nutritious diet, access to 
medical care, and perhaps an opportunity to further one's edu- 
cation and acquire a useful job skill. Military service offers an 
interlude from the unvarying pace of village life and is a source 
of pride, linking one to the warrior tradition of Turkish society. 

Politics and the Military 

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, six of 
the nation's nine presidents have had armed forces back- 
grounds. Until 1950 Ataturk and his successor and closest mili- 
tary associate, Inonii, ruled what was an essentially a one-party 
political system with a strong martial flavor. Ataturk encour- 
aged the military to abjure politics, but the armed forces inter- 



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vened on three occasions — in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Although 
they did so under different circumstances in each case, their 
justification was their sworn duty to uphold national unity and 
the democratic order. 

The military regime of 1980-83 was the longest lasting, and 
represented the armed forces' most serious effort to transform 
traditional political behavior. The changes the regime intro- 
duced were intended to break what had become a cycle of 
decennial military interventions. The constitution introduced 
by the coup leaders in 1982, which forbade political activism in 
the universities and trade unions, abolished pre-existing par- 
ties, and banned political activity by pre-1980 party leaders, was 
the centerpiece of the military's efforts to curtail the factional- 
ism and polarization that had stalemated the previous civilian 
government (see Political Developments since the 1980 Coup, 
ch. 4). 

The leader of the 1980-83 junta, General Kenan Evren, 
remained as president after the return of civilian government, 
but the generals disavowed any desire for a continuing political 
role for the military. The public failed to respond to Evren's 
appeal to vote for the party favored by the generals, the Nation- 
alist Democracy Party (Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi — MDP). A 
new grouping of retired officers and other leading citizens, the 
MDP had the same interests and goals as the military regime. 
Although disappointed by the party's lack of success, military 
leaders established good working relations with the victorious 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi — ANAP) of Turgut Ozal. 
By promptly relinquishing control over public life, the military 
preserved its reputation as the ultimate protector of Turkish 
democratic institutions. 

On two occasions, Ozal prevailed when differences arose 
with the armed forces. In 1987, as prime minister, he overrode 
the military's choice of an army commander as the new chief of 
the General Staff, reportedly out of dissatisfaction with the con- 
duct of the campaign against the Kurdish insurgency. In 1990, 
after Ozal became president, the chief of staff resigned as a 
result of undisclosed disagreements assumed to have sprung 
from Ozal's activist stance against Iraq's takeover of Kuwait but 
did not make a public issue of his difference with Ozal. 

Imbued with the concept that its mission is to safeguard 
Atatiirk's heritage, the military establishment has often shown 
its impatience with political bickering and compromises that 
appear to slight Kemalist objectives. Civilian politicians indif- 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

ferent to those goals or embracing other ideologies are viewed 
with suspicion or even as subversive. Much of the military edu- 
cation system is concerned with instilling the Kemalist spirit 
through study of the 1919-22 War of Independence, the con- 
cept of patriotism as embodied by Ataturk, and the values and 
principles of Kemalism, particularly the "Six Arrows" of secular- 
ism, republicanism, populism, etatism (see Glossary), reform- 
ism, and nationalism, as guidance for the future of the Turkish 
state. 

A democratic system is fully accepted as the best form of 
government by the professional military. However, young 
career officers are indoctrinated with the view that the proper 
working of democracy demands discipline, organization, con- 
structiveness, unity of purpose, and rejection of self-interest. 
Thus, the military has little tolerance of politicians whom it 
perceives as putting personal ambition before the good of the 
state or of political parties or groups acting in ways it considers 
to be dictated by a struggle for power and economic advantage. 

From a career point of view, it is said to be unwise for an offi- 
cer to express opinions that can be construed as liberal or 
otherwise unorthodox. The armed forces have shown particu- 
lar sensitivity to the threat of radical Islamism to military order. 
In 1991 the general staff disclosed that in the preceding 
decade 357 officers and seventy-one noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs) had been dismissed on charges of involvement in 
extreme leftist or separatist (presumably Kurdish) activities. 
During the same period, thirty-seven officers and 188 NCOs 
were discharged for involvement in extreme rightist or Islamist 
activities. 

External Security Concerns 

Throughout the Cold War, Turkey's security situation was 
shaped by the country's vulnerability to Soviet military 
strength. It was obliged to contend with the threat of twenty 
divisions of Soviet land forces close to the common border of 
more than 500 kilometers in the Transcaucasus region of 
northern Turkey. Turkey's heavily populated areas were within 
easy range of Soviet fighter aircraft and bombers; Soviet naval 
vessels and submarines were well positioned to dominate the 
Black Sea. 

Turkish suspicion of Soviet motives had historical roots in 
the efforts of imperial Russia to extend its influence beyond 
the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle 



312 




Soldiers, armored unit, and mobile antiaircraft passing in review, 

Republic Day parade ( October 29) 
Courtesy Embassy of Turkey, Washington 



313 



Turkey: A Country Study 



East. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was 
linked tactically and logistically to the Soviet Black Sea fleet. 
Transit of the Turkish-controlled Bosporus was essential to the 
projection of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean. 

For Turkey, perhaps the most important consequence of the 
1991 breakup of the Soviet Union was that it no longer shares a 
border with Russia and that the risk of conflict with the Rus- 
sians has greatly receded. The appearance of several newly 
independent nations at Turkey's borders, however, has resulted 
in a less settled security environment because Turkey now feels 
a greater potential threat from other powers in the area such as 
Greece, Syria, and Iraq. 

Although buffered by other new nations in the Black Sea 
and Caucasus regions, Russia remains a compelling presence in 
the minds of Turkish military planners. With Moscow increas- 
ingly willing to intervene in conflicts near Turkey's borders, 
concern has grown that a resurgent Russian nationalism might 
seek pretexts to gain control of former republics of the Soviet 
Union. Russia has repositioned to its southern flank some of 
the ground weapons withdrawn from Central Europe under 
the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 
of 1990. Although the treaty placed a ceiling on the number of 
tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces that could be rede- 
ployed to the North Caucasus Military District, the Russians 
have exceeded this limit, citing concerns over instability in 
their border regions. 

Close to Turkey's northeastern border, three former repub- 
lics of the Soviet Union — Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan — 
are beset by dissidence and fighting. Turkey has historical, cul- 
tural, religious, and linguistic ties with Azerbaijan and sup- 
ported Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia. From the Turkish 
perspective, Armenia committed aggression against Azerbaijan 
by seizing the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is inhabited 
mostly by ethnic Armenians. Russia issued veiled warnings 
against Turkish involvement in the Armenian situation, which 
could pit Turkey against Russia. Turkey has ruled out the use of 
force, wary of a wider conflict between Christians and Muslims 
in the region. 

Middle Eastern Conflicts 

Despite its location, Turkey generally has been successful in 
pursuing a policy of noninterference and noninvolvement in 
Middle Eastern conflicts. For instance, Turkey refrained from 



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supporting either belligerent in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. 
Although both sides violated Turkish airspace, Turkey took no 
defensive action and sought to mediate an end to hostilities. 

In the first days after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 
1990, the Turkish government tried to preserve its traditional 
neutral stance in what it perceived as an inter-Arab dispute. 
Ankara was quickly obliged to depart from this position, how- 
ever, in light of the strong reaction in the UN against the inva- 
sion. Turkey responded to the UN Security Council's call for an 
embargo against Iraq by closing the Kirkuk-Yurmurtalik oil 
pipeline linking the two countries and halting trade with Iraq. 
These measures were crucial to the economic campaign 
against Saddam Husayn but imposed severe economic hard- 
ship on Turkey. The direct cost to its balance of payments was 
estimated at US$2 billion to US$2.5 billion annually. This bur- 
den was eased somewhat by aid from the United States and the 
Persian Gulf countries. Firm opposition in parliament and the 
cabinet prevented President Ozal from offering a Turkish con- 
tingent for the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf. However, 
some 150,000 Turkish troops were deployed near the south- 
eastern border with Iraq, tying down eight or nine Iraqi divi- 
sions. Turkey requested and received a defensive deployment 
of NATO air forces in the area to discourage attack by the Iraqi 
air force, which could easily outmatch the fighter aircraft and 
antiaircraft defenses that Turkey could muster. A total of forty 
German, Italian, and Belgian aircraft were dispatched to Tur- 
key. In addition, United States and Dutch Patriot missile batter- 
ies were deployed against a possible Iraqi missile attack. 

When the coalition air strikes on Iraq were launched in Jan- 
uary 1991, ninety-six United States aircraft and several British 
bombers operated from the United States air base at Incirlik, 
refueling at Batman, a base about 150 kilometers from the 
Iraqi border. Sorties continued from Incirlik until the cease- 
fire on February 28, 1991, without provoking retaliation from 
Saddam Husayn. 

The major consequence of the Persian Gulf War from the 
standpoint of Turkish security was the uprising of the Kurds in 
northern Iraq and the exodus of Kurds toward Turkish terri- 
tory to escape Saddam Husayn's brutal suppression of the 
rebellion. Turkey was decidedly reluctant to accept the Kurds 
as refugees, considering them a potential destabilizing factor in 
its struggle with domestic Kurdish dissidents. As an alternative, 
Turkey supported the UN-approved Operation Provide Com- 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

fort, which distributed relief and set up a safe haven in north- 
ern Iraq whose security was guaranteed by a coalition force of 
2,000 soldiers from five countries. Incirlik served as the base 
for a rapid deployment of air forces to enforce a no-fly zone in 
the region. 

The Iraqi government's loss of control over Iraqi Kurdistan 
and elections in the area in May 1992 produced what was in 
effect an autonomous Kurdish government. Although Turkey 
permitted the lifeline to the Iraqi Kurdish enclave to originate 
on its territory, the Turks feared what they saw as the emerging 
outlines of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. For this rea- 
son, Turkey resisted any international action that could lead to 
Iraq's dismemberment and thus endanger the regional status 
quo. 

Syria 

Several disputes make relations between Syria and Turkey 
uneasy. However, Syria's limited military potential and the 
alignment of Syrian forces on the Israeli front preclude any 
immediate threat along the 900-kilometer border between Tur- 
key and Syria. 

Syria has never abandoned its claim to the Turkish province 
of Hatay, which includes the city of Iskenderun. France, the 
mandatory power over Syria from 1920 to 1941, ceded the area 
to Turkey in 1939 after a disputed plebiscite, in violation of its 
League of Nations mandate. 

Tensions with Syria are compounded by Turkey's control 
over distribution of the waters of the Euphrates River. Turkey's 
huge Southeast Anatolian Project, with its dams and hydroelec- 
tric plants, threatens to deplete Syria's water resources. In addi- 
tion, Syria has a history of permitting hostile political 
movements — Armenian, Marxist, and Kurdish — to conduct 
anti-Turkish operations from Syrian-controlled territory in 
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. To a considerable degree, the issues of 
access to water and Syria's support for the Kurdish insurgency 
are linked. To the extent that Turkey attempts to accommodate 
Syria on water sharing, Syria limits its backing of the Kurds. In 
December 1993, the Syrian government took into custody the 
Kurdish rebel leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in what was seen as an 
attempt to strengthen Syria's hand in water negotiations. 

Iran 

Frictions with the Tehran government stem largely from 



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competing philosophies — the secularism at the root of the 
Turkish system and the Shia (see Glossary) orientation of Iran. 
The Turkish government has refrained from accusing Iran of 
direct responsibility for incidents of Islamist terrorism. How- 
ever, the Turkish minister of interior declared in 1993 that the 
perpetrators of a series of murders of well-known secularist fig- 
ures had been trained in Iran and helped by the staff of the Ira- 
nian Cultural Center in Ankara. Turkey considers such attacks 
a threat to national security because the government and laws 
of the modern Turkish state are so closely identified with its 
secular tradition. 

Another source of potential tension is Turkey's support of 
Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. Tehran fears that a 
nationalistic Azerbaijan friendly to Turkey could encourage 
unrest in northern Iran, which has a considerable Azerbaijani 
population. Turkey estimates that about 800 Kurdish guerrillas 
are based in Iranian territory. Tehran has denied supporting 
them, and in December 1993 the two countries announced 
that an agreement had been reached to prevent the guerrillas 
from using Iran as a sanctuary. 

The Balkans 

As the principal successor state to the Ottoman Empire, 
which controlled the Balkans for centuries until its defeat in 
the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, Turkey retains a keen interest in 
the fate of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM — the name under 
which independent Macedonia was recognized by the United 
Nations in 1993), and Albania. Turkey opposed the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia, fearing the resulting instability could create 
broader regional conflict. With the outbreak of war in Bosnia 
in 1992 and Serbian human rights violations, Turkey advocated 
Western military measures to contain the Serbs. It pressed for 
an end to the UN arms embargo to enable Bosnian Muslims to 
defend themselves more effectively against Serbian attack. Tur- 
key contributed ships to the NATO naval force blockading Ser- 
bia and Montenegro and dispatched a squadron of eighteen F- 
16 aircraft to Italy to help enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. 
Unilateral Turkish military aid to Bosnia was impractical 
because of the interposition of Greek and Bulgarian territory 
in between. A Turkish offer of troops to the UN Protection 
Force in Bosnia was at first rejected by the UN Security Council 
because of Ankara's strong sympathies for the Bosnian Muslims 



317 



Turkey: A Country Study 

and memories of the Ottoman role in the Balkans. In April 
1994, however, after experiencing difficulties in obtaining 
force commitments, the UN accepted a Turkish deployment of 
about 1,500 soldiers in spite of objections by the Bosnian Serbs, 
Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. 

Albania also is receiving attention from Turkey. Once Alba- 
nia ended its long isolation as a Stalinist state, Turkey proposed 
military cooperation accords that included officer training. 
The possibility of Serbian action against FYROM, whose inde- 
pendence Turkey recognized, and against Kosovo, a Serbian 
province largely populated by Albanians, is a concern of both 
Albania and Turkey. It seems unlikely, however, that Turkish 
military help will be forthcoming if the conflict in former Yugo- 
slavia widens to Kosovo and FYROM. 

Mutual distrust has long characterized Turkey's relations 
with Bulgaria, which, like Greece, has a short but strategically 
significant border with Turkish Thrace, the European region 
of Turkey. A major cause of friction was the Balkanization pro- 
gram instituted by the communist government of Bulgaria, 
which caused a mass migration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey in 
the spring of 1989. After the communists fell in late 1989, Tur- 
key moved to improve its security ties to Bulgaria's new govern- 
ment. A series of agreements were reached on formal 
notification of military movements, exchanges of military visits, 
and the establishment of a military security zone extending 
sixty to eighty kilometers on each side of the common border. 
Talks were also held in 1993 on cooperating in the production 
of military equipment, and the two countries conducted a joint 
military exercise with Romania. 

Greece and Cyprus 

In their first foreign combat operations since the Korean 
War, Turkish troops intervened in Cyprus in 1974 with the pro- 
fessed aim of protecting the Turkish minority population after 
a Greek-inspired coup brought a threat of union of the island 
with Greece. Against determined resistance by the lightly 
armed Greek Cypriot National Guard, the Turkish troops occu- 
pied the northern third of the island. The Turkish intervention 
force, which consisted of about 40,000 soldiers and 200 tanks, 
subsequently was reduced to a garrison of 30,000 troops. It 
greatly outnumbers the contingent of Greek national forces on 
the island, which is supplemented by the Greek Cypriot 



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National Guard. Air reinforcement of the Turkish troops can 
be effected, if necessary, within hours. 

Ankara does not consider Cyprus one of its most pressing 
security issues because of Turkey's military superiority over 
Greece and the more serious strategic problems posed in the 
east. Nevertheless, the unresolved dispute over Cyprus compli- 
cates Turkish participation in NATO and remains an obstacle 
to NATO's effectiveness in the region. In addition, the question 
of the rights of 120,000 Muslims of Turkish ancestry in Grecian 
Thrace arouses Turkish sympathies, contributing to long-stand- 
ing distrust between Greece and Turkey. 

Other differences between the two NATO members contrib- 
ute to contention. Greece, basing its claim on the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea passed by the UN in November 1994, 
which extends territorial waters from six to twelve nautical 
miles, seeks to claim this limit around each of the more than 
2,000 Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Such a claim, if imple- 
mented, would give Greece about 70 percent of the Aegean 
Sea. Greece also claims a ten-nautical-mile airspace around 
each island. Turkish military aircraft and ships do not respect 
these claims. In addition, Turkey claims an Exclusive Economic 
Zone that is disputed by Greece. 

Turkey maintains the Aegean Army, a force separate from 
its NATO-committed troops, ostensibly to defend the south- 
western coastal areas. The force is a response to Greece's milita- 
rization of its islands close to the Turkish coast, which Turkey 
asserts violates the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that set Turkey's 
present borders. The Aegean Army is considered a largely sym- 
bolic force; most of the troops assigned to it are kept in train- 
ing status. 

Turkey's Participation in NATO 

Turkey's decision to seek Western assistance after being con- 
fronted by Soviet territorial demands at the conclusion of 
World War II and its subsequent participation in NATO's col- 
lective defense system have been the principal factors influenc- 
ing the country's modern military evolution. In 1950 Turkey 
demonstrated its gratitude for the military aid received from 
the United States when it sent a brigade of 4,500 troops to 
serve under the UN command in Korea. The brigade became 
known for its valor on the battlefield after suffering propor- 
tionately the highest casualty rates of any UN element engaged 
in the fighting. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

Turkey's admission to NATO, effective in February 1952, 
was preceded by extensive study and debate of the strategy of 
extending the alliance's southern flank to include the eastern 
Mediterranean. Changes were needed in the wording of the 
treaty to expand its territorial reach to include Turkey. The 
admission of Turkey gave NATO a much longer land frontier 
with the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), as well as a treaty interest 
in Turkey's Black Sea coast and the straits through which the 
Soviet Union had access to the Mediterranean. At the same 
time, Turkey brought to the alliance its second largest body of 
military manpower after that of the United States, in addition 
to access to sites for forward deployment and intelligence gath- 
ering. 

Under the provisions of the alliance, most of the Turkish 
armed forces are committed to NATO command in the event 
of hostilities. Turkish land, sea, and air units then come under 
the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe 
(AFSOUTH), with headquarters in Naples. The largest of 
NATO's four military regions, AFSOUTH encompasses Italy, 
Greece, Turkey, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea 
(including the Adriatic Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Ionian Sea, 
and the Tyrrhenian Sea). AFSOUTH develops joint contin- 
gency plans and conducts training exercises of assigned units. 

One of the five principal subordinate commands under 
AFSOUTH, the Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe 
(LANDSOUTHEAST) is headquartered at Izmir under a Turk- 
ish lieutenant general, with a United States general officer as 
deputy. About 90 percent of Turkish land forces are committed 
to this command. The two other commands with Turkish 
forces assigned to them are Allied Air Forces Southern Europe 
(AIRSOUTH), under a United States general officer, and 
Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH), under 
command of an Italian vice admiral. Both commands have 
headquarters in the Naples area. Still under dispute is the mat- 
ter of establishing LANDSOUTHCENT in Larissa, Greece. Ini- 
tially, Turkey agreed and Greece objected, but in early 1995 
Turkey objected unless a Turkish general were to command 
the center. 

Important air, naval, and intelligence-gathering facilities are 
made available on Turkish soil to United States combat aircraft 
and to units of the United States Sixth Fleet committed to 
NATO (see Military Cooperation with the United States, this 
ch.). A detachment of NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force 



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National Security 



was installed at the Konya Air Base in southwestern Turkey in 
1983, using NATO-owned Airborne Warning and Control Sys- 
tem (AWACS) aircraft to provide low-level radar coverage and 
regional air and sea surveillance. 

In the mid-1990s, Turkey allocated a mechanized infantry 
division consisting of one mechanized brigade and one 
armored brigade, as well as one combat engineering company, 
to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force formed 
as part of NATO's restructuring. One commando brigade was 
earmarked for the southern multinational division, along with 
brigades from Italy and Greece. These forces remain under 
national command at their home bases until released to 
NATO. 

Despite rapid changes in the European security environ- 
ment that have replaced the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation 
with a less definable set of missions for the alliance, Turkey 
remains a strong partisan of the NATO linkage. Turkish partic- 
ipation gives the country a voice in major strategic decisions by 
Western democracies and a framework for multilateral cooper- 
ation in matters critical to its own security. Nevertheless, with 
NATO strategy based on the management of multidimensional 
threats rather than deterrence of the now-defunct Soviet 
Union, and with the admission of former members of the War- 
saw Pact into a partnership relation with NATO, the impor- 
tance of Turkey to European security has become less obvious. 
From a Turkish perspective, the protection of Turkey's eastern 
borders demands a continued high level of NATO involve- 
ment. In the shifting European security order, however, Tur- 
key's geostrategic position could become a liability, potentially 
exposing the alliance to military action in an area where its 
commitments are ill defined. 

Armed Forces 

Composed of elements of regular cadre and conscripts, the 
armed forces in 1994 had an active-duty strength estimated by 
The Military Balance, 1994-1995 at 503,800 officers and enlisted 
personnel. Of this total, some 93,600 were regulars in career 
assignments; the remaining 410,200 were draftees. The staffing 
level already had been reduced by 6 percent from that in 1990 
as a consequence of forces reorganization. 

Article 117 of the constitution stipulates that the president 
of the republic is the commander in chief of the armed forces. 
Responsibility for ensuring security and military preparedness 



321 



Turkey: A Country Study 



is delegated to the prime minister and the Council of Ministers 
(the cabinet), who are appointed by the president but are sub- 
ject to a legislative vote of confidence. Article 118 of the consti- 
tution prescribes that the National Security Council (NSC — see 
Glossary) shall submit its views to the Council of Ministers on 
pending decisions and shall coordinate the formulation, estab- 
lishment, and implementation of the state's national security 
policy. A joint body of the chief civilian and military officials 
concerned with national defense and internal security, the 
NSC meets twice monthly. Its meetings are chaired by the pres- 
ident or, in his or her absence, by the prime minister (see fig. 
14). 

In the view of one Turkish observer, the NSC has not been 
particularly successful as a forum for the armed forces and the 
government to debate and agree on security policies. At the 
meetings, the military speaks with a single voice, having worked 
out differences beforehand. Such unanimity is not conducive 
to an open dialogue, yet the military is disappointed when it 
fails to elicit concrete responses from the civilian leadership. 
Civilians sometimes have found the military insensitive to the 
government's problems in dealing with the bureaucracy, parlia- 
ment, and the public when facing difficult decisions. 

The constitution designates the chief of the General Staff as 
the commander of the armed forces. In wartime that officer 
also exercises the duties of commander in chief on behalf of 
the president. The chief of the General Staff is appointed by 
the president upon nomination by the Council of Ministers 
and is responsible to the prime minister in the exercise of his 
duties. In early 1995, the chief of the General Staff was General 
Ismail Hakki Karadayi, who was appointed in August 1994. The 
extensive authority of the Turkish chief of the General Staff 
contrasts strikingly with that of his counterparts in most NATO 
countries. He holds one of the highest positions in the govern- 
ment after the prime minister and is chosen strictly on the basis 
of seniority. As of 1994, the chief of the General Staff had 
always been an army officer, although an air force or naval offi- 
cer might also be selected. 

By law the chief of the General Staff determines the princi- 
ples and policies of major programs concerned with opera- 
tions, training, intelligence, and logistics. His views must be 
sought with respect to the military implications of proposed 
international treaties. He has the final say in the allocation of 
the military budget among programs and service branches. 



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National Security 



The General Staff, a prestigious body that implements the 
decisions and guidance of the chief of the General Staff, in 
effect constitutes a joint headquarters with authority over the 
commanders of the service branches. It thus differs materially 
from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, who act as the 
immediate military staff of the secretary of defense, subject to 
the latter's authority and direction, and whose chair functions 
as presiding officer and spokesperson for the service com- 
manders. The Turkish General Staff headquarters is adminis- 
tered by the deputy chief of the General Staff, who is 
responsible for preparing directives representing orders ema- 
nating from the General Staff, and for assuring their proper 
implementation. 

The General Staff organization follows the same pattern as 
the United States system in most respects. Its departments are 
J-l (personnel, including appointments and promotions), J-2 
(internal and foreign intelligence), J-3 (operations, training, 
organization, war planning, and exercises), J-4 (logistics), J-5 
(strategic-military policies, threat planning, targeting, budget 
allocations, and military agreements), J— 6 (communications 
and electronics), andJ-7 (studies of military history and strat- 
egy) . The Turkish representative to NATO and the Turkish mil- 
itary representative to the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE) are both attached to the office of the 
deputy chief of the General Staff. 

A separate body, the Supreme Military Council, consists of 
eighteen members, including the prime minister as chair, the 
chief of the General Staff as vice chair, the minister of national 
defense, the three service commanders, and other command- 
ers of four-star rank. All promotions and other appointments 
to higher military positions are decided in this council, as are 
many internal policy matters affecting the military services. In 
practice, the chief of the General Staff initiates the appoint- 
ments of service chiefs after consulting the civilian leadership 
and promotions to general rank after consulting the respective 
service chiefs. 

The Ministry of National Defense executes defense policies 
and programs determined by the chief of the General Staff 
with respect to conscription, procurement of weapons and 
equipment, logistical needs, and other services such as health 
care, construction, infrastructure, and finances and auditing. 
The ministry compiles, coordinates, and steers the annual bud- 
get request through the National Assembly. The ministry is 



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Turkey: A Country Study 




324 



National Security 



responsible for negotiating with other countries for military 
assistance and arms supplies but is not involved in discussions 
concerning the allocation of foreign aid among the service 
branches. The Ministry of National Defense reflects lesser civil- 
ian influence than its United States counterpart; many ministry 
staff officers are military officers, and the undersecretary of 
national defense is a general on active duty. 

Defense Spending 

The high cost of maintaining a credible military establish- 
ment in an age of rapidly changing technology has required 
heavy expenditures by the Ministry of National Defense in rela- 
tion to other demands on the government's revenue. As a 
result, the Turkish government has allocated funds to defense 
in disproportion to widely acknowledged needs for social and 
economic development. In the decade between 1981 and 1991, 
defense was the largest category in the national budget, averag- 
ing in most years close to 20 percent of total government 
expenditures and 4 to 5 percent of the country's gross domes- 
tic product (GDP — see Glossary). The next largest budget cate- 
gory — education — commanded little more than half of the 
resources earmarked for defense. 

Until the mid-1970s, the military budget covered only the 
domestic cost of maintaining the large armed forces establish- 
ment; most equipment costs and much of the expense of train- 
ing military specialists were borne by the United States. A sharp 
increase in defense spending by Turkey itself was necessitated 
by the 1974 intervention in Cyprus. The immediate cost of the 
Cyprus operation, estimated at between US$350 million and 
US$700 million, was overshadowed by the burden of compen- 
sating for the embargo on military assistance imposed by the 
United States until 1978. 

The Defense Industry Support Fund, which is separate from 
the regular defense budget, finances a US$15 billion military 
modernization program with earmarked taxes and assess- 
ments. The modernization fund is supplemented by a so-called 
Gulf Fund of grants from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates, and the United States to compensate Turkey for 
the cost of maintaining the embargo against Iraq and the lost 
income from the closing of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline. 
By 1993 the Gulf Fund had accumulated more than US$4.8 bil- 
lion (see Domestic Arms Industry, this ch.). 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

According to NATO estimates, personnel expenditures con- 
stituted almost exactly 50 percent of total defense expenditures 
in 1993. Equipment expenditures made up 25 percent of the 
total, infrastructure expenditures 3.2 percent, and other oper- 
ating expenses the remaining 21.6 percent. The share of the 
budget going to personnel was lower than in most NATO coun- 
tries, although higher than in the United States (38.6 percent 
in 1993). Low-paid conscripts who make up the bulk of the 
armed forces accounted for only 11 percent of overall person- 
nel costs. 

Equipment purchases absorbed 9.2 percent of defense out- 
lays from 1980 to 1984 and 18.2 percent from 1985 to 1989. 
Such expenditures rose to 25.6 percent in 1993 because Turkey 
was obliged to assume an increasing share of the cost of new 
armaments, munitions, and supplies. 

United States and German aid has been indispensable to 
Turkey's efforts to introduce advanced weapons systems. 
United States assistance has enabled Turkey to continue its 
modernization program in spite of the weakness of the Turkish 
lira (for value of the lira — see Glossary). The aid reached a 
high level during the Persian Gulf crisis, but tapered off with 
the end of the Cold War, its basis shifting from grants to con- 
cessionary loans. 

The Military Balance, 1994-1995 has estimated the Turkish 
defense budget at US$4.1 billion in 1992, US$4.5 billion in 
1993, and US$4.6 billion in 1994. Based on the NATO defini- 
tion of military spending, the 1992 budget was US$6.1 billion, 
the 1993 budget US$7.1 billion, and the 1994 budget US$7.3 
billion. Separate data published by the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) depict moderate 
real growth in Turkey's actual defense spending during most of 
the 1980s, from US$3.19 billion in 1981 to US$4.13 billion in 
1989 (both expressed in constant 1991 dollars). Expenditures 
rose sharply to US$5.2 billion in 1990 and US$5.7 billion in 
1991, largely as a result of the Persian Gulf War. The shrinkage 
of the armed forces was expected eventually to produce econo- 
mies, but the initial effect was an increase in the defense bud- 
get to acquire and support more advanced weapons. 

The country's economic sacrifice in building a strong 
defense establishment has been greater than that of its more 
affluent NATO partners. In 1991 Turkey's military expendi- 
tures were 5.4 percent of gross national product (GNP — see 
Glossary); this was roughly the same proportion as a decade 



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earlier, although defense spending had dropped to as low as 
3.9 percent of GNP in 1988. Military spending constituted 20.3 
percent of total central government expenditures in 1990 and 
17.9 percent in 1991 by ACDA's calculations. The budget of the 
Ministry of National Defense, which excludes some defense- 
related costs, was 10.4 percent of the entire budget in 1993 and 
was scheduled to fall to 9.4 percent in 1994. Within NATO only 
the United States expended a larger percentage of government 
outlays on defense, and only Greece spent as high a share of 
GNP on defense. However, Turkey's defense expenditures per 
capita, amounting to US$97 annually, were the lowest among 
NATO countries. 

Sources and Quality of Personnel 

As expressed in Article 72 of the constitution, "National ser- 
vice is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which 
this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, 
either in the armed forces or in the public service, shall be reg- 
ulated by law." The required period of active-duty service has 
been scaled back periodically, from two years to eighteen 
months and, in 1992, to fifteen months. Male citizens who pass 
a physical examination are called up during their twentieth 
year, but induction can be deferred until completion of an edu- 
cation program. 

University and college graduates may fulfill their military 
obligation as reserve officers with an eighteen-month period of 
active service following some previous preparation at their edu- 
cation institution. Four months of the service period consist of 
cadet training, followed by fourteen months of service in the 
branch to which the individual is appointed. With the dwin- 
dling need for reserve officers, complete professionalization of 
the officer corps is contemplated. Most university graduates 
would serve as conscripts in the regular army, but their active 
duty would be limited to nine months. An exception would be 
made for graduates of technical universities who could be 
called up for longer periods of specialized service. 

Reserve officers seem not to be held in high esteem in the 
services, being regarded as less dependable than regulars, lack- 
ing in motivation, and inadequately trained. Regulars are reluc- 
tant to accept reservists as equals in personal and social 
relations. Reservists, on the other hand, tend to look down on 
regulars as narrowly educated. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

After completing four months of basic training, conscripts 
are sent to their assigned units for more training and unit exer- 
cises. Recruits who have graduated from senior high school are 
eligible to serve as sergeants after NCO training. Promising but 
less educated recruits can become corporals after a two-week 
training course. In 1993 a program was introduced to increase 
the number of career NCOs. The intent was to enlist 100,000 
regulars as privates and corporals in the course of the first year. 
As inducements, the maximum age of enlistment was raised 
from thirty to thirty-five, and new financial and social benefits 
were introduced. 

The period of active service is an important educational 
experience for many young men. In addition to mastering 
weapons, they learn personal hygiene, table manners, and the 
basics of social conduct. They receive a wholesome diet and, in 
most cases, better medical and dental care than they will have 
at any other time in their lives. Literacy classes were formerly 
an important feature of military training, but by the 1980s 
fewer than 5 percent of recruits needed to be taught to read 
and write. 

Many conscripts are taught useful skills, such as truck driving 
and machinery repair. The army's training of technicians and 
artisans may rival the contribution of civilian technical second- 
ary schools, which produce only about 100,000 graduates a 
year. 

Draft evasion apparently had become a serious problem by 
the mid-1990s, perhaps because of young men's reluctance to 
risk their lives against Kurdish insurgents. In December 1993, 
the chief of staff said that 30 percent of all men of draft age 
had deferred their service (in many cases in order to complete 
higher education), 22 percent were evading conscription, and 
7 percent were medically unfit. The total of those who had 
avoided conscription came to about 250,000 but, as the chief of 
staff pointed out, the armed forces did not have facilities to 
induct all these men even if they were available. Desertions 
were also said to have increased, although military leaders were 
unwilling to confirm this fact. 

After completing their active-duty obligation, conscripts are 
subject to recall in periods of national emergency until age 
forty-six if physically fit and not otherwise exempted. In prac- 
tice, it is only for a few years after discharge that conscripts are 
considered part of the reserve system with specific unit assign- 
ments. In 1994 the number in this category was reported to be 



328 



Infantry exercises in Kocaeli Province 
Courtesy Embassy of Turkey, Washington 

about 952,300 (831,700 in the army, 55,600 in the navy, and 
65,000 in the air force). 

Turkey has always had an ample supply of personnel to meet 
its military needs. In 1994 roughly 3 million men were between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. The annual call-up for all 
branches totaled about 300,000 but was likely to shrink rapidly 
with the reduction of the army complement and the effort to 
enlist more regulars. Nevertheless, in January 1994 all dis- 
charges were frozen for three months to ensure that the army 
had enough trained soldiers for operations against the Kurdish 
guerrillas. 

Military discipline is strict. Turkish officers are taught to 
believe that softness is a sign of weakness, which soldiers will 
quickly take advantage of. Discipline is considered necessary to 
ensure quality performance and to prevent the slackness that 
officers feel pervades the civilian labor force. Corporal punish- 
ment is strictly prohibited under the Law of the Armed Ser- 
vices. Yet beatings and slappings, although not common, 
appear to be accepted forms of punishment. NCOs and some- 
times second lieutenants are those most likely to employ corpo- 
ral punishment for acts considered disruptive of discipline. 
The alternative is to institute legal proceedings for minor 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

offenses. Such proceedings can be delayed so long that they 
have little deterrent effect; they may also be perceived as 
reflecting poorly on the effectiveness of the officer involved. 
Major offenses, such as theft, desertion, or prohibited ideologi- 
cal activities, are normally the subject of courts-martial. 

From the squad level up, soldiers engage in daily training 
exercises. The armed forces hold a number of combined exer- 
cises and participate in several NATO exercises each year. Nev- 
ertheless, in the mid-1990s Turkish observers felt that the 
quality of training still suffered from shortcomings. They 
noted, for example, that training often has a theoretical qual- 
ity, traceable in part to the need to conserve ammunition, vehi- 
cles, and aircraft. 

Since 1955, when the government opened certain military 
specialties to women, moderate numbers have volunteered for 
active duty. Recruitment of women was suspended for a time 
but was resumed in the early 1980s when some female univer- 
sity graduates were again taken in as pharmacists, doctors, den- 
tists, and administrative or communications specialists. No 
women were accepted in the enlisted ranks or for assignments 
that could expose them to combat or hazardous duty. In 1992 
access to military service was increased when 154 women were 
allowed to enter the service academies, half of them as army 
cadets. 

Education and Training 

The sole source of regular commissioned officers is the 
army academy at Harbiye, near Istanbul; the naval academy at 
Tuzla, on the Sea of Marmara near Istanbul; and the air force 
academy at Istanbul. Cadets who complete officer training 
receive commissions as second lieutenants or naval ensigns. 
The three services also operate five military high schools, from 
which half or more of the cadets are recruited. The selection 
process is highly selective, based on school grades, especially in 
the sciences, an oral interview in which appearance and 
demeanor are appraised, graded fitness tests, and a confiden- 
tial investigation of the political background of the applicant 
and his or her family. 

The military high schools have superior facilities, and 
classes are as little as one-third the size of those in civilian high 
schools. Scholastic performance is closely monitored. A sum- 
mer camp is devoted to sports and military instruction. 



330 



Armed forces personnel engaged in landing exercise 
Courtesy Embassy of Turkey, Washington 

The selection process for the military academies is even 
more rigorous than for the military high schools. Only about 
one in seven applicants is successful. A further weeding out 
occurs after an initial one-month adaptation course. The acad- 
emies offer the opportunity of a free higher education under 
conditions of instruction that cannot be matched at civilian 
universities. Classroom and laboratory equipment is much 
superior, and sports facilities are unequaled elsewhere. 

Candidates for the academies must be high-school gradu- 
ates under twenty years of age and must have studied the sci- 
ences and a foreign language. Candidates must also score well 
in the regular university entrance examinations. An academy 
appointment is not offered until test scores are available. Appli- 
cants who score high enough for a place at a leading university 
often shift to a civilian career path. Each of the service acade- 



331 



Turkey: A Country Study 

mies must accept at least one cadet from each of Turkey's sev- 
enty-six provinces. 

Founded on Prussian principles of military education, the 
service academies since the 1950s have been strongly influ- 
enced by the United States approach to officer training. The 
emphasis of the curriculum has been modified from time to 
time, often to ensure an acceptable ideological outlook among 
students. Since the late 1970s, the curriculum has been 56 per- 
cent military, including sports, and 44 percent academic. The 
political and economic areas have been strengthened and man- 
agerial training added. Foreign languages are stressed; some 
classes are taught in English. It is estimated that 20 percent of 
the curriculum is devoted, directly or indirectly, to study of the 
principles and reforms of Ataturk. Much attention is given to 
appearance, social polish, and a proper public deportment. 
Available books and periodicals have an orthodox outlook; left- 
wing and religious publications are forbidden. To limit expo- 
sure of cadets to political theories inconsistent with the Ataturk 
model, the academies permit conservative guest lecturers only. 
Many cadets are expelled for ideological reasons, primarily if 
they are suspected of leftist sympathies, given that graduates of 
Islamic high schools are not admitted in the first place. The 
role played by the army academy in the 1960 coup and in the 
abortive coup of 1962 led to the expulsion of 1,400 cadets, as a 
result of which there were no army graduating classes in 1963 
and 1964. 

The most prestigious training assignment for career officers 
is to one of the staff academies, which usually occurs after 
about six years of service, at the rank of captain or the equiva- 
lent. There are separate land, air, and naval staff academies, 
but they share a location in an Istanbul suburb. The staff acad- 
emies constitute a self-sufficient town with modern accommo- 
dations for all officers, day care for the children of officers 
whose spouses have jobs, and complete sports facilities. 

Only 120 to 130 officers are accepted into the staff acade- 
mies each year for the two-year program. About 60 percent of 
the curriculum is devoted to military subjects — the principles 
of war, strategy, and weapons technology — and the remainder 
to administrative and management skills and general cultural 
subjects at a postgraduate level. An officer completing the 
course is credited with an extra three years of seniority, receives 
a higher salary, progresses faster, and is more likely to be 



332 



National Security 



offered a coveted foreign posting. About 75 percent of those 
reaching the rank of general are staff officers. 

Within ten years of commissioning, staff officers who have 
attained the rank of major or lieutenant colonel or their equiv- 
alents are expected to attend the Armed Forces Academy. This 
academy has a program twice a year for about seventy-five staff 
officers in subjects such as joint operations, campaign plan- 
ning, strategy, global conflict, and new concepts and doctrines. 

A five-month course is presented once a year at the National 
Security Academy to twenty civilians and ten officers, usually 
colonels and sometimes brigadier generals or the equivalent. 
The civilians typically include high-level civil servants, ambassa- 
dors, provincial governors, and subgovernors. Presented in 
seminar form, the program deals with international political, 
economic, and military trends, joint planning, and national 
security problems. Like the staff academies, the Armed Forces 
Academy and the National Security Academy are located out- 
side Istanbul. 

Conditions of Service 

The average military academy graduate serves at least ten 
years in the three lowest officer grades in a combination of 
training and field assignments as a platoon or company com- 
mander. The pace of promotion is usually fairly steady through 
the rank of colonel or its equivalent, assuming satisfactory per- 
formance reports graded by three superior officers. A particu- 
larly high rating can advance a promotion by a year. In normal 
times, an army officer can expect at least two "eastern" assign- 
ments, once while a lieutenant or captain and once between 
the ranks of major and colonel or their equivalents. A post in 
eastern Turkey is considered undesirable because of its isola- 
tion, the severe weather, and the lack of medical and education 
facilities for families. Since the early 1990s, a much larger part 
of the army has been deployed in the east to deal with the Kur- 
dish insurgency. Personal influence has little effect on where 
people in the military are posted. 

Most career officers can expect to retire with the rank of 
colonel or the equivalent. With the number of generals and 
admirals ranging between 280 and 300, only forty-eight of the 
hundreds of colonels and navy captains are promoted to flag 
rank each year. People being considered for general officer 
rank are subjected to a minute review of their entire service 
record. General officers must not be involved in political activi- 



333 



Turkey: A Country Study 

ties and must show discretion and conservatism in social and 
domestic life. Treated with great deference in civilian society, 
general officers are entitled to full-time use of an official car 
and chauffeur, as well as the services of an adjutant and several 
orderlies. Protocol activities take up much of a general officer's 
time. A general serving as a field commander exercises author- 
ity and responsibility comparable to those of a provincial gover- 
nor. 

Except during periods of high inflation, the net salary of 
career officers is slightly more than the pay of civil servants of 
comparable standing, although the difference narrows at 
higher ranks. The living standards of career officers clearly sur- 
pass those of other government workers when special benefits 
are included. Quarters are provided for more than 70 percent 
of permanent military personnel. Rents, deducted directly 
from salaries, may be no more than one-eighth of equivalent 
civilian rents. Security and the maintenance of grounds and 
buildings, duties assigned to enlisted personnel, are of high 
quality. 

Salaries of noncareer soldiers are very low and during the 
first half of the 1990s were eroded by inflation. As of January 
1994, the monthly wage of a private was TL37,000, then equiva- 
lent to only US$2.25. A corporal earned TL57,000 and a ser- 
geant, TL75,000. Pensions for families of soldiers who had died 
in service were minimal; compensation for the widow of a pri- 
vate came to about US$37 a month. 

Military hospitals provide medical care to all active-duty and 
retired officers and enlisted personnel and their families. 
Reservists are eligible on a space-available basis. The quality of 
treatment and personnel at military hospitals is at least as good 
as at university hospitals, and superior to what is available in 
general hospitals. 

There are officers' clubs in about forty of the provinces, 
most with excellent facilities for leisure and recreation, as well 
as temporary accommodations for officers and their families. 
The clubs are heavily patronized by retired officers as well. 
Prices are far lower than in comparable commercial establish- 
ments. NCO clubs traditionally were much more modest, but a 
program was initiated in the mid-1980s to bring them up to 
officers' club standards. Twenty-five rest camps enable service 
members and their families to enjoy two-week holidays at a 
fraction of the cost of commercial resorts. Accommodations 



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National Security 



are awarded on a point system ensuring an opening at least 
every four years. 

An unusual feature of the national defense establishment is 
the existence of a semiautonomous foundation known as the 
Army Mutual Aid Association (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu — 
OYAK), which is essentially a military social security organiza- 
tion. Career officers and warrant officers contribute 10 percent 
of their basic salaries to the association's fund. Reserve officers 
contribute 5 percent. OYAK's business activities, which include 
holdings in eight major companies, have an annual turnover of 
US$5 billion, and are tax exempt. Participants may obtain 
housing loans from OYAK and may purchase homes built by 
OYAK's own construction companies at prices well below com- 
mercial rates. Upon retirement, OYAK makes a lump sum pay- 
ment to career (but not reserve) officers, based on the 
members' investment plus accrued interest and dividends. 
OYAK also operates post exchanges selling items at 15 percent 
below prices at civilian outlets and offering durable consumer 
goods on highly favorable credit terms. 

Army 

The army (officially referred to as the Turkish Land Forces) 
is by far the largest of the three service components. During 
1992 the army introduced a sweeping reorganization, shifting 
from a predominantly divisional and regimental structure to 
one based on corps and brigades. The personnel strength of 
the army was reduced in 1994 to about 393,000 (including 
about 345,000 conscripts). Major equipment acquisitions have 
enabled the army to upgrade firepower and mobility while 
enhancing command and control. 

Until the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990, the army 
had a static defense mission of countering Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact forces in the Caucasus and any possible attack on Thrace. 
When the General Staff attempted to shift 120,000 troops to 
the frontier with Iraq in 1990, they discovered that there were 
serious deficiencies in the army's ability to respond to crises 
that could erupt suddenly in distant regions. The army was 
even less prepared for a situation requiring the deployment 
and logistical support of forces in operations beyond Turkey's 
borders. 

Prior to the army reorganization, the principal tactical units 
consisted of sixteen infantry divisions and one armored divi- 
sion, plus twenty-three independent brigades, of which six were 



335 



Turkey: A Country Study 

armored and four mechanized. Under the reorganization, all 
divisions except three were dismantled. The existing nine 
corps were retained, with brigades directly responsible to the 
corps commands. The brigades were reconfigured as seventeen 
mechanized infantry brigades, fourteen armored brigades, 
nine infantry brigades, and four commando brigades. Each 
armored brigade consisted in late 1994 of six battalions: two 
armored, two mechanized, and two artillery. The mechanized 
brigades consisted of one armored battalion, two mechanized 
battalions, and one artillery battalion, plus a reconnaissance 
squadron. The infantry brigades consisted of four infantry bat- 
talions and one artillery battalion. Each commando brigade 
consisted of three commando battalions and one artillery bat- 
talion. 

The Military Balance, 1994-1995 also lists a Presidential 
Guard regiment, an infantry regiment, five border defense reg- 
iments, and twenty-six border defense battalions. The fate of 
these independent units under the reorganization remained 
unclear in early 1995. 

General Hikmet Bayar, the commander of Turkish land 
forces in early 1995, operated from headquarters in Ankara. 
The capital is also the home of the Ankara garrison and of the 
training and logistics commands. The country is divided into 
four military sectors on the basis of strategic conditions of ter- 
rain, logistics, communications, and the potential external 
threat. The sectors are assigned to four field armies, the first 
three of which would come under NATO command in the 
event of a NATO reinforced alert (see fig. 15). 

The First Army, with headquarters in Istanbul, is widely 
deployed in the European part of Turkey known historically as 
Thrace, with responsibility for the defense of that province, the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, and the Kocaeli Peninsula. 
The Second Army, headquartered at Malatya, is deployed in 
southeastern Anatolia with a defensive mission facing Syria, 
Iraq, and Iran. The Third Army, with headquarters at Erzincan, 
is deployed throughout the rugged mountains and deep valleys 
of eastern Anatolia, covering the borders with Georgia and 
Armenia and the historical invasion routes from the east. Dur- 
ing the buildup preceding the Persian Gulf War, the Second 
Army was deployed along the Iraqi border along with some 
units from the Third Army. Under the new structure, most of 
the armored, mechanized, and commando brigades are 



336 



National Security 



located in the central region with the mission of rapidly rein- 
forcing brigades in each theater as required. 

The Aegean Army (sometimes called the Fourth Army) was 
organized in the mid-1970s in response to tensions with Greece 
in the Aegean Sea. Headquartered in Izmir, it is responsible for 
the vast area facing the Aegean coast from the Dardanelles in 
the north to the southernmost Greek offshore islands. Turkish 
commanders describe the Aegean Army as composed simply of 
training elements from which the major army units are sup- 
plied. They presumably would have the mission of defending 
the Aegean coast and keeping lines of communication open in 
the Aegean district in an emergency, although their capability 
for this mission seems highly limited. The Turkish corps on 
Cyprus is within the Aegean Army command structure. Known 
as the Cyprus Turkish Peace Force, it is said in The Military Bal- 
ance, 1994-1995 to consist of 30,000 troops, equipped with 235 
M-48 tanks, 107 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 
numerous pieces of towed and self-propelled artillery. 

In late 1994, in addition to 1,500 troops who served with the 
United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, a contingent of 
about 300 Turkish soldiers had participated in the UN opera- 
tion in Somalia. The overall commander of the UN force in 
Somalia in 1993 was Turkish general Cevik Bir. 

Accompanying the reorganization of the land forces was a 
significant upgrading of weapons systems, armor, and trans- 
port. Under the NATO harmonization program adopted 
under the CFE Treaty, considerable equipment subject to 
removal from the central front was passed on to other NATO 
armies, notably those of Greece and Turkey. Turkey's share 
included more than 1,000 United States M-60 and German 
Leopard main battle tanks and some 700 armored combat vehi- 
cles, as well as self-propelled howitzers and United States Cobra 
attack helicopters. 

Under the CFE Treaty, NATO and Soviet Union/Warsaw 
Pact countries also were to reduce the size of their conven- 
tional forces. Russia has sought to change this commitment on 
the grounds that it needs forces for "police" actions and to 
assist former member states of the Soviet Union, such as Arme- 
nia, where Russian troops are stationed. Turkey has endeav- 
ored to prevent Russia's backing out on its commitment 
because, among other reasons, Turkey shares a border with 
Armenia. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 




338 



National Security 



In addition to the arms received as a result of the CFE 
Treaty, Turkey's arsenal of more than 3,000 M-48 tanks was 
being upgraded with advanced fire controls. By 1994 deliveries 
had begun of armored infantry fighting vehicles, large num- 
bers of which were to be supplied under a Turkey/United 
States coproduction program. Procurement of a multiple- 
launch rocket system was proceeding under a similar program 
(see table 13, Appendix A). 

Turkey acquired 300 Russian BTR-60 APCs for use in the 
struggle against the Kurds because weapons of NATO origin 
were not approved for this purpose. In spite of the fact that the 
engines and transmissions of the BTR-60s had to be replaced 
after brief use, Ankara announced in 1994 that it had acquired 
110 BTR-80s. These APCs were assigned to the gendarmerie, 
who were actively engaged in the war against the Kurds (see 
Police System, this ch.). 

More effective employment of commando and infantry 
units would become possible with the United States UH-1H 
Iroquois (of which Turkey had ninety-six in 1994) and other 
modern troop-lift helicopters entering the army aviation inven- 
tory. The addition of missile-armed Cobra AH-1 (Bell 209) 
assault helicopters and five Super Cobras promised by the 
United States was expected to improve antitank capabilities. 

Air Force 

The Turkish air force is the youngest of the three branches 
of the armed services. Founded in 1911, it saw action in the 
Balkan Wars and World War I, as well as the War of Indepen- 
dence. The first Turkish pilots were trained in France. The air 
force has a high priority in Turkey's strategic planning because 
control of the air would be indispensable for successful defense 
against a ground attack by well-equipped forces. Moreover, 
reinforcement and supply of Turkish ground forces by Turkey's 
NATO allies would not be feasible without control of the air. 
The air force role in interdicting an invasion force would be to 
provide close support of ground troops in tactical defensive 
actions and to airlift troops and supplies. Upon declaration of a 
NATO reinforced alert, the Turkish air force would be commit- 
ted to action as part of NATO's Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force 
(SIXATAF) headquartered at Izmir. 

In late 1994, the air force was staffed by about 56,800 offic- 
ers and enlisted personnel. It is organized around two basic 
combat elements operating east and west of the thirty-fifth 



339 



Turkey: A Country Study 

meridian of longitude. The First Tactical Air Force has its head- 
quarters at Eskisehir Air Base in western Turkey. It defends the 
Turkish straits and provides air cover in the First Army's area of 
operations. The Second Tactical Air Force, commanded from 
its headquarters at Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey, is charged 
with defending the Third Army and part of the Second Army. 
Separate air training and logistics commands with their own 
aircraft squadrons are headquartered at Ankara. The air trans- 
port units are assigned directly to specific air force commands. 
Air force headquarters is located at Ankara; the air force com- 
mander in 1994 was General Halis Burhan. 

The air force in late 1994 was organized tactically into four- 
teen fighter-ground attack squadrons, six fighter squadrons, 
four transport squadrons, two reconnaissance squadrons, one 
antisubmarine warfare squadron, and three training squad- 
rons. The fighter-ground attack squadrons and three of the 
four transport squadrons are assigned to NATO. There are 
eight surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons. In 1994 six of the 
SAM squadrons were equipped with 128 obsolete United States 
Nike-Hercules missiles; the remaining two were supplied with 
twenty-four Rapier SAMs of British manufacture. Many Turkish 
bases and large cities are within range of Russian, Chinese, and 
North Korean missile systems possessed by Syria and Iran. Iraq 
supposedly has relinquished its longer-range missiles but still 
may have some Scud-Bs from North Korea. Turkish officers 
acknowledge their limited ability to defend against these 
threats. 

In the mid-1990s, Turkey was phasing in advanced F-16 
fighter aircraft produced domestically under a cooperative pro- 
gram with the General Dynamics and General Electric corpora- 
tions. An initial shipment of 160 aircraft was to be 
supplemented with a second package of eighty aircraft. The F— 
16s were to replace a combat fleet of obsolete F-5s and F-104s; 
the force also included somewhat more up-to-date F-4Es (see 
table 14, Appendix A) . 

In 1994 the air force's fixed-wing transport squadrons con- 
sisted of United States-manufactured C-130E Hercules and 
German C-160D Transall medium transports and CN-235 
light transports. Fifty-two CN-235s coproduced with a Spanish 
manufacturer have replaced the United States-manufactured 
C-47s for troop-transport and cargo missions. 

Upon completion of the four-year air force academy pro- 
gram, air force pilots are trained for two to two-and-a-half years 



340 



National Security 



on a variety of United States propeller and jet training aircraft. 
The Italian SF-260 coproduced in Turkey is being introduced 
as an advanced combat trainer. Nonflying officers are trained 
by the Air Technical Schools Command. NCOs are also trained 
in twelve- to eighteen-month programs in administrative and 
technical skills at specialized institutions of this command. 

Upgrading of the air force flight inventory is expected to 
include acquisition from the United States of two surplus KC- 
135A tanker aircraft — scaled back from seven for financial rea- 
sons — that would permit air refueling and thus dramatically 
increase the range of fighter aircraft. The air force also hopes 
to receive airborne early warning aircraft and airborne com- 
mand and control aircraft. The planned transfer of fifty surplus 
United States A-10 attack aircraft for close support of ground 
troops was canceled because Turkey's tight foreign-exchange 
situation did not permit acquisition of the needed recondition- 
ing and support equipment. Ankara considers the acquisition 
of United States Patriot missiles essential to reducing Turkey's 
vulnerability to conventional air and missile attack, but in early 
1995 such an acquisition did not appear imminent. 

Navy 

Numbering 54,000 individuals in late 1994, nearly 70 per- 
cent conscripts, the navy is responsible for defending the coun- 
try against seaborne attack in time of war, for safeguarding the 
Turkish straits at all times, and for patrol and coastal protection 
along the extensive coastline that borders about two-thirds of 
the nation. The navy has an assigned NATO role in which it is 
responsible to the alliance's commander of NAVSOUTH in 
Naples. The commander of Turkish naval forces serves concur- 
rently as commander, North-East Mediterranean (COME- 
DNOREAST), under NAVSOUTH. The Turkish navy shares in 
NAVSOUTH's mission of protecting a line of communications 
through the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and conducting 
antisubmarine operations in the event of a general war. 

Turkish strategists feel that the creation of new countries in 
the Black Sea area, following the end of the Cold War, has 
imposed new missions on the navy. They point out that, 
whereas there were previously four littoral states on the Black 
Sea, since the breakup of the Soviet Union there are seven — 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and 
Ukraine. Russia retains the major share of the former Soviet 
Black Sea fleet, but Ukraine claims a number of vessels and 



341 



Turkey: A Country Study 

base facilities. Because Turkey considers the Central Asian 
republics likely to make heavy use of the Black Sea for foreign 
trade, the maintenance of open sea-lanes is expected to 
become more important. Turkey foresees a greater flow of oil 
from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia via pipelines to ter- 
minals at Iskenderun in the eastern Mediterranean, imposing 
additional requirements on the navy to ensure the safety of 
ports and sea-lanes in an increasingly strategic area. 

The navy has three operational commands: the Northern 
Sea Area Command, based at Istanbul; the Fleet Command at 
Golciik; and the Southern Sea Area Command at Izmir. The 
Fleet Command, the largest of the naval components, consists 
of specialized elements: the war fleet, the submarine fleet, the 
mine fleet, and the landing units. The zonal commands are the 
Black Sea (headquartered at Eregli), the Aegean (headquar- 
tered at Izmir), two straits commands (headquartered at Istan- 
bul and Qanakkale), and the Mediterranean (headquartered at 
Mersin). The commander in chief of the Turkish navy in early 
1995 was Admiral Vural Bayazit. 

The Naval Training Command is based at Karamursel on 
the southern coast of the Sea of Marmara. The naval academy 
near Istanbul is colocated with the Naval Lyceum, a four-year 
secondary school. Graduates of the lyceum and other high 
schools who are accepted as midshipmen at the naval academy 
are promoted to subensign after the four-year program, and 
then are assigned to sea duty for two probationary years before 
being commissioned in the regular navy. Entrance to the 
lyceum is highly competitive; only a small percentage of appli- 
cants pass the qualifying examinations. 

The Petty Officers School at Istanbul receives applicants at 
age twelve for four years of secondary and naval preparatory 
instruction. Graduates are then admitted as petty officer candi- 
dates and, after four years of specialist training, are designated 
career petty officers at the entry grade. Conscripts assigned to 
the navy receive about four months of basic training and are 
then assigned to sea or shore duties for the balance of their 
required service. 

The navy's inventory of ships is well maintained, and its 
officers and crews are considered to possess high levels of pro- 
fessionalism and readiness. Turkey participates in NATO exer- 
cises in its region and frequently takes part in national 
exercises of other NATO members. Its relations with other 
Black Sea naval powers are good. Mutual high-level naval visits 



342 



F-16 aircraft used by Turkish Air Force 
Turkish naval vessel on patrol 
Courtesy Embassy of Turkey, Washington 

have been exchanged with Russia, and negotiations have been 
opened on agreements to prevent incidents on and over the 
high seas with both Russia and Ukraine. Turkey conducted 
joint mine and search-and-rescue exercises with Bulgaria in 
1993. 

The main categories of Turkish fighting ships are destroy- 
ers, frigates, submarines, and fast-attack craft (see table 15, 
Appendix A). Most of the older ships are of United States ori- 
gin. More modern units have been supplied by Germany or 
constructed in Turkish shipyards with German technical assis- 
tance and components. The largest vessels are United States 
destroyers, most of them launched at the close of World War II. 
They are considered obsolete and incapable of operating with 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

other NATO ships in battle-group formations. One of the 
destroyers, the Muavenet, was hit by two Sea Sparrow surface-to- 
surface missiles (SSMs) launched accidentally by a United 
States warship during exercises in 1992. The Turkish captain 
and four other personnel were killed and a number injured. 
The destroyer subsequently was scrapped. In 1993 and 1994, 
eight newer Knox-class frigates were transferred to Turkey by 
the United States. 

In 1994 four MEKO-200 class frigates of German design 
were in the inventory, and an additional four modernized 
MEKO-200 frigates are to be delivered between 1995 and 
1998. Construction is split, with the first four frigates having 
been built in Germany and four being built at the naval ship- 
yard at Golcuk, with German equipment packages. The vessels 
are armed with five-inch guns, Harpoon SSMs, and Sea Spar- 
row SAMs. 

The submarine force consisted originally of United States 
World War II-era diesel-powered attack vessels of the Guppy 
class. Seven of these were still listed in 1994, but their utility was 
doubtful. Since 1975 Turkey has been acquiring German 20- 
class (type-1200) submarines, quiet-running craft smaller than 
the Guppies but suitable for defending the approaches to the 
straits as well as Turkey's coastal waters. The first three of the 
six vessels were built in Germany and the next three were built 
at Golcuk. Four additional 209-class submarines of the more 
advanced type-1400, armed with sub-Harpoon SSMs, are to be 
added between 1994 and 1998. 

The sixteen missile-armed fast-attack craft in the Turkish 
fleet in 1994 were a mixture of older and newer technologies. 
The most up-to-date units were eight Dogan-class vessels 
equipped with Harpoon SSMs. They were built in Turkey along 
the lines of the German Lurssen 57. Two more fast-attack craft 
of the Yildiz class are to be delivered in 1995. These high-speed 
vessels would be especially effective against ships attempting to 
transit the confined waters in and around the Turkish straits. 

The amphibious force of sixty-six vessels in the inventory at 
the end of 1994 would be sufficient to land Turkish infantry 
and tanks in individual operations or in conjunction with other 
NATO assault forces. The inventory of twenty-nine minelayers 
and minesweepers would have the task of implementing a 
NATO decision to seal off the Black Sea. Turkish officers are 
considered to be highly qualified in such operations, but in the 



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National Security 



mid-1990s minesweepers and minelayers were due for modern- 
ization. 

In 1994 the naval air arm included fourteen Italian-built 
Agusta-Bell AB-204 and AB-212 antisubmarine helicopters, 
which could be flown off frigate flight decks. United States- 
manufactured Grumman S-2E Tracker aircraft, flown by air 
force personnel and used for land-based antisubmarine and 
marine reconnaissance, were due to be replaced. The marine 
contingent of some 3,000 officers and troops was organized as 
a brigade of three infantry battalions and one artillery battal- 
ion, plus support units. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

Uniforms worn in Turkey's three military services are simi- 
lar in design to those worn by United States military personnel 
and by troops of other NATO countries. The army winter ser- 
vice dress uniform is a shade of olive drab; a khaki shirt and 
trousers are worn in summer. Troops wear a field-gray shirt and 
trousers for winter field duty, and a camouflaged battle-fatigue 
uniform during the summer. The navy wears a black uniform 
in winter and a white one in summer. The air force uniforms 
are the same shade of blue worn by the United States and Brit- 
ish air forces. 

Army and air force officers wear their rank insignia on 
shoulder straps. Generals are identified by a red lapel patch; 
their rank is denoted by a shoulder device combining a wreath 
with star and crescent and superimposed crossed sabers, plus 
one to four gold stars. Field-grade officers have one to three 
gold stars with a wreath and star and crescent. Company-grade 
officers wear one to three gold stars on plain shoulder straps 
(see fig. 16). 

A red backing to an army officer's wreath indicates general's 
rank. Among officers at lower grades, the backing's color indi- 
cates service corps; for example, green for infantry, dark blue 
for artillery, black for armor, and light blue for signals. The 
same wreath device forms part of the badge on the peaked cap. 
Variations in the cap's peak and chin strap decorations provide 
further indications of rank. The air force's method of display- 
ing rank is virtually the same as the army's. Naval officers' ranks 
are indicated by gold stripes around the lower sleeves of their 
jackets (the upper stripe looped as in the British navy), on 
shoulder boards, and on the chin straps of visored caps. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 




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347 



Turkey: A Country Study 

NCO ranks are denoted by arm chevrons (see fig. 17). Insig- 
nia of the army and air force are almost identical in design, 
resembling those of the United States Air Force, with a star and 
crescent rather than a star at the center. Enlisted personnel 
wear tabs colored to indicate service corps on their lapels and 
service caps. 

Military Cooperation with the United States 

During the postwar era, Turkey's foremost ally has been the 
United States. Because of Turkey's strategic location in the 
Middle East, its proximity to the Soviet Union's military instal- 
lations and test sites, and its control of the Black Sea straits, mil- 
itary ties with the United States were a crucial factor in the 
East-West confrontation. The alliance originated soon after the 
end of World War II, when Soviet dictator Josef V. Stalin made 
a series of demands on Turkey that the Turkish government 
and the Western powers interpreted as a possible prelude to 
military action. The begrudging withdrawal of Soviet occupa- 
tion forces from northern Iran in May 1946 and communist 
guerrilla warfare in Greece heightened fears of a Soviet drive 
into the Middle East. The United States responded with procla- 
mation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Both Greece 
and Turkey were provided with aid to resist the Soviet threat. 

Because of concerns over extending a United States military 
commitment to the Middle East, the United States initially was 
not convinced that Turkey's admission to NATO should be 
approved. Turkish troops' noteworthy participation in the 
Korean War changed this view; Turkey entered NATO in 1952. 

In accordance with bilateral defense arrangements under 
NATO auspices, the United States has developed and main- 
tained several major military installations on Turkish bases. Of 
particular significance are several electronic intelligence posts 
considered vital for monitoring Russian weapons and Moscow's 
compliance with strategic arms limitation agreements. A long- 
range radar system has been established at Pirinclik, near 
Diyarbakir, to monitor Russian missile testing. At Belbasi, near 
Ankara, nuclear testing can be monitored by means of seismic 
data collection. 

No United States combat forces are based in Turkey, but ele- 
ments of two United States Air Force fighter squadrons based 
in Italy are rotated periodically to Incirlik — the West's farthest 
forward-based tactical combat aircraft in the eastern Mediterra- 
nean. £igli, a Turkish air base north of Izmir, is used by United 



348 



National Security 



States Air Force units in connection with NATO exercises. 
Three bases in eastern Turkey — at Erzurum, Batman, and 
Mus — were upgraded following a 1982 agreement to make 
them available for forward deployment of United States tactical 
aircraft under conditions of a NATO alert. Aircraft operating 
from them could cover the entire Turkish-Iranian-Transcauca- 
sian border region without aerial refueling. 

A Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), first negotiated 
in 1969 and renewed numerous times, consolidated various 
bilateral accords governing the United States military presence 
in Turkey. As a result of its 1988 renegotiation, the agreement 
is now known as the Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (DECA) . Under the DECA, the number of United 
States personnel, including dependents, in Turkey — which had 
reached a peak of 25,000 in 1968 — was reduced to 16,000 in 
1970 and 9,000 by 1980. In 1991 the total was slightly above 
10,000. Since that year, nearly all of the communications and 
naval facilities have been closed. In late 1994, United States 
personnel remained only at the air stations at Incirlik, Ankara, 
and Qigli, the intelligence posts at Pirinclik and Belbasi, and a 
communications station at Karatas, near Incirlik. The number 
of United States personnel had been reduced to about 4,000. 

It is common practice to refer to installations staffed by 
United States personnel — even those solely connected with the 
NATO mission — as 'American." Turkey has never waived its 
sovereignty over them; they have Turkish commanders and are 
officially regarded as joint-use facilities. Even so, Turkish sensi- 
tivity about their control and the conspicuous United States 
presence have at times provoked incidents and disputes. 
Extremist political factions tend to exploit these issues for their 
own purposes. 

Turkey regarded the arms embargo imposed by the United 
States Congress after the Cyprus invasion of 1974 as a serious 
affront. Put into effect in 1975, the embargo was opposed by 
the executive branch of the United States government, which 
considered it an obstruction in the quest for an equitable set- 
tlement of the Cyprus situation. Turkey retaliated by abrogat- 
ing the 1969 DCA and suspending operations of United States- 
used installations not clearly linked to the NATO mission. The 
intelligence collection sites were closed down, and the United 
States Navy was denied use of its loran (long-range) navigation 
station in Turkey. The embargo ended in 1978 when Congress 
repealed its earlier restrictions, although the president of the 



349 



Turkey: A Country Study 

United States was required to make periodic certifications that 
Turkey was contributing to efforts to settle the Cyprus issue. 

Turkish public opinion has been sensitive to suggestions 
that United States rapid deployment forces or other units 
might make use of facilities on Turkish territory for non-NATO 
purposes. The only Muslim country in NATO, Turkey is deter- 
mined to avoid giving open support to controversial or unpop- 
ular actions by the United States in the Middle East. The 
Turkish government did not permit use of the bases for United 
States operations during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 
and allowed only nonmilitary supplies to be shipped via Turkey 
to the United States-led multinational contingent in Lebanon 
in 1983. 

Repeated attempts by members of Congress to pass resolu- 
tions commemorating the Ottoman government's massacre of 
Armenians during World War I have prompted strong reac- 
tions by the Turkish government. For instance, in 1989, after 
such a resolution was approved in the Senate Judiciary Com- 
mittee, Turkey prohibited some United States training flights, 
reduced port calls, and halted military construction. 

Military assistance has been an intrinsic feature of the 
defense relationship between Turkey and the United States. 
Turkey's limited economic resources, juxtaposed against its 
heavy NATO obligation to contain Soviet power in the eastern 
Mediterranean, made such support indispensable until the 
Soviet threat receded in the late 1980s. Between 1950 and 
1991, the United States provided military assistance valued at 
US$9.4 billion, of which about US$6.1 billion was in grant form 
and US$3.3 billion was on a concessional loan basis. 

At the insistence of Congress, the appropriation of military 
funds for Greece and Turkey has for many years been on a 
seven-to-ten ratio. The Turkish government regards the aid for- 
mula as inequitable given that Turkey has a population about 
six times that of Greece, has correspondingly heavier NATO 
commitments, and is host to many NATO and United States 
military facilities. In 1994 the United States Congress held back 
10 percent of the funds appropriated for Turkey until the 
Department of State could verify improvement of Turkey's 
human rights record and progress on confidence-building 
measures in Cyprus. Turkey considered this interference in its 
internal affairs and made no effort to have the funds restored. 

Turkey nevertheless has been the third largest recipient of 
United States military aid, after Israel and Egypt. Despite the 



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end of the Soviet threat, Turkey's military needs during the 
Persian Gulf crisis resulted in a rise in the level of grant aid to 
US$500 million in fiscal year (FY— see Glossary) 1991. 
Although the administrations of presidents George H.W. Bush 
and William J. Clinton sought to maintain a similar level in sub- 
sequent years, citing heavy United States reliance on Turkish 
air bases for support of the Iraqi Kurds in Provide Comfort II. 
Congress approved only US$450 million in FY 1993 and shifted 
the financing from grants to loans. In FY 1994, a move in Con- 
gress to charge interest at market rather than concessional 
rates was barely deflected. Such a change would have been a 
blow to Turkey, which was already saddled with heavy foreign 
debts. Ultimately, US$405 millon in low-interest loans was 
approved. The Department of Defense also provides training 
to about 160 Turkish officers each year. These include students 
at the United States Army Command and General Staff Col- 
lege, as well as individuals assigned to technical schools and 
those receiving specialized training in management, language 
instruction, medical logistics, and air-traffic control. 

Domestic Arms Industry 

Since the mid-1980s, Turkey has been engaged in a wide- 
ranging program to develop a modern defense industry based 
on cooperation with firms in other countries. Previously, Tur- 
key's economic and industrial capacity was insufficient to pro- 
duce weapons as sophisticated as those of Western Europe. In 
the early years of the republic, the government sponsored a 
number of arms factories intended primarily to supply basic 
infantry weapons and ammunition. After World War II, Tur- 
key's efforts to bring its military establishment up to modern 
standards depended almost totally on military assistance and 
credits from its NATO partners. After the imposition of the lim- 
ited embargo by the United States in 1975, Turkey launched a 
series of projects to reduce its dependence on imports of major 
military items. Initial results took the form of a broader range 
of domestically produced light weapons and artillery and the 
development of an electronics industry oriented toward battle- 
field communications and the requirements of military air- 
craft. 

In 1985 new legislation centralized efforts to launch an up- 
to-date arms industry under a new agency — the Defense Indus- 
try Development and Support Administration (later the Minis- 
try of National Defense Undersecretariat for Defense Indus- 



351 



Turkey: A Country Study 

tries, known as SSM) with its own source of capital, the Defense 
Industry Support Fund. The fund does not depend on national 
defense budget appropriations but receives earmarked reve- 
nues directly — 10 percent of taxes on fuel, 5 percent of individ- 
ual and corporate income taxes, and taxes on alcohol and 
tobacco. Most of the major projects encouraged by SSM have 
been international joint ventures and coproduction enter- 
prises. In most cases, the foreign partner must agree to an off- 
set provision, that is, a commitment to purchase some part of 
the resulting production, or components or other goods manu- 
factured in Turkey. 

The Turkish defense industry employs about 50,000 individ- 
uals at 110 firms, many of them state owned. About 1,000 addi- 
tional firms participate in defense business as subcontractors. 
The largest producer of weaponry in Turkey, with about 12,000 
employees, is Makina ve Kimya Endiistrisi Kurumu (MKEK), 
controlled by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. MKEK meets 
the requirements of the Turkish armed forces for light arms 
(including the M-3 and MG-3 rifles and a machine gun of Ger- 
man design), ammunition, and explosives. It also produces 
antiaircraft and antitank guns. 

In 1988 rocket and missile production was shifted from 
MKEK to a new company, Roket Sanayii (ROKETSAN). 
ROKETSAN has the largest share in the production of the pro- 
pulsion system and rocket assembly for the four-country Euro- 
pean consortium manufacturing the Stinger SAM. The 
company also plans to produce multi-launch rocket systems 
(MLRS) in partnership with a United States firm, the LTV Cor- 
poration. A consortium formed by a United States firm, FMC 
Corporation, and a Turkish firm, Nurol, is projected to pro- 
duce 1,700 APCs and armored fighting vehicles by 1997. 

Turkish arms manufacturers' most ambitious undertaking 
has been a consortium with United States firms to produce F- 
16 fighter aircraft. Under this arrangement, airframes for the 
F-16s are produced in a factory at Miirted Air Base near 
Ankara by TUSAS (Turk Ucak Sanayi Sirketi) Aerospace Indus- 
tries, with 51 percent ownership by Turkish interests, 42 per- 
cent by General Dynamics, and 7 percent by General Electric. 
The engine plant near Eskisehir is a joint venture with General 
Electric. 

The project, whose total cost is projected at US$4.2 billion, 
is expected to result in the delivery of 240 F-16C/Ds to the 
Turkish air force between the late 1980s and the late 1990s. 



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National Security 



Additional funds were pledged to the Turkish Defense Fund 
(TDF) after the Persian Gulf War by the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, to be paid over 
a five-year period. Under an October 1994 agreement, Turkey 
requested that the TDF, which thus far amounted to some 
US$1.8 billion, be transferred to Turkey. Most of the TDF 
funds are to be used to cover the cost of eighty F-16 aircraft, of 
which forty were agreed upon in March 1992 and forty more in 
February 1994. Through offset arrangements, F-16 compo- 
nents and engines produced in Turkey are exported to the 
United States. Egypt ordered forty-six F-16s to be delivered 
between 1993 and 1995. 

Communications equipment and electronic warfare systems 
for the Turkish military are produced by ASELSAN Military 
Electronics Industries, a state-owned company whose dominant 
shareholder is OYAK. ASELSAN manufactures under license a 
United States-designed family of manpack and vehicular battle- 
field radios and voice scramblers. It supplies the inertial naviga- 
tion systems and fire control for the TUSAS F-16 project and 
produces components for the Stinger missile program. 

In addition to its coproduction role in the F-16 project, 
TUSAS has contracted with Agusta, the Italian aircraft manu- 
facturer, to produce forty SF-260 trainers at the Miirted plant. 
A contract with Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA) of 
Spain calls for joint production of fifty-two CN-235 light trans- 
port aircraft. A US$1.1 billion agreement was concluded in 
1992 with Sikorsky covering direct procurement of forty-five 
Black Hawk helicopters, with an additional fifty helicopters to 
be coproduced in Turkey by 1999. 

Much of Turkey's indigenous naval construction has been 
carried out with cooperation from German shipbuilders. Four 
frigates of the MEKO-200 class were being built in 1995 at the 
main naval shipyard at Golcuk where three submarines of the 
209-class (type-1200) had been built; four type-1400 subma- 
rines are scheduled to be commissioned between 1994 and 
1998. Dogan-class fast-attack boats armed with Harpoon mis- 
siles have been produced in Turkish yards, as well as destroyer 
escorts, patrol boats, landing craft, and auxiliary craft. In 1993 
private shipyards were invited to bid on construction of mine- 
sweepers and patrol boats. 

The effort to create a modern defense industry on a narrow 
technological base was risky for Turkish defense planners. 
However, it appears to have been successful in enabling Turkey 



353 



Turkey: A Country Study 

to rely on domestic sources to meet an increasing portion of its 
advanced equipment needs. The results have included reduc- 
tions in costs and in the demand for foreign exchange, as well 
as the opening of foreign markets, mainly through offset provi- 
sions. As of the mid-1990s, the anticipated development of a 
Middle Eastern market for finished products did not appear to 
have occurred, based on available arms export data. A broader 
goal was to set new standards for quality and productivity in 
Turkish industry generally and thus increase the country's 
competitiveness through the lead established by the defense 
industry. 

Internal Security Concerns 

Since the late 1960s, Turkey has been plagued by recurrent 
political violence. Radical groups responsible for terrorism 
have included movements of both leftist and rightist orienta- 
tion, as well as ethnic and religious extremists. By far the most 
serious source of violence since the mid-1980s has been the 
Kurdish separatist insurgency, which by the mid-1990s had 
nearly assumed the character of a civil war in the southeastern 
area of the country bordering Syria and Iraq. 

During the 1970s, various political groups — particularly 
ones on the left — used violence in the hope that civil disorder 
and the consequent suppression by the state might lead to rev- 
olution. In the months preceding the assumption of power by 
Turkey's generals in September 1980, the toll of political kill- 
ings rose to more than twenty a day. The government's repres- 
sion of political activism and the detention of an estimated 
30,000 persons suspected of terrorism were accompanied by 
arrests of union members, university students, and journalists. 
The stern measures of the military commanders were vehe- 
mently criticized by Turkish intellectuals and foreign observ- 
ers; however, the measures did reduce the violence. 

Even after civilian rule was restored in 1983, the continua- 
tion of martial law in certain areas, the expansion of police 
powers, and legal constraints on political movements damp- 
ened politically inspired violence. Terrorist incidents contin- 
ued to occur in urban areas, but these were for the most part 
individually targeted bombings and assassinations, including 
attacks on United States installations and personnel. The num- 
ber of such incidents peaked at seventy-five in 1991, most of 
them attributed to leftist protests against Turkey's strategic role 
in the international coalition against Iraq. Nevertheless, the 



354 



National Security 



preoccupying security issue for the Turkish government con- 
tinued to be the mounting separatist insurgency of the Kurdis- 
tan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan — PKK). The 
uprising of Kurds in northern Iraq after the Persian Gulf War 
focused attention on the condition of Kurds in general; the 
PKK used the occasion to intensify its military operations in the 
Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey. 

Kurdish Separatists 

The Kurdish national movement dates back at least to 1925, 
when Atatiirk ruthlessly suppressed a revolt against the new 
Turkish republic motivated by the regime's renunciation of 
Muslim religious practices. Uprisings in the 1930s and 1940s 
prompted by opposition to the modernizing and centralizing 
reforms of the Turkish government in Ankara also were put 
down by the Turkish army. Kurdish opposition to the govern- 
ment's emphasis on linguistic homogeneity was spurred in the 
1960s and 1970s by agitation in neighboring Iran and Iraq on 
behalf of an autonomous Kurdistan, to include Kurds from 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The majority of Kurds, however, 
continued to participate in Turkish political parties and to 
assimilate into Turkish society. 

The best known and most radical of the Kurdish move- 
ments, the PKK, which does not represent the majority of 
Kurds, seeks to establish an independent Marxist state in south- 
eastern Turkey where the Kurdish population predominates. 
Beginning in 1984, a resurgence of Kurdish attacks attributed 
to the PKK necessitated the deployment of Turkish army units 
and elite police forces. Fighting in the mountain terrain 
favored the insurgents, who could intimidate local Kurdish 
families and ambush regular troops. The violence has mounted 
since 1991, with PKK guerrillas from camps in Syria, Iran, and 
Iraq, as well as from inside Turkey itself, attacking Turkish mili- 
tary and police outposts and targeting civilian community lead- 
ers and teachers. In 1993 PKK gunmen sought military targets 
outside the southeastern region; they also conducted coordi- 
nated attacks in many West European cities, particularly in Ger- 
many where more than 1 million Kurds live, against Turkish 
diplomatic installations and Turkish businesses, often operated 
by Kurds. Such attacks on commercial firms can be seen as 
efforts at intimidation to gain contributions to PKK fundrais- 
ing. 



355 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Increased numbers of security forces were mobilized in 
1994 against the Kurds in a government campaign of mounting 
intensity. One government strategy has been the forced evacua- 
tion and in a number of instances burning some 850 Kurdish 
villages to prevent them from harboring PKK insurgents. 
Although militarily successful, the evacuations have caused 
great hardship to the villagers. 

The government has been accused of harassment, destruc- 
tion of villages, and the slaying of Kurds believed to be sympa- 
thetic to the PKK. Its tactics have resulted in hundreds of 
civilian casualties and turned thousands into refugees, who 
have crowded into major Turkish cities. The insurgents, in 
turn, have targeted villages known to be sympathetic to the gov- 
ernment, murdering state officials, teachers, government col- 
laborators, and paramilitary village guards. In an especially 
cruel incident in May 1993 that ended a two-month cease-fire 
announced by the PKK, a PKK unit executed thirty unarmed 
military recruits after ambushing several buses. 

As of early 1994, about 160,000 Turkish troops and gen- 
darmerie had been mobilized for operations against the PKK. 
Some 40,000 civilians formed a village guard of progovern- 
ment Kurds. A new mobile security force of about 10,000 
troops was undergoing special training in antiguerrilla opera- 
tions. The United States Department of State estimated that 
there were 10,000 to 15,000 full-time PKK guerrillas, 5,000 to 
6,000 of whom were in Turkey and the others in Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria. There were thought to be an additional 60,000 to 75,000 
part-time guerrillas. 

The number of deaths since the war's outbreak in 1984 had 
risen beyond 12,000 by 1994. According to official figures, 
more than 1,500 PKK guerrillas were killed and 7,600 captured 
during the first eleven months of 1993. During the same 
period, the number of government security personnel killed 
came to 676. Civilian deaths totaled 1,249, more than double 
the 1992 total. 

The PKK cause was not helped by the Kurds of Iraq, who 
depended on Turkey to keep their enclave protected from the 
forces of Iraqi president Saddam Husayn. In October 1992, 
Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish army carried out a joint offensive 
against PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, forcing the surrender of 
more than 1,000 PKK fighters. Turkey also enlisted Syria's 
cooperation in closing the PKK base in the Bekaa Valley of Leb- 
anon. The government's flexibility in seeking a negotiated 



356 



National Security 



solution to the conflict was limited by the growing anger of the 
Turkish public over PKK terrorism and the killing of troops in 
the southeast and by the military's uncompromising anti-Kurd- 
ish stance. 

Terrorism of the Left 

Marxists and other groups of the extreme left have never 
been more than marginal factors in national politics, even dur- 
ing those periods when they were permitted to function as 
legal parties. Just before the military crackdown in 1980, four 
of the seven Marxist-oriented parties legally recognized at the 
time contested local elections but were able to gather a total of 
only 1 percent of the national vote. During the 1970s, the leftist 
movement turned increasingly to violence and terrorism; at 
the same time, left-wing ideologies became popular in the uni- 
versities and among alienated and often unemployed urban 
youth. 

In 1987 the leaders of the banned Turkish Workers' Party 
and of the Turkish Communist Party returned from exile to 
form a new Turkish United Communist Party. Both politicians 
were arrested and charged under the provision of the penal 
code that specifically outlawed communist organizations and 
the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist theories. After being 
decriminalized in 1991, the Turkish United Communist Party 
was again proscribed after the Constitutional Court upheld a 
ban on the grounds that it had violated Article 14 of the consti- 
tution, which prohibits "establishing the hegemony of one 
social class over another." 

The most active of the left-wing terrorist groups is the Revo- 
lutionary Left Party (Devrimci Sol — Dev Sol). Virulently anti- 
American and anti-NATO, Dev Sol was responsible for most of 
the attacks against United States targets and other political vio- 
lence during the Persian Gulf War. In one incident, two United 
States civilians working for a United States defense contractor 
were killed. The Turkish government reacted vigorously, con- 
ducting raids against Dev Sol safe houses and enacting new 
antiterrorist legislation. Dev Sol is believed to have several hun- 
dred members, including several dozen armed militants. 
Because of police raids and internal factionalism, attacks by 
Dev Sol have been less numerous since 1991. Sympathizers 
among the foreign Turkish population in Western Europe have 
helped fund the organization; training support is believed to 
come from radical Palestinians in Lebanon. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

The Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army and 
the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit committed 
numerous acts of terrorism in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
including bank robberies and bombings of businesses, courts, 
and key government offices. Members of the latter group were 
sentenced in 1984 after convictions for eighty-seven killings, 
including the murders of five United States servicemen in 
1979. Since 1990, however, the other extremist groups of the 
left have been overshadowed by Dev Sol. 

Armenian Terrorism 

The primary objective of Armenian terrorists during the 
1970s and 1980s was to inflict revenge for the massacres of 
Armenians during World War I. Armenians regard these kill- 
ings as systematic genocide, but Turks claim they were the 
unfortunate outgrowth of deportations intended to prevent 
Armenians from assisting the invading Russian armies. Terror- 
ist groups also demanded that Turkey admit its guilt for crimes 
committed against Armenians and provide reparations in the 
form of money and territory for an Armenian homeland. 

Most of the violence by Armenian terrorists has been 
inflicted on Turkish agencies and representatives outside Tur- 
key. The best known of these groups, the Armenian Secret 
Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), apparently was 
formed in 1975 among leftist Armenians living in Beirut, Leba- 
non, with the help of sympathetic Palestinians. In reaction, 
rightists from the Armenian community in Lebanon formed 
the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). A 
number of other groups claimed responsibility for terrorist 
acts, but ASALA and JCAG were judged to be the two main 
groups. It was not clear whether lawful Armenian political 
blocs in Lebanon sponsored these terrorist units, but they did 
not openly condone the terrorist acts of their offshoots. 

Among the Armenian diaspora, numbering more than 6 
million worldwide, probably fewer than 1,000 persons belong 
to terrorist factions. Members generally are young, recent 
immigrants to their countries of residence, or reside in places 
such as Lebanon where political violence is common. Assassina- 
tion and bombing are the principal techniques used by the two 
main terrorist organizations. However, JCAG has limited its 
attacks to Turkish embassy officials in the United States, Can- 
ada, and Western Europe, refraining from indiscriminate vio- 
lence to avoid alienating Western public opinion. Since 1983 



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responsibility for most of the attacks has been claimed by a 
group called the Armenian Revolutionary Army, possibly a 
cover name for JCAG. 

ASALA has carried out a number of bombings of ticket 
offices and airport counters of United States airlines in West- 
ern Europe. Following the bombing of a Turkish airline 
counter at Orly Airport in Paris in 1983, which resulted in sev- 
eral deaths and injuries, a split developed within ASALA over 
the rationale of indiscriminate terrorism in advancing the 
Armenian cause. An offshoot, the ASALA Revolutionary Move- 
ment (ASALA-RM), regarded indiscriminate terrorism as coun- 
terproductive, while ASALA-Militant (ASALA-M) continued to 
favor unrestricted violence against both Turkish and "imperial- 
ist" targets. After the split, the ASALA membership appeared to 
become preoccupied with its internal differences and has since 
been relatively inactive. 

Islamists 

A legal, nonviolent Islamic political movement exists in Tur- 
key. Its main locus is the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi — RP; also 
seen as Prosperity Party), which obtained the votes of 16.9 per- 
cent of the electorate in the 1991 general elections and cap- 
tured 19 percent in the municipal elections of 1994. The 
Welfare Party also won mayoral contests in Ankara, Istanbul, 
and twenty-seven other large cities. The party stresses eco- 
nomic goals; to cast its appeal in religious terms would bring it 
into conflict with the constitutional ban on the organization of 
parties on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or political ideas con- 
sidered authoritarian. 

Turkey's political system is more open than those of most 
Middle Eastern states, and to a large extent it has been able to 
accommodate Muslim political expression while marginalizing 
its radical elements. Nevertheless, radical Muslim groups are 
considered a threat to the secular political establishment. 
Although a link with the Iranian government has not been 
proven, Iranian mullahs are believed to give support and 
encouragement to extremist Muslims. 

Radical Islamic activism — sometimes described as funda- 
mentalism — has been the source of some terrorism, in particu- 
lar the murders of journalists, politicians, and academics who 
were outspoken defenders of Turkish secularism. Several 
Islamic groups have claimed responsibility for these deaths, 
among them the Islamic Movement Organization, about which 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

little is known. Another obscure group, composed of local 
Islamists linked to the Iranian government, has targeted exter- 
nal enemies of Iran. One of the worst incidents of religious vio- 
lence occurred in the city of Sivas in 1993 when religious 
fanatics set fire to a hotel where a well-known author and trans- 
lator of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses was staying. The 
author escaped, but thirty-seven people perished and 100 were 
injured. Anxious to avoid unnecessary tension in relations with 
Iran, Turkish officials have avoided placing blame directly on 
the Tehran government for sponsoring terrorist activity. Evi- 
dence, however, has been presented to Iran implicating 
extremists within the revolutionary power structure, if not the 
Iranian government itself. 

Since 1991 a shadowy group known as Hizballah-Contra has 
sprung up in Kurdish areas, carrying out a campaign of assassi- 
nation and terrorism against the PKK and its sympathizers. The 
organization is not connected to Hizballah (Party of God, also 
known as Islamic Jihad), a Shia terrorist movement dedicated 
to establishing an Iranian-style government in Lebanon. 
Although the Turkish government denies any link to Hizbal- 
lah-Contra, the group's hit squads are believed to be tolerated 
by the police and gendarmerie, along with other Kurdish 
groups violently hostile to the PKK. 

The leadership of Turkey's armed forces is highly sensitive 
to the possibility of soldiers becoming exposed to extremist 
Islamic influences. Orders issued in 1991 instructed troops to 
avoid "illegal, destructive, separatist trends, either from the 
right or left, which threaten the military's discipline." Com- 
manders were urged to be especially careful with regard to staff 
members living outside military compounds in large cities 
where they could come into contact with Islamist groups. They 
were ordered to take stern measures — in some cases, expul- 
sion — against officers and NCOs who adopted strong religious 
views, who refrained from certain social activities on religious 
grounds, or whose spouses wore Islamic garb. 

Police System 

The principal agencies devoted to internal security and law 
enforcement are the National Police and the gendarmerie, 
both headquartered in Ankara and both administered by the 
Ministry of Interior. Broadly, the National Police handles 
police functions (including traffic control) in the cities and 
towns, and the gendarmerie serves principally as a rural con- 



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stabulary. In times of crisis, the prime minister can direct the 
chief of the General Staff to assist the police and gendarmerie 
in maintaining internal security. The gendarmerie is regarded 
as a military security force; during wartime or in areas placed 
under martial law, it functions under the army. 

National Police 

The territorial organization of the National Police corre- 
sponds roughly to Turkey's administrative subdivisions (see 
Provincial and Local Government, ch. 4). Below the general 
directorate are police directorates in all of the country's sev- 
enty-six provinces and police posts (district commands) in 
most of the administrative districts. Despite their wide territo- 
rial distribution, a very large proportion of the police are clus- 
tered in the major cities. No reliable data are available on the 
size of the police force, whose members are believed to num- 
ber more than 50,000. Regardless of its size, the force does not 
appear large enough to keep up with the need generated by 
Turkey's urban growth and ordinary crime and traffic prob- 
lems. 

The laws establishing the organization of police at the pro- 
vincial and local levels distinguish three categories of func- 
tions: administrative, judicial, and political. In this context, the 
administrative police perform the usual functions relating to 
the safety of persons and property: enforcement of laws and 
regulations, prevention of smuggling and apprehension of 
smugglers, quelling of public disorder, fingerprinting and pho- 
tographing, public licensing, controlling traffic and inspecting 
motor vehicles, apprehending thieves and military deserters, 
locating missing persons, and keeping track of foreigners resid- 
ing or traveling in Turkey. Film censorship is also considered 
an administrative responsibility. In some cases, municipalities 
provide all or part of the funding for administrative police 
functions in their localities. 

The judicial police work closely with the administrators of 
justice. Attached to the offices of public prosecutors, the judi- 
cial police assist in investigating crimes, issue arrest warrants, 
and help prosecutors assemble evidence for trials. The political 
police combat activities considered subversive and deal with 
those groups whose actions or plans are identified as contrary 
to the security of the republic. 

To carry out the police's broad and sometimes overlapping 
functions, specialized squads focusing on such problems as 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

smuggling and the narcotics trade are located in the larger 
commands. At the other end of the scale, the police employ 
unskilled auxiliaries in many towns and in some neighbor- 
hoods of larger communities. These are selected local men, 
not armed, who are engaged to prevent local theft and to give 
the alarm in case of emergency. 

Police ranks range from constable through sergeant, lieu- 
tenant, captain, superintendent second and first class, and sev- 
eral grades of police chief. A commissioner of police 
commands each of the seventy-six provincial directorates of 
police. Provincial directorates are divided into district police 
commands headed by superintendents. 

In earlier years, an entrant to the lowest police grade was 
expected to have completed junior high school. But police 
authorities recognized that the low education level of the force 
contributed to violations of legal rights and mistreatment of 
prisoners. Thus, recent recruits have been required to have 
completed secondary school. Training consists of a six-month 
basic course at one of five police schools. Candidates for higher 
rank are sent to a police college (equivalent to a senior high 
school offering university preparation) and then to the Police 
Institute at Ankara, from which students graduate as sergeants 
after a three-year course. 

The performance of the Turkish police has been the subject 
of persistent criticism for violations of fundamental human 
rights. These problems, which have received growing interna- 
tional and domestic attention, involve torture during question- 
ing, incommunicado detention, politically motivated 
disappearances, "mystery killings," and excessive use of force. 
Successive governments have repeatedly promised to curb 
abuses by the security forces, but little if any improvement has 
been recorded (see Individual Rights, this ch.). 

Gendarmerie 

Primarily a rural police force, the gendarmerie maintains 
public order outside the municipal boundaries of cities and 
provincial towns and guards Turkey's land borders against ille- 
gal entry and smuggling. It has jurisdiction over 90 percent of 
the territory of Turkey and 50 percent of the population. The 
gendarmerie's recruits are supplied through the military con- 
scription system, and its officers and NCOs are transferred 
from the army. New career junior officers are obtained by quo- 
tas from the graduating classes of the Turkish army academy. 



362 



Policeman directing traffic, Istanbul 
Courtesy Hermine Dreyfus s 



In late 1994, the gendarmerie's headquarters in Ankara was 
commanded by Aydin liter, a four-star general. Subordinate to 
the commanding general's chief of staff, a two-star general, are 
typical military staff sections for personnel, intelligence, opera- 
tions, and logistics, as well as the headquarters commandant. 
The major operational category consists of the internal security 
units, divided into stationary forces and mobile infantry bri- 
gades. These forces may be supplemented by air units and com- 
mando units equipped with Russian APCs and towed artillery 
weapons. In 1994 Turkey announced the purchase of nineteen 
Russian helicopters to assist in operations against the PKK. 
Elite fighting formations that distinguished themselves in 
Cyprus in 1974, the commando units execute many of the 
operations against the PKK in the southeast. The gendarmerie 
also includes headquarters and border forces, administrative 
control and logistical support units, and training staff. 

The total number of gendarmes was estimated at 70,000 
active members and 50,000 reserves in late 1994. They are 
organized into thirteen regional commands encompassing the 
seventy-six provinces. In each province, the principal gendarm- 
erie commander, a colonel or lieutenant colonel, advises the 
governor on matters of security and maintains direct charge of 



363 



Turkey: A Country Study 

the district gendarmerie commands, usually headed by cap- 
tains. Below the district commanders are commanders of the 
administrative subdistricts, each of whom controls the fixed 
posts in his area. There are some 3,600 posts, exclusive of bor- 
der posts, usually located at intervals along the main roads and 
staffed by a sergeant and six or more gendarmes. To foster 
detachment from local groups and their interests and quarrels, 
gendarmes are usually assigned away from their home areas. 

The administrative functions of the gendarmerie corre- 
spond roughly to those of the National Police but include such 
distinctive requirements as enforcing hunting and fishing laws, 
fighting forest fires, and patrolling borders. The gendarmes' 
judicial tasks include guarding prisons and assisting in investi- 
gations and preparations for trial. They also have military 
duties: serving as adjuncts to the army in emergencies, enforc- 
ing conscription, apprehending military deserters, and work- 
ing in military courts. 

Gendarmerie officers are chosen from cadets during the 
second year of training at the military academy, an aptitude for 
law being a prime factor in the selection. After completing 
their academy training, officers attend the infantry school for 
six months and the commando school for four months. Fur- 
ther professional training follows at the Gendarmerie Schools 
Command. NCOs are selected by examination from army per- 
sonnel who have already served at least one year. They are then 
trained at the Gendarmerie Schools Command for five 
months. Basic military training is given to conscripts by the 
Gendarmerie Schools Command, followed by specialized train- 
ing in various areas. 

Writing in the late 1980s, the noted political journalist Meh- 
met Ali Birand commented that the gendarmerie had had an 
unfavorable reputation since its founding in 1839 and its later 
reorganization on the pattern of the French gendarmerie. It 
began as the agent of brute force for the government, putting 
down civil conflicts, pursuing criminals, and collecting taxes. 
From the early days of the republic, the gendarmerie was the 
only body available to subdue unrest, enforce the principles of 
Atatiirk, suppress opposition, and collect levies. 

The gendarmerie has relatively few officers and NCOs; the 
main burden of the service falls on ordinary conscripts who 
predominate in the force of 70,000. The conscripts are poorly 
trained in matters of law and regulations and in the manner of 
enforcing them, contributing to the harsh image of the gen- 



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National Security 



darmerie. As Birand notes, in contrast to Turkish gendarmerie 
operations, operations of the French, Belgian, and Italian gen- 
darmeries are carried out primarily by officers and NCOs, pri- 
vates being assigned sentry duty and other tasks that will not 
bring them into contact with the public. 

The commander of the gendarmerie said in 1993 that 
efforts were being made to tailor the personnel structure to 
enable the force to perform its missions more effectively. Spe- 
cialized sergeants were being recruited instead of conscripts. 
No longer standardized, unit training was being tailored to 
conditions in various regions and particular types of missions. 
New equipment had been introduced to improve air transpor- 
tation and surface movement, and to provide mobile com- 
mand, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities. 

Formed in 1982 as the maritime wing of the gendarmerie, 
the coast guard is now separate but also reports to the Ministry 
of Interior. With a personnel strength of about 1,100, the coast 
guard is responsible for maintaining the security of the coast 
and territorial waters, for conducting missions to protect its 
Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean — the boundaries of 
which are under dispute with Greece — for search-and-air-res- 
cue operations, and for protecting the marine environment. 
The coast guard is organized into four area commands: the 
Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and adjacent straits, the Aegean 
Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. Surface patrols are carried 
out by fifty-two patrol vessels and smaller craft. The most effec- 
tive of these are fourteen search-and-rescue vessels of 220 tons, 
all built within recent years in Turkish shipyards. Smaller 150- 
ton and 70-ton patrol boats of German origin were nearing 
obsolescence in the mid-1990s. An ambitious construction plan 
foresaw a major strengthening of the service with eight new ves- 
sels of 350 to 400 tons and forty-eight ships of 180 to 300 tons. 
A number of helicopters and aircraft were to be acquired to 
expand a small maritime air unit of three United States-manu- 
factured OH-58 (Jet Ranger) helicopters. 

Intelligence Services 

Intelligence gathering is the primary responsibility of the 
National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati — 
MIT), which combines the functions of internal and external 
intelligence agencies. In 1993 a career diplomat, Sonmez Kok- 
sal, was named undersecretary in charge of MIT, the first civil- 
ian to head the organization. Each branch of the military has 



365 



Turkey: A Country Study 

its own intelligence arm, as do the National Police and the gen- 
darmerie. Military intelligence activities in martial law areas 
aim to prevent seditious activities against the state. Intelligence 
personnel also engage in electronic eavesdropping and rely on 
reports of overseas military attaches and exchange information 
with foreign intelligence services. 

Military and civil intelligence requirements are formulated 
by the National Intelligence Coordination Committee. This 
committee includes members of the staff of the National Secu- 
rity Council, to which it is directly responsible. Nevertheless, a 
lack of coordination among the intelligence services is said to 
be a weakness that hampers MIT effectiveness. 

MIT has no police powers; it is authorized only to gather 
intelligence and conduct counterintelligence abroad and to 
uncover communist, extreme right-wing, and separatist — that 
is, Kurdish and Armenian — groups internally. The MIT chief 
reports to the prime minister but was in the past considered 
close to the military. MIT has been charged with failing to 
notify the government when it became aware of past plots, if 
not actual complicity in military coup attempts. The organiza- 
tion functions under strict discipline and secrecy. Housing and 
headquarters offices for its personnel are colocated in a com- 
pound in Ankara. 

Kurdish groups in Western Europe have charged the Turk- 
ish intelligence service with fomenting dissension and unrest 
among their various factions. Although these claims have not 
been verified, it seems likely that infiltration of the Kurdish sep- 
aratist movement is a high priority for MIT. Members of the 
agency are also suspected of having acted as agents provoca- 
teurs in leftist organizations during the 1970s. Dev Sol is 
believed to have been infiltrated by intelligence agents, as raids 
on its establishments in the early 1990s seemed to demonstrate. 

Crime and Punishment 

The Turkish court system and judicial procedures are based 
on European models adopted after the establishment of the 
republic. For example, the system of criminal justice that 
replaced the Islamic justice system of the Ottoman Empire 
derives from the Italian penal code, and civil law follows the 
Swiss model (see Secularist Reforms, ch. 2). 

Crimes are defined as either felonies or misdemeanors, the 
latter including minor infractions such as traffic violations. Fel- 



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onies include premeditated homicide, theft, arson, armed rob- 
bery, embezzlement of state property, perjury, and rape. 

Punishments for felonies fall into the categories of strict 
imprisonment, ordinary imprisonment, and heavy fines. Under 
the Criminal Code of 1926, as amended, certain crimes against 
the state and premeditated murder were punished with the 
death penalty. In practice, executions were suspended in 1984. 
More than 1,000 death sentences were pending when blanket 
commutations were granted in 1986, and capital punishment 
ended formally with passage of the Anti-Terror Law of 1991. 
Strict imprisonment entails labor for between one year and life 
and, for a recidivist, could begin with a period of solitary con- 
finement. Ordinary imprisonment can range up to twenty 
years and also requires labor. In serious cases, convictions may 
disqualify a person from holding public office and from prac- 
ticing a profession or trade. Withdrawal of the right to vote and 
payment of damages or restitution also may result from convic- 
tion for a felony. In 1986 the Execution of Sentences Act 
halved the time for prisoners then serving jail sentences. Life 
sentences were reduced to twenty years and death sentences 
commuted to thirty-year terms. 

Procedures in Criminal Law 

When the police (or gendarmerie) believe that a person has 
committed a crime, the suspect is taken to the nearest police 
station for registration and interrogation. A police magistrate 
informs the suspect of the charges and questions the suspect 
and any witnesses to determine whether a prima facie case 
exists. A warrant of arrest is issued when detention of the 
accused is indicated. In principle, individuals can be detained 
pending trial only when there is a strong presumption that they 
have committed the offense with which they are charged and 
when there is reason to believe that they intend to escape, to 
destroy traces of the crime, to induce accomplices or witnesses 
to make false statements, or to evade the obligation to testify. 

Important changes in the treatment of suspects occurred in 
1992 with the introduction of the Criminal Trials Procedure 
Law. This law affirms the right of common criminal suspects to 
immediate access to legal counsel and the right to meet with an 
attorney at any time. Permissible prearraignment detention 
was shortened to twenty-four hours for common individual 
crimes and to four days for common crimes involving conspir- 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

acy. The practical effect of the new law has been improved 
attorney access for those charged with common crimes. 

The 1991 Anti-Terror Law nullified the "thought crimes" 
articles of the penal code. However, it introduced a broad and 
ambiguous definition of terrorism, enabling the government 
to use the law not only to combat alleged terrorism but also to 
impose sentences of two to five years on ordinary citizens for 
written and oral propaganda, meetings, and demonstrations 
aimed at "damaging the indivisible unity of the state." 

Persons detained for individual crimes under the Anti-Ter- 
ror Law must be brought before a judge within forty-eight 
hours. Anyone charged with crimes of a collective political or 
conspiratorial nature may be detained for up to fifteen days 
and up to thirty days in the ten southeastern provinces under a 
state of emergency in early 1995. The law does not guarantee 
access to counsel in such cases, leaving this decision to prosecu- 
tors, who routinely deny access. 

Cases involving minor offenses are tried by a justice of the 
peace, a single judge who has limited penal and civil jurisdic- 
tion. Somewhat more serious offenses are tried by courts of 
first instance, with a single judge. Central criminal courts that 
have a president and two judges deal with crimes punishable by 
more than five years' imprisonment. Three-judge commercial 
courts also exist. 

Ordinary defendants have the right to a public trial and 
must be provided with free counsel if they are indigent. How- 
ever, the constitution does provide for closed trials in the inter- 
est of "public morality and public security." There is no jury 
system; all cases are decided by a judge or panel of judges. The 
constitution requires that judges be independent of the execu- 
tive in the discharge of their duties, and, in practice, judges are 
not subject to government interference. Defense lawyers have 
access to the prosecutor's files after arraignment and prior to 
the trial. Release may be granted after arraignment upon pay- 
ment of bail or presentation of an appropriate guarantee. 

Eight state security courts, each composed of five mem- 
bers — two civilian judges, one military judge, and two prosecu- 
tors — may try defendants accused of terrorism, drug 
smuggling, membership in illegal organizations, or espousing 
and disseminating prohibited ideas. The state security courts 
mainly handle cases under the Anti-Terror Law. As of the end 
of 1993, a total of 3,792 persons had been detained under the 
law, and 811 persons were serving sentences under its provi- 



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sions. In addition to the longer prearraignment detention the 
law permits, the state security courts can hold closed hearings 
and may admit testimony gathered during police interrogation 
in the absence of counsel. Verdicts of the courts may be 
appealed to a special State Security Court of Appeals. 

Martial law courts established after the 1980 coup continue 
to function in those provinces under martial law. Military 
courts hear cases involving infractions of military law by mem- 
bers of the armed forces. A separate military court appeals sys- 
tem applies. In late 1993, two television journalists received 
two-month sentences from a military court for presenting a 
program on military deserters and draft evaders in the first 
known case of civilians tried in a military court while Turkey 
was under civilian rule. 

Incidence of Crime 

The incidence of ordinary crime is considered low in com- 
parison to rates in other Middle Eastern and some West Euro- 
pean countries. As in many other countries with even better 
data-gathering capabilities, the statistics on criminal acts may 
be unreliable. The penal registry maintained by the Ministry of 
Justice offers only a partial indication of the actual extent of 
crime. Moreover, in much of rural Turkey acts formally consid- 
ered police matters may be addressed in the local community 
without coming to the attention of the gendarmerie. 

Official statistics indicate a doubling of prison admissions 
between 1984 and 1991. This increase was due almost entirely 
to a rapid rise in the number of persons jailed "according to 
special laws," meaning presumably those convicted of terrorism 
or illegal political activity. In numerous categories of ordinary 
crime, the number of prison admissions actually fell from 1984 
to 1991. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that the incidence 
of ordinary crime has been growing because of the economic, 
social, and cultural stresses associated with relatively rapid 
urbanization and the weakening of traditional social controls 
among urban immigrants. 

According to the Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1993, the num- 
ber of convicts entering prisons in 1991 was 53,912, and the 
number discharged was 72,885. In most years, the number of 
admissions and discharges is nearly equal; the higher rate of 
discharges in 1991 was probably a result of the release of those 
convicted under political clauses of the penal code repealed 
that year. Among the most common felonies resulting in incar- 



369 



Turkey: A Country Study 

ceration in 1991 were crimes against property (8,360), crimes 
against individuals (5,879), and crimes against "public decency 
and family order" (2,681). The numbers of persons admitted to 
prison bore little relation to the number of cases brought 
before the various criminal courts. According to official statis- 
tics, more than 52,000 new cases were brought before the cen- 
tral criminal courts, 632,000 before the criminal courts of first 
instance, and 493,000 before the justices of the peace. 

The number entering prisons under special laws rose rap- 
idly, from 7,514 in 1985 to 32,645 in 1991. Although Turkish 
sources offer no explanation of the increase, the period corre- 
sponds to the spiraling Kurdish dissidence and the strict laws 
then in effect dealing with "thought crimes." 

Narcotics Trafficking 

Turkey plays a major role in the narcotics trade, primarily as 
a natural route for the movement of hashish from Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Iran to destinations in Europe. The disinte- 
gration of the Soviet Union has resulted in a loss of control 
over drug production in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Unrest 
in Azerbaijan and Georgia facilitates smuggling from the Cau- 
casus area. Turkish police maintain that the PKK is heavily 
involved in the heroin trade. The use of air and sea routes for 
narcotics transshipment through Turkey has grown as the con- 
flict in former Yugoslavia has disrupted the traditional over- 
land routes through the Balkans. 

Turkey is an important processing point for morphine base 
and heroin base imported into the country. Also, the Turks tra- 
ditionally have grown the opium poppy for medicinal pur- 
poses. The government effectively controls the cultivation and 
production of opiates, paying high prices for the crop and care- 
fully monitoring growing areas. Local drug consumption and 
abuse are considered minor problems, although there are 
some indications that heroin and cocaine use is increasing 
among the more affluent segments of the population. 

Nationwide there are more than 1,000 narcotics law 
enforcement officers. The principal law enforcement agencies 
concerned with narcotics are the National Police and the gen- 
darmerie. Turkish customs agencies have lacked a professional 
cadre of narcotics interdiction agents, but in the mid-1990s 
were working toward creating such a body with United States 
training assistance. The coast guard has also begun playing a 
larger role in interdiction. In spite of Turkey's efforts, it is 



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National Security 



believed that little of the heroin passing through the country is 
seized because of insufficient staff to screen cargoes ade- 
quately, particularly at the key transfer point of Istanbul. 

There is no evidence of widespread corruption among 
senior officials engaged in drug law enforcement. In some 
cases, however, drug investigations have been compromised by 
corruption at lower levels of the criminal justice system, as well 
as within the judicial system once traffickers have been appre- 
hended. Because Turkey has no legislation prohibiting money 
laundering, it is almost impossible to track inflows of drug prof- 
its. However, the Turkish government has indicated its inten- 
tion to introduce laws to deal with this practice. 

Data on seizures of heroin and hashish show an upward 
trend in the five-year period between 1989 and 1993. Hashish 
seizures increased from 6.9 tons in 1989 to 28.7 tons in 1993. 
However, a major factor was a single seizure of more than 2.7 
tons of morphine base and 13.5 tons of hashish aboard a Turk- 
ish merchant ship in January 1993. 

Individual Rights 

Under the martial-law regime established after the 1980 
coup, Turkey's citizens suffered a serious curtailment of nor- 
mal civil rights. Starting in 1983, when parliamentary elections 
were held, the government gradually lifted restraints on indi- 
vidual liberties and progressively withdrew martial law from 
major cities and provinces. Restrictions on the press were 
removed in 1985, making it permissible to publish all views 
except those banned by the penal code. The 1987 state of 
emergency declared in ten southeastern provinces where the 
government faced terrorist violence allowed the civilian gover- 
nor to exercise certain powers verging on martial law, includ- 
ing warrantless searches and restrictions on the press. 

Although progress has been made in reducing human 
rights abuses since the military government period, mistreat- 
ment by the police in the form of beatings and torture has 
remained a seemingly intractable problem. Reports of illegal 
practices, in some cases extrajudicial killings, deaths in custody, 
and disappearances, have become more widespread since 
1992, when violence resulting from the Kurdish insurgency 
reached unprecedented levels. The Turkish government has 
renewed previous pledges to end the use of torture by the secu- 
rity forces, but little has been achieved in curbing the excesses 
of the police and military. 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

The widespread evidence of torture and severe ill-treatment 
of detainees has been condemned by numerous international 
groups, such as the Council of Europe's Committee for the Pre- 
vention of Torture and the United Nations Committee on Tor- 
ture. Within Turkey, illegal police activities have been 
monitored by the Human Rights Association since that organi- 
zation received official approval in 1987. The association subse- 
quently attracted a membership of about 20,000 and opened 
branches in fifty of the provincial capitals. The companion 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, established in 1990, 
operates torture-rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, and 
Istanbul, and serves as a clearinghouse for human rights infor- 
mation. Besides enduring government-imposed restrictions, 
the Human Rights Association has seen nine people associated 
with the organization slain. The group's leadership has 
charged that nearly half of its offices have been forced to close 
because of police pressure. 

The Human Rights Foundation has claimed that govern- 
ment security forces were responsible for ninety-one extrajudi- 
cial killings during the first nine months of 1993, and that 
security forces were implicated in many of the 291 "mystery kill- 
ings" during the same period. Perhaps twenty persons died in 
official custody, some allegedly as a result of torture. Other kill- 
ings occurred during raids on terrorist safe houses, or when 
deadly force was used against unarmed civilians participating 
in peaceful demonstrations. 

Turkish human rights advocates believe that most persons 
charged with political crimes undergo torture, usually while in 
incommunicado detention in the hands of the police or gen- 
darmerie before being brought before a court. About half of 
the ordinary criminal suspects are thought to undergo torture 
while under police interrogation. In the event that law enforce- 
ment officers are charged in torture cases, the sentences 
imposed are generally light or the cases drag on for years. 

The constitution guarantees inviolability of the domicile 
and privacy of communications except upon issuance of a judi- 
cial warrant. However, in the southeastern provinces that are 
under state of emergency the governor may authorize warrant- 
less search. In these areas, security personnel at roadblocks reg- 
ularly search travelers and vehicles in an effort to apprehend 
smugglers and terrorists. 

University students and faculty members may not be mem- 
bers of political parties or become involved in political activi- 



372 



National Security 



ties. Youth branches of political parties are forbidden, and the 
university rector must grant permission for a student to join 
any association. Political activity by trade unions is also banned. 
Thus, unions may neither endorse candidates nor make contri- 
butions to their campaigns; they are, however, able to make 
known their opposition to or support of political parties and 
government policies. Collective bargaining and strikes are 
strictly regulated. Unions must have government permission to 
hold meetings and rallies but are permitted to organize work- 
places freely and to engage in collective bargaining (see 
Human Resources and Trade Unions, ch. 3; Political Interest 
Groups, ch. 4). 

In March 1994, seven Kurdish legislators were arrested on 
the parliament grounds. Indictments were prepared against 
them for writings and speeches deemed supportive of Kurdish 
separatism. The incident aroused considerable controversy 
both domestically and internationally; all seven assembly mem- 
bers were given long prison terms in late 1994. 

Freedom of conscience and religious belief is guaranteed by 
the constitution, as is private dissemination of religious ideas. 
However, religious activity is strictly supervised in accordance 
with the principles of secularism and separation of church and 
state. No political party advocating a theocracy or government 
founded on religious principles is permitted. The operation of 
churches, monasteries, synagogues, and schools must be 
approved by the state. Armenian and Greek churches are care- 
fully monitored, and prosecutors have brought charges of pros- 
elytism against Islamists and evangelical Christian groups 
deemed to have political overtones. Courts have not been sym- 
pathetic to such charges, but the police have acted against 
some evangelical Christians by refusing to renew their resi- 
dence permits and expelling them. 

Penal System 

The civil penal system is administered by the General Direc- 
torate of Prisons and Houses of Detention in the Ministry of 
Justice. There is a prison or jail in almost every town and at 
least one in every district. The older penal institutions include 
most of the town and district jails and the larger provincial pris- 
ons in use since Ottoman times. These are gradually being sup- 
plemented by newer "penitentiary labor establishments" whose 
distinguishing feature is the availability of equipment for labor. 
Prison labor is compulsory for all in old and new prisons. Pris- 



373 



Turkey: A Country Study 

oners are allowed to send up to one-half of their prison earn- 
ings to a dependent; part is withheld for rations, and the 
remainder goes to the prisoner upon discharge. Prisons were 
previously known to be overcrowded, but the apparent reduc- 
tion in jail sentences for common crimes and the commutation 
of longer sentences may have mitigated the problem. 

According to official data, the number of convicts in prisons 
declined from more than 46,000 in 1984 to 10,656 in 1991. The 
drop in the prison population took place mainly between 1986 
and 1991, when mass releases occurred. When the large num- 
ber sentenced to prison is compared with the small prison pop- 
ulation at any one time, it appears that many convicts serve 
sentences of only a few months. Persons classified as political 
prisoners or terrorists are apparently regarded separately 
because more than 32,000 were incarcerated in 1991 under the 
"special laws" category. 

By and large, Turks accept the Muslim view that crime is a 
willful act and thus regard penalties as punishment for the act 
and as a means to deter similar acts, not as instruments of reha- 
bilitation or reeducation. There has been a trend among some 
specialists and Turkish officials to view criminal acts as the 
product of social conditions and therefore to emphasize reha- 
bilitation, but this view has had only limited influence on penal 
practice. 

Whereas torture of both political and ordinary prisoners by 
security forces is a deep-rooted problem, much of it occurs 
prior to court hearings. Incidents arising from mistreatment in 
prisons have been decreasing in recent years. However, in two 
cases mentioned in 1992 by the international human rights 
group Amnesty International, large numbers of prisoners were 
beaten, some seriously, for protesting against prison disciplin- 
ary measures. 

After widespread hunger strikes in 1989, the minister of jus- 
tice introduced a number of reforms to improve prison condi- 
tions, including an end to corporal punishment, bread-and- 
water diets, and solitary confinement in unlighted cells. The 
government, however, continued to be faced with domestic 
and international criticism and subsequently announced a 
prison reform bill in 1993. At the end of 1994, parliament had 
not enacted promised prison reforms. 

* * * 



374 



National Security 



Discussion in this chapter of the size, organization, and 
armaments of the Turkish armed forces is based in part on The 
Military Balance, 1994-1995, published by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and on Jane's Fighting 
Ships, 1994-95 Additional material can be found in the section 
on Turkey by Mark Stenhouse in Jane's NATO Handbook, 1991— 
92. 

An authoritative statement by Turkish chief of staff General 
Dogan Giires on the new strategy and restructuring of the 
armed forces is contained in the June 1993 issue of the Journal 
of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. Graham E. 
Fuller and other authors address Turkey's changed geostrate- 
gic situation following the collapse of the Soviet Union in Tur- 
key's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China. Turkish 
military leaders analyze the missions and capabilities of the 
individual service branches in a series of articles in a special 
1993 issue of NATO's Sixteen Nations called "Defence of Turkey." 

A book by a noted Turkish journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, 
Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces, provides 
previously unfamiliar details on the military education system, 
military traditions and institutions, and the perspectives and 
aspirations of career officers. 

Discussion of Turkey's human rights record can be found in 
publications by Amnesty International and in the annual Coun- 
try Reports on Human Rights Practices published by the United 
States Department of State. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



375 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 The House of Osman: Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, 

1281-1922 

3 Presidents and Prime Ministers, 1920-95 

4 Population by Age-Group, 1980, 1990, and 2000 

5 Economically Active Population by Sector, Selected Years, 

1970-93 

6 Summary of Consolidated Budget, 1988-93 

7 Production of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1987-92 

8 Energy Production, 1988-92 

9 Exports by Commodity, 1987-92 

10 Imports by Commodity, 1987-92 

11 Major Trading Partners, 1988-95 

12 Summary of Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985-93 

13 Major Army Equipment, 1994 

14 Major Air Force Equipment, 1994 

15 Major Naval Equipment, 1994 



377 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares 


2.47 


acres 




0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


H ''■ 35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204.0 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 



and add 32 



379 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Table 2. The House of Osman: Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, 

1281-1922 



Name Lineage Reigned 



Osman I Son of the gad 1281-1324 1 

Ertugrul 

Orhan Son of Osman 1324-60 

MuradI Son of Orhan 1360^89 

Bayezid I 2 Son of MuradI 1389-1402 

Suleyman 2 Son of Bayezid I 1402-11 

Musa 2 Son of Bayezid I 1411-13 

Mehmetl 2 Son of Bayezid I 1413-21 

Muradll Son of Mehmetl 1421-44, 

1446-51 

Mehmet II Son of Murad II 1444-46, 

1451-81 

Bayezid II Son of Mehmet II 1481-1512 

Selim I Son of Bayezid II 1512-20 

Suleyman I 3 Son of Selim I 1520-66 

Selim II Son of Suleyman I 1566-74 

Murad in Son of Selim II 1574-95 

Mehmet III Son of Murad III 1595-1603 

Ahmet I Son of Mehmet III 1603-17 

Mustafa I Son of Ahmet I 1617-18 

Osman II Son of Ahmet I 1618-22 

Mustafa I Son of Ahmet I 1622-23 

Murad IV Nephew of Mustafa I 1623^0 

Ibrahim Brother of Murad IV 1640-48 

Mehmet IV Son of Ibrahim 1648-S7 

Suleyman II 4 Son of Ibrahim 1687-91 

Ahmet II Son of Ibrahim 1691-95 

Mustafa II Son of Mehmet IV 1695-1703 

Ahmet ID Son of Mehmet IV 1703-30 

Mahmud I Son of Mustafa II 1730-54 

Osman III Son of Mustafa II 1754-57 

Mustafa in Son of Ahmet HI 1757-74 

Abdul Hamid I Brother of Mustafa HI 1774-89 

Selim in Nephew of Abdul 1789-1807 

Hamid I 

Mustafa IV Cousin of Selim HI 1807-08 

Mahmud II Brother of Mustafa IV 1808-39 

Abdulmecid I Son of Mahmud II 1839-61 

Abdulaziz Son of Mahmud II 1861-76 

Murad V Son of Abdulmecid I 1876 

Abdul Hamid U Son of Abdulmecid I 1876-1909 

Mehmet V Son of Abdulmecid I 1909-18 



380 



Appendix A 



Table 2. The House of Osman: Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, 

1281-1922 



Name 


Lineage 


Reigned 


MehmetVI 


Son of Abdulmecid I 


1918-22 5 



Date of beginning of reign is approximate. 

The period 1403—13, during which the sons of Bayezid I contested succession to the sultanate, is cited as an 
interregnum by many sources. Other sources date the beginning of the reign of Mehmet I from 1403. 
Suleyman II in some sources. 
Suleyman III in some sources. 

Sultanate abolished 1922; Abdulmecid II (brother of Mehmet VI) remained as caliph 1922-24. 



Table 3. Presidents and Prime Ministers, 1920-95 



President 


Prime Minister 


Period in Office 




Ataturk 1 


May 1920-January 1921 




Fevzi Cakmak 1 


January 1921-July 1922 




Rauf Orbay 1 


July 1922-August 1923 




Fethi Okyar 1 


August-October 1923 


A M*i rk 

ALdLUl IS. 

(1923-38) 


Tsmpf Tnonfi ffHP\ 2 


Nnvpmhpr 1 Q9^— Nnvpmher 1 Q94 




Fethi Okyar (Progressive 
Republican Party) 


November 1924-March 1925 




Ismet Inonu (CHP) 


March 1925-October 1937 


Ismet Inonu 
(1938-50) 


Celal Bayar (CHP) 


October 1937-January 1939 




Refik Saydam (CHP) 


January 1939-July 1942 




Sukru Saracoglu (CHP) 


July 1942-August 1946 




Recep Peker (CHP) 


August 1946^September 1947 




Hasan Saka (CHP) 


September 1947-January 1949 




Semsettin Giinaltay (CHP) 


January 1949-May 1950 


Celal Bayar 
(1950-60) 


Adnan Menderes (DP) 3 


May 1950-May 1960 


Cemal Gursel 
(1960-66) 


Cemal Gursel 4 


May 1960-November 1961 




Ismet Inonu (CHP) 


November 1961-February 1965 




Suat Hayri Urgiiplu 
(Independent) 


February-October 1965 




Suleyman Demirel (AP) 5 


October 1965-March 1971 


Cevdet Sunay 
(1966-73) 


Nihat Erim (Independent) 


March 1971-April 1972 




Ferit Melen 6 (NRP) 7 


April 1972 




Suat Hayri Urgiiplu 
(Independent) 


April-May 1972 




Ferit Melen (NRP) 


May 1972-April 1973 




Nairn Talu (Independent) 


April 1973-January 1974 



381 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Table 3. Presidents and Prime Ministers, 1920-95 



President 



Prime Minister 



Period in Office 



Fahri Koruturk 
(1973-80) 



Kenan Evren 
(1980-89) 



Turgut Ozal 
(1989-93) 



Suleyman Demirel 
1993- 



Bulent Ecevit (CHP) 

Sadi Irmak (Independent) 
Suleyman Demirel (AP) 
Bulent Ecevit (CHP) 
Suleyman Demirel (AP) 
Bulent Ulusu (appointed) 

Turgut Ozal (ANAP) 9 
Ali Bozer 6 (ANAP) 
Yildirim Akbulut (ANAP) 

Mesut Yilmaz (ANAP) 
Suleyman Demirel (DYP) 10 
Erdal Inonii 11 
Tansu Ciller (DYP) 



January-November 1974 

November 1974-March 1975 
March 1975-January 1978 
January 1978-October 1979 
October 1979-September 1980 
September 1980-December 1983 

December 1983-October 1989 
October-November 1989 
November 1989-June 1991 

June-November 1991 
November 1991-May 1993 
May-June 1993 
June 1993- 



1 President of the Grand National Assembly. 

2 CHP — Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party). 

3 DP — Demokrat Partisi (Democrat Party). 

4 Interim government under Committee of National Unity. 

5 AP— Adalet Partisi (Justice Party). 

6 Acting prime minister. 

7 NRP — National Reliance Party. 

8 Evren functioned as head of the National Security Council, or de facto chief of state, from September 1980 to 
November 1982. 

9 ANAP— Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party). 



DYP— Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) . 
Caretaker prime minister. 



382 



Appendix A 



Table 4. Population by Age-Group, 1980, 1990, and 2000 
(in percentages) 



Age-Group 1980 1990 2000 



0-14 39.2 34.8 31.8 

15-64 56.1 61.2 62.6 

Over 65 4.7 4.2 5.6 

TOTAL 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 

Projected. 



Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from The Dorling Kindersley World Reference Atlas, New 
York, 1994, 546 



Table 5. Economically Active Population by Sector, Selected Years, 

1970-93 

(in thousands of workers over age fifteen) 



Sector 


1970 


1980 


1990 


1993 


Agriculture, fishing, and forestry 


8,237 


8,353 


8,723 


8,397 




665 


895 


973 


1,141 


Manufacturing 


1,343 


2,057 


2,553 


2,693 




156 


188 


202 


131 


Trade and hotels 


886 


1,429 


2,093 


2,338 


Transportation and communications 


417 


612 


808 


898 


Other, including services 


1,330 


2,168 


3,012 


3,104 




13,034 


15,702 


18,364 


18,702 


Unemployment 


871 


1,376 


1,590 


1,530 


Unemployment rate (in percentages) 


6.3 


8.1 


8.0 


7.6 


CrVTLIAN LABOR FORCE 


13,905 


17,078 


19,954 


20,232 



Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey, 1995, Paris, 1995, 9. 



383 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Table 6. Summary of Consolidated Budget, 1988-93 
(in billions of Turkish lira) 1 





1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 


1993 


Revenues 














Tax revenues 


14,232 


25,550 


45,399 


78,643 


141,602 


264,273 


Non-tax reve- 


3,355 


5,819 


11,174 


18,104 


32,622 


87,119 


nues 














Total reve- 


17,587 


31,369 


56,573 


96,747 


174,224 


351,392 


nues 














Expenditures 














Current expen- 
ditures 


7,460 


16,660 


33,452 


60,403 


114,221 


204,829 


Investments 


3,564 


5,818 


10,055 


17,146 


29,239 


53,161 


Transfers to 
SEEs 2 


1,025 


1,223 


1,265 


12,191 


8,145 


25,850 


Interest pay- 


4,998 


8,259 


13,966 


24,073 


40,298 


116,470 


ments 














Other transfers 


4,420 


6,911 


9,789 


16,450 


29,755 


89,939 


Total expendi- 
tures 


21,447 


38,871 


68,527 


130,263 


221.658 


485,249 


Budget bal- 


-3,860 


-7,502 


-11,954 


-33,516 


-47,434 


-133,857 


ance 














Deferred minus 
advanced pay- 
ments 


-81 


-639 


^00 


90 


-12,005 


7,754 


Cash balance 


-3,941 


-8,141 


-12,354 


-33,426 


-59,439 


-126,103 


Long-term bor- 
rowing (net) 


2,609 


5,578 


7,983 


4,200 


19,446 


51,197 


Short-term bor- 
rowing (net) 


1,064 


1,452 


2,263 


23,509 


41,372 


75,251 


Other (including 
errors and omis- 
sions) 


268 


1,111 


2,108 


5,717 


-1,379 


-345 



For value of the Turkish lira — see Glossary. 
2 SEEs — State Economic Enterprises. 

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Developmnent, OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey, 1995, Paris, 1995, 105. 



384 



Appendix A 



Table 7. Production of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1987-92 
(in thousands of tons) 

Commodity 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 



Cereals 






Wheat 


18,932 


20,500 


Barley 


6,900 


7,500 


Corn 


2,600 


2,000 


Rye 


385 


280 


Oats 


325 


276 


Rice 


165 


158 


Total cereals . . . 


29,307 


30,714 


Industrial crops 






Sugar beets .... 


12,717 


11,534 


Cotton (lint) . . . 


537 


657 


Tobacco 


177 


212 


Total industrial 
crops 


13,431 


12,403 


Oilseeds 






Sunflower seed 


1,100 


1,150 


Cottonseed 


859 


1,051 


Sesame seed 


43 


45 


Total oilseeds . . 


2,002 


2,246 


Vegetables, fruits, 
and nuts 






Potatoes 


4,300 


4,350 


Grapes 


3,300 


3,350 


Oranges 


700 


740 


Olives 


600 


1,100 


Lemons 


340 


360 


Hazelnuts (in 
shell) 


280 


353 


Raisins 


105 


129 


Dried figs 


45 


50 


Olive oil 


100 


90 


Total vegetables, 
fruits, and 
nuts 


9,770 


10,522 



16,200 


20,000 


20,400 


19,318 


4,500 


7,300 


7,800 


6,900 


2,000 


2,100 


2,100 


2,100 


191 


240 


250 


225 


216 


270 


255 


250 


181 


230 


200 


215 


23,288 


30,140 


31,005 


29,008 


10,929 


13,986 


15,097 


14,800 


565 


655 


539 


605 


270 


288 


243 


320 


11,764 


14,929 


15,879 


15,725 


1,250 


860 


800 


950 






1 ,401 


1 ,o 1 5 


37 


39 


43 


34 


2,191 


2,601 


2,244 


2,557 


4,080 


4,300 


4,600 


4,500 


3,430 


3,500 


3,600 


3,460 


740 


739 


835 


824 


500 


1,100 


640 


750 


335 


357 


429 


420 


456 


375 


315 


520 


138 


135 


130 


120 


50 


45 


45 


35 


72 


110 


96 


n.a. 


9,801 


10,661 


10,690 


10,629 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Turkey, 
1994-95, London, 1994, 24. 



385 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Table 8. Energy Production, 1988-92 
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated) 





1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 


Total coal (including 


11,530 


12,940 


12,550 


11,880 


12,210 


Crude petroleum 


2,564 


2,876 


3,720 


4,537 


4,584 


Main petroleum products .... 


19,265 


17,789 


18,563 


18,409 


18,811 


Electricity (in thousands of 


48 


52 


58 


58 


67 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Turkey, 
1994-1995, London, 1994, 28; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 1991-1992, Paris, 1994, 
170. 



Table 9. Exports by Commodity, 1987-92 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 



Agricultural products 





266 


441 


315 


342 


287 


419 


Hazelnuts 


391 


359 


266 


456 


366 


291 


Other fruits and 














vegetables 


409 


508 


523 


612 


721 


692 


Cotton 


20 


141 


160 


191 


193 


46 


Tobacco 


314 


266 


480 


419 


564 


309 


Other industral crops and 














forestry products 


97 


289 


53 


57 


284 


268 


Live animals and sea prod- 














ucts 


356 


337 


330 


272 


268 


178 


Total agricultural 














products 


1,853 


2,341 


2,127 


2,349 


2,683 


2,203 


Mineral products 


272 


377 


413 


331 


286 


265 


Processed and manufactured 














products 














Processed agricultural 














products 


954 


885 


918 


940 


1,212 


1,337 


Textiles and clothing . . . 


2,707 


3,201 


3,505 


4,060 


4,328 


5,268 



386 



Appendix A 



Table 9. Exports by Commodity, 1987-92 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1987 


1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 


Hides and leather 


722 


514 


604 


747 


620 


568 


Chemicals 


527 


734 


774 


616 


464 


491 


Petroleum products .... 


232 


331 


254 


287 


277 


231 


Glass and ceramics 


205 


233 


258 


329 


359 


395 


Iron and steel 


852 


1,458 


1,349 


1,612 


1,452 


1,558 


Metal products and 
machinery 


788 


383 


219 


230 


265 


398 


Electrical equipment and 
products 


293 


294 


234 


438 


533 


591 


Other 


785 


911 


972 


1.020 


1,119 


1.410 


Total processed 
and manufactured 
products 


8,065 


8,944 


9,087 


10,279 


10,629 


12,247 


TOTAL 


10,190 


11,662 


11,627 


12,959 


13,598 


14,715 



Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey, 1995, Paris, 1995, 96; and Econo- 
mist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Turkey, 1994-95, London, 1994, 43. 



387 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Table 1 0. Imports by Commodity, 1 98 7- 92 
(in millions of United States dollars) 1 



Commodity 


1987 


1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 


Agricultural products and 
livestock 


782 


499 


1,041 


1,323 


813 


1,184 


Ivlineral products 














Oil 














Crude oil 


2,711 


2,434 


2 456 


3,817 


2 794 


2 894 


Oil products 


245 


343 


522 


805 


962 


865 


Total oil 


2,956 


2,777 


2,980 


4,622 


3,756 


3,759 


Other 


444 


427 


448 


172 


198 


161 


Total mineral 














products 


3,400 


3,204 


3,426 


4,794 


3,954 


3,920 


Processed and manufac- 














tured products 














Processed agricultural 
products 


720 


738 


843 


1,162 


989 


935 


Manufactured products 














Chemicals 


1,685 


1,781 


1,710 


2,451 


2,463 


2,624 


Rubber and plastics . . 


488 


525 


485 


807 


848 


986 


Iron and steel 


1,537 


1,655 


2,217 


1,932 


2,009 


2,118 


Non ferrous metals . . 


418 


412 


421 


537 


452 


426 


Electrical appliances . 


940 


1,075 


1,028 


1,580 


1,877 


1,762 


Motor vehicles 


540 


690 


790 


1,590 


1,540 


2,221 


Other machinery .... 


974 


635 


370 


585 


342 


61 


Other industrial prod- 














ucts 


2,799 


3,121 


3.461 


5,541 


5,760 


6,635 


Total manufac- 














tured prod- 
ucts 


9,381 


9.894 


10.482 


15,023 


15,291 


16.833 


Total processed 
and manufac- 














tured prod- 
ucts 


10,101 


10,632 


11,325 


16,185 


16,280 


17,768 


TOTAL 


14,283 


14,335 


15,792 


22,302 


21,047 


22,872 



1 C.I.F. — Cost, insurance, and freight. 

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey, 1995, Paris, 1995, 97; and Econo- 
mist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Turkey, 1994-95, London, 1994, 44. 



388 



Appendix A 



Table 11. Major Trading Partners, 1988-95 



Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 



EXPORTS 

OECD countries 1 

EU countries 2 

Britain 

France 

Germany 

Italy 

Other 

Total EU 

Japan 

Switzerland 

United States 

Other OECD 

Total OECD 

Central and East European 
countries 

Middle East and North 
Africa 

Iran 

Iraq 

Other 

Total Middle East and 
North Africa 

Other 

TOTAL EXPORTS 

IMPORTS 

OECD countries 

EU countries 

Britain 

France 

Germany 

Italy 

Other 

Total EU 

Japan 

Switzerland 

United States 

Other OECD 

Total OECD 

Central and East European 
coutnries 



576 


616 


744 


676 


796 


835 


499 


595 


111 

lot 


689 


809 


in 
ill 


2,178 


2,196 


3,076 


3,413 


3,660 


3,654 


955 


978 


1,106 


972 


943 


750 


920 


1,047 


1,241 


1.292 


1,393 


1.283 


5,128 


5,432 


6,904 


7,042 


7,601 


7,293 


209 


233 


239 


226 


162 


158 


265 


174 


293 


246 


223 


216 


761 


971 


968 


913 


865 


986 


374 


391 


417 


430 


496 


420 


6,737 


7,201 


8,821 


8,857 


9,346 


9,072 


520 


923 


829 


1,053 


1,217 


1,670 


546 


561 


495 


487 


455 


290 


986 


445 


215 


122 


212 


160 


1,924 


1,798 


1,742 


2.085 


2.096 


2.293 


3,456 


2,804 


2,452 


2,694 


2,763 


2,743 


949 


699 


855 


989 


1,388 


1,863 


11,662 


11,627 


12,957 


13,593 


14,715 


15,349 


739 


728 


1,014 


1,166 


1,187 


1,546 


829 


745 


1,340 


1,227 


1,351 


1,952 


2,067 


2,225 


3,523 


3,232 


3,754 


4,533 


1,006 


1,071 


1,727 


1,845 


1,919 


2,558 


1,267 


1,307 


1.750 


1,753 


1,838 


2,361 


5,908 


6,076 


9,354 


9,223 


10,049 


12,950 


555 


530 


1,120 


1,092 


1,113 


1,621 


344 


412 


537 


489 


688 


651 


1,520 


2,094 


2,282 


2,255 


2,601 


3,351 


924 


822 


958 


1,013 


972 


1.402 


9,251 


9,934 


14,251 


14,072 


15,423 


19,975 


857 


1,124 


1,947 


1,875 


2,094 


3,253 



389 



Turkey: A Country Study 

Table 11. Major Trading Partners, 1988-95 



Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 



Middle East and North 
Africa 

Iran 660 233 492 91 365 667 

Iraq 1,441 1,650 1,047 1 

Other 740 947 2,120 2.890 2.872 2,573 

Total Middle East and 

North Africa 2,841 2,830 3,659 2,981 3,238 3,240 

Other 1,391 1.902 2.445 2.119 2.116 2.961 

TOTAL IMPORTS 14,340 15,790 22,302 21,047 22,871 29,429 



OECD — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
2 EU — European Union. 

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-opearation and 
Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey, 1995, Paris, 1995, 99. 



Table 12. Summary of Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985-93 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1985 


1987 


1989 


1991 


1993 


Exports (f.o.b.) 1 


8,255 


10,322 


11,780 


13,667 


15,610 


Imports (f.o.b.) 


-11,230 


-13,551 


15,999 


21.007 


29,772 


Trade balance 


-2,975 


-3,229 


^,219 


-7,340 


-14,162 


Services 


22 


33 


1,622 


2,499 


4,014 


Private transfers (net) 


1,762 


2,066 


3,135 


2,854 


3,085 


Official transfers (net) 


222 


324 


423 


2.245 


73 


Current account balance .... 


-969 


^806 


961 


258 


-6,990 


Private long-term capital 












(net) 


856 


1,388 


2,456 


1,562 


6,839 


Official long-term capital 












(net) 


-594 


453 


-1,092 


-939 


-930 


Capital account balance 


262 


1.841 


1.364 


623 


5.909 


Balance of payments 


-707 


1,035 


2,325 


881 


1,081 


Change in reserves 


-361 


137 


2,471 


-1,197 


308 



f.o.b. — free on board. 



Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey, 1995, Paris, 1995, 100. 



390 



Appendix A 



Table 13. Major Army Equipment, 1994 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin 



In Inventory 



Tanks 

Leopard Germany 397 

M^8 United States 3,004 

M-60 -do- 932 

Armored vehicles 

Infantry fighting vehicles Turkey/United States 65 

Armored personnel carriers 

M-113 United States 2,815 

IAPC United States/Turkey 125 

BTR60 Russia 300 

AWC Turkey 345 

Self-propelled guns and howitzers 

105mm: M-52A1 and M-108 United States 389 

155mm: M-44 -do- 168 

175mm: M-107 -do- 36 

203mm: M-55 and M-l 10 -do- 228 

Towed artillery 

105mm: M-101A1 and others -do- 640 

150mm: Skoda Czechoslovakia 161 

155mm: M-114A1 and M-59 United States 613 

203mm: M-l 15 -do- 162 

Mortars 

107mm: M-30, some self-propelled -do- 1,265 

120mm: various United States/Germany/ 578 

France 

81mm: various, including self-propelled . . -do- 3,175 

Multiple rocket launchers 

227mm: MLRS United States/Turkey 12 

107mm United States 23 

Antitank guided weapons 

Milan France 392 

Cobra Germany 186 

TOW self-propelled United States 365 

Helicopters 

Cobra AH-1W/P -do- 38 

S-70A Sikorsky United States 8 

AB-204 Agusta Bell Italy 14 

AB-205 Agusta Bell -do- 64 

AB-212 Agusta Bell -do- 2 

UH-1H Iroquois United States 96 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 66- 
67 



391 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Table 14. Major Air Force Equipment, 1994 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin 



In Inventory 



Fighter-bombers and fighter-ground attack 

F-16C/D United States/Turkey 138 

F-5A/B United States 195 

F-4E -do- 152 

F-104G Various NATO 24 

Reconnaissance (armed) 

RF-5A United States 20 

RF-4E -do- 26 

Transports 

C-130E Hercules -do- 13 

C-160D Transall Germany 19 

CN-235 Spain/Turkey 52 

Helicopters 

UH-1H Blackhawk utility United States 21 

Surface-to-air missile launchers 

Nike-Hercules -do- 128 

Rapier Britain 24 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 68. 



392 



Appendix A 



Table 15. Major Naval Equipment, 1994 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

Destroyers 

Gearing-class United States 8 

Carpenter-class -do- 2 

Sumner-class -do- 1 

Frigates 

MEKO-200 with Sub Harpoon 

SSM Germany 4 

MEKO-200 Turkey 4 

(on order) 

Berk-class -do- 2 

Koln-class Germany 2 

Knox-class with Sub Harpoon 

SSM United States 8 

Submarines 

Guppy-class -do- 7 

Type-209/1200 Germany/Turkey 6 

Type-209/1400 Turkey 2 

Tang-class United States 2 

Fast-attack craft 

Dogan-class (Lurssen 57) with Harpoon 

SSM Germany/Turkey 8 

Kartal-class (Jaguar) with Penguin 

SSM Germany 8 

Yildiz-class Turkey 2 

(on order) 

Patrol craft 

Coastal and inshore United States/Germany/ 29 

Turkey 

Minelayers United States/Denmark 3 

Minesweepers United States/France/ 26 

Canada 

Amphibious 

Landing ships, tank United States/Turkey 7 

Landing craft, tank Turkey 35 

Landing craft, utility -do- 2 

Landing craft, mechanized -do- 22 

Naval Aviation 

Agusta-Bell AB-212 ASW shipborne 

helicopters Italy 14 

Grumman ST-2E Tracker ASW 

search United States 14 

Source: Based on information from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1994-95, London, 1994, 704- 
22. 



393 



Appendix B 



Selected Political Parties and Labor Organizations 

ANAP — Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) . Founded in May 
1983 under the leadership of Turgut Ozal. The ruling 
party following the 1983 election, the center-right ANAP 
included mostly former members of the pre-1980 AP 
(Adalet Partisi) (q.v.) . 

AP — Adalet Partisi (Justice Party). Established in 1961, one of 
the two major parties prior to the September 1980 coup, 
led by Suleyman Demirel. Following its dissolution by the 
National Security Council, many of its members subse- 
quently joined the ANAP (q.v.) or the DYP (q.v.) 

Birlik ve Baris (Unity and Peace). Splinter from RP (q.v.) in 
1992. 

BTP — Buyuk Turkiye Partisi (Grand Turkey Party) . Founded in 
May 1983 and banned the same month for having connec- 
tions with the dissolved AP (q.v.). Its supporters then 
formed the center-right DYP (q.v.). 

CHP — Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party). 
Founded in the 1920s and led by Ataturk until his death in 
1938. Headed by Biilent Ecevit in the 1970s, it was one of 
the major parties prior to the 1980 coup. A majority of its 
deputies ultimately regrouped in the left-of-center SHP 
(q.v.); others joined the DSP (q.v.). Party reactivated by 
Deniz Baykal in 1992. In 1995 the SHP dissolved itself, and 
many members joined the CHP. 

CNU — Committee of National Unity. Composed of thirty-eight 
officers who executed the May 1960 coup; the CNU gov- 
erned the country until a constituent assembly was formed 
in January 1961. 

Demokratik Partisi (Democratic Party) — Formed in 1971 by 
former AP (q.v.) members who disapproved of Suleyman 
Demirel's leadership; merged with the AP shortly before 
the 1980 coup. Not a successor to the DP (q.v.). 

DEP — Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party). Pro-Kurd party 
formed in 1993 on demise of the HEP (q.v.), proscribed by 
Constitutional Court in June 1994. 

Dev Sol — Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left Party) . A radical 
movement espousing Marxist ideology and advocating vio- 



395 



Turkey: A Country Study 

lent tactics against state institutions. 

DISK — Turkiye Devrimci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu 
(Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions 
of Turkey). Federation of trade unions second in impor- 
tance only to Turk-Is (q.v.) before 1980. Banned after 
1980, DISK was less influential in the mid-1990s than some 
of the other labor organizations. 

DP — Demokrat Partisi (Democrat Party). Founded in 1946, the 
party secured power in the 1950 election. It was over- 
thrown and declared illegal by the armed forces in 1960. 
Should not be confused with the Demokratik Partisi (q.v.). 
Party reactivated in 1992. 

DSP — Demokratik Sol Partisi (Democratic Left Party). 
Founded in November 1985 by Rahsan Ecevit, wife of 
former CHP {q.v.) leader Biilent Ecevit, who had been 
banned from political activity. The party advocated a more 
radical variety of democratic socialism than the SHP (q.v.). 

DYP — Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party). Founded in June 
1983 after the dissolution of the BTP (q.v.). The center- 
right party was considered to be the successor to the 
banned AP (q.v.). Former AP leader Suleyman Demirel 
was its leader before becoming president. Head in 1995 
was Prime Minister Tansu (filler. 

HADEP — Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democracy 
Party). Formed in June 1994 as pro-Kurd party. 

Hak-Is — Turkiye Hak Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu (Con- 
federation of Turkish Just Workers' Unions). Pro-Islamist 
union. 

HDP — Hur Demokrat Partisi (Free Democratic Party). A short- 
lived right-wing party founded in 1983 by former members 
of the MDP (q.v.) under the leadership of Mehmet Yazar. 
The HDP was disbanded the same year. 

HEP — Halkin Emek Partisi (People's Labor Party). Formed in 
late 1991 to promote full equality of Kurds and Turks 
within Turkey. Outlawed in 1993. 

HP — Halkci Partisi (Populist Party). Founded in May 1983, it 
was one of the three parties allowed to compete in the 
1983 general election. It merged with Sodep (q.v.) in 
November 1985 to form the SHP (q.v.). 

MQF — Milliyetci £alisma Partisi (Nationalist Labor Party). 
Founded in July 1983 and originally named the Conserva- 
tive Party, it changed its name in November 1985 to MQF. 
The conservative nationalist party is considered to be the 



396 



Appendix B 



successor to the MHP (q.v.). In 1993 the party reassumed 
the name of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). 

MDP — Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy 
Party). Founded in May 1983 under the leadership of 
General Turgut Sunalp, the party never gained popular 
support and was dissolved in April 1986. 

MHP — Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party). A 
militant, nationalist party led by Alparslan Turkes. It was 
associated with the pre-1980 violence and was banned fol- 
lowing the coup. The M^P (q.v.) was considered to be its 
successor prior to changing its name to MHP in 1993. 

MISK — Turkiye Milliyetci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu 
(Confederation of Turkish Nationalist Workers' Unions). 
Government-sponsored federation of labor unions. 

MSP — Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party). 
Founded in 1972 and dissolved in 1980, this conservative, 
religiously oriented party served in various government 
coalitions prior to the 1980 coup. Many of its members 
subsequently supported the RP (q.v.). 

OZEP — Freedom and Labor Party. Splinter from SHP (q.v.) 
formed in 1992. 

PKK — Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party). 
Founded in late 1960s. Initiated armed insurrection on 
behalf of an independent Kurdistan in 1984; fighting con- 
tinued through 1995. 

RP — Refah Partisi (Welfare Party; also seen as Prosperity 
Party). A religious party based on Islamic principles; suc- 
cessor to the MSP (q.v.). 

SHP — Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti (Social Democratic Popu- 
list Party). Formed in November 1985 by the merger of 
two left-of-center parties, Sodep (q.v.) and the HP (q.v.). 
Dissolved itself in mid-1995, and many members joined 
the CHP (q.v.). 

Sodep — Sosyal Demokrat Parti (Social Democratic Party). 
Founded in July 1983, it had the support of the moderate 
left that had backed the pre-coup CHP (q.v.). Merged with 
the HP (q.v.) in 1985 to form the SHP (q.v.). 

TISK — Turkiye Isveren Sendikalari Konfederasyonu (Turkish 
Confederation of Employers' Associations). A confedera- 
tion of employers' associations, concerned primarily with 
labor-management relations. 

TOB — Turkiye Odalar Birligi (Turkish Trade Association). 
Organization that has represented the interests of mer- 



397 



Turkey: A Country Study 

chants and industrialists since the early 1950s. In later 
years, it has been identified primarily with small and 
medium-sized firms. 

Turk-Is — Turkiye Isci Sendikalan Konfederasyonu (Confedera- 
tion of Turkish Trade Unions). The largest and most influ- 
ential of the union federations. 

Turkish Communist Party — -Joined TWP (q.v.) in 1987 to form 
Turkish United Communist Party. 

Turkiye Birlesik Komunist Partisi (Turkish United Communist 
Party). Created in 1987 by merger of TWP and Turkish 
Communist Party. Party was banned shortly thereafter, 
decriminalized in 1991, and then again proscribed. 

TUSIAD — Turk Sanayicileri ve Is Adamlari Dernegi (Turkish 
Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association). Organiza- 
tion that represents the interests of big business. 

TWP — Turkish Workers' Party. Joined with Turkish Communist 
Party in 1987 to form the Turkiye Birlesik Komunist Partisi 
(q.u). 

VAP — Vatandas Partisi (Citizens' Party). Founded in March 
1986 under the leadership of former ANAP (q.v.) member 
Vural Arikan. A small center-right party, its two parliamen- 
tary deputies joined the DYP (q.v.) in December 1986. 



398 



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Turkey: A Country Study 

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423 



Glossary 



Alevi — (Alawi in Arabic), a heterodox Shia (q.v.) Islamic sect 
that has many followers in Turkey. 

barrels per day — Production of crude oil and petroleum prod- 
ucts is frequently measured in barrels per day, often abbre- 
viated bpd or bd. A barrel is a volume measure of forty-two 
United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to tons 
depends on the density of the specific product. About 7.3 
barrels of average crude oil weigh one ton. Heavy crude 
weighs about seven barrels per ton. Light products, such as 
gasoline and kerosene, average close to eight barrels per 
ton. 

capitulations — Special agreements between the Ottoman 
Empire and various foreign governments giving those gov- 
ernments and their citizens and subjects specific exemp- 
tions from the laws of the empire. 

Common Agricultural Policy — Agricultural support system of 
the EU (q.v.), under which farmers' incomes are main- 
tained through a system of target prices for agricultural 
commodities. 

etatism — Often considered as state socialism. In Turkish use, it 
involves state control of some industries and public ser- 
vices. 

European Community (EC) — See European Union (EU). 

European Currency Unit (ECU) — Instituted in 1979, the ECU 
is the unit of account of the EU (q.v.). The value of the 
ECU is determined by the value of a basket that includes 
the currencies of all EU member states. In establishing the 
value of the basket, each member's currency receives a 
share that reflects the relative strength and importance of 
the member's economy. In 1995 one ECU was equivalent 
to about one United States dollar. 

European Union (EU) — Until November 1993, the EU was 
known as the European Community (EC). The EU com- 
prises three communities: the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community 
(EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom). Each community is a legally distinct body, but 
since 1967 they have shared common governing institu- 
tions. The EU forms more than a framework for free trade 



425 



Turkey: A Country Study 

and economic cooperation: the signatories to the treaties 
governing the communities have agreed in principle to 
integrate their economies and ultimately to form a politi- 
cal union. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth- 
erlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) were charter members of the EU; Britain, Den- 
mark, and Ireland joined on January 1, 1973; Greece 
became a member on January 1, 1981; Portugal and Spain 
entered on January 1, 1986; and Austria, Finland, and Swe- 
den became members on January 1, 1995. 
fiscal year — Calendar year since 1983. 

gecekondus — Literally, "built overnight"; term used for shantyl- 
ike squatter housing erected on outskirts of large cities. 
Ottoman custom dictated that once a structure was built, it 
could not be destroyed. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy 
over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of 
goods for final consumption and intermediate production 
are assumed to be included in the final prices. GDP is 
sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, mean- 
ing that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when 
these indirect taxes and subsidies have been eliminated, 
the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates 
that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have 
not been made. See also gross national product. 

gross national product (GNP) — The gross domestic product 
(q.v.) plus net income or loss stemming from transactions 
with foreign countries including income received from 
abroad by residents and subtracting payments remitted 
abroad to nonresidents. GNP is the broadest measurement 
of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can 
be calculated at market prices, which include indirect 
taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies 
are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at fac- 
tor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

imam — A word used in several senses. In general use and lower- 
cased, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as 
such it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers 
beyond sufficient education to carry out this function. 
Imam is also used figuratively by many Sunni (q.v.) Mus- 
lims to mean the leader of the Islamic community. Among 
Shia (q.v.) the word takes on many complex and contro- 



426 



Glossary 



versial meanings; in general, however, it indicates that par- 
ticular descendant of the House of Ali who is believed to 
have been God's designated repository of the spiritual 
authority inherent in that line. The identity of this individ- 
ual and the means of ascertaining his identity have been 
major issues causing divisions among Shia. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with 
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized 
agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsi- 
ble for stabilizing international exchange rates and pay- 
ments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of 
loans to its members (including industrialized and devel- 
oping countries) when they experience balance of pay- 
ments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions 
that require substantial internal economic adjustments by 
the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

lira — Turkish currency; 1 Turkish lira (TL) = 100 kurus. Value 
of the lira has fluctuated considerably. In 1989 US$1.00 = 
TL2,122; in 1991 US$1.00 = TL4,172; in 1993 US$1.00 = 
TL10,983; in January 1994 US$1.00 = TL 15,196; as of 
August 31, 1995, US$1.00 = TL47,963. 

millet — A non-Muslim group or community in the Ottoman 
Empire organized under its own religious head, who also 
exercised important civil functions. 

National Security Council (NSC — Mili Giivenlik Kurulu) — 
Under both the 1961 and the 1982 constitutions, the NSC 
comprised military and civilian personnel and was charged 
with reviewing national security policy. The generals who 
took control of Turkey's government in 1980 also consti- 
tuted themselves as a National Security Council (Milli 
Giivenlik Konseyi); this body was abolished following the 
reestablishment of civilian government after the 1983 elec- 
tion. The former members of the 1980-83 NSC, except for 
President Evren, subsequently formed the Presidential 
Council, whose function was to advise the president. The 
Presidential Council was dissolved in 1989. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — In 1995 mem- 
bership composed of Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and United States. 

Shia (from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) — A member of the 
smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia origi- 
nated in a dispute over who should be the legitimate suc- 



427 



Turkey: A Country Study 

cessor to the Prophet; a majority of early Muslims accepted 
the tradition of community consensus to choose the 
leader, but a minority supported the claim of Ali, the 
Prophet's cousin, to inherit the mantle of leadership. Over 
time, theological differences emerged between the Shia 
and Sunni (q.v.). The Alevi (q.v.), Ismaili, Twelve Imam 
Shia, and Zayidi all are distinct Shia sects. 

Sublime Porte (or Porte) — Ottoman Empire palace entrance 
that provided access to the chief minister, who represented 
the government and the sultan. Term came to mean the 
Ottoman government. 

Sunni — (from Arabic sunna, tradition or precedent) — A fol- 
lower of the larger of the two primary denominations of 
Islam. 

tarikat (pi., tarikatlar) — A Sufi order or lodge, usually headed by 
a teacher or master known as a seyh, in which devotees 
undertake a path of instruction toward spiritual perfec- 
tion. 

Warsaw Treaty Organization — Formal name for Warsaw Pact. 
Political-military alliance founded by the Soviet Union in 
1955 as a counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization (q.v.). Albania, an original member, stopped par- 
ticipating in Warsaw Pact activities in 1962 and withdrew in 
1968. Members in 1991 included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet 
Union. Before it was formally dissolved in April 1991, the 
Warsaw Pact served as the Soviet Union's primary mecha- 
nism for keeping political and military control over East- 
ern Europe. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA), the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Invest- 
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established 
in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans 
to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, 
a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff 
of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the 
poorest developing countries on much easier terms than 
those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 
1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans 
and assistance designed specifically to encourage the 



428 



Glossary 



growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures pri- 
vate foreign investment in developing countries against 
various noncommercial risks. The president and certain 
senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the 
IFC. The four institutions are owned by the governments 
of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate 
in the World Bank group, member states must first belong 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



429 



Index 



Abbasid dynasty, 109 
Abdul Hamid II, 26-27; forced to abdi- 
cate, 28, 32, 308 
Abdiilmecid, 35 
Abkaz, 102 
abortion, 91,92 
Abraham. See Ibrahim 
Abu Hanifa, 109 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), 144 
Adalet Partisi. See Justice Party 
administrative commission, 251 
Adrianople, 17 
adultery, 135 

Aegean region, 78, 81; agriculture in, 81; 
climate of, 81, 84-86; immigrants in, 
89; population density in, 87; rainfall 
in, 81; villages in, 131 

Aegean Sea: conflict over, with Greece, 
55-56, 66, 236, 297-98, 319, 337, 365 

Afghanistan: relations with, 39; Soviet 
invasion of, 286 

AFL-CIO. See American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organi- 
zations 

agrarian reform, 176 

Agricultural Bank of Turkey (Turkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi — TCZB), 
180,212, 213 

agricultural production, 153, 178, 187- 
91; cropping patterns, 187-91; and 
rainfall, 180-81, 187 

agricultural products {see also under indi- 
vidual crops): cash crops, 26, 176; cit- 
rus fruit, 81, 82, 176; cotton, 82, 83, 
180, 182, 189, 206; exports of, 176, 
178-79, 187, 220; fruit, 83, 176, 180, 
190-91; grain, 82, 83, 97, 182, 187-89; 
nuts, 81, 190; oilseeds, 190; olives, 81, 
176; opium poppies, 83, 190, 370; 
pulses, 182, 189; sugar beets, 189-90; 
tobacco, 81, 83, 176, 180, 189; vegeta- 
bles, 82, 176, 190-91 

Agricultural Supply Organization, 180 

agriculture, 175-94; in Aegean region, 



131; in Anatolian Plateau, 83; in Ara- 
bian Platform, 84; in Black Sea area, 
81, 131; budget for, 251; commercial, 
186; development of, 152, 176; 
employment in, 159, 161; export 
crops, 178; extension services, 180; 
government intervention in, 179; 
growth of, 176; income from, 176; 
investment in, 176; irrigation in, 82, 
83, 180-82; land for, 182, 187; mecha- 
nization of, 129, 182; in Mediterra- 
nean region, 82, 131; modernization 
of, 150, 161, 182; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 159, 176; 
research on, 180; self-sufficiency in, 
175; subsidies for, 178, 179-80; subsis- 
tence, 149 

Agn Dagi. See Mount Ararat 

Agusta aircraft company, 353 

Ahmet III, 22 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air force, 339-41; insignia, 345, 348; 
ranks, 345, 348; reserves, 329; uni- 
forms, 345 

air force academy at Istanbul, 330, 340- 
41; selection for, 331-32 

airports, 217; state control of, 171 

Air Technical Schools Command, 341 

AkbankTAS, 212, 213 

Akbulut, Yildirim, 259, 266 

Aktash, Timotheos Samuel, 122 

Aktuel, 283 

Albania: military relations with, 318; 
relations with, 66, 317 

Alexander the Great, 9 

Algeria: imports from, 202; seized by 
France, 25 

Algiers: conquest of, 21 

Ali ibn Abu Tali b, 109, 114 

Allied Land Forces Southeastern 
Europe, 48 

Allies: guerrilla warfare against, 33; occu- 
pation of Turkey by, 32 

Alp Arslan. SeeMehmetibn Daud 



431 



Turkey: A Country Study 



American Federation of Labor-Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL- 
CIO), 165 

Amnesty International, 257, 283, 296, 
374 

Anadolu Ajansi (Anatolian Agency) , 284 

ANAP. ^Motherland Party 

Anatolia: Armenians in, 103; under Byz- 
antine Empire, 11; formation of, 77; 
geography of, 75; history of, 3, 6-10; 
immigrants in, 89; oil fields in, 198; 
under Ottoman Empire, 21; under 
Rome, 10; villages in, 129-31; with- 
drawal of occupying forces from, 34 

Anatolia, southeast: infrastructure in, 
xxxi; Kurdish resistance in, xxxi; pov- 
erty in, xxxi; terrorism in, xxxv; troops 
stationed in, 307; villages in, 131-32 

Anatolian Plateau, 83-84; agriculture in, 
83, 182, 190; climate in, 83-84, 86; 
population in, 87; rainfall in, 83, 84, 
180; Turks in, 96-97 

Anavatan Partisi. See Motherland Party 

Ankara, 76; Kurds in, 235; population of, 
88 

Ankara University: religious education 

in, 118-19 
Anti-Taurus Mountains, 84; climate in, 

86 

Anti-Terror Law of 1991, 367, 368 
AP. Seejustice Party 
Arabia: under Ottoman Empire, 21 
Arabian Platform, 78, 84 
Arabic language, 92 
Arab-Israeli conflict, 293, 294, 300 
Arab Revolt (1916), 31 
Arabs, 101-2, 282; religion of, 100; ties 
of, with Syrians, 101-2; in villages, 131 
Aras River, 84 

archaeological research, 3; in Anatolia, 6 
Ariburun, Tekin, 49 

armed forces, 321-48; attitudes toward, 
309; careers in, 309; conscription for, 
327; under constitution of 1982, 321- 
22; coups d'etat by, 4-5; as guardians 
of Kemalism, 42; ideology of, 311-12; 
janissary, 307; missions of, 272, 305-6, 
307-8, 311; modernization of, 305, 
306, 307; national security under, 272; 
number of personnel in, 321; offen- 
sives of, against Kurds, xxxv, xxxvi, 
236, 339, 356; origins of, 307; Otto- 



man, 305, 307; political role of, xxvii, 
272, 310-12; professionalization of, 
327; reforms of, 22; reserves, 327, 
328-29; resources, 229; restructuring 
of, 305; and society, 309-10; staff acad- 
emies, 332-33; training, 27, 330-33; 
uniforms, ranks, and insignia of, 345- 
48; women in, 330 

Armed Forces Academy, 333 

Armenia: annexed, 14; attack on, 34-35; 
borders with, 76; economic ties with, 
229; relations with, 287, 314; revolu- 
tion in, 27; war of, with Azerbaijan, 66 

Armenian Catholic Church, 120, 122 

Armenian Orthodox Church, 120, 122, 
373 

Armenian Revolutionary Army, 359 
Armenians, 9, 103-4, 282-83; deporta- 
tion of, 30, 89, 104, 153; diaspora of, 
14, 153; massacre of, 30, 104, 153, 282, 
300, 350, 358; in Ottoman bureau- 
cracy, 20; terrorism by, 358-59; in 
World War I, 30 
Armenian Secret Army for the Libera- 
tion of Armenia (ASALA), 282, 358, 
359 

Armistice of Mundanya (1922), 35 

army, 335-39; Aegean, 319; deployment 
of, 237, 336; insignia, 345, 348; mate- 
riel of, 306, 335; mission of, 335; num- 
ber of personnel in, 306, 335; 
organization of, 306, 335-37; ranks, 
345, 348; reserves, 329; restructuring 
of, 335-37; uniforms, 345 

army academy at Tuzla, 330; police can- 
didates in, 362; selection for, 331-32 

Army Mutual Aid Association (Ordu 
Yardimlasma Kurumu — OYAK) , 335 

Artvin Province, 102 

ASALA. See Armenian Secret Army for 
the Liberation of Armenia 

ASELSAN Military-Electronics Indus- 
tries, 353 

Asian -American Free Labor Institute, 
165 

assassinations, 270, 282; 292, 354, 360 
Assyrian Empire, 7 

Atatiirk, Kemal {see a&oKemal, Mustafa), 
xxv, 31-39; background of, 31-32, 
124; goals of, xxvi, 308; in Grand 
National Assembly, 34; language 
reform under, 93-95; military career 



432 



Index 



of, 30, 31, 34, 308; nationalism of, 4; 
nationalist movement of, 33; as presi- 
dent, xxvi, 36-39 

Atatiirk administration, xxvi; armed 
forces under, 272; elite under, xxv; for- 
eign policy of, 39; social reforms 
under, xxv, 36-39, 74-75; transporta- 
tion under, 214 

Atatiirk Dam, 68, 181-82, 198; financing 
for, 203-4 

Ataturkism. SaeKemalism 

Attalid Dynasty, 1 

Australia: petroleum concessions in, 201 
Austria: in Holy League, 22; Ottoman 
wars with, 22, 23; territory acquired 
by, 22, 25, 28; Turkish immigrants in, 
90 

automobile industry, 208-9, 223 
Aydinlik, 283 

Azerbaijan: borders with, 76; coup d'etat 
in, 288; economic ties with, 229; refu- 
gees from, 287; relations with, xxxv, 
202, 236, 287-88, 314; war of, with 
Armenia, 66 

Azov, 22 



Bab-i Ali (Sublime Porte), 20 
Baghdad Pact members of, 48 
balance of payments, 68, 151, 223-26; 

crises in, xxix, 150, 153, 154, 173, 223- 

24; deficit, 58 
balance of trade, 220; agriculture and, 

178; in Ottoman Empire, 21 
Baldwin of Flanders, Count, 15 
Balkan Pact, 39 

Balkans, 317-18; immigrants from, 89; 
Ottoman conquest of, 17, 21; relations 
with, 305; Russian position in, 25 

Balkan War, First (1912-13), 28, 32, 308, 
317, 339 

Balkan War, Second (1913), 28, 32, 308, 

317, 339 
banking, 151,210-14 
banks: commercial, 212; development, 

212; foreign, 212, 213; state-owned, 

212,213 
Bati Raman oil fields, 199 
Battle of Kosovo (1389), 17 
Battle of Lepanto (1571), 21-22 
Battle of Manzikert (1071), 14, 110 
Battle of Mohacs, 21 



Battle of Navarino (1827), 23 

Bayar, Celal, 40; as president, 41; as 

prime minister, 40 
Bayar, Hikmet, 336 
BayezidI, 17 

Baykal, Deniz, xxxviii, 270 

Belgium: Turkish immigrants in, 90 

Belgrade: conquered by Ottomans, 20 

Bessarabia: ceded to Russia, 25 

Bilkent University, 141 

Bir, Cevik, 337 

Birand, Mehmet Ali, 364 

Birlik ve Baris. See Unity and Peace party 

birth control {see also family planning), 

90-91,92 
Black Sea: fishing in, 193 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation 

project, 229 
Black Sea region, 78-81; oil exploration 
in, 198; population density in, 87; 
rainfall in, 86, 180; villages in, 131 
Bogazkoy. SeeHattusas 
Bolshevik Revolution (1917), 31 
borders, 76-77; with Iraq, 36, 76; with 

Soviet Union, 76, 312 
border problems: with Syria, 76-77 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: under Austrian 
rule, 25, 28; civil war in, 289-90, 317- 
18; immigrants from, 89-90; relations 
with, 317; United Nations peacekeep- 
ing forces in, 305, 317, 337 
Bosporus, 81 

Britain: in Baghdad Pact, 48; in Crimean 
War, 25; occupation of Egypt by, 25; 
occupation of Turkey by, 32, 308; rela- 
tions with, 25; territory acquired by, 
33; in World War I, 30 

British Petroleum, 198, 201 

Buda: conquered, 21 

budget deficit, 174, 224; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 158, 175 

Bulac,Ali, 119 

Bulgaria: borders with, 76; conquest of, 
by Ottomans, 17; economic ties with, 
229, 287; in First Balkan War, 28; 
immigrants from, 89, 289, 318; 
imports from, 202, 203; independence 
declared by, 28; military relations 
with, 318, 343; under Ottoman rule, 
25; relations with, 66, 289, 318; union 
of Rumelia with, 26 

Bureau of the Press Directorate, 284 



433 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Burhan, Halis, 340 

Bursa: population of, 88 

Bush, George, 206, 300, 301 

business associations, 276-77 

Byzantine civilization, 3 

Byzantine Empire, 10-11; Armenia 

annexed by, 14; end of, 19, 110 
Byzantium: founded, 9; as Constantine's 

capital, 10 



Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri: as acting presi- 
dent, 52-53 
caliph, 19, 110 

caliphate, 111; abolished, 74, 105, 116 
Callaghan, James, 53 
Calp, Necdet, 62, 256, 265 
capital account, 225 
Capital Markets Board, 213 
Capital Markets Law (1982), 213 
Carter, Jimmy, 56 
Catalhuyiik, 6 

Catholic Church, Roman. 5ee Roman 

Catholic Church 
Caucasus: ceded to Russia, 25; economic 

ties with, 229, 287; ethnic groups 

from, 102; under Ottoman Empire, 

21; relations with, 201, 287 
Cemal Pasha, Ahmet, 28; exile of, 31 
cement, 208 

Censor's Board on Obscene Publica- 
tions, 283 

censorship, xxix, 234, 257, 361 

census: of 1927, 86; of 1965, 120, 121; of 
1990, 86, 87, 88 

Center for Selection and Placement of 
Students, 142 

CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization 

Central Asia: construction in, 209; eco- 
nomic ties with, 229, 287; relations 
with, 66, 201, 236, 287, 288-89; trade 
with, 152; Turks in, 96, 97 

Central Bank of Turkey, 210-12; quar- 
terly reporting system in, 212; disputes 
of, with Ciller, 157-58; role of, 169, 
212 

Central Planning Organization, 172 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 
48 

CFE. See Conventional Forces in Europe 

Treaty 
chemical industry, 208 



children: health problems of, 177 
CHP. See Republican People's Party 
Christianity (see also under individual 

denominations): conversion to, 14 
Christians: number of, 120, 121 
Ciller, Tansu: disputes of, with Central 

Bank, 157-58; as prime minister, 

xxxvi, xxxviii, 6, 68, 235, 247, 265 
Ciller administration: cabinet in, 247; 

economy under, xxxviii-xxxix, 180 
Cilician Gates (Giilek Bogazi), 83 
Cimmerians, 7 
Cindoruk, Husamettin, 263 
Circassians, 102, 282 

CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent 
States 

civic associations: restrictions on, 271 
civil code of 1926, 132; divorce under, 

134-35; origins of, 248 
civil rights, 38, 233, 262 
civil service, 252-53; purged, xxix; salary 

in, 157 
Clerides, Glafcos, 54 

climate, 84-86, 175; in Aegean region, 
81; in Anatolian plateau, 83; precipita- 
tion, 81, 83, 86, 175, 180-81; tempera- 
ture, 83, 86 

Clinton, William J., 301, 351 

CNU. See Committee of National Unity 

coal, 202; electricity from, 203; imports, 
202-3; production, 202 

Coast Guard, 365, 370 

coastline, 81 

Cold War, 312 

Committee of National Unity (CNU), 
42-44 

Committee of Union and Progress 
( CUP) . See Young Turks 

Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS): relations with, 286-87 

communications. See telecommunica- 
tions 

Confederation of Revolutionary Trade 
Unions of Turkey (Tiirkiye Devrimci 
Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu — 
DISK), xxviii, 164, 275; members of, 
164, 165, 275; suspended, 275 

Confederation of Turkish Just Workers' 
Unions (Tiirkiye Hak Isci Sendikalari 
Konfederasyonu — Hak-Is), 164; mem- 
bers of, 164, 165; political affiliations 
of, 165 



434 



Index 



Confederation of Turkish Nationalist 
Workers' Unions (Turkiye Milliyetci 
Isci Sendikalan Konfederasyonu — 
MISK), 164; members of, 165; political 
affiliations of, 165 

Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions 
(Turkiye Isci Sendikalan Konfederas- 
yonu— Turk-Is) , 164-65, 275, 276; 
founded, 274 

Conference on International Organiza- 
tion (1945), 40 

Congress of Berlin (1878), 25 

Constantine, 10 

Constantinople, 11; capture of, 19, 111 

constituent assembly (1961), 43 

Constitutional Court, 249; appointment 
to, 245 

constitution of 1876, 26 

constitution of 1924, xxvi, 38 

constitution of 1961, xxvi, xxviii, 5, 43, 
237; economic planning under, 172 

constitution of 1982, xxvi, 237-40; 
amendments to, xxxvii, 64, 240; 
approved, 62, 236, 237; armed forces 
under, 321-22; associations under, 
271; bill of rights, 238; Council of Min- 
isters under, 238, 247-48; drafted, 
xxix, 62, 236, 237; education under, 
239, 278; electoral system under, 240- 
41; individual rights under, 237, 238, 
271; labor unions under, 165-66, 239, 
275, 311; language under, 73, 96; 
political activity under, 311; political 
parties under, xxix, 237, 240; presi- 
dent under, xxix, 5, 237, 238, 244-47; 
prime minister under, xxix, 238, 247; 
privacy under, 372; religion under, 
239, 278; secularism under, 239; uni- 
versities under, 311 

Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A., 353 

construction, 209-10; employment in, 
161; in foreign countries, 209 

Consultative Assembly, 61, 237; members 
of, 237 

contraception. See birth control; family 
planning 

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 

Treaty (1990), 314,337 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 319 
corruption: in government, 64 
cotton, 180, 206; production of, 82, 83, 

189 



Council of Europe, 256, 372; member- 
ship in, xxxii, xxxvii, 48, 296 

Council of Higher Education (Yuksek 
Ogretim Kurumu— YOK), 141-42, 
274; appointment to, 245 

Council of Ministers, 142, 238, 242, 247, 
248, 322 

Council of State, 241, 249-50; appoint- 
ment to, 245, 249 

coup d'etat of 1909, 28, 32, 308 

coup d'etat of 1913, 28 

coup d'etat of 1960, xxvii, 4-5, 42, 262, 
272, 274, 311, 332; economic policies 
of, xxvii; social reforms under, xxvii 

coup d'etat of 1971 , xxvii, 272, 31 1 

coup d'etat of 1980, xxvii, xxix, 5, 60, 
125, 263, 272, 274, 311, 332; civil 
rights under, 233; economic policies 
of, xxvii; international reaction to, 61, 
296; labor unions under, 165; political 
parties under, 233, 278; social reforms 
under, xxvii, 254 

Court of Appeals, 241, 249 

Court of Cassation. See Court of Appeals 

Court of Jurisdictional Disputes, 249 

courts: administrative, 248, 249-50; 
appellate, 249; civil, 249; criminal, 
249; judicial, 248, 249; military, 248, 
250, 257, 369 

courts, seriat : closed, 74 

court system, 248-49, 366; cases in, 370; 
defendants in, 368; lawyers in, 368 

Crete: rebellion on, 27 

crime, 366-74 

Crimea: under Ottoman Empire, 21 

Crimean Tartars, 97 

Crimean War (1854-56), 25 

Criminal Code of 1926, 367 

criminal justice system (see also courts; 

judicial system): procedure in, 367-69 
Criminal Trials Procedure Law (1992), 

367-68 

Croatia: ceded to Austria, 22 
Croesus, 9 
Crusades, 15, 17 
Cukur Ova, 82 

Cukurova Electrical Company, 203 

Cukurova Group, 213 

culture: elite, 74, 133; popular, 74, 133 

Cumhuriyet, 284 

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. See Republican 
People's Party 



435 



Turkey: A Country Study 



CUP. See Young Turks 

currency: convertibility of, 168; decline 
in, 151; devaluation of, xxx, 58, 68, 
153, 154, 156; floating of, xxx, 168; 
weakness of, 326 

current account: deficits, 153, 157, 225; 
stabilized, 155; surplus, 225, 226 

customs: agents, 370; tariffs, 168, 168 

Cyprus, 318-19; conflict with Greece 
over, xxxii, 48, 53-54, 66, 236, 294, 
296-97, 318-19; coup d'etat of 1974, 
53; immigrants from, 89; invasion of, 
299-300, 318-19, 325, 349; partition 
of, 54 

Cyprus Turkish Peace Force, 337 

Dalmatia, 22 

Dardanelles Strait, 81 

Dark Age (Aegean), 9 

debt, 151, 153, 157; under Ecevit, 58; 
under Inonii and Menderes, 43; inter- 
est payments on, 225; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 153, 157; 
short-term, 225-26 

debt restructuring, 58 

debt servicing, 225 

defense industry, domestic, 306, 351-54 
Defense Industry Development and Sup- 
port Administration, 351-52 
Defense Industry Support Fund, 174, 
325, 352 

defense spending, 229, 325-27; budget, 
325, 326; under Demirel, 45; increase 
in, 159 

Demirel, Suleyman: arrested, 61; back- 
ground of, 44; ban on political activi- 
ties of, xxix, 258; as deputy, 264; 
overthrown, xxix; political activities of, 
xxxiii, 67, 242, 256, 258, 262-63, 263; 
political comeback of, 258-59; as pres- 
ident, 5-6, 68, 235, 244, 261, 264-65; 
as prime minister, xxxiv, 5, 44, 261; 
resignation of, 49; rivalry of, with 
Ozal, 259, 267 

Demirel administration, 5, 264; economy 
under, 58-59, 154, 180; human rights 
under, 265 

democracy: conceptions of, 254; transi- 
tion to, 240, 241-53 

Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi — 
DEP), 266, 281 



Demokrasi Partisi. See Democracy Party 
Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol 
Partisi— DSP) , xxxiii, 63, 258, 269; in 
elections of 1987, 258; in elections of 
1991, 66-67 
Democratic Party: in elections of 1973, 

50; formed, 49 
democratization, xxxiii, xxxviii, 40 
Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti — DP) 
(see abo Justice Party), xxvii, 253; con- 
stituency of, 269; economic planning 
under, 172; in elections of 1946, 41; in 
elections of 1950, 4, 41; in elections of 
1954, 41; founded, 40, 262; outlawed, 
5; platform of, 262, 269, 277; religious 
education under, 118 
Demokrat Parti. See Democrat Party 
Demokratik Sol Partisi. See Democratic 
Left Party 

demonstrations. See political demonstra- 
tions 

Denizcilik Bankasi. See Maritime Bank 

Deniz Nakliyati, 217 

Denktas, Rauf, 54 

DEP. See Democracy Party 

dervishes (Mevlevi Sufi brotherhood). 

See Sufi brotherhoods, Mevlevi 
Development Bank, 212 
Development Plan for 1990-95, 173 
Devlet Su Isleri. See General Directorate 

of State Hydraulic Works 
Devrimci Sol. See Revolutionary Left 

Party 

Dev Sol. See Revolutionary Left Party 
Dicle, Hatip, 281 
Diocletian, 10 

DISK. See Confederation of Revolution- 
ary Trade Unions of Turkey 

divorce, 134-35; laws of, 132, 134-35 

Dogru Yol Partisi. See True Path Party 

Dogukaradeniz Daglan. See Pontus 
Mountains 

Donme people, 102 

Dorians, 9; invasion by, of Greece, 7 

DP. See Democrat Party 

dress: secularization of, 36; of women, 
120, 137-38 

drug trafficking, 362, 370-71; profits for, 
371; punishment for, 368 

DSL See General Directorate of State 
Hydraulic Works 

DSP. See Democratic Left Party 



436 



Index 



DYP. SeeTrxxe Path Party 

earthquakes, 77 

eastern highlands, 78, 84 

Eastern Question, 23 

EC. See European Community 

Ecevit, Biilent, 55; arrested, 61; ban on 
political activities of, xxix, 258; politi- 
cal activities of, xxxiii, 5, 45, 49, 242, 
258, 269; as prime minister, 5; resigna- 
tion of, 52 

Ecevit administration, 52 

Ecevit, Rahsan, 63 

economic austerity plans, xxix, 61, 150, 
153, 158, 226; unemployment under, 
161 

Economic Cooperation Organization, 
288 

economic crises: in 1970s, 153-54 

economic depression, xxviii, 168 

economic development, 152-54, 168 

economic growth, 152; under develop- 
ment plans, 173 

economic integration, 226-29; with 
Europe, 227 

economic planning (see also under indi- 
vidual plans) , 149, 150; under constitu- 
tion of 1961, 172; for development, 
150, 172-73; five-year plans, 172-73 

economic policy: liberal, 149; under mil- 
itary rule, xxvii, xxix 

economic problems: from Persian Gulf 
War, 149, 151, 152, 156-57, 315 

economic protectionism, xxx 

economic reform: advocated by Welfare 
Party, xxxii; under military rule, 43; 
under Ozal, xxx, xxxiii, 150-51, 154- 
56, 224 

economic stabilization program, 58, 68; 
under Demirel, 58-59; under Ozal, 
61-62 

economic ties: with Europe, 151-52 
economy, 56-59; under Ciller, xxxviii- 
xxxix; informal, 150, 159; long-term 
prospects, 151; under Menderes, 4; of 
Ottoman Empire, 25-26, 27; under 
Ozal, xxx; planning of, 38; role of gov- 
ernment in, 38, 167-75; structure of, 
159; in War of Independence, 152; in 
World War I, 152 
Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantino- 



ple, 122-23 

Edict of Milan (313), 11 

education (see also schools), 139-43; 
access to, xxviii; adult, 142; under con- 
stitution of 1982, 239; equivalency 
program, 143; expansion of, 159; gov- 
ernment spending on, 325; middle- 
school, 140; of middle class, 126; post- 
secondary, 140-42; preschool, 139; 
primary, 139-40; religious, 74, 105, 
118, 139, 140, 278; secondary, 140; sec- 
ular, 74; and social advancement, 142; 
special, 142; stages of, 139; vocational, 
140, 143; of women, 139, 161 

Egypt: invasion of Syria by, 23; occupied 
by Britain, 25; under Ottoman 
Empire, 21, 25; petroleum conces- 
sions in, 201; relations with, 294; trade 
with, 294-95, 353 

Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), 299 

elections: of 1946, 41; of 1950, xxvii, 4, 
41; of 1954, 41; of 1961, 43; of 1969, 
46; of 1973, 50; of 1977, 51; of 1979, 
52; of 1980, 28; of 1983, xxix, 5, 63, 
233, 255; of 1984, 257; of 1986, 63, 64; 
of 1987, xxxiii, 5, 258, 264, 267; of 
1989, 64, 259; of 1991, xxxiv, 66-67, 
242, 260, 266; of 1994, 261-62, 268 

Electoral Law (1983), 241 

electoral system, 240-41 

electric power: demand for, 197, 203, 
204; distribution of, xxxi; generation, 
203; imports of, 203; privatization of, 
171; in rural areas, 203; sources of, 
203 

elite, business, 124, 125-26; competition 
of, with political elite, 124; members 
of, 125; in villages, 131 

elite, military, 254 

elite, political, 254; acceptance into, 124; 
factions in, 125; competition of, with 
business class, 124; competition of, 
with Islamic activists, 235; social struc- 
ture of, 75, 124 

elite, professional, 125 

elite class, xxxviii; acceptance into, 20; 
under Atatiirk, xxv; culture of, 74, 
133; education of, 74; social structure 
of, 124-25; in towns, 128; in urban 
areas, 125, 126; in villages, 131; 
women, 139 

employers' associations, 276-77 



437 



Turkey: A Country Study 



employment: in agriculture, 159, 161; in 
construction, 161; in defense industry, 
352; in industry, 127, 161, 196, 352; of 
lower class, 12V; in manufacturing, 
161, 206; in services sector, 162; in 
state enterprises, 169; in urban areas, 
159-61, 162; of women, 138 
End of Laissez-Faire, The (Keynes), 168 
energy (see also electric power; see also 
under individual energy sources), 197- 
204 

Enver Pasha, 28; death of, 31; exile of, 31 
Erbakan, Necmettin, xxviii, xxxi, 50, 64, 

257, 267; as deputy prime minister, 51; 

political activities of, 268; prosecuted, 

61,268,278 
Erdogan, Tayyip, 268 
Eregli Iron and Steelworks, 206, 207; 

privatization of, 172 
Erim, Nihat: as prime minister, 49 
Erkman, Hayrettin, 60 
Ertugrul, 17 

Eskisehir: population of, 88 

etatism, 4, 38, 153, 168-69; and trade 
policy, 220 

ethnic conflict, xxx-xxxi 

ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups), 95-105; distribution of, xxix, 
4; marriage between, 15, 102 

Etibank, 204, 205, 208 

EU. See European Union 

Euphrates River, 84 

Europe: economic ties with, 151-52, 227; 
guest workers in, xxviii, 90, 152; immi- 
grants in, 152; Ottoman relations with, 
21, 149; political intervention in Otto- 
man Empire by, 21; trade with, 226, 
227 

Europe, Eastern, 66 

European Community (EC): Common 
Agricultural Policy, 227; desire to join, 
48, 295; relations with, 256; trade with, 
227-28 

European Community-Turkey Associa- 
tion Council, 228 

European Recovery Program (Marshall 
Plan), 48, 182 

European Union (EU) , 295-98; in cus- 
toms union of, xxxvii; desire to join, 
xxx, xxxi, xxxii-xxxiii, 48, 152, 223, 
228, 236, 295-97; exports to, 176, 206; 
reluctance of, to admit Turkey, 87 



Evren, Kenan: coup d'etat by, 5; as presi- 
dent, xxix, 5, 233, 256, 279, 311 
exchange rate, 220; flexible, 154; over- 
valued, 157 
Exclusive Economic Zone, 319, 365 
Execution of Sentences Act (1986), 367 
Export Credit Bank of Turkey (Tiirkiye 

Ihracat Kredi Bankasi) , 212 
exports (see also under individual prod- 
ucts): of cement, 208; of chemicals, 
208; of crops, 176, 187, 220; decline 
in, 58, 151, 153; to European Union, 
176, 206; of food, 151, 206; growth of, 
xxxix, 68, 154, 220, 224; of iron and 
steel, 207; of livestock, 176; of manu- 
factures, 156; to Middle East, 176, 226, 
294; of minerals, 204, 220; as percent- 
age of gross national product, 220; 
promotion of, 154; subsidies for, xxx; 
of textiles, 206; to United States, 176, 
206; value of, 220-22 



families (see also households): functions 
of, 129-30; of guest workers, 137; laws 
affecting, 36, 132 

families, extended, 129, 131, 135-37 

families, nuclear, 129 

family planning: services, 91 

farmers: subsistence, 187; taxes on, 175 

farming (see also agriculture), 175; crop- 
ping patterns, 187-91 

farms: distribution of, 175, 185-86; 
expansion of, 182-84; 185; state sup- 
port for, 170 

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- 
many, Federal Republic of 

Fethullahci tarikat, 279 

finance, 159 

fishing, 131, 176, 193-94 

FMC Corporation, 352 

Fodder Industry (Yem Sanayili), 179 

food: export of, 151, 206; import of, 
177-78; production, 176; self-suffi- 
ciency in, 151, 175 

Ford, Gerald, 56 

foreign assistance: from Germany, 326; 

from Kuwait, 325; from OECD, 224; 

from Saudi Arabia, 325; from United 

Arab Emirates, 325; from the United 

States, 325, 326 
foreign borrowing, 225 



438 



Index 



foreign currency: reserves, 158 
foreign economic relations, 220-29 
foreign exchange, 220; shortages of, 

xxviii, 58, 223 
foreign investment, 151, 225; encour- 
aged, 68; growth of, 155; in mining, 
205 

foreign policy, xxxii, 235; under Atatiirk, 
39; and Kurdish problem, xxxvi-xxxvii 

foreign relations, 285-301; with Afghani- 
stan, 39; with Albania, 66, 317; with 
Armenia, 287, 314; under Atatiirk, 39; 
with Azerbaijan, xxxv, 202, 236, 287- 
88, 314; with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
317; with Britain, 25; with Bulgaria, 
66, 289, 318; with Central Asia, 66, 
201, 236, 287, 288-89; with Egypt, 294; 
with Georgia, 287, 314; with Greece, 
xxxii, 55, 66, 298; with Hungary, 289; 
with Iran, xxxiii, 39, 201, 292-93, 306, 
316-17; with Iraq, xxxiii, 39, 294, 306; 
with Israel, 294; with Kazakhstan, xxxv, 
288; with Kyrgyzstan, xxxv, 288; with 
Macedonia, 66, 317; with Romania, 
289; with Russia, 25, 286; with Soviet 
Union, 39; with Syria, 282, 292, 293- 
94, 306, 316; with Tajikistan, 288; with 
Turkmenistan, xxxv, 288; with 
Ukraine, 343; with the United States, 
47, 235, 298-301; with Uzbekistan, 
xxxv, 288 

forestry, 131, 176, 193; budget for, 251 
Fourteen Points, 32 

France: anti-immigrant stance of, 163; in 
Crimean War, 25; guest workers in, 
162, 163; military training by, 339; 
occupation of Turkey by, 32, 308; 
Ottoman trade with, 21; territory 
acquired by, 25, 33; Turkish immi- 
grants in, 90, 163; withdrawal of, 34; in 
World War I, 30 

Freedom and Labor Party (OZEP) , 269 

fruit, 83, 180; citrus, 81 

FYROM. See Macedonia, Former Yugo- 
slav Republic of 

Gallipoli, battle of, xxv, 30, 308 
GAP. See Southeast Anatolia Project 
gas, natural, 202; imports of, 202; pipe- 
lines, 202, 286; reserves, 198 
GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 



and Trade 
Gaziantep: population of, 88 
gazis. amirates of, 15; conquests of, 4, 14, 

110; role of, 13, 17 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
gendarmerie, 360, 361, 362-65; 

deployed against Kurdish insurgents, 

339; functions of, 360, 362, 364, 370 
Gendarmerie Schools Command, 364 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT) , 223 
General Directorate of Prisons and 

Houses of Detention, 373 
General Directorate of State Hydraulic 

Works (Devlet Su Isleri— DSI), 181, 

203 

General Dynamics, 194, 340, 352 

General Electric, 340, 352 

General Management for Trade in 
Tobacco, Tobacco Products, and Alco- 
holic Spirits (Tutiin Mamulleri, Tuz ve 
Alkol Isletmeleri Genel Miidurlugu — 
TEKEL): state control of, 171 

General Motors, 209 

General Staff, 142, 323; appointment to, 
245; chief of, 311, 322,323 

geography, 75-86; of Anatolia, 75; loca- 
tion, 75 

geology, 77-78; of Anatolian Plateau, 83 

Georgia: borders with, 76; economic ties 
with, 229, 287; relations with, 287, 314 

Georgians, 102, 282; distribution of, 102 

geostrategic situation, 201-2 

Germany: military training by, 27; Otto- 
man treaty with, 29; relations of, with 
Ottomans, 27, 28-29; in World War I, 
xxv 

Germany, Federal Republic of (West 
Germany): emigration to, 101; finan- 
cial aid from, 326; guest workers in, 
90, 162, 163; joint ventures with, 306; 
Kurdish terrorism in, 355; materiel 
from, 343, 344, 353, 365; technical 
assistance from, 285; tourists from, 
219; trade with, 222 

GNP. See gross national product 

Gokalp, Ziya, 27, 93 

Gokchek, Melih, 268 

Gordium, 7 

Gortiirk Empire, 13 

gossip groups, 130 

government, 241-53; corruption in, 64; 



439 



Turkey: A Country Study 



economic role of, 167-75; interven- 
tion in agriculture, 179; population 
policies of, 90-92; powers of, 238; role 
of, 237-38 

government, local, 250-52; budgets for, 
174; revenues, 174-75 

government, provincial, 250-52 

government budget, 173-75; for 
defense, 325; for education, 325 

Government Employees' Retirement 
Fund, 144 

government securities, 214 

government spending, 157; on defense, 
325; on infrastructure, 167; reduction 
in, 155, 158 

governors, 250-51 

Grand National Assembly, xxvii; under 
constitution of 1924, 38; convened, 
34; dissolved, 254; reforms under, 35 

Gray Wolves, 47, 59 

Great Depression, 168 

Greece: in Balkan Pact, 39; borders with, 
76; conflicts with, xxxii, 48, 53-54, 55- 
56, 236, 296-98, 337, 365; driven from 
Turkey, 34-35; economic ties with, 
229; in First Balkan War, 28; invasion 
of, by Dorians, 7; occupation of Tur- 
key by, 32, 33, 34, 308; Ottoman war 
with, 27; population exchange with, 
76, 89, 103; relations with, xxxii, 55, 
66, 298; as security threat, 314; tourists 
from, 219; United States military assis- 
tance to, 350 

Greek Catholics, 1 23 

Greek Cypriot National Guard, 318-19 

Greek Orthodox Church, 19, 120, 122, 
373 

Greeks, 9-10, 103, 282; emigration of, 
153; in Ottoman bureaucracy, 20; in 
population exchange, 76, 89, 103 

Greek War of Independence (1821-32), 
23 

gross domestic product (GDP): growth 
rate, xxx 

gross domestic product fractions: agri- 
culture, 159, 176; budget deficit, 158, 
175; current account deficit, 157; 
debt, 153, 157; defense budget, 325; 
education budget, 325; industry, 159, 
194; mining, 204; services sector, 159 

gross national product (GNP): decline 
in, 155-56; defense spending as per- 



centage of, 326-27; exports as per- 
centage of, 220; growth of, 156; 
minerals as percentage of, 222; taxes 
as percentage of, 174; textiles as per- 
centage of, 222; trade as percentage 
of, 220, 222 

guest workers, 162, 271, 296; families of, 
137; hostility toward, 162-63, 296; 
number of, 162, 163; in Persian Gulf 
states, 90, 163; remittances from, 163, 
224-25; in Western Europe, xxviii, 90, 
152,162,163 

Giilek Bogazi. See Cilician Gates 

Gunaydm, 284 

Giineydogu Anadolu Projesi. See South- 
east Anatolia Project 
Giines, Turan, 53, 54 
Giirler, Faruk, 49 

Gursel, Cemal, 42, 43; death of, 45; as 
president, 44 

HADEP. See People's Democracy Party 
Hagia Sophia: in Byzantine Empire, 11; 

under Ottomans, 19; under Turks, 117 
Hak-Is. See Confederation of Turkish Just 

Workers' Unions 
Halk Bank: state control of, 171 
Halkci Partisi. See Populist Party 
Halkin Demokrasi Partisi. See People's 

Democracy Party 
Halkin Emek Partisi. See People's Labor 

Party 

Hatay Province: Arabs in, 101; Syria's 
claims to, 293, 316 

Hattusas (Bogazkoy): archaeological 
research at, 6; burned, 7 

Havas airport company, 171, 172 

health, 143-44; and malnutrition, 177 

health care: availability of, 143; expan- 
sion of, 159; military, 334 

health care professionals: ratio of, to 
patients, 144; salaries of, 143^14 

health facilities, 144 

Hearth of Intellectuals, 119 

Hellenistic civilization, 3 

Helsinki Watch, 296 

HEP. See People's Labor Party 

higher education law (1981), 141 

High Gate. 5^Bab-i Ali 

High Planning Council, 172 

Hisarlik, 6 



440 



Index 



Hittite Empire, 7 

Hittites, 3, 6-7; as proto-Turks, 4 

Hisballah-Contra, 360 

Holy League: Ottoman war with, 22 

Homer, 6 

households (see also families): activities 

of, 130; members of, 130 
housing: shortage, 209-10; in urban 

areas, 209-10 
HP. See Populist Party 
human rights: abuses, xxxii, xxxvii, 61, 

152, 228, 236, 256, 265, 296, 300, 371; 

advocacy groups, 257, 283, 296, 372 
Human Rights Association, 296, 372 
Human Rights Foundation, 372 
Hungary: ceded to Austria, 22; relations 

with, 289 
Hurriyet, 284 

Husayn ibn Ali, Sharif, 31 
hydroelectric power (see also electric 

power; energy), 68, 181, 197, 214; 

electricity from, 203; potential, 198 
Hyundai, 209 

Iconium. SeeKonya 
Iliad (Homer), 6 
Ilion, 6 
Ilium, 6 

Iller Bankasi. ^Municipalities Bank 
liter, Aydin, 363 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

immigrants: in Europe, 152 

immigration, 88; from Russia, 102 

imports, xxviii; of food, 177-78; increase 
in, xxxix, 154, 220, 224; liberalization 
of, xxx; of petroleum, 198, 222 

import-substitution industrialization , 
xxviii, xxx, 150, 154, 168, 194; under 
economic planning, 173; end of, 154 

income: from agriculture, 176 

income distribution, 150, 177 

individual rights, 371-73; under consti- 
tution of 1982, 237, 238, 271 

industrial development, 150, 169-70 

industrial growth, 153, 194 

industrialization, 97, 125, 176 

industrial policy, 196-97 

industry, 149, 175, 194-210; in Black Sea 
area, 81; employment in, 161, 196; 
encouragement of, 167; expansion of, 
271; labor unions in, 163; under Ozal, 



196; as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 159, 194; privatization of, 197 
infant mortality, 144 

inflation, 158, 224; under economic 
planning, 173; under Inonii and Men- 
deres, 43; in 1970s, xxviii, 5, 56, 154; 
in 1980s, xxx, 61, 68, 151; in 1990s, 
xxxix, 156, 157, 169 

infrastructure: improvement of, 68-69, 
194; investment in, 167; transporta- 
tion, 68 

inheritance: laws of, 132 

Inonii, Erdal, xxxiv, 63, 67, 256, 265, 269 

Inonii, Ismet (see also Ismet Pasha), xxvii, 
xxxiv, 4, 308; as deputy prime minister, 
261; as president, 40; as prime minis- 
ter, 44 

Inonii administration, 5; economy 

under, 43 
Interbank, 213 

interest: payments, 155; rates, xxx, 68, 
154 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 58, 
153; aid from, 300 

investment: in agriculture, 176; under 
development plans, 173; foreign, 173 

Iran, 316-17; in Baghdad Pact, 48; bor- 
ders with, 76, 290; exports to, 151, 
152, 192, 226, 227, 294; refugees from, 
292; Kurdish bases in, 306, 317, 355; 
relations with, xxxiii, 39, 201, 292-93, 
306, 316-17; as security threat, 280; 
trade with, 156, 222, 292 

Iranian Revolution (1979), 292 

Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), 156, 209, 292, 
315 

Iraq: in Baghdad Pact, 48; border with, 
36, 76, 290, 336; British mandate in, 
33; embargo on, 149, 151, 152, 156- 
57, 192, 315, 325; exports to, 151, 192, 
226, 294; instability of, 286; invasion 
of, xxxvii; Kurdish bases in, 306, 355; 
Kurdish region, xxxv, xxxvii, 290-91, 
351; Kurdish uprising in, 65, 236, 306, 
355, 356; pipelines from, 156, 201, 
286, 315, 325; refugees from, 234, 236, 
290-91; relations with, xxxiii, 39, 294, 
306; as security threat, 314; trade with, 
156, 222-23, 227 

Irmak, Sadi, 51 

iron production, 6, 206-7 

irrigation, 180-82, 187; in Anatolian Pla- 



441 



Turkey: A Country Study 



teau, 83, 180; in Arabian Platform, 84; 
budget for, 251; in Mediterranean 
region, 82, 180-81; in southeast Ana- 
tolia, xxxi, 68 

Isbank, 212 

Ishmael. See Ismail 

Iskenderun: industry in, 207; port of, 
217 

Islam {see also secularism), 106-16, 277; 
birth control in, 92; conversion to, 
xxvi, 13, 15, 110; disestablishment of, 
xxvi, 74, 132; divorce under, 134; as 
foundation of Ottoman Empire, 111; 
inheritance under, 185; introduction 
of, 3; language of, 92; marriage under, 
133; open expression of, 45; role of, 
xxv, xxvi; Turkification of, 117 

Islam, Alevi, 116 

Islam, Shia, 13 

Islam, Sunni, 13; Istanbul as center of, 
19; schools of, 109 

Islamic calendar, 106, 117 

Islamic Movement Organization, 359-60 

Islamic political activism, xxv, xxxi, 5, 60, 
235, 267, 278, 359 

Islamist movement, 45, 105, 151, 235, 
264, 279, 359-60; intellectuals in, 119- 
20; as security threat, 312, 359; terror- 
ism by, 317 

Ismet Pasha {see also Inonu, Ismet), 35; 
military actions of, 34 

Israel: emigration to, 104; relations with, 
294; trade with, 294-95 

Istanbul, 75-76; established, 19; etymol- 
ogy of, 19, 111; Kurds in, 235; popula- 
tion of, 88; population density in, 87; 
port of, 217 

Istanbul Stock Exchange, 213-14 

Italy: Libya seized by, 28; occupation of 
Turkey by, 32, 308; war with, 32; with- 
drawal of, 34 

Izmir (Smyrna): Kurds in, 235; port of, 
217 



janissary, 22, 111, 307 

Jews, 104-5; emigration of, 104, 153; in 

Ottoman bureaucracy, 20; population 

of, 104, 120-21, 123 
Jordan: British mandate in, 33 
journalists: arrested, xxxvi, 234, 283, 

354, 369 



judges, 248, 250, 368 

judiciary, 238, 248-50 

Justice Commandos of the Armenian 
Genocide (JCAG), 358, 359 

Justice Party (Adalet Partisi — AP) (see 
also Democrat Party, Democratic 
Party), xxxiv, 43, 49, 51, 62, 253, 256, 
262, 263; in elections of 1961, 43; in 
elections of 1977, 51; founded, 5, 262; 
in power, 5 

Kahramanmaras: political violence in, 
59-60 

Kahramanmaras Province: martial law 

in, 60 
Kamal, Yashar, xxxvii 
Karadag, Davut, 283 
Karadayi, Ismail Hakki, 322 
Karaites, 105 
Karakaya Dam, 203 
Karaman: population density in, 87 
Karamanlis, Constantine, 55 
Kastelli Bank: collapse of, 62 
Kayseri: population of, 88 
Kazakhstan: oil exploration in, 199-201; 

relations with, xxxv, 288 
Kazandjian, Karekin Bedros, 122 
Keban Dam, 203, 214 
Kemal, Mustafa (see also Atatiirk, 

Kemal), xxv, 4; military activities of, 

305; and Young Turks, 27 
Kemalism, xxvi, 4, 37; in armed forces, 

309, 312; elements of, 4, 37, 74-75; 

maintenance of, 42, 45, 60, 62, 254 
Keynes, John Maynard, 168 
Knights of Saint John, 20 
Kocaeli: population density in, 87; port 

of, 217 
Kocbank, 213 

Koc Holding Company, 213 

Koksal, Sonmez, 365 

Konya (Iconium), 14; population of, 88 

KonyaAir Base, 321 

Konya Ovasi (Konya Basin) , 83; archaeo- 
logical research at, 6; rainfall in, 86 

Kopriilu, Ahmet, 22 

Koprulii era, 22-23 

Kopriilu family, 22 

Kopriilu, Mehmet, 22 

Korean War: Turkish troops in, xxxii, 47, 
299, 319 



442 



Index 



Koruturk, Fahri: as president, 50 

Korutiirk administration, 51 

Kuran (Quran), 106-7 

Kurdish insurgency, 59, 152, 177, 199, 
219, 233-34, 234, 280, 293, 300, 306- 
7, 355, 371; casualties from, 356; costs 
of, 229; support for, 316, 317; terror- 
ism by, 354, 356 

Kurdish language, 73; dialects of, 98; 
prohibition of, 67, 96, 98-100, 280; 
publications in, 100 

Kurdistan, 84; conquest of, 21; Kurds' 
desire for state of, xxxi, xxxvi, 355 

Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Kark- 
ere Kurdistan— PKK), xxxi, 100, 270, 
355, 370; armed forces offensives 
against, xxxv, xxxvi, 236, 339, 356; 
banned, 67; foreign support for, 292- 
93, 356-57; goals of, 281-82, 355; mili- 
tary activities of, xxxv, 67-68, 132, 266, 
281, 282; terrorism against, 360 

Kurds, 9, 98-101, 280-81; under Atatiirk, 
355; geographic distribution of, 235; 
government policy toward, 95, 100, 
257; Iraqi, 65, 234, 236, 290, 291-92, 
306, 315-16, 351; languages of, 67, 73, 
96, 98-100, 101; as non-Turks, 73; 
under Ozal, 100; as percentage of 
population, xxx, 73; population of, 98; 
as refugees, 66, 234, 236, 290, 356; 
relations of, with Turkey, xxxi; religion 
of, 73, 109, 115; relocated, 234-35, 
281, 356; separatist sentiments of, 59, 
67, 98, 280, 293, 355-57; support for, 
264; uprisings by, 355; in villages, 132 

Kuwait: exports to, 294; financial aid 
from, 325, 353 

Kyrgyzstan: relations with, xxxv, 288 



tribution, 185; erosion, 184; owner- 
ship, 185, 186; redistribution of, 184 

land reform, 184, 186 

land tenure, 129, 132, 184-87 

land use, 182-84 

language groups (see also under individual 

languages) , 95—1 05 
language reform (see also Turkish lan- 
guage) , 73-74, 92-95 
Latin Empire of Constantinople, 15 
Lausanne Conference (1922), 35 
Law for the Encouragement of Industry 

(1927), 167 
Law of Fundamental Organization 

(Organic Law) (1921), 34 
Lawrence, T. E., 31 
Lazi language, 95 
Laz people, 95, 102 
League of Nations, 36, 76 
Lebanon: French occupation of, 33 
legal system: proposed changes to, 40; 

secularized, 36 
legislation, 242 
Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 163 
Libya: construction in, 209; exports to, 

226; seized by Italy, 28 
literacy: campaigns, 142; rate, 93, 139, 

271 

livestock, 175, 191-92; export of, 176, 

191, 192; production, 178, 184, 191, 

192; wool from, 191, 206 
London Convention of 1832, 23 
London Convention of 1840, 25 
lower class: occupations of, 127; religion 

of, 277; in towns, 128; in urban areas, 

126 
Lydia, 9 
Lydians, 7-9 



labor movement, 274-76; weakening of, 
163-64 

labor unions, 127, 128, 162-67, 271; 
banned, 164, 275; under constitution 
of 1982, 165-66, 239, 275; laws regu- 
lating, 274, 275, 276; political activism 
of, 165, 274-75, 276, 311, 373; and 
privatization, 171; purged, 61; restric- 
tions on, 165-66, 354 

Ladino, 105 

Lake Van, 84 

land: arable, 182, 187; area, 75, 182; dis- 



Macedonia, 26, 28; war in, 26 
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic 

of (FYROM), 66, 317 
Mahmud II, 307 
Makarios III, Archbishop, 53 
Makina ve Kimya Endiistrisi Kurumu 

(MKEK), 352 
Malatya Ovasi: rainfall in, 86 
manufacturing, 152, 205-9; decline in, 

155-56; under economic planning, 

173; employment in, 161, 206; 

exports, 156; state enterprises in, 150, 



443 



Turkey: A Country Study 



205-6; of textiles, 206 
Maritime Bank (Denizcilik Bankasi), 21V 
Marmara region: immigrants in, 89 
Maronites, 123 

marriage, 133-35; interethnic, 15, 102, 
121, 134; laws of, 132, 133; seculariza- 
tion of, 36, 133; women in, 136-37, 
138 

Marshall Plan. See European Recovery 
Program 

martial law, 354; courts, 369; imposed, 
42, 52, 59, 60, 61, 255; repealed, 
xxxiii, 257 

Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda 
Unit, 358 

Mass Housing Fund, 174, 209, 210 

materiel: air force, 340, 341, 352; army, 
306; domestic, 352; embargo on, 56, 
300, 349-50; export of, 353; gendar- 
merie, 363; from Germany, 343, 344, 
353, 365; navy, 342, 343-45, 353, 365; 
procurement of, 339; spending on, 
326; from United States, 343, 344, 345, 
365; upgrading of, 337 

Mavros, George, 53 

mayors, 252; religious, 235, 262, 268 

MCP. ^Nationalist Labor Party 

MDP. See Nationalist Democracy Party 

Meat and Fish Board, 179 

media, 283-85; availability of, xxviii; cen- 
sored, 234, 262 

Mediterranean region, 78, 82; agricul- 
ture in, 82; climate in, 84-86; popula- 
tion in, 88; tourism in, 82; villages in, 
131 

Medya Gunesi, 283 
Megara, 9 

Mehmetibn Daud, 13-14 

Mehmetll, 19 

MehmetV, 28 

MehmetVI: exiled, 35 

Memcu, Ugur: assassination of, 270 

men: life expectancy of, 87; relations of, 

with women, 137-38 
Menderes, Adnan, 4, 40; hanged, 43; as 

prime minister, 41 
Menderes administration: economy 

under, 4, 43; overthrown, 5; religious 

tolerance under, 4 
Mercedes-Benz, 194 
merchant marine, 217 
Mersin: population of, 88; port of, 217 



Mesopotamia: conquest of, 21; under 

Ottoman Empire, 21, 308 
Mevlana (Jalal ad Din Rumi), 114 
MHP. ^Nationalist Action Party 
middle class, 126; in towns, 128; women, 

139 

Middle East, 290-95, 314-17; construc- 
tion in, 209; exports to, 176, 191, 192; 
tourists from, 219, 226; trade with, 
222, 226 

Midhat Pasha, 26 

migration, 88-90; of workers, 163 

military: discipline, 329-30; education 
system, 312; intelligence, 366 

military academies: admission to, 310, 
331-32; women in, 330 

military assistance: from United States, 
56, 350-51 

military conscription, 327; evasion of, 
328 

Military Court of Appeals, 250 

military officers: backgrounds of, 310; 
comportment of, 332; noncommis- 
sioned, 328, 341; outlook of, 309; pay 
of, 310, 334; privileges of, 309-10, 
334-35; purge of, 44; restrictions on, 
308, 333-34; retirement of, 333; revolt 
by, 44 

military personnel: backgrounds of, 310, 
327-30; desertion by, 328; pay of, 334; 
training of, 328, 342 

military rule: 1960-61, 5, 42; 1980-83, 
311 

military schools, 309, 330 
military staff academies, 332-33 
military training: by France, 339; by 

United States, 351 
millet system, 20; abolished, 38; legacy of, 

96 

Milli Istihbarat Teskilati. See National 
Intelligence Organization 

Milli Selamet Partisi. See National Salva- 
tion Party 

MilUyet, 284 

Milliyetci Calisma Partisi. See Nationalist 
Labor Party 

Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi. See Nation- 
alist Democracy Party 

Milliyetci Hareket Partisi. See Nationalist 
Action Party 

minerals, 204-5; export of, 204, 220; as 
percentage of gross national product, 



444 



Index 



222 

mining: in Black Sea area, 81; foreign 
investment in, 205; nationalized, 205; 
as percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 204; in private sector, 205; state 
enterprises for, 204-5 

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs, 179 

Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources, 181 

Ministry of Finance, 174 

Ministry of Forestry, 179, 193 

Ministry of Health and Social Assistance, 
143; Family Planning Division, 91 

Ministry of Industry and Trade, 352 

Ministry of Justice, 369, 373 

Ministry of National Defense, 323-25; 
budget for, 327; Undersecretariat for 
Defense Industries, 351-52 

Ministry of National Education, 117, 
140, 142; Directorate of Apprentice- 
ship and Nonformal Education, 143 

Minoan-Mycenean civilization, 9 

minorities, 1 20-23 

MISK. See Confederation of Turkish 
Nationalist Workers' Unions 

MIT. See National Intelligence Organiza- 
tion 

MKEK. See Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi 
Kurumu 

Mobil Oil, 199, 201 

modernism: versus traditionalism, 74 

modernization: of agriculture, 150, 161; 
of armed forces, 305; under Atatiirk, 
4, 74-75, 150; of infrastructure, 68-69 

Moldavia: under Ottoman Empire, 21 

Moldova: economic ties with, 229 

Mongols, 15 

Montenegro: in First Balkan War, 28 

Montreux Convention, 39, 40 

Morea: ceded to Venice, 22 

mosques: attendance at, 107; construc- 
tion of, 119, 277 

Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi — 
ANAP), xxix-xxx, xxxiii, xxxiv, 62, 67, 
235, 266-67; in elections of 1983, 63, 
233, 241, 311; in elections of 1984, 
257; in elections of 1986, 63, 64; in 
elections of 1987, 5, 241-42, 258; in 
elections of 1989, 64, 259; in elections 
of 1991, 66, 242, 260, 266; foreign 
relations under, 287; problems in, 261; 



religion under, 278; support for, 118, 

261,267 
mountains, 78-81, 84 
Mount Ararat (Agri Dagi) , 78, 84 
MSP. See National Salvation Party 
Muhammad, 106; successor to, 109 
Muhammad Ali (of Egypt), 23, 25 
Muhammad ash Shafii, 109 
Muhammad ibn Nusayr an Namiri, 110 
Municipalities Bank (Iller Bankasi), 212 
Muradl, 17 

Murted Air Base, 352-53 

Muslims {see also Islam) : Ahl-i Haq, 115; 
definition of, 106, 107; sectarian ten- 
sions among, 101; as Turks, xxx; 
Yazidi, 101 

Muslims, Alevi, 115-16; adherents of, 73; 
Arabs as, 100-101; ethnicity of, 96; 
Kurds as, 100; origins of, 110; as per- 
centage of population, xxx; Turks as, 
100-101, 109 

Muslims, Shia (see also Muslims, Alevi), 
110; Kurds as, 100; as percentage of 
population, 115; Twelve Imam, 110, 
115 

Muslims, Sunni, xxx; as genuine Turks, 

73; Kurds as, 100 
Muslim courts. See courts, seriat 
Mustafa II, 22 

Naksibendi tarikat, 279 

names: under Atatiirk, 36 

National Assembly, 241-43; arrests of 
members of, xxxvi-xxxvii, 234, 243, 
254, 266, 373; elections to, 5; mem- 
bers of, 238,241,242, 243 

National Front, 51 

National Intelligence Coordination 

Committee, 366 
National Intelligence Organization 

(Milli Istihbarat Teskilati — MIT) , 365 
National Salvation Party, 62 
nationalism, 4, 93 

Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci 
Hareket Partisi — MHP), xxviii, 43, 44, 
46, 51, 62, 165; in elections of 1977, 
51; organization of, 47; and political 
violence, 59; support for, 46^17 
nationalist congress (1919), 33-34 
Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetci 
Demokrasi Partisi — MDP) , xxix, 62; 



445 



Turkey: A Country Study 



dissolved, 264; in elections of 1983, 63, 
255-56, 311; in elections of 1984, 257 

Nationalist Labor Party (Milliyetci Cal- 
isma Partisi— M£P) , 269-70; in elec- 
tions of 1987, 258 

nationalist movement, 33-34; attack on 
Armenia by, 34-35 

National Pact (1919), 33, 35; approved, 
34 

National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet 
Partisi— MSP), xxviii, 49, 51, 118, 165, 
267-68; dissolved, 268; in elections of 
1973, 50; in elections of 1977, 51; 
founded, 278; religious activism in, 
278 

National Security Academy, 333 

National Security Council (NSC), xxix, 
5, 245-47, 322, 366; appointed, 60; 
members of, 60, 236-37, 245-47; 
reforms under, xxix, 5 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation 

naval academy, 342 

Naval Lyceum, 342 

Naval Training Command, 342 

navy, 341-45; reserves, 329 

Netherlands: guest workers in, 162; 
Turkish immigrants in, 90 

newspapers {see also journalists; media), 
283, 284; censored, 283; religious, 119 

New Turkey Party, 43-44 

Nicholas I (tsar), 23 

North Africa: under Ottoman Empire, 
21 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO): admission to, 320, 348; com- 
mands, 320; deployment of troops in, 
320-21; exercises of, 342; intelligence 
gathering by, 320, 348; membership 
in, xxxii, 48, 235, 286, 299, 305, 319- 
21; representative to, 323; strategy, 321 

NSC. See National Security Council 

nuclear power, 204 

Nurol arms company, 352 

Ocalan, Abdullah, 67, 281, 282 

OECD. See Organisation for Economic 

Co-operation and Development 
Oguz tribes, 13 

oil {see also petroleum): exploration, 
198-201; pipelines, 156, 201, 315, 325 



oil crisis of 1973, xxviii, 56, 154, 224 

Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu. See Army 
Mutual Aid Association 

Organic Law. See Law of Fundamental 
Organization 

Organisation for Economic Co-opera- 
tion and Development (OECD), 56, 
174; assistance from, 224; membership 
in, xxx, xxxii; trade with, 222 

Orhan, 17 

Osman 1, 17 

Osmanli Dynasty. See Ottomans 
Ottoman Empire, xxv, 3, 17-31, 111; 
armed forces of, 305; bureaucracy of, 

20, 22, 167; conquests of, in Balkans, 
17, 20-21; in Crimean War, 25; debt 
under, 149; decline of, 21, 23, 307-8; 
dependence of, on West, 149; econ- 
omy of, 25-26, 27, 149, 167; European 
intervention in, 21; expansion of, 20- 

21, 307; institutions of, 19-20; internal 
opposition to, 27; Islam as foundation 
of, 111; origins of, 4; relations of, with 
Germany, 26-27, 28, 29; tanzimat 
(reform), 149; transportation under, 
214; 29; wars of, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 32; 
in World War I, xxv, 30 

Ottoman Land Code, 97 

Ottomans, 17, 110 

Ottoman Turkish, 20, 92, 167 

OYAK. See Army Mutual Aid Association 

Oyak-Renault automobile manufac- 
turer, 209 

Oymapinar Dam, 214 

Ozal, Korkut, 278-79 

Ozal, Turgut, xxix, 62; death of, xxxv, 5, 
68, 264; goals of, xxx; political activi- 
ties of, 256, 266, 311; popularity of, 64, 
68; as president, 64, 234, 241, 244, 
259; as prime minister, 5, 233; rivalry 
of, with Demirel, 259, 267 

Ozal administration, 5; economy under, 
xxx, 59, 150-51, 154-56, 170, 180, 
213, 224; energy under, 197-98; eth- 
nic groups under, 1 00; industry under, 
196; labor under, 127; tourism under, 
219 

Ozdenoren, Rasim, 119 
Ozel, Ismet, 119 

OZEP. See Freedom and Labor Party 

Ozgur Gundem, 283 



446 



Index 



Pakistan: in Baghdad Pact, 48; petro- 
leum concessions in, 201 

Palaeologus, Michael, 15 

Palestine: British mandate in, 33; under 
Ottoman Empire, 21, 308 

Pamukbank, 213 

pan-Turanism, 27 

Paris peace talks of 1919, 32 

Partiya Karkere Kurdistan. See Kurdistan 
Workers' Party 

Paul (apostle), 11 

People's Democracy Party (Halkin 
Demokrasi Partisi— HADEP) , 281 

People's Labor Party (Halkin Emek Par- 
tisi— HEP), 234, 265-66; banned, 266, 
281; platform of, 265, 281 

Pergamum, 10 

Persia, 9; Ottoman wars with, 22, 23 

Persian Gulf states: exports to, 191, 294; 
guest workers in, 163 

Persian Gulf War (1990-91), xxxv, 64- 
65, 156-57, 235, 285-86, 290, 306; aid 
for, 351; economic problems caused 
by, 149, 209, 294, 300, 315, 325; refu- 
gees from, 290-91, 315-16; spending 
on, 326 

Persian language, 92 

Peter the Great (tsar), 22 

Petkim. ^Petrochemical Corporation 

Petrochemical Corporation (Petro- 
kimya Anonimsirketi — Petkim) ,172, 
208 

Petrokimya Anonimsirketi. See Petro- 
chemical Corporation 

petroleum {see also oil): consumption of, 
197, 203; imports of, 198, 222; output, 
199; refineries, 201, 201; reserves, 198; 
subsidies for, 197 

Petrol Ofisi, 172, 201 

Petty Officers School, 342 

Phrygia, 9 

Phrygians, 7-9 

PKK See Kurdistan Workers' Party 
Podolia, 22 

Poland: in Holy League, 22; Ottoman 
wars with, 22, 23; recovery of territory 
by, 22 

police, national, 360, 361-62; functions 
of, 361,370 

political activity: banned, 255; restric- 
tions on, 142, 274, 308, 354, 372-73 

political candidates: religious, 105-6 



political demonstrations: in 1960, 42 

political factionalism, 5 

political instability, xxviii-xxix, 5, 263; of 
former Soviet Union, 286; of Iraq, 286 

political interest groups, 270-83; armed 
forces as, 272, 310-12; labor unions as, 
274-75; religious, 277-80; universities 
as, 272-74 

political killings, 354 

political parties (see also under individual 
parties), 40-42, 130, 262-70; abol- 
ished, 61, 233, 255, 311; under consti- 
tution of 1982, xxix, 62, 240; illegal, 
270, 368; law on, 62, 240; and religion, 
277; restrictions on, 240, 254, 274, 
372-73 

political reform, 125; under Ozal, xxxiii 
political threats, 229 

political violence, 52, 59-60; casualties 
from, 59-60, 67 

politicians: arrested, xxxvi-xxxvii, 234, 
243, 254, 266, 373; political activities 
of, 258; restrictions on, 255 

Pontus Mountains (Dogukaradeniz Dag- 
Ian) , 78, 82, 84 

population, 86-92; Alevi Muslims in, 
xxx; of Armenians, 103, 282; 
exchange with Greece, 76; of Jews, 
104; Kurds in, xxx, 73, 98; in 1990, 86; 
in 1994, 73, 86; Shia Muslims in, 115; 
Turks in, 96 

population fractions: in rural areas, 88; 
in Thrace, 75; in urban areas, 88, 125, 
126; in villages, 128 

population statistics: birth rate, 91, 150; 
death rate, 87; fertility rate, 91; growth 
rate, 86-87, 91, 161; infant mortality 
rate, 144; life expectancy, 87; sex ratio, 
87 

populism, 4 

Populist Party (Halkci Partisi— HP), 62, 
256, 265; in elections of 1983, 63; in 
elections of 1984, 257 

ports, 217 

Portugal: Ottoman war with, 21 
poverty: in southeast Anatolia, xxxi 
president: under constitution of 1982, 

xxix, 238, 244-47; powers of, 250 
Presidential Council, 240, 247 
press (see also journalists; media; newspa- 
pers), 283; censorship of, 257, 283; 
restrictions on, 41-42, 262, 371 



447 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Prevention of Terrorism Law, xxxvi, xxx- 
viii 

prices, 169-70; market, 187; support, 
180,187 

prime minister: under constitution of 

1982, xxix, 238, 247 
prisoners, 374; killings of, 372; numbers 

of, 369, 374; torture of, 257, 362, 371, 

372, 374 
prison system, 373-74 
private sector, 149; encouragement of, 

167; in mining, 205 
privatization: opposition to, 171; of state 

enterprises, xxxix, 158, 168-69, 169- 

72, 179,197,201 
Privatization Fund, 171 
Prosperity Party. See Welfare Party 
provincial assembly, 251 
publications: religious, 119 
public enterprises. See state enterprises 
public order, 59-60 

Public Participation Administration, 
171,179 

Public Revenue Sharing Schemes Fund, 
174 

public sector: labor unions in, 163 
purges: of armed forces, xxix; of civil ser- 
vice, xxix; of officer corps, 44; of labor 
unions, 61; of universities, xxix 



Quran. SegKuran 



radio, 218, 283, 284-85; Islamic, 119 
Ragusa (Dubrovnik): under Ottoman 

Empire, 21 
railroads: construction of, 26, 167, 214; 

maintenance of, 214-15; network, 

215; problems with, 215; state control 

of, 171, 214 
Reagan, Ronald, 300 
Real Estate Bank (Tiirkiye Emlak Ban- 

kasi As), 212 
Refah Partisi. See Welfare Party 
reformism, 4, 38 

refugees, 88; from Azerbaijan , 287; from 

Bulgaria, 289, 318; from Iran, 292; 

from Iraq, 290-91, 315; Kurds as, 66, 

234, 236, 290, 356 
religion {see also under individual sects) , 

105-23, 277; under constitution of 



1982, 239; distribution of, in popula- 
tion, 277; language in, 92, 93; and pol- 
itics, 278; supervision of, 373; 
tolerance of, 38, 45, 74, 277 

religious associations (tarikatlar) ; 130, 
277-80; nationalized, 105 

religious minorities, 96 

religious tolerance, 45; under Menderes, 
4 

republicanism, 4, 37 

Republican Peasants' Nation Party (see 
also Nationalist Action Party) , 43, 46 

Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi— CHP), xxvii, 62, 256, 
262, 269; in elections of 1950, 4; in 
elections of 1954, 41; in elections of 
1961, 43; in elections of 1973, 50; in 
elections of 1977, 51; founded, 38; 
platform of, 5, 38, 45, 168, 262, 263; in 
power, 5; revival of, xxxviii 

Republican Reliance Party (RRP), 50, 51 

Republic State Railways (Tiirkiye Cum- 
huriyeti Devlet Demiryollari Isletmesi 
Genel Mudurulii — TCDD) , 214 

Revolutionary Left Party (Devrimci 
Sol— DevSol), 270, 357 

revolution of 1908, 308 

Rhodes: conquest of, 20 

rivers, 84, 217 

roads, 215; construction of, xxxi; mainte- 
nance of, 68, 215-17 

Roket Sanayii, 352 

Roman Catholic Church, 123 

Roman Empire, 10-11 

Romania: in Balkan Pact, 39; economic 
ties with, 229, 287; immigrants from, 
89; independence of, 25; relations 
with, 289 

RP. Welfare Party 

RRP. See Republican Reliance Party 

Rum, Sultanate of, 14-15 

Rumelia, 17; Turks in, 96, 97; union of, 
with Bulgaria, 26 

rural areas: electrification of, 203; fami- 
lies in, 135; family planning in, 91; 
income in, 177; population in, 88; reli- 
gion in, 277; unemployment in, 162 

Russia (see also Soviet Union): and Bal- 
kans, 25; Bolshevik Revolution in, 31; 
construction in, 209; in Crimean War, 
25; desire for Black Sea ports, 22-23; 
economic ties with, 229, 287; immi- 



448 



Index 



grants from, 102; military relations 
with, 23, 343; Ottoman wars with, 22, 
23, 25; relations with, 25, 286; as secu- 
rity threat, 312-14; territory acquired 
by, 22, 25; in World War I, 30 
Russo-Ottoman War (1768-74), 23 



Sabanci Holding, 209, 213 
Sabbatai Sebi, 102 
Saddam Husayn, 315, 356 
Samsun area, 81 

Saudi Arabia: construction in, 209; 
exports to, 226; financial aid from, 
325, 353; guest workers in, 90, 163 

Schliemann, Heinrich, 6 

schools {see also education): attendance 
at, 139, 140, 143; budget for, 251; 
lycees, 140; middle, 140; military, 309; 
number of, 140; preschool, 139; pri- 
mary, 139; religious, xxvi, 38, 117, 
118-19, 139, 140, 239; secondary, 140; 
vocational, 140 

Sea of Marmara: fishing in, 193 

Second Republic (1961-71), 5, 43 

secularism (see also Islam), xxv, xxvi, 4, 
38, 116-17, 277; commitment to, 124; 
under constitution of 1982, 239; insti- 
tution of, xxvi-xxvii, 36, 74, 105; main- 
tenance of, 45, 45; opposition to, 105, 
1 1 8; retreat from, 117-20 

security, internal, 354-60; intelligence 
gathering for, 365-66 

security, national, 248, 312-19; defini- 
tions of, 272; policy, 322; threats to, 
229, 305, 312-14 

Seleucid Dynasty, 1 

Seleucids, 10 

Seleucus Nicator, 10 

SelimI, 19, 20-22 

Selim III, 307 

Seljuk (khan), 13 

Serbia: in First Balkan War, 28; indepen- 
dence of, 25 

Serbs: defeated by gazis, 17 

serial (sharia, Islamic law), 109, 111; abol- 
ished, 38, 117, 132; and the family, 36, 
132; new codification of, 20 

services sector, 149, 210-20; decline in, 
155-56; employment in, 162; growth 
of, 153, 154-55; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 159 



Seyh Sait rebellion (1925), 117 
shantytowns, 126-27, 162, 210; Kurds in, 
98 

SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters 

Allied Powers Europe 
sharia. Seeseriat 
Shell Oil, 198, 199, 201 
ShiatAli, 110 

SHP. See Social Democratic Populist 
Party 

SIS. See State Institute of Statistics 
Six Arrows, xxvi, 4, 37, 38-38, 116, 252, 
312 

smuggling, 362 
Smyrna (Izmir) , 26 
Sobieskijan, 22 

Social Democratic Party (Sosyal 
Demokrat Parti— Sodep), 234, 265; 
organization of, 256 

Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkci Parti — SHP) , xxxiv, 
xxxviii, 234, 265-66; in elections of 
1983, 63; in elections of 1986, 63, 64; 
in elections of 1987, 258; in elections 
of 1989, 259; in elections of 1991, 66- 
67, 242; support for, 264 

Social Insurance Institution, 144 

Social Insurance Institution for the Self- 
Employed, 144 

social reform: under Atatiirk, xxv; under 
military rule, xxvii 

social structure, 123-32 

Sodep. See Social Democratic Party 

Soil Products Office, 187; state control 
of, 171 

Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti. See Social 
Democratic Populist Party 

Sosyal Demokrat Parti. See Social Demo- 
cratic Party 

South Antalya Project, 220 

Southeast Anatolia Project (Giineydogu 
Anadolu Projesi— GAP) , 68, 181-82, 
203, 316; construction in, 209 

Soviet Union (see also Russia): collapse 
of, xxxv, 66, 236, 285, 286-90, 305, 
314; immigrants from, 89; imports 
from, 202, 203; invasion of Afghani- 
stan by, 286; relations with, 39; as secu- 
rity threat, 286, 312, 314; trade with, 
223; treaties of, with Turkey, 34 

Spain: Ottoman war with, 21 

Stalin, Josef V., 348 



449 



Turkey: A Country Study 



state enterprises, 149, 150, 169-72; bud- 
get for, 157, 174; investment in, 38; in 
manufacturing, 150, 205-7; in mining, 
204—5; privatization of, xxxix, 158, 
168-69, 170, 171, 179, 197, 201; trans- 
portation, 171, 214 

State Highway Administration, 174 

State Institute of Statistics (SIS), 86, 159 

State Investment Bank, 1 69 

State Planning Organization, 172, 174; 
established, 43 

State Security Court, 250, 275, 368-69 

State Security Court of Appeals, 369 

State Supervisory Council, 245 

steel, 206-7 

stock market, 213-14 

strikes, 275; banned, 61 , 276; in 1979, 52; 
in 1995, xxxix; restrictions on, 166, 
373 

structural adjustment program, xxxix 
student demonstrations, 42; repression 
of, 274 

students: arrested, 354; political activities 

by, 142, 274, 372-73 
Sublime Porte. SeeBab-i Ali 
subsidies: for agriculture, 178, 179-80; 

for exports, xxx; reduction in, 68, 154; 

for state enterprises, 170 
suffrage. See voting 

Sufi brotherhoods, xxvi, 110-15, 130; 
banned, xxvi, 74, 105, 117; Bektasi, 
111, 114, 115; etymology of, 111; 
Isikcilar, 118; Kadiri, 114, 118; Kurds 
in, 100; Mevlevi, 74, 105, 114, 118; 
Naksibendi, 114, 118; Nurcular, 118; 
organization of, 114; and politics, 118; 
revival of, 118; role of, xxvi; Safavi, 
110-11; Siileymanci, 118; Ticani, 118 

Siileyman I (the Magnificent), 20-22 

sultan, 19-20; abolished, 35, 116; 
deposed, 26 

Sumerbank, 206 

Sunalp, Turgut, 62, 256 

Sunay, Cevdet, 44; as president, 45, 49 

Sun-Language Theory, 94 

sunna, 109 

Supreme Board of Supervision, 253 
Supreme Council of Judges and Public 

Prosecutors: appointment to, 245; 

head of, 248; duties of, 248, 249, 250 
Supreme Electoral Council, 241 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 



Europe (SHAPE): representative to, 
323 

Supreme Military Administrative Court, 

250; appointment to, 245 
Supreme Military Council, 323 
Supreme Planning Council. See High 

Planning Council 
Sweden: Turkish immigrants in, 90 
Switzerland: Turkish immigrants in, 90 
Syria: border problems with, 76-77, 316; 
borders with, 76, 290; Egypt's invasion 
of, 23; French occupation of, 33; Kur- 
dish bases in, 306, 316, 355; under 
Ottoman Empire, 21; relations with, 
282, 292, 293-94, 306, 316; as security 
threat, 314 
Syrian Catholic Church, 120, 122 
Syrian Orthodox Church, 120, 122 

Tajikistan: relations with, 288 
Talat Pasha, Mehmet, 28; exile of, 31 
Tamerlane. SeeTimur 
tarikatlar. See religious associations 
Tartar language, 97 
Taurus Mountains, 78, 82-83, 84 
taxes: on farmers, 175; increase in, 158; 
as percentage of gross national prod- 
uct, 174; reform of, 154, 175; revenues 
from, 174 
TCDD. See Republic State Railways 
TCP. See Turkish Communist Party 
TCZB. See Agricultural Bank of Turkey 
TEK. See Turkish Electricity Authority 
TEKEL. See General Management for 
Trade in Tobacco, Tobacco Products, 
and Alcoholic Spirits 
telecommunications, 218; improvements 

in, 68, 218; privatization of, 171 
telephones, 218; installation of, xxxi 
television, 218, 283, 284-85; Islamic, 119 
terrorism, xxviii, 5, 49, 354; Armenian, 
358-59; casualties from, xxviii; govern- 
ment crackdown on, 61; by Gray 
Wolves, 59; by Kurds, xxxi, xxxv, 219, 
354; leftist, 357-58; punishment for, 
368 

textiles, 206; as percentage of gross 

national product, 222 
Third Republic (1983-), 5, 61 
Thrace, 318, 319; annexed by Ottomans, 

1 7; civilization of, 3; in First Balkan 



450 



Index 



War, 28; natural gas production in, 
202; under Ottoman rule, 25; popula- 
tion in, 75; population density in, 87; 
size of, 75 

THY. See Turkish Airlines 

Tigris River, 84 

Timur (Tamerlane) , 1 7 

TISK. See Turkish Confederation of 
Employers' Unions 

Titidates III, 14 

TOB. Turkish Trade Association 

tobacco, 81, 83, 180, 189 

Tofas automobile manufacturer, 209 

topography. See geology 

torture, 257, 362, 371, 372, 374 

tourism, 151, 219-20; income from, 155, 
219, 225; increase in, 159; in Mediter- 
ranean region, 82 

tourists, 219; origins of, 219, 226; spend- 
ing by, 220 

towns, 128 

Toyota, 209 

trade (see also exports; imports), 159, 
220-23; balance, 178, 220; with Cen- 
tral Asia, 152; as conduit for, 227; defi- 
cit, 150, 154, 157, 168, 224; with Egypt, 
294-95, 353; with Europe, 226, 227; 
with European Community, 227-28; 
with former Soviet Union, 223; with 
France, 21; with Germany, 222; with 
Iran, 156, 222, 292; with Iraq, 156, 
222-23, 227; with Israel, 294-95; with 
Middle East, 222, 226; with Organisa- 
tion for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 222; as percentage of 
gross national product, 220, 222; with 
Soviet Union, 223; with the United 
States, 223 

traditionalism: versus modernism, 74 

transportation, 151, 214-18; of freight, 
215-17; increase in, 159; railroads, 26, 
167, 171, 214; shipping, 217; under 
Ottoman Empire, 21 

Transylvania: ceded to Austria, 22; under 
Ottoman rule, 21 

Treaty of Angora (Ankara) (1926), 76- 
77 

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), 31, 32 
Treaty of Hiinkar Iskelesi (1833) , 23-25 
Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), 22 
Treaty of Kars (1921), 76 
Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynarja (1774), 23 



Treaty of Lausanne (1923), 35-36, 55, 
76, 89, 103, 167-68, 308, 319 

Treaty of Moscow (1921), 76 

Treaty of Paris (1856), 25 

Treaty of San Stefano (1877), 25 

Treaty of Sevres (1920), 32-33 

Tripoli: conquest of, 21 

Troy: archaeological research at, 6 

TRT. See Turkish Radio-Television Cor- 
poration 

True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi — 
DYP), xxxiii-xxxiv, xxxviii, 67, 235, 
258, 261, 263-65; in elections of 1983, 
63; in elections of 1984, 257; in elec- 
tions of 1986, 63, 64; in elections of 
1987, 5, 258, 264; in elections of 1989, 
64, 259; in elections of 1991, 66, 242; 
in elections of 1994, 261-62; foreign 
relations under, 287; organization of, 
256; platform of, 279 

Truman, Harry S, 47 

Truman Doctrine, 47-48, 298, 348 

Tugrul Bey, 13 

Tu-Kiie kingdom, 13 

Tunceli: population density in, 87 

Tunis: conquest of, 21 

Tunisia: seized by France, 25 

TUPRAS. See Turkish Petroleum Refiner- 
ies Corporation 

Turk, Ahmet, 265 

Turk Dil Kurumu. See Turkish Language 
Society 

Tiirkes, Alparslan, xxviii, 46, 59, 270; 

arrested, 61 
Turkey: etymology of, 3; partition of, 32- 

33 

Turkey, Republic of: established, xxv, 3, 
4, 36, 308 

Turk Hava Yollan. See Turkish Airlines 
Turk-Is. See Confederation of Turkish 

Trade Unions 
Turkish Airlines (Turk Hava Yollan — 

THY), 217-18; privatization of, 172; 

state control of, 171 
Turkish Cement Corporation, 208 
Turkish Coal Company, 202 
Turkish Communist Party (TCP), xxviii, 

357 

Turkish Confederation of Employers' 
Unions (Tiirkiye Isveren Sendikalan 
Konfederasyonu— TISK), 276-77 

Turkish Defense Fund, 353 



451 



Turkey: A Country Study 



Turkish Electricity Authority (Tiirkiye 
Elektrik Kurumu — TEK) , 203; 
Nuclear Power Plants Division, 204 

Turkish Family Health and Planning 
Foundation, 91-92 

Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's 
Association (Turk Sanayicileri ve Is 
Adamlan Dernegi— TUSIAD) , 277 

Turkish Land Forces. See armed forces; 
army 

Turkish language {see also Ottoman 
Turkish) , xxx; under constitution of 
1982, 73; introduction of, 3; reform 
of, 73-74, 92; spelling of, 92, 93, 94; 
spoken by Kurds, 101; as vernacular, 
27 

Turkish Language Society (Turk Dil 

Kurumu) , 94 
Turkish Lignite Company, 202 
Turkish people. See Turks 
Turkish Petroleum Corporation, 199; 

exploration by, 199-201; state control 

of, 171 

Turkish Petroleum International Corpo- 
ration, 201 

Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corpora- 
tion (Tiirkiye Petrol Refinerileri As — 
TUPRAS): privatization of, 172 

Turkish Radio-Television Corporation 
(Tiirkiye Radyo-Televizyon Kurumu — 
TRT), 218, 284-85 

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
54, 66, 297 

Turkish Trade Association (Tiirkiye 
Odalar Birligi — TOB) , 276 

Turkish United Communist Party, 357 

Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Libera- 
tion Army, 358 

Turkish Workers' Party (TWP), 46, 357; 
platform of, 46 

Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Demiryol- 
lari Isletmesi Genel Miidurulu. See 
Republic State Railways 

Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi. See 
Agricultural Bank of Turkey 

Tiirkiye Devrimci Isci Sendikalan Kon- 
federasyonu. See Confederation of 
Revolutionary Trade Unions of Tur- 
key 

Tiirkiye Elektrik Kurumu. See Turkish 

Electricity Authority 
Tiirkiye Emlak Bankasi As. See Real 



Estate Bank 
Tiirkiye Hak Isci Sendikalan Konfederas- 

yonu. See Confederation of Turkish 

Just Workers' Union 
Tiirkiye Ihracat Kredi Bankasi. See 

Export Credit Bank of Turkey 
Tiirkiye Isci Sendikalan Konfederas- 

yonu. See Confederation of Turkish 

Trade Unions 
Tiirkiye Isveren Sendikalan Konfederas- 

yonu. See Turkish Confederation of 

Employers' Unions 
Tiirkiye Milliyetci Isci Sendikalan Kon- 

federasyonu. See Confederation of 

Turkish Nationalist Workers' Unions 
Tiirkiye Odalar Birligi. See Turkish Trade 

Association 
Tiirkiye Petrol Refinerileri As. ^Turk- 
ish Petroleum Refineries Corporation 
Tiirkiye Radyo-Televizyon Kurumu. See 

Turkish Radio-Television Corporation 
Turkomans, 97-98 

Turkmenistan: relations with, xxxv, 288 
Turks, 96-98; ancestors of, 13; conver- 
sion of, to Islam, xxvi, 110; definition 
of, xxx, 73, 96; ethnic background of, 
4, 96-97; opinion of, in Ottoman 
Empire, 92; origins of, xxvi, 3, 11-15; 
religion of, 73, 109, 115 
Turks, Seljuk, 13-14; Islam introduced 
by, 3, 13 

Turk Sanayicileri ve Is Adamlan Der- 
negi. See Turkish Industrialists' and 
Businessmen's Association 

Turk Ucak Sanayi Sirketi. SeeTUSAS 
Aerospace Industries 

TUSAS (Turk Ucak Sanayi Sirketi) Aero- 
space Industries, 352 

TUSIAD. See Turkish Industrialists' and 
Businessmen's Association 

Tutunbank, 213 

Tutiin Mamulleri, Tuz ve Alkol Isletme- 
leri Genel Mudurliigu. See General 
Management for Trade in Tobacco, 
Tobacco Products, and Alcoholic Spir- 
its 

Tuz Golu, 83 

TWP. See Turkish Workers' Party 

Ukraine: economic ties with, 229, 287; 
military relations with, 343 



452 



Index 



Ulusu, Bulent: as prime minister, 60-61 
Umayyad dynasty, 109 
underemployment, 159, 162 
unemployment, 127, 142, 150, 161; in 

1970s, xxviii, 5, 56-58, 154; in 1980s, 

xxx; in 1990s, 142, 156, 159, 169, 279; 

in rural areas, 162; in urban areas, 

159-61, 162 
Unionist Party, 1 24 
Union of Chambers of Industry, 276 
United Arab Emirates: financial aid 

from, 325, 353 
United Nations, 40, 372; embargo on 

Iraq, 149, 151, 152, 156-57, 192, 315, 

325; peacekeeping forces, 305, 317, 

337 

United States: aid from, 325, 326, 353; 
arms embargo by, 56, 300, 349-50; 
defense and economic cooperation 
agreement with, 349; exports to, 176, 
206, 353; joint ventures with, 306; 
materiel from, 341, 343, 344, 365; mili- 
tary assistance from, 56; military coop- 
eration with, 306, 348-51; military 
installations of, 300-301, 306, 348-49, 
350; military personnel from, 349; mil- 
itary training by, 351; relations with, 
47, 235, 298-301; trade with, 223 

Unity and Peace party (Birlik ve Baris), 
269 

universities, 140-41, 274; admission to, 
142; demonstrations in, 272-74; politi- 
cal interests of, 272-74, 311; purged, 
xx ix 

urban areas: class structure in, 125-26; 
growth of, 126; income in, 177; popu- 
lation in, 88, 125, 126; unemployment 
in, 159-61, 162 

urbanization, 88, 97, 125, 174, 271 

urban life, 125-27 

urban migration, 88, 97, 150, 161, 177; 

in 1970s, xxviii 
Uzbekistan: relations with, xxxv, 288 



wages: adjustments of, 166; decline in, 

158; freeze on, 68 
Wallachia: under Ottoman Empire, 21 
War of Independence (1919-22), xxv, 

34-36, 312, 339; economy under, 152 
welfare, 144-45; expansion of, 159 
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi— RP; also 
seen as Prosperity Party), xxxi-xxxii, 
64, 235, 257, 267-69, 359; activism of, 
279; and economic reform, xxxiii; in 
elections of 1983, 63; in elections of 
1987, 258, 267; in elections of 1991, 
67; in elections of 1994, 261-62; plat- 
form of, xxxii, xxxiii, 261, 268, 269 
Western influence (see also moderniza- 
tion), 4 

West Germany. See Germany, Federal 
Republic of 

WHO. See World Health Organization 

Wilson, Woodrow, 32 

women: in armed forces, 330; under 
Ataturk, 36; dress of, 120, 137-38; edu- 
cation of, 139, 161; employment of, 
138-39, 161; life expectancy of, 87; 
marriage of, 136-37, 138; relations of, 
with men, 137; roles of, 136, 137; suf- 
frage for, 138; status of, 136, 138-39 

workers: under constitution of 1982, 
238-39; migration of, 163; pay 
increases for, 165; restrictions on, 
166-67; skilled, 163 

workforce, 159-67; in manufacturing, 
161, 206; in state enterprises, 169 

working class, 139 

World Bank: aid from, 143 

World Health Organization (WHO), 144 

World War I, 28-31, 339; economy 
under, 152; Germany in, xxv; Ottoman 
Empire in, xxv, 308 

World War II, 40, 153 



Xenophon, 9, 98 



Venice, 22 

Vienna: sieges of, 21, 22, 307 

villages, 128-32; electrification of, 203; 
government of, 251, 252; headman 
(muhtar) in, 131, 252; relocation of, 
132, 234-35,281,356 

volcanoes, 77 



Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi, 213 

Yasar Holding Corporation, 213 

Yassiada trials, 43, 44 

Yazar, Feridun, 281 

Yem Sanayili. See Fodder Industry 

Yiddish, 105 

Yilmaz, Mesut, 266, 267; opposition to, 



453 



Turkey: A Country Study 



267 

YOK. See Council of Higher Education 
Young Ottoman movement, 26 
Young Turks, 27-28, 308 
Yugoslavia: in Balkan Pact, 39; collapse 

of, xxxv, 289; immigrants from, 89 
Yuksek Ogretim Kurumu. See Council of 



Higher Education 
Yuriik Turks, 97 



Zayna, Leyla, xxxvii, 281 

Ziraat Bank: state control of, 1 71 



454 



Contributors 



Steven A. Glazer is Lecturer in the Department of History at 
George Mason University; he previously served as book 
review editor of the Middle East Journal 

Eric Hooglund is the Editor of Critique: Journal for Critical Studies 
of the Middle East. He has taught courses on the Middle 
East at several universities and formerly was editor of the 
Middle East Journal 

Helen Chapin Metz is Supervisor, Middle East/ Africa/Latin 
America Unit, Federal Research Division, Library of Con- 
gress. 

Fareed Mohamedi is Senior Economist, Petroleum Finance 
Company, and author of articles on the Middle East and 
international oil affairs. 

Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has 
written extensively on the Middle East and Africa for the 
Country Studies series. 



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